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This thesis examines British policy towards the USSR from the Labour party's
general election victory in October 1964 to the aftermath of the 'Prague Spring'
and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (August 1968). It argues that the Prime
Minister, Harold Wilson, emulated his predecessors in seeking improved relations
with the Soviet Union, while preserving alliance ties with the USA and NATO. In
addition, Foreign Office officials examining the fttture of East-West relations
concluded that in the long-term the Eastern bloc states would undergo a process
of internal 'evolution', developing less doctrinaire and more liberal domestic
policies.
This thesis concludes that British efforts to develop East-West détente in
the late 1960s, like those of France and West Germany, suffered because of the
effect of the Vietnam war on superpower relations, the Sino-Soviet split, internal
problems within NATO and the pressures for internal reform in Eastern Europe,
which culminated in the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. The suppression of the pro-
reform Czechoslovak government also showed that the Foreign Office's concept of
'evolution' did not take into account the hard-line conservatism of the Soviet
regime and its East European clients. Despite Wilson's interest in Anglo-Soviet
relations, particularly regarding East-West commerce, and a state visit by the Soviet
Premier, Aiexei Kosygin, in February 1967, bilateral relations were generally poor.
Furthermore, in spite of the Prime Minister's belief that the UK could act as a
'go-between' facilitating contact between the superpowers, the British were
excluded from US-Soviet arms control talks. British officials were dissatisfied by
the manner in which Moscow had responded to London's efforts to improve
bilateral relations, and by 1968 the majority of Foreign Office officials believed
that the USSR had exploited Britain's eagerness for détente. Although the Warsaw
Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia did not arouse any fears of a more aggressive
Soviet foreign policy, it did little to alter the prevailing view in Whitehall that the
main impediment to détente was the USSR's intransigence. This assessment set the
tone for British policy towards East-West relations throughout the following
decade.
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INTRODUCTION.
Until two decades ago, studies of the Cold War tended to focus almost exclusively
on the bipolar power struggle between the two superpowers, overlooking the roles
of smaller states. Since 1991, our knowledge and understanding of the perspectives
and policies of not only the USSR, but China and other Communist powers has
been significantly enhanced, and this thesis includes the findings of recent studies
on Soviet, Chinese and Eastern bloc archives.' While this research has helped
historians to comprehend how East-West crises and developments were perceived
on 'the other side of the hill', there are still significant gaps in Cold War
histonography as far as the 'Western' powers are concerned, one example being
British policy towards East-West relations from the mid-1960s onwards.
Studies of Britain's post-war foreign policy tended to focus on the UK's
decline from great power status and on Anglo-American relations, 2 but in the past
two decades historians have written extensively on British policy towards the Cold
War from the collapse of the wartime 'Grand Alliance' to the Cuban Missile
Crisis. 3 However, due principally to the 'Thirty Year Rule' governing the
'These include the research bulletins and papors produced since 1992 by scholars associated with the Cold
War International Histoiy Project (CWIIIP - http://cwihp.si.edu), not to mention the research conducted by the
National Security Archive in George Washington University, Washington DC (http:llwww.gw.eduf-nsarchiv),
and the Parallel Histoiy Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (httpi/w.w,'.isn.ethz.ch/phpf).
2 See 'Britain and the Cold War. The forgotten war' in The Economist, l3.l1.99,pA6.
3 See, for instance, ML Kitchen, British policy trnwirds the Soviet Union during the Second World War, (London;
Macmillan 1998). ML Folly, Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union 1940-45, (Macmillan 2000). A. Bullock,
Ernest Bevin. Foreign Secretaiy 1945-1951, (Oxford University Press 1985). it J. Aldrich, The Hiddan Hand.
Britain, Ameriai and Cold War Secret Intelligence, (London; John Muimy 2001). J. Young, Winston Churchill's
Last Campaign, (Oxford; Clarendon Press 1996). S. Dockrill, Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament,
declassification of government documents, there is little if any material covering
Britain's approach to East-West relations after 1964. It is only since 1995 that
archival material from Harold Wilson's first term as Prime Minister (1964-1970)
has been made available to researchers. As a consequence, historians are aware of
Charles de Gaulle's emphasis on improved Franco-Soviet relations, and the
development of West Germany's policy of Osipolitik during the late 1960s-early
1970s, but British policy towards détente has generally been overlooked. 5
 The
publication of three volumes of edited documents by the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) covering the UK's relations with the USSR and
Eastern bloc states from 1968 to 1976 goes some way towards addressing this
gap. Hopeflully the FCO will follow suit with more volumes covering the
deterioration of superpower détente, the 'second Cold War' in the early 1980s and
the UK's response to perestroika and the disintegration of Communism in Eastern
Europe and the US SR.6
Previous studies of the Wilson government tended to indict, rather than
analyse, Labour's record in office. Wilson himself has been regarded as a
'Yorkshire Walter Mitty', and has been depicted as a shallow opportunist with a
1951-1 955, (Cambiidge University Press 1991). J. Gearson, Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall Crisis,
çMacmillan 1998). L. V. Scott,Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Macmillan 1999).
This shortage of material is shown by the sketchy coverage of post-1964 developments given in S.
Greenwood's Britain and the Cold War 1945-1991, (Macmillan 2000).
5 See, for example, R. Crockatt, The Ffy Years War. The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics,
1941-1991, (London; Routledge 2000), pp.209-210; J. Dunbabin, The Cold War: The Great Powers and their
Allies, (London; Longinan 1994), pp.27O-279; & R Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, (Washington; Brookings
1994, 2'' edition), pp.123-145.
on British Policy Overseas. Series 3. Volume I. Britain and the Soviet Union 1968-1972; &
Volume IL The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, (London; HMSO 1997). Volume 1ff. Détente
in Europe, (London; Frank Cam 2001).
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penchant for deceit and self-delusion. 7
 Recent studies have sought to be more
dispassionate and even-minded in their treatment of Wilson's policies, but it should
be noted that Ben Pimlott and Chris Wrigley examine his government's foreign
policy almost exclusively in terms of the 'special relationship' between a declining
Britain and its superpower ally. Vietnam, for example, is discussed purely in the
context of Anglo-American relations. The impact of East-West relations on British
foreign policy from 1964 to 1970 has been ignored, even though the Cold War
underpinned the development of international politics during this period. The
objective of this thesis is to analyse the impact of both Anglo-Soviet relations and
developments in East-West relations on the Wilson government's foreign and
defence policies. Although unlike its predecessors, the Labour government was not
faced with a Cold War crisis as severe as previous crises, for example over Berlin
and Cuba, bilateral relations between London and Moscow were affected by the
intensification of Sino-Soviet rivalry, the Vietnam war, the development of US-
Soviet contacts on arms control, the discord between the USA and its European
allies (especially France) and the pressures for internal reform in Eastern Europe
which culminated in the 'Prague Spring' of 1968.
7 See P. Foot, The Politics of Harold Lwn, (London; Penguin 1968); & A. Roth, Harold Wilson. Yoi'*shire
Walter Mitty, (London; Macdonald & Jane's 1977), which goes no further than 1964. Like Foot, A. Morgan's
Harold Wilson (London; Pluto Press 1992) criticises the Wilson government from a left-ng standpoint, thi1e
C. Ponting's, Breach of Promise. Labour in Power 1964-1970, (London; Hamish Hamilton 1989) reflects its title
by offering a blunt indictment of Labour's record in power.
S See, for example, C. Wrigley, 'Now you see it, now you don't: Harold Wilson and Labour's Foreign Policy
1964-1970', in R. Coopey, S. Fielding & N. Tiratsoo (ed.), The Wilson Governments 1964-1970, (London; Pinter
Press 1993), & Ponting, Breach of Promise. The same criticism applies to P. Ziegler, Wilson, (London;
Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1993), & the most comprehensive of recent biographies on Wilson, B. Pinilott's
Harold Wilson, (London; HarperCollins 1993).
I
As noted above, it was during the late 1960s that the policy of détente -
of seeking to reduce tensions between the superpowers and their respective allies -
began to bear fruit after two decades of ideological hostility and periodic war
scares. The word détente was used in diplomatic parlance to define the relaxation
of tensions and diminished animosity between states, and as Raymond Garthoff
notes, détente is different from entente, which involves a positive improvement of
inter-state relations. 9 Détente was first used in the context of the Cold War after
Joseph Stalin's death in 1953, and a decade later the phrase appeared frequently in
both British government documents and MPs speeches in Parliament. From 1964
onwards, France sought to improve its relations with the USSR and the East
European states, while at the same time West Germany pursued its own policy
(known as Ostpolitik) of reconciliation with the Eastern bloc states. De Gaulle's
policy of détente was noteworthy because the French President's more proactive
approach to East-West relations differed from that of his predecessors, while
Ostpolitik was significant because West Gennany's relations with Eastern bloc
states had hitherto been characterised by uncompromising hostility and mutual
non-recognition. Yet Wilson was not the first British Prime Minister to declare his
interest in improving East-West relations. Before analysing the Wilson
government's approach towards détente, it is necessary to analyse the policies of
its predecessors from 1945 onwards.
In one of the few studies to analyse British policy towards East-West
relations, Brian White argues that the promotion of détente was 'a recurring theme
Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p.28.
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in post-war British foreign policy', and that while co-operating with the USA and
other Western allies to 'contain' the perceived Communist threat, British policy-
makers also sought a less adversarial relationship with the USSR and other
Communist states. According to White, Britain showed its traditional preference for
diplomatic mediation as a means of addressing international disputes, and by a
long-term interest in preserving the status quo. He also comments on the tendency
of British policy-makers to maintain diplomatic and commercial contacts with
other states, regardless of their ideological character. British interest in détente also
derived from a genuine awareness in London that if Cold War rivalries
deteriorated into a 'hot war', the consequences would be devastating, a concern
which grew more pronounced following the development of thermonuclear
weapons and the intensification of the superpower arms race in the 1 950s.'° Of
Britain's post-war Prime Ministers, both Winston Churchill and Harold Macmillan
were particularly vocal advocates of a relaxation of East-West tensions. One of the
aims of this thesis is to assess to what extent the Wilson government's policy
towards the USSR reflected the policies of its predecessors.
Throughout his political career, Wilson showed a consistent interest in
Anglo-Soviet relations, in particular bilateral trading relations, which began when he
was a junior Minister in the Board of Trade in 1947. During his first term as
Prime Minister, Wilson paid three visits to Moscow, and at the time of the June
1970 election he was planning to undertake a fourth. By contrast, of his
predecessors, Macmillan made but one trip to the USSR in 1959. In this respect,
'°B. White, Bntain, Détente and Changing East-West Relatkms, (Routledge 1992), pp.1-7, pp.36-49.
Wilson's contacts with the Soviet leadership are as worthy of study as his
dealings with Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon, and another objective behind
this thesis is to examine the extent of his involvement in Britain's dealings with
the USSR and its Eastern bloc allies during his premiership.
This study examines the Wilson government's approach towards East-West
relations, and the development of Britain's foreign and defence policies from 1964
to 1968. The key issues here concern how the Labour government responded to
developments within the Communist world - in particular the Sino-Soviet split and
the emergence of 'polycentrism' within Eastern Europe - and to the first efforts
by the West European states to improve relations with the Eastern bloc. Britain's
attempt to seek a less adversarial relationship with the Soviet bloc states were
inevitably affected by the course of superpower rivalry and general trends in East-
West relations. It is for this reason, as well as the importance of the UK' s alliance
ties with the USA, that this thesis refers to contemporary American attitudes
towards the Cold War. Despite Lyndon Johnson's declared intention to 'build
bridges' between the USA and the Eastern bloc states, American military
intervention in Indochina delayed superpower détente, and the Vietnam war also
had an adverse impact on Anglo-Soviet relations. It should also be noted that
since the late 1940s the USSR was considered by British politicians and officials
to be a strategic threat, and this study will also discuss what impact the growth of
Soviet military power during the 1960s and the invasion of Czechoslovakia
(August 1968) had on Britain's defence policy.
6
The principal sources for this thesis are the declassified government papers,
available at the Public Record Office in Kew, in addition to the published
memoirs of leading politicians and officials, secondary source monographs and
articles, private papers, oral history interviews and contemporary newspaper reports.
Due to the nature of the Anglo-American 'special relationship', and its significance
for British external policies, this study also relies on declassified US government
material available in archives on both sides of the Atlantic. During the drafting of
this thesis, after considerable thought I decided that the chapter structure should be
a combination of the chronological and thematic approaches. A purely thematic
structure was unfeasible, because of the interrelationship between the issues
analysed. For example, British policy towards Vietnam cannot be discussed without
reference to the UK's defence policy 'East of Suez' or Sino-Soviet relations, while
London's perceptions of internal developments in the Communist world were
interlinked with British policy towards East-West trade. For the sake of coherence,
the thesis structure is broadly chronological, although at certain times particular
issues acquired greater prominence. For example, Chapter Four focuses on the rift
between France and NATO in 1966 and its implications for European security,
while Chapters Eight and Nine concentrate on the impact of the Czechoslovak
crisis of 1968 on British policy-making.
The following limitations should be noted. Although the author makes use
of recent research into the policies of the Soviet, Chinese and East European
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Communist regimes, this thesis is not strictly speaking a study of Anglo-Soviet
relations, as the emphasis is on British, rather than Soviet, foreign and defence
policies. In addition, despite the Thirty Year Rule (for which historians have the
Wilson government to thank), a considerable amount of documentary material
relating to intelligence matters and nuclear policy remains classified." For example,
researchers can read Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) papers dated before 1969,
as well as the sanitised files of the Cabinet Nuclear Policy Committee (PN)
established by Wilson. Yet certain areas, such as the material intercepted and
decrypted by GCHQ (the British signals intelligence service), remains inaccessible.
This is a significant limitation not only on this thesis, but for any study of British
post-war external policy, given the essential importance of espionage and nuclear
matters not only regarding the Cold War but also the co-operation between the
USA and the UK in the fields of defence and intelligence-gathering.'2
It should be noted that this is a study of official, rather than popular,
attitudes and opinions, although at certain points I refer to public and media
perceptions of the USSR. The imprisonment of Gerald Brooke and the Soviet
regime's treatment of dissidents was heavily criticised by the British press, but on
the other hand the Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin, received a warm welcome from
the public when he visited the UK in February 1967. By 1968, Foreign Office
officials were concerned that popular opinion overlooked both the unsavoury
"On the Thizty Year Rule, see Richard Crossinan, Diaries of a Cabinet Minister. Volume I. Minister of
Housing (Crossman, I), (London Hainish Hamilton 1975), 5.8.65, pp.3O3-3O4.
' m R. J. Aldrich, 'British Intelligence and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' during the Cold War', in
Renew of International Studies, 24/3 (1998), p.334.
aspects of the Soviet system and Moscow's objective of 'driving wedges' between
the Western powers, and civil servants concluded that the British public needed to
be reminded of the fact that the USSR was still a powerful potential foe.
The thesis is subdivided into nine chapters, the first of which analyses
Britain's approach to East-West relations from the conclusion of the Second
World War to the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. The main question this
chapter will address is whether it is correct to argue that successive British
governments followed a consistent policy towards the Communist powers during
this period. The second chapter analyses British perceptions in 1964 of
developments within the Communist world, with particular reference to the
perceived Soviet 'threat', internal developments in the USSR and Eastern Europe,
and the implications of the Sino-Soviet split. This chapter also analyses the
development of Wilson's interest in relations with the Eastern bloc prior to the
Labour general election victory of October 1964. The third chapter concentrates on
the period from Labour's return to office to February 1966, when Wilson paid his
first visit to the USSR as Prime Minister. Labour returned to office at the same
time as the overthrow of Nikita Khrushchev, and Wilson's efforts to develop ties
with the new Soviet leadership were hampered both by East-West disputes over
nuclear non-proliferation and by the escalation of the Vietnam war.
The fourth chapter focuses on British policy towards European security
following de Gaulle's announcement that France would withdraw from NATO's
9
military command structure (March 1966). Chapter Five analyses developments in
Anglo-Soviet relations from the Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin's visit to London
(February 1967) to the condition of bilateral relations prior to Wilson's third trip
to Moscow (January 1968). The sixth chapter focuses upon Britain's policy
towards East-West trade in 1967 and 1968. The seventh chapter examines the
expansion of Soviet military and maritime power during the late I 960s, as well as
Moscow's increased involvement in the Third World, and will assess what impact
if any the USSR's emergence as a world power had on British defence policy.
Chapter Eight analyses British (and Western) reactions to the 'Prague
Spring', and the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia, and Chapter Nine will
discuss the impact of the Czechoslovak crisis on Anglo-Soviet relations and on
British perceptions of the USSR's policies. The conclusion will briefly summarise
the course of bilateral relations in the years which followed, and will seek to
answer the principal questions this thesis seeks to address; whether there was any
continuity between the Labour government's policies towards East-West relations
and those of its predecessors; what achievements, if any, the Wilson government
made in pursuing détente; the extent to which Wilson himself was committed to
improving Anglo-Soviet relations; and the significance of British policy at a time
when the major Western powers were seeking to improve their relations with the
Eastern bloc.
10
CHAPTER 1: BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND EAST-WEST
RELATIONS, 1945-1964.
The first twenty years of the Cold War were marked by a series of crises over
Berlin (1948-1949 and 1958-1961), Korea (1950-1953), Indochina (1954) and Cuba
(1962). The aim of this chapter is not so much to describe these clashes of
interest between East and West, but to discuss how successive British governments
responded to developments in both the Cold War and within the so-called
Communist 'bloc' between 1945 and 1964.1 One of the principal questions London
sought to address concerned the feasibility of efforts to alleviate East-West
tensions and to improve relations with the USSR and other Communist powers.
This issue was related to the maintenance of the UK's alliance ties with other
Western powers, the most important being those established with the USA.
It is due to the importance of Anglo-American relations for British
interests, and the fact that British and West European security ultimately rested on
US military and economic power, that it is necessary to compare and contrast the
British approach to East-West relations to that of the Americans. Washington and
London often disagreed over assessments of the perceived Soviet threat, and of
developments in the Communist bloc. This chapter will therefore refer to American
1 As far as official terminology s concerned, from 1965 onwards the Foreign Office used the phrase 'Soviet
bloc' (or 'Eastern bloc') to refer to the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies. The latter (in addition to
Yugoslavia and Albania) were refed to simply as 'East European countries'. Northern Department note,
11.6.65, Ni 981/1; & note by E. Youde (Northern Department - ND), 16.6.65, N1981/2, F0371/182529, Public
Record Office (PRO). I have used these three phrases in a similar sense, and I also use the phrases
'Communist bloc', 'Communist powers' or 'Communist world' to describe the USSR and other Communist
states such as China, particularly when discussing East-West relations before the Sino-Soviet split.
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perceptions of East-West relations and, where relevant, to the role in the Cold War
of two other Western European powers, France and the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG), because at certain stages in this period the Western powers were
at odds over how to manage their relations with Communist powers. The principal
controversy, which repeatedly emerged in Anglo-American relations, concerned
whether it was feasible, or indeed necessary, to moderate East-West tensions by
negotiating with the USSR.
From World War to Cold War: 1945-1951.
The conclusion of the Second World War brought about a major revolution in
international relations. Before 1939 the USSR had played a peripheral role in
world politics, but six years later the Soviets dominated Eastern and Central
Europe.2 In stark contrast Britain, though one of the victorious allied powers,
emerged from the war economically exhausted and militarily over-stretched. A year
before the Allied victory over Nazi Germany, British officials debated the future
course of Anglo-Soviet relations. Before 1941, relations between London and
Moscow had been blighted by mutual suspicion and ideological hostility, and
during the war the Soviets had quarrelled with the Americans and British over
military strategy and the post-war settlement. During the last two years of the war,
the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff (COS) clashed over their respective
assessments of future Soviet policy. The COS pessimistically envisaged the need
2 çj	 British Policy, p.274. G. Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics, (Routledge 1999), pp.2-3.
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for an alliance with other 'Western' powers to withstand Soviet expansionism. In
contrast, Foreign Office officials - in particular those of the Northern Department
(which oversaw relations with the USSR and other East European states) -
concluded that Moscow's interests lay in internal reconstruction and the
containment of Germany, and that there was scope for Anglo-Soviet co-operation
once the war was won. Winston Churchill believed that he had established a
strong personal relationship with Stalin, although at certain points during the war
he showed considerable concern over future Soviet intentions. For example, during
the spring of 1945 the Prime Minister felt that the Western allies could soon find
themselves at war with the USSR. 3
 Following Labour's victory in the July 1945
election, there was a general belief within the party's ranks that Britain's new
social-democratic government could maintain friendly relations with the Soviets.
However, by early 1946 the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was publicly
complaining about Soviet hostility towards the UK. 4 In the months which followed
Nazi Germany's defeat, Anglo-Soviet relations deteriorated sharply.
This decline reflected the collapse of the wartime alliance, resulting from
fundamental disagreement over Germany's future and Anglo-American concerns
over Soviet intentions concerning the Eastern Mediterranean and Iran. In its
analyses of Soviet policy the JTC, which oversaw British intelligence gathering and
analysis, frankly admitted that while assessing the USSR's military capabilities was
Kitchen, British Policy, p.244, pp.260-261. Aldrich, Hidden Hand, pp.52-63. M. Folly's Churchill, Whitehall and
the Soviet Union, examines official British rtime perceptions of the USSR in detaiL
4 Denis Henley, The Time of My Lfe, (Penguin 1990), p.100. H. Thomas, Armed Truce, (Hamish Hamilton 1986),
p.2%.
comparatively easy, it had scant information on Soviet intentions because of the
secretive nature of the decision-making process in Moscow. This was a problem
which constantly affected Britain's assessments of the 'Soviet threat', and during
the late 1940s this factor led officials to assume the worst of the USSR's
motives. 5
 The British showed little concern with the imposition of Soviet client
regimes on the East European states - an attitude demonstrated by Churchill's
'percentages agreement' with Stalin over the Balkans (October 1944). However, the
USSR's expressed interest in expanding its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean
and Middle East was a different matter, as both regions were considered vital for
the defence of Britain's overseas empire. 6
 Recent Russian research suggests that
Stalin's diplomats - like their British opposite numbers - regarded continued
goodwill between the 'Big Three' as the best means of promoting Soviet security
interests. However, during the autumn and winter of 1945 the Soviet dictator's
inherent paranoia led him to reassess the USSR's foreign policy, and to mobilise
the Soviet economy and society for a resumption of rivalry with the capitalist
world. 7
 The debate between academics over 'who started the Cold War?' aside, it
should be noted that from London's perspective the USSR had changed from an
alliance partner to a potential enemy. The Foreign Office had initially adopted a
sanguine view of Soviet intentions in 1944, but the reaction of Northern
JIC(47)7/1(Final), Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities, 6.8.47, CAB1S8/1(PRO). P. Hennessy, The Secret
State, (Penguin 2002), p.3, pp.12-14.
6 A Bullock, Ernest Bevin. Foreign Secretaty, 1945-1951, (Oxford University Press (OUP) 1985), pp.124-137.
' V. Pechatnov, The Big Three After World War IL New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post War
Relations th the United States and Great Bntain, Cold War International Histoiy Project (CWIHP) Paper
No.13 (1995); & Pechatnov (trans. V. Zubok), "The Allies are pressing on you to break your will ... ".Foreign
Policy Correspondence between Stalin and Molotov and other Politburo Me,nber, September 1945-December
1946, CWIHP Paper No.26 (1999).
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Department officials to the three despatches sent by the chargé of the Moscow
Embassy, Frank Roberts, in March 1946 demonstrated how attitudes had changed.
Roberts argued that Soviet propaganda attacks were directed against Britain
because it remained the only other power of any significance in Europe and Asia,
but the UK's financial difficulties and diplomatic isolation presented opportunities
for Moscow to extend Communism. Soviet ideology stressed that tensions (or
'contradictions') between capitalist states (notably between the UK and USA)
would lead to the disintegration of capitalism and the triumph of world
Communism - Roberts' judgement that Stalin believed that capitalist states were
preordained to clash with each other have been confirmed by recent research.8
Roberts emphasised the fundamental difference between pre-war Anglo-Soviet
relations and the situation after 1945 by stating that all the other powers that had
hitherto counter-balanced the USSR had been levelled by World War Two,
although he qualified this assessment by commenting that the inefficiency and
backwardness of the Soviet system hampered the USSR's power-projection
capabilities. 9 Roberts' despatches had the same effect on London as George
Kennan's 'Long Telegram' (February 1946) had on Washington. One Northern
Department official expressed the widely held opinion that the Soviets were
'practising the most vicious power politics in the political, economic, and
propaganda spheres' against British interests, and that the USSR would 'stop at
V. Mastny, NATO in the Beholder's Eye. Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949-56, CWIIIP Paper No.35,
pp.36-37. V. Zubok & C. Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, (Cambiidge Ma; Harvard University Press
1997), pp.52-53, pp.73-74.
9 F. Roberts (Moscow) to E. Bevin, 14, 17, & 18.3.46, N4065/97/38, N4156/97/38, & N4157197138, F0371156763.
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nothing short of war' to achieve its objective of a Communist world. In retrospect
this rhetoric appears alarmist, but it should be noted that while British officials
were unaware until 1951 that the Foreign Office and intelligence services had
been penetrated by Donald Maclean, Kim Philby and other traitors, the extent of
Soviet espionage in the UK during the Second World War and its aftermath
provided some justification for official fears of Communist subversion.'0
In response to Roberts' recommendations, the Foreign Office established the
'Russia Committee' to analyse developments in Moscow's foreign policy. Its
functions were later taken over by the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department
(PUSD), founded by Bevin in 1949 to oversee liaison with the COS and
intelligence services. 11 Roberts' despatches had a clear influence on the Foreign
Secretary, who in April 1946 informed the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, that the
Soviets 'have decided upon an aggressive policy based upon militant Communism
and Russian chauvinism'. Bevin and his officials were aware that Britain could not
counter the Soviet 'threat' alone, but in the summer of 1945 Washington had
shown complete disinterest in retaining alliance ties with the UK. Bevin and
Foreign Office officials toyed with the concept of a 'third force' bloc -
incorporating the West European states and their African colonies - but concluded
that the impact of the war on potential 'third force' powers made this concept
unrealistic. About the same time that the Attlee government came to regard the
'°Jnterview with Frank Roberts, p.13, Diplomatic Oral Histoty Programme (DOHP), Churchill College. C.
Warner (ND), 'The Soviet Campaign Against this Countiy', 2.4.46, in R Aldrich (e'i), Espionage, security and
intelligence in Britain, 1945-1970, (Manchester, Manchester University Press 1998), pp.174-175. Hennessy, Secret
State, p.83.
"R. Menick, 'The Russia Committee of the Bntish Foreign Office and the Cold War, 1946-1947', in Journal
of Contemponay Histoty, 20 (1985), pp.453-468. Aldrich, Hidden Hand, pp.157-158.
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USSR as a hostile state, the administration of Harry S. Truman likewise gradually
adopted a policy of 'containing' Soviet influence. During 1946 the COS and
British intelligence services established close ties with their American counterparts,
and the following year Washington and London began to openly collaborate with
each other in a policy of 'containing' the USSR.'2
Until the spring of 1948, British officials regarded East-West rivalries as
being restricted to the political, economic and diplomatic spheres. The JTC
concluded that due to the human and material losses suffered during World War
Two the USSR would be in no position to wage war before the mid-1950s at the
earliest. In the short-term, Moscow was expected to focus upon internal
reconstruction and the consolidation of its rule over Eastern Europe. The Soviets
would avoid overt military aggression, but would also seek to promote the collapse
of capitalism. Regarding this last point, the Attlee government shared the American
concern that Western Europe was vulnerable to internal collapse and Communist
takeover, and therefore supported the Marshall Plan for European economic
recovery and integration (June 1947) and the foundation of the FRG two years
later. After the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia (February 1948) and the Berlin
blockade (July 1948-June 1949) the British were concerned not only that the
French and Italian Communist Parties might emulate their Czechoslovak comrades,
but by the apparent imbalance between Soviet and Western military power in
Europe. It is worth comparing Bevin's instructions concerning the establishment of
12 Bullock, Bevin, p.234. C. Bart1ett, "The Special Relarionsh4". A Political Histoi'y ( Anglo-American Relations
Since 1945, (London Longman 1991), p.13. pp.23-25.
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the Information Research Department (IRD) within the Foreign Office (4 January
1948), and his Cabinet paper The Threat to Western Civilisation (5 March 1948).
Regarding the IRD, Bevin maintained that American propaganda overplayed the
Soviet threat and made the USSR appear stronger than it was, and that IRD
propaganda should highlight Communism's weaknesses, in order to help 'relax
rather than raise international tensions'. 13 In contrast, Bevin's Cabinet paper,
depicting the USSR as a fundamental threat to Western culture and social values,
was more alarmist in tone. The Foreign Secretary's argument that Britain had to
align with the USA, the Commonwealth states and other West European
democracies to counter the Soviet threat was endorsed by Cabinet colleagues
following events in Czechoslovakia and Berlin. Having backed American efforts to
promote West European economic recovery with the Marshall plan, the British
played the principal role in creating the Brussels defence pact with France and
the Benelux states in March 1948 (subsequently named the Western European
Union, or WEU). The UK also made a significant contribution to the conclusion of
the North Atlantic Treaty in April l949.'
Although the Attlee government had embarked on an 'Atlanticist' policy of
aligning with the USA and other Western powers to restrict Soviet expansion, the
British were still determined to maintain a world role and, to the annoyance of
the Americans, refused to participate in European economic integration. The
'3 J1C(47)7/1(Final), 6.8.47, CAB15SI1. Aldrich, Hidden Hand, pp.137-140. C. Warner, 2.4.46; & E. Bevm, 'Future
Foreign Publicity Policy', 4.1.48, in Aldrich, Espionage, secunty, pp.174-175, p.198.
Bullock, Bevin, pp.368-371. CM(48)1 9th Cabinet conclusions, 5.3.48, CAB128/12(PRO). J. Young, Cold War
Europe 1945-1989, (London E. Arnold 1991), pp.6-7.
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decision to develop an independent nuclear programme was intended to reaffirm
the UK's great power status as well as to create a deterrent to Soviet aggression.
In addition, the Aulee government did not completely rule out diplomatic means
of resolving East-West differences. Curtis Keeble describes British objectives at
this time as being to develop its alliance ties with the USA and other Western
powers 'while seeking at the same time to reduce the inherent tension by
dialogue with the Soviet Union'. Yet the prospects for such a dialogue while
Stalin retained power were regarded as non-existent. Following the first Soviet
nuclear test (August 1949) and the outbreak of the Korean war (June 1950), the
British were also increasingly concerned to avert a third global conflict which
would result in the UK's annihilation.' 5 Although the Attlee government committed
British forces to augment the US-led war effort in Korea, London was concerned
that the conflict would escalate into a general East-West clash. The Truman
administration's objectives, from June 1950 onwards, were to wage a limited
conflict in Korea, prepare for the possibility of all-out war and to use all means,
including covert action, to weaken the Communist powers. As far as the Americans
were concerned, any conciliatory approach to the USSR, the People's Republic of
China (PRC) or any other Communist state would be as ill-conceived and as
disastrous as Britain's appeasement of Adolf Hitler in the 193 Os. Throughout the
Korean war (1950-1953) British concerns of excessive American belligerence were
met by accusations of 'appeasement' from Washington, and Anglo-American
P. Hennessy, Muddling Through, (London; Indigo 1997), p.103. C. Keeble, Britain and the Soviet Union, 1917-
89, (Macmillan 1990), p.207. DO(50)20, 20.3.50, CAB131/9(PRO). Bartlett, "Special Relationship", pp.34-37.
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relations were characterised by similar differences of perception in successive Cold
War crises.'6
The Attlee government was also beset by criticisms from the Labour left
that its foreign policy involved slavish obedience to an over-mighty, war-mongering
America. The split within the Labour party widened after the Cabinet agreed in
January 1951 to raise defence expenditure from £3.6 to £4.7 billion over a three-
year period. This was a response to a general rearmament effort on the part of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) powers following the outbreak of
the Korean war, but left-wingers were sceptical as to the extent of the Soviet
threat, and believed that rearmament would destroy the welfare state. In April 1951
three Ministers - Aneurin Bevan, John Freeman and Harold Wilson - resigned
from the government on the grounds that the rearmament programme would not
only reduce social spending but would undermine the British economy and
indirectly assist the Communist cause. 17
 Five months later, a divided Labour party
lost the 1951 general election. It is ironic to note that while a consensus
developed between the Conservatives and Labour's right-wing over British foreign
policy goals, the latter quarrelled furiously with the left-wing 'Bevanites' over the
party's policy towards East-West relations throughout Labour's thirteen years in
opposition. As a consequence of this split, after Labour's return to office in 1964
there was a profound difference of outlook between the majority of Ministers on
16 lvi Leffler, A Preponden-ince of Power, (Stanford Ca.; Stanford University Press 1992), pp.402-403. P. Lowe,
Containing the Cold War in East Asia, (Manchest University Press 1997), pp. 195-197.
17 M. Dockrill, British Defence since 1945, (London; Basil Blackwell 1988), pp.42-44. For the left-wing Labour
view, see Ian Mikardo, Backbencher, (London; Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1988), p.121. Pjmlott, Wilson, pp.157-162.
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the one hand and a significant number of left-wing MPs, who regarded NATO as
obsolete, favoured the abolition of the British nuclear deterrent, supported
recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and who were generally
anti-American.
Between 'Scylla' and 'Charybdis' 18: 1951-1958.
In October 1951 the Conservatives returned to office in Britain, and the following
year Dwight D. Eisenhower won the US Presidential election. Stalin died in March
1953 and was succeeded by a 'collective leadership' consisting of his former
henchmen. During these three years, the American, Soviet and British governments
reassessed both their national security policies and their respective policies towards
East-West relations. Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech at Fulton, Missouri (March
1946) reinforced his anti-Communist reputation, yet five years later he favoured
direct negotiations with Stalin aimed at relaxing, if not ending, the Cold War.
Churchill distinguished between 'appeasement' (concessions made from weakness)
and 'easement' (the positive outcome of negotiating from a position of strength),
and he argued that the West was in a position to 'negotiate from strength' with
the Soviets to settle seemingly intractable issues such as the future of Germany.
Motivated by a combination of personal vanity and a genuine desire to avert a
'8 This section title is taken from a quote by Pierson Dixon, a Russia Committee official. See J. Young (ed.),
The British Foreign Office and Cold War Fighting in the early 1950s: PUSC(51)16 and the 1952 'Sore
Spots' Memorandum, Leicester University Discussion Papers in Politics, No.195/2 (1995), p.5. I would like to
thank Dr S. Dockrill for providing me with a copy of this paper.
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third world war ('to jaw-jaw is better than to war-war'), Churchill was also
convinced that increased East-West contacts through trade would eventually
undermine an already moribund Communist system. 19
 The Prime Minister's
opinions were criticised not only by the Americans, but by the Foreign Office,
who considered summitry to be inherently dangerous. The expectations summits
aroused in domestic opinion could, officials argued, place pressure on Western
governments to conclude superficially attractive agreements with the Soviets which
would have adverse long-term repercussions. Churchill's intention to hold a summit
with Stalin led the PUSD to review Britain's Cold War policies during the winter
of 1951, the conclusions of which were produced in PUSC(5 1)16 (17 January
1952).
This paper bluntly stated that 'the present Soviet leadership is inspired not
only by traditional Russian ambitions but also by a fanatical and dynamic
revolutionary spirit which utterly rejects the very idea of a lasting settlement with
the non-Communist part of the world'. Soviet foreign policy partly reflected
'traditional' ambitions in its determination to maintain Eastern Europe as a buffer
against invasion from the West, as well as to expand its influence in the Middle
East. Yet the USSR was also bent upon subverting and weakening the Western
world while expanding into the 'vacuum areas' between it and the USA and its
allies. PUSC(51)16 summarised British (and Western) objectives as being, first, to
achieve 'equilibrium' between the Communist and Western worlds; second, to
establish a 'modus vivendi' as a basis for 'co-existence' with the Soviets; and
Young, Churchill's Last Campaign, pp.27-31, pp.159-160, p.269.
22
finally, to pursue negotiations towards a 'more stable settlement'. Unlike Churchill,
PUSD officials considered that the Western powers still had to strengthen their
military posture, particularly their conventional forces, and reinforce their alliance
ties before proceeding to the second stage of 'co-existence'. During this stage,
rearmament would impose economic strains on the UK and its allies, but PUSD
officials were confident that the Western states had the resources they needed to
survive the 'long haul' of Cold War rivalry. Having gained 'equilibrium' with the
Communist powers, the West could negotiate 'piecemeal' settlements with the
USSR on specific issues. The final stage of negotiations aimed at a general
settlement of East-West problems depended on the 'evolution' of the USSR from
the intransigent hostility towards the West shown by Stalin.
PUSC(51)16's conclusions were crucial as they underpinned the British
approach to East-West relations over the following decade. This paper regarded the
restoration of Britain's economy as a priority, and concluded that while the
attainment of 'equilibrium' involved a Western military build-up, the UK was not
prepared to 'lightly embark on courses involving serious risk of war'. The Foreign
Office adopted the view that war with the USSR was not inevitable. PUSD
officials had American efforts to 'roll back' Communist power in Eastern Europe
in mind when they asserted that while Western 'psychological warfare' and
propaganda emphasising the Soviet bloc's weaknesses was permissible, there were
'sore spots' in Soviet foreign policy which if pressed could provoke a violent
response from Moscow. The main 'sore spot' concerned Eastern Europe, and
PUSC(51)16 reflected the British belief that the Americans were too optimistic
about the prospects of detaching East European 'satellites' from Soviet domination.
British officials, in particular senior military officers, had initially supported Anglo-
American covert action to assist anti-Communist resistance in Albania, the Baltic
States and Ukraine. Yet by the early 1950s London had concluded that no Soviet
bloc regime could be overthrown in a popular revolt without Western military
assistance. Furthermore, covert operations in the Eastern bloc could provoke a
major East-West clash in which the West Europeans would face the brunt of the
Soviet response. PUSD officials argued that Britain should act as an 'influence of
moderation', in order to prevent any reckless American action towards Eastern
Europe or other 'sore spots'. 2° The Americans were critical of PUSC(51)16's
conclusions, and the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) commented
that its criticisms of covert action had 'an appeasement ring' to them. This
divergence of opinions concerning support for anti-Communist rebellions in Eastern
Europe reflected a wider dispute between Washington and London over whether a
modus vivendi could be reached with the USSR.2'
The differences between Churchill and the Foreign Office concerned
methods rather than objectives. PUSC(5 1)16 concluded that negotiations with the
USSR were in the short-term unlikely given the mindset of the present leadership
(i.e. Stalin), and inadvisable until the Western world had achieved 'equilibrium'
with the Communist states. PUSD officials also thought that any agreements
20 PUSC(51)16, Future Policy tords Soviet Russia, 17.1.52, is in Young, 'Sore Spots'. Aldrich, Hidden Hand,
pp.142-149. pp.160-179.
Aldrich, 'British intelligence', pp.339-340.
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reached after attaining 'equilibrium' would be limited in scope. Churchill's
intention to re-establish a 'working relationship' with Stalin was unrealistic, given
the extreme paranoia the latter displayed during his final two years. Furthermore,
the Prime Minister's subsequent efforts to establish contact with Stalin's successors
was hampered by the struggle for succession within the 'collective leadership',
which remained unresolved until 1957. It should be noted that neither Churchill
nor the Foreign Office considered the overthrow of Communism to be a viable
objective. The Prime Minister hoped that East-West contacts would eventually
erode the ideological basis of the Soviet bloc, while PUSC(51)16 referred to the
IRD's efforts to discredit Communism, but placed considerable emphasis on the
long-term 'evolution' of the USSR towards less doctrinaire external policies. The
Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, shared his officials' views that in the meantime
the Western powers should focus on building up their economic and military
strength. This involved addressing, in particular, the controversy surrounding West
German rearmament.22
The service chiefs likewise emphasised the need for the Western states to
concentrate on economic and military consolidation. This approach was outlined in
the Global Strategy paper of 1952 which, like previous COS studies in 1947 and
1950, stressed that the Soviets could be deterred from aggression by Western unity
and the USA's nuclear supremacy. The 1952 Global Strategy paper referred to
'imperialist Russia' employing Communism as a tool of policy - the implication
Roberts, pp.3-4, DOIIP. Young, Foreign Office, introduction, p.6. For Stalin's state of mind in 195 1-1953, see
D. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (New Haven Co.; Yale University Press 1994), pp.273-293, and R Service, A
History of Twentieth Centuiy Russia, (Penguin 1998), pp.324-328.
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being that the 'Russians' would moderate their ideological objectives if Western
strength and cohesion made their attainment impossible. While recommending the
creation of a British nuclear force, the establishment of a global anti-Communist
front and (like PUSC(51)16) endorsing psychological operations to play on Sino-
Soviet tensions and other weaknesses in the Communist world, the COS were
initially wary of the consequences of rearming West Germany, another potential
'sore spot' in East-West relations. By 1952, there was therefore a general
consensus in Whitehall that Britain was obliged, to use the classical metaphor used
by one Russia Committee official, to 'steer between the Scylla of another war and
the Charybdis of an appeasement policy which might forfeit us United States
sympathy' 23
Following Stalin's death, Churchill's interest in 'easement' was revived
when one member of the 'collective leadership', Georgi Malenkov, declared on 15
March 1953 that 'there is no disputed or unresolved question that cannot be
settled peacefully by mutual agreement among the interested countries'. These
comments influenced the Prime Minister's call for a summit meeting with the
Soviets in a speech in Parliament on 11 May. Malenkov was concerned by the
escalation of the superpower arms race, in particular the development of thermo-
nuclear weapons, and had come to the conclusion that a world war would destroy
both Communism and capitalism. Although Malenkov was later expelled from the
leadership by his rivals, Nikita Khrushchev subsequently used similar arguments in
23 D(52)26, Defence Policy and Global Strategy, 17.6.52, CAB131/12(PRO). Excerpts from the 1947 and 1950
COS plans are in Appendixes 3 & 4 of J. Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence. British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-
1964, (Clarendon 1995), pp.396-399, pp.403-404. Young, 'Sore Spots', p.5.
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his public pronouncements. 24 Malenkov's statement was treated with scepticism in
the Foreign Office, where officials felt that the 'collective leadership' was
'adopting a much cleverer policy for dividing and weakening the West than Stalin
ever did'. In Washington, the Eisenhower administration undertook its own
reappraisal of the perceived Soviet threat, and the 'New Look' strategy outlined in
NSCI62/2 envisaged a 'long haul' of East-West rivalry in which economic
prosperity would be as crucial to Western security as military strength. While the
Conservatives scrapped the Attlee government's rearmament programme, Eisenhower
likewise rejected the conventional military build-up which his predecessor initiated,
relying more on the expansion of US nuclear forces. 25 Yet if American opinions
on the military means needed to deter the USSR had changed, neither the
President nor his senior advisors believed that Soviet objectives had been altered
by Stalin's death.26
One source of constant friction between London and Washington concerned
the embargo on strategic trade with the Communist powers, regulated since 1950
by the Co-ordinating Commission (COCOM) of participating powers. The aim of
the embargo was to prevent the USSR and its allies from acquiring materials
which would enhance their technological and military capabilities; there was no
intention as such to wage 'economic warfare' to cripple the economies of
24 R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star, (Ithaca Cornell University Press 1992), pp.204-205. Parliamentary
Debates, Hansard, 5" Series, Vol.515, (HMSO 1953), cols. 863-898 (515 H.C.Deb5s) (1-IMSO 1953), cols. 863-
898). Zubok & Pleshakov, Kremlin's Cold War, p.167-169.
Evelyn Shuckburgh, Descent into Suez. Diaries 1951-1956, (Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1986), 24-30.3.53, pp.82-
83. S. Dockrill, Eisenhower's New Look National Security Policy, 1953-61, (Macmillan 1991), pp.19-29, pp.42-47.
26 MOW to State Dept. 18.3.53, pp.1 131-1132, Foreign Relations cf the United States (FRUS) 1952-1954, Vol.
'7I, (Washington; US Government Printing Office 1988).
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Communist states. Yet the Americans and British were at odds over the definition
of 'strategic' exports, with the former intent on blocking all trade in goods which
could enhance the USSR's military-industrial potential. The British position
reflected the UK's dependence on world trade, and as such London was less ready
to ban exports of 'dual use' items. 27
 These Anglo-American disputes over COCOM
continued well into the 1960s.
Another source of tension concerned the possibility that Western efforts to
achieve 'equilibrium' with the Soviet bloc rubbed raw the 'sore spots' which
would exacerbate East-West tensions. The British brokered a settlement on the
West German rearmament problem at the London conference (28 September-3
October 1954) in which the FRG gained NATO membership, and pledged not to
acquire nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. In return, Alliance members
recognised the FRG as the only legitimate German state, and the UK committed
itself to maintain the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) to help defend its
NATO and WEU allies. One result of the London agreement was that the USSR
and its East European 'satellites' founded the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO,
or 'Warsaw Pact') in May 1955. On the issue of West German rearmament,
Britain was ultimately less concerned with upsetting Soviet or East European
sensibilities than with achieving 'equilibrium' with the Eastern bloc. The British
calculated that Moscow's response to the FRG's admission to NATO would not
271 Jackson, The Economic Cold War, (London, Palgrave 2001), p.7, pp.66-72, pp.109-Ill, pp.125-127.
go beyond propaganda invective and (with the establishment of the WTO) the
formalisation of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.28
However, during the crises concerning Indochina (1954) and Taiwan (1955
and 1958) the British were less prepared to support American actions which could
exacerbate tensions with the Communist powers. Washington had opposed the
UK's earlier decision to recognise the PRC and Eisenhower's Secretary of State,
John Foster Dulles, quarrelled with Eden during the Geneva conference on
Indochina. The latter's private secretary, Evelyn Shuckburgh, noted that the British
delegation had a better working relationship with the Soviets than with the
Americans, who refused to endorse the accords reached at the end of the
conference (22 July 1954). While US officials concluded that the British lacked
resolve, and were treating the USSR as if it were Tsarist Russia, the Foreign
Office Minister of State, Selwyn Lloyd, expressed his colleagues' feelings when he
commented that the Americans possessed 'emotional feelings about Communist
China and to a lesser extent Russia which borders (sic) on hysteria'. 29
 There was
also significant, although privately expressed, concern within the Churchill
government that the USA might wage a pre-emptive war while it retained nuclear
supremacy over the USSR.3°
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Churchill's efforts to seek a ground-breaking summit with Malenkov
provoked a Cabinet revolt in April 1954 - Ministers were angered both by the
Prime Minister's failure to consult them, and by Churchill's readiness to accept
Soviet protestations of goodwill at face value. 31
 An additional problem for the
Prime Minister was that the 'collective leadership' was suspicious of the Prime
Minister's motives, and doubted whether his policy of 'easement' had any
influence on American policy-making. 32
 There were signs that compromise
agreements could be made with Communist powers, notably the armistice
agreement in Korea (July 1953) and the conclusion of the Austrian state treaty
(May 1955). However, the Geneva summit meeting between the American, British,
Soviet and French leaders in July 1955 produced little but ephemeral goodwill.
The problem of German reunification remained an intractable one, and Eden (who
had succeeded Churchill three months before the summit) observed 'no sign of
any new flexibility in the Russian attitude'.33
In April 1956, Eden received the Soviet Premier, Nikolai Bulganin, and the
First Secretary of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Nikita
Khrushchev, on a state visit to Britain. The visit was marred by a scandal
concerning a botched attempt by the British intelligence service (SIS) to place a
' Young, Churchill's Last Campaign, pp.272-279. Keeble, Britain and Soviet Union, p.139, p.248.
n U. Bar-Noi, 'The Soviet Union and Churchill's Appeals for High-Level Talks, 1953-54', in Diplomacy &
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Press 2000).
Soviet cruiser in Portsmouth harbour under surveillance. 34 Eden's public comment
on the clauses of the final communiqué concerning bilateral commercial, cultural
and technological contacts was, one Foreign Office official recalled, 'not based on
any broad philosophy of 'bridge-building' [between East and West]', but was
simply an attempt to prove to domestic opinion that the visit had been
worthwhile.35 Nevertheless, in its policy towards COCOM the British government
had already stressed the UK's readiness to engage in non-strategic trade with
Communist powers. In addition, both Churchill and the Foreign Office had
expressed the view that bilateral cultural and scientific exchanges were the only
feasible means of encouraging the Soviet bloc's internal 'evolution'. This view was
subsequently reinforced by the upheavals in Hungary and Poland in the autumn of
1956.
By 1952 British officials concluded that efforts to inspire anti-Communist
revolts behind the Iron Curtain were futile unless backed by Western military
support, an action which no NATO power (including the USA) would contemplate.
The brutal suppression of the Hungarian revolution by the Soviet army showed
that the USSR was determined to maintain its hegemony over Eastern Europe. 36 In
October 1956, Khrushchev accepted (albeit with ill-grace) the downfall of Poland's
Stalinist leadership and the emergence of a 'national Communist' regime in
Warsaw under Wiadyslaw Gomulka. However, the following month he used force
K. Morgan, The People's Peace, (OUP 1992), pp.146-147. Eden to E. Bridges (Treaswy), 9.5.56, in Aldrich,
Espionage, securz4', pp.33-34.
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to save the Communist system in Hungary from a popular revolt. 37
 Traditionally,
British governments had never shown much interest in events in Eastern Europe
unless these had implications closer to home, as was thought to be the case with
Czechoslovakia in 1948. During the East Berlin rising of June 1953, Churchill
showed no concern for the plight of the East Germans. 38 Three years later, the JIC
concluded that the Soviets were 'prepared to go at any lengths to keep the Soviet
bloc intact', and that 'the example of Hungary would probably deter similar anti-
Soviet groups in other [East European] countries'. Yet Gomulka's rise to power
showed that Moscow would tolerate 'limited concessions ... as the price of
subduing popular discontent' in order to preserve Communism in Poland. 39 It
should be noted that at Cabinet level, the Eden government's attention was
focused on the Suez crisis, and Ministers paid little if any attention to events in
either Hungary or Poland. Judging from the contents of the Prime Minister's files,
Eden showed a similar lack of interest in East European developments.40
After Harold Macmillan became Prime Minister following Eden's
resignation (January 1957), his priority was to restore the damage done to the
'special relationship' by Suez. Macmillan also hoped to promote East-West détente,
and was concerned by the escalating superpower strategic arms race. However, his
support for an international ban on nuclear tests conflicted with the development
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of the British deterrent, the RAF ' s V-bomber force. The 1957 defence review
committed the UK to develop its own deterrent, but cut defence expenditure from
10 to 7% of gross national product, upon which Britain had to support not only
BAOR but its military commitments 'East of Suez' arising from decolonisation
and the UK's membership of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and the
South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). 41
 The defence review provided part
of the rationale behind Britain's intention to reduce BAOR, but the Macmillan
government also believed that the UK could fulfil its commitment to NATO with
fewer forces. After months of bargaining within the WEU, and furious disputes
with Washington and Bonn, BAOR was reduced in two phases from 77,000 to
55,000 troops in December 1959. The equivocal British response to the Rapacki
plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe (named after the Polish foreign
minister, Adam Rapacki) also annoyed allied powers. NATO rejected Rapacki's
proposals because their implementation would leave the Alliance vulnerable to the
WTO's conventional superiority, but Selwyn Lloyd, now the Foreign Secretary,
advised his West German counterpart that 'we should avoid giving the impression
that new proposals and initiatives [from East European countries] ... are
automatically rejected by the West' •42
The West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, suspected that the British
regarded disengagement as an alibi for further reductions in BAOR and for
I. Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship, (Clarendon 1994), pp.222-223. M. Dockrill, British
Defence, pp.65-71.
42 s• Dockrill, 'Britain's Motives for Troop Reductions in Western Germany, 1955-1958', in Journal of Strategic
Studies 20/3 (1997), pp.45-65. Lloyd to H. von Brentano, 4.1.58, F03711137078(PRO).
reneging on their commitment to their WEU partners. There were similar
suspicions in Washington, despite the fact that the Eisenhower administration
initially intended to reduce the US military presence in Europe. Adenauer had
some grounds to be suspicious, as Macmillan had not rejected disengagement
outright. 43 Ironically, Khrushchev had planned to reduce the USSR's conventional
forces, partly because he favoured an increased emphasis on nuclear power, but
also because of the economic cost of maintaining existing force levels.
Khrushchev's thinking was similar to that which had influenced the 'New Look'
and the 1957 British defence review, but any intention in Washington, Moscow or
London of reducing conventional force levels further was rendered impossible by
the Berlin crisis.
Berlin, Cuba and 'Cold détente': 1958-1964.
Soon after Khrushchev emerged victorious after the power struggle between
Stalin's successors, East-West rivalries took a sharp and potentially dangerous turn
for the worse. This was to a considerable degree due to the Soviet leader's
mercurial conduct. By a combination of crude bluster and intimidation he alienated
Western leaders, while his volatile and erratic behaviour alarmed even his
compatriots. Khrushchev was confident that the Soviet system's economic and
technological prowess would surpass that of the capitalist world, which was
Gearson, Berlin Crisis, pp.25-30. W. Loth, Overcoming the Cold War, (Palgrave 2002), pp.44-47. Lloyd to
Macmillan, 26.4.58, PREM11!2347(PRO).
M. Evangelisla, lThy Keep such an Army ?' Khnjshchev 's Troop Reductions, CWI}IP Paper No.19 (1997).
preordained by its 'contradictions' to collapse. By expressing this belief with the
phrase 'We will bury you', he contributed to Western fears of a more aggressive
Soviet foreign policy. 45
 These concerns were intensified by Khrushchev's threat in
November 1958 to hand over responsibility for Berlin and its access routes to the
GDR, unless the four powers occupying the city (the USA, UK, USSR and France)
agreed to a German peace treaty.
The Soviet leader's ultimatum was prompted by the East German leader,
Walter Ulbricht, who was frustrated by the flight of refugees from his country, but
because the Western powers did not recognise the GDR, Khrushchev's actions
provoked a major crisis. The Berlin issue also exposed the intra-Western divisions
over Germany's future. Officially, Britain supported German reunification, although
because a reunified Germany within NATO would be as unacceptable to the
Soviets as a Communist Germany would be to the West, the British privately
upheld the status quo as a favourable alternative. The Americans and French
shared this view, but the Adenauer government was not prepared to accept
Germany's indefinite division. Bonn also refused to recognise any state other than
the USSR which had diplomatic relations with the GDR (this being the essence
of the 'Halistein doctrine') or to recognise Germany's Eastern border with Poland
(the 'Oder-Neisse line') and Czechoslovakia.' Before Khrushchev's ultimatum, the
British ambassador to Moscow warned London that the USSR showed no interest
RobeTts, Soviet Union, pp.42-44. Zubok & Pleshakov, Kremlin's Cold War, pp.174-175.
46 Gearson, Berlin Crisis, pp.54-55. Zubok & Pleshakov, Kremlin's Cold War, pp.196-198. COSI4O/27/l/58,
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in improving relations with the West, and advised that NATO powers had to
preserve their solidarity in order to resist 'further blackmail or splitting tactics' by
the Soviet leader. Yet during the Berlin crisis, the British were suspected by the
Americans, French and West Germans of being prepared to recognise the GDR
and sacrifice the allied position in West Berlin, in order to avert conflict with the
USSR. The Eisenhower administration concluded that Macmillan was preparing to
appease Moscow in the same way that Neville Chamberlain gave way to Hitler at
Munich.
The Prime Minister's trip to Moscow (February 1959) - the first peace-time
visit by a British Prime Minister to the USSR - went ahead despite opposition
from allied governments. Macmillan was bullied and humiliated by Khrushchev,
who made a temporary gesture in lifting the deadline on a German settlement
imposed the previous November. The Prime Minister's envious response to
Khrushchev's summit with Eisenhower at Camp David (September 1959) and his
dismay over the collapse of the four-power Paris summit (May 1960) reflected his
concern for personal prestige, as well as with alleviating East-West tensions. 48 At
the height of the crisis in June 1961, the JTC noted that Khrushchev 'appeared to
be convinced that the West was not prepared to go to war over Berlin'. The
Soviet leader would have regarded this as Macmillan's attitude, and it was also
noteworthy that public pronouncements from Washington stressed the American
commitment to defending the allied position in West Berlin, rather than in the city
P.Reily (Moscow) to Lloyd, 12.2.58, PREM1112347(PRO). Lloyd to Macmillan, 15.2.60, PREM11/2998(PRO).
Gearson, Berlin Crisis, pi56. Keeble, Britain and Soviet Union, pp.260-266.
as a whole. The eventual resolution of the crisis, following Ulbricht's decision to
build the Berlin wall (August 1961), was not a result of Macmillan's diplomacy,
but due to a tacit recognition by the powers involved that there was no feasible
alternative to the de facto division of Germany. Yet the equivocal British stance
on Western rights in Berlin was regarded in Washington, Paris and Bonn as
evidence of an appeasement mentality.49
Soon after his inauguration (January 1961), John F. Kennedy oversaw the
expansion of American military power in order to maintain nuclear superiority
over the USSR, and to give the USA greater strategic flexibility than was
considered possible within the bounds of the 'New Look'. 'Flexible response'
involved revising the NATO strategic concept agreed in 1957 (MC7O), which
concluded that any Soviet aggression would involve the immediate use of nuclear
weapons. While MC7O based NATO defence policy on nuclear power, Kennedy's
Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, intended to increase the Alliance's
conventional military forces in order to give NATO the ability to respond to a
WTO attack by non-nuclear means. In practice, however, the Kennedy
administration did little to increase US troop levels in Europe. The President felt
that the European NATO powers were not bearing their share of the Alliance's
defence burden, and Washington wanted the West Europeans to undertake the
conventional force build-up which would make 'flexible response' practical. 5° The
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Kennedy administration's sentiments are worth noting, as these persisted and
contributed to NATO's internal crisis in the third year of Lyndon Johnson's term
in office.
British officials agreed with McNamara's view that MC7O was out of date,
but opposed his position on conventional forces. 5 ' In the summer of 1961, the
Ministry of Defence (MoD) reviewed NATO strategy on the basis of British
assessments of the Soviet 'threat'. The JIC took the view that the USSR would
not deliberately risk a global war which would lead to mutual destruction - Soviet
military doctrine stated that even a 'limited' East-West conflict in Europe would
inevitably escalate into all-out thermonuclear war. On the basis of this assessment,
the MoD study (named the Mottershead report) concluded that there was a slight
risk of war by 'accident' (caused by a border clash in Central Europe) or
'miscalculation' (involving a WTO probing attack to test NATO's resolve). The
Mottershead report concluded that NATO did not need to increase its conventional
forces in order to meet either contingency. Put simply, while McNamara was
'thinking the unthinkable' in envisaging the possibility of a non-nuclear war in
Central Europe, British thinking was focused on deterrence, and this attitude
subsequently provided the basis for British views on NATO's strategic review.52
51 C. Bluth, 'Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Alliance Politics and the Paradox of Extended Deterrence in the
1960s', in Cold War Histoty, 1/2 (2001), p.74, pp.92-93.
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In October 1962, the discovery of Soviet medium-range missiles (MIRBMs)
in Cuba sparked off a superpower crisis which nearly escalated into global war.53
Britain's role in the Cuban crisis was, as one Foreign Office official later
commented, 'peripheral', 54
 and before the MRBMs were discovered British officials
regarded American concerns of a Soviet missile build-up in Cuba to be far-
fetched. 55
 Two months after the crisis was resolved, the JIC confidently concluded
that Khrushchev's miscalculation 'in no way invalidated [our] earlier assessment'
that the Soviets 'would be more cautious in the pursuit of their foreign policy'.
What was evident the following year was that Khrushchev was noticeably more
restrained in his dealings with the West. D. C. Watt describes 1963 as the year of
'Cold détente', in which agreements such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)
concluded by the USA, USSR and UK (August 1963) were counterbalanced by
ongoing squabbles over Berlin and conflicts in Indochina. Macmillan did
encouraged Kennedy to negotiate an LTBT with Moscow, although the latter
demonstrated his own commitment to détente in his American University speech
(10 June). 56 Following Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, Lyndon Johnson
inherited his predecessor's policy on East-West relations, and officials like Roswell
Gilpatric, the assistant Secretary of Defense, considered it 'possible, though not
53 The most recent general study is by A. Fursenko & T. Naflali, 'One Hell of a Gamble ' Khrurhchev, Castro,
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P. Cradock, Know Your Enemy. How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World, (John Murray 2002), p.190
Aldrich, Hidden Hand, p.621. G. Rawnsley, 'How Special is Special? The Anglo-American Alliance During
the Cuban Missile Crisis', in Contemporary Record, 9/3 (1995), pp.586-601; P. Boyle, 'The British Government's
view of the Cuban Missile Crisis', in Contemporwy British History, 10/3 (1996), pp22-38.
JIC(62)63 d
 meeting, 6.12.62, CAB159138(PRO). D. C. Watt (ed), Survey of International Affairs 1963, (RIIA
& OUP 1979), pp.3-4. J. See, 'An Uneasy Truce: John F. Kennedy and Soviet-American Détente, 1963', in Cold
War History, 2t2 (2002), pp.161-194.
assured, that we shall at last find a more than temporary easing' of Cold War
tensions.57
Paul Gore-Booth, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office from
January 1965 to February 1969, retrospectively observed that by early 1964 there
were 'no serious irritants' affecting Anglo-Soviet reLations, and that British officials
were more concerned with crises concerning decolonisation in the 'Third World'
than with East-West relations. 58 At this time, the old bipolar order Frank Roberts
had observed in 1946 was disintegrating. The post-war economic revival of
Western Europe was symbolised by the founding of the EEC in 1957, and
Macmillan's belated application for British membership was vetoed by the French
President, Charles de Gaulle, in January 1963. De Gaulle argued that the UK's ties
to the USA would harm the EEC's development - the irony here was that the
'third force' idea of the 1940s was subsequently adopted by Paris to the detriment
of British interests. 59 Western Europe's increased self-confidence was mirrored by
the increased assertiveness of Romania and other East European states, as well as
the emergence of China as a rival to the USSR's authority over the Communist
world. The Sino-Soviet split, which was an open secret after 1961, also threatened
Moscow's efforts to enhance its influence over newly independent Third World
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states. 6° British opinions on these developments and their implications for East-
West relations will be discussed in Chapter Two.
Conclusion: A British approach to East-West relations?
According to Joseph Korbel, the British treated détente as 'a matter of style, of
political atmosphere, of some mutual trust rather than of some momentous and
overt policy'. Unlike West Germany, Britain did not have any direct dispute, or any
recent legacy of 'past hostilities' or 'political ambitions', to complicate its dealings
with the Soviet bloc. It was this difference in perspective, as well as the UK's
tacit acceptance of the status quo in Europe, which contributed to the sharp
disputes between London and Bonn over Berlin and the feasibility of German
reunification. 6 ' Korbel's comments aside, it should be noted that in the first two
decades of the Cold War détente was often conspicuous by its absence. During
this period, under the Attlee government and its Conservative successors, there
were three distinct features behind Britain's approach to East-West relations,
concerning security, diplomacy and what would now be termed 'trans-national'
contacts in trade and other fields.
Since 1948, two basic objectives of British national security policy were the
preservation of the Anglo-American alliance and the collective defence of Western
60 P. Calvocoressi, World Politics since 1945, (Longman 1996,7th edition), p.26, pp.176-177
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Europe, reinforced by a US troop presence and by the USA's nuclear arsenal.
British military and civilian officials were generally confident that as long as
these two factors existed, the Soviets were unlikely to risk the consequences of
deliberate aggression. 62
 Yet successive British governments were anxious not to
provoke a world war, and while during Cold War crises Washington fretted about
the possibility of the UK doing 'another Munich', London was equally concerned
that excessive American belligerence would result in another Sarajevo. During the
second Berlin crisis, the emphasis the Macmillan government placed on averting a
military clash with the Soviets overrode the general objective of preserving
Western solidarity - American, West German and French officials clearly
considered this to be the case. Although convinced that the USSR would not
deliberately risk the consequences of a world war, the British were always aware
that in a third global conflict the UK would face nuclear annihilation. 63
 It should
be noted that before the Soviets developed inter-continental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) capable of striking the USA American officials tended to be more
prepared to contemplate raising the stakes in any East-West confrontation.
Regarding diplomatic contacts with Communist states, the Truman and
Eisenhower administrations tended to regard such contacts as being 'somehow
unnatural' - this attitude was evident in Dulles' demeanour at the Geneva
conferences of 1954 and 1955. Although Eisenhower and Kennedy's summit
62 White, Britain (and) Detente, p.10, p.42. M. Evangeista, 'T1 "Soviet Threat": Intentions, Capabilities and
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meetings with Khrushchev (and the installation of the Washington-Moscow hotline
in 1963) legitimised US-Soviet contacts, the USA still refused to recognise the
PRC or Fidel Castro's Cuba. Yet as White observes, Britain had a tradition of
disregarding ideology as an influence on diplomacy. TM
 Paul Gore-Booth's comments
in March 1967 are worth quoting as they reflected the survival of this tradition.
Gore-Booth asserted that '[our] need to oppose Communism cannot be based
simply on our strong distaste for it as a system', as Britain was 'compelled to
live with and even sometimes co-operate with other distasteful regimes'. British
policy did not involve overthrowing the Soviet, Chinese, Yugoslav or other
Communist regimes - 'we do not like them, but we accept them'. What was
unacceptable was that these regimes espoused aim was to spread world
Communism, and while Britain was determined to maintain diplomatic relations
and to negotiate with Communist states whenever possible, the policy of
'containment' remained unchanged. In addition, the UK's reluctance to support anti-
Communist rebellions did not extend to covert efforts to discredit the Soviet and
Chinese regimes through the IRD's propaganda. 65
 Britain's approach to diplomatic
relations with Communist powers did reflect the UK's reduced influence and
comparative weakness. For example, unlike the Americans the British could not act
as though Mao Zedong's regime did not exist as long as their interests in Hong
Kong were at stake. It should also be noted that British politicians - both Labour
and Conservative - avoided the strident and vitriolic anti-Communist rhetoric
Gaddis, Containment, p.189. White, Britain (and) Détente, pp.37-40.
65 SC(67)17 Communist Policies and Propaganda: Our Response, 6.3.67, FC049158(PRO).
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which characterised American political discourse, and that there was no equivalent
of 'McCarthyism' in London.
On the issue of commercial, cultural and scientific contacts, Eden had cited
these in 1956 as areas where Anglo-Soviet co-operation could produce mutually
beneficial results, and Macmillan made similar comments after his otherwise sterile
visit to Moscow in 1959. With these two exceptions, British governments placed
little public emphasis on 'trans-national' contacts with the Eastern bloc, although
as one diplomat later noted, in London 'a sort of philosophy was crystallising
about the advantages to be derived from a programme of exchanges'. The Soviets
had an interest in developing trading contacts with the West, thus gaining access
to consumer goods and sophisticated technology, while from the UK's perspective
commercial contacts were a means of encouraging internal change in the Eastern
bloc. 67 The idea that the influence of Communist ideology on the policies of the
Soviet bloc states would gradually diminish had been expressed by Churchill and
the PUSD in the early 1950s. A decade later, this presumption that the Communist
states would slowly liberalise their Stalinist political and economic systems
influenced Foreign Office thinking on the long-term future of the Soviet bloc.
Hennessy draws a contrast beten the low-key British approach to the 'positive vetting' of officials
occupying sensitive posts in Whitehall th the atmosphere of anti-Communist hysteria in Washington during
the early 1 950s. See Secret State, pp.86-97.
67 D Wilson, 'Anglo-Soviet Relations', pp.386-387. SC(67)17, FC049/58(PRO).
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CHAPTER 2: 'FORWARD FROM SOCIALISM ?'. BRITISH
PERCEPTIONS OF TIlE USSR AND THE COMMUNIST
WORLD IN 1964.
By early 1964, the British and other Western governments had concluded that
international tensions had eased considerably since the Cuban crisis. As far as
British officials were concerned, internal developments within the USSR and
Eastern Europe had a wider impact on East-West relations. Before analysing
Whitehall's analysis of Eastern bloc affairs, it is worth summarising domestic
developments in the Soviet bloc prior to Khrushchev's overthrow (October 1964).
Nikita Khrushchev had presided over the 'de-Stalinization' of the Soviet system,
and had denounced his predecessor's reign of terror in the 'secret speech' at the
20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956. Khrushchev was of course
constrained by his intention to preserve the CPSU's authority and by his
association with Stalin's brutal regime, and although he curbed the powers of the
secret police (the KGB), freed thousands of political prisoners and granted limited
cultural freedoms, the USSR remained a totalitarian state. De-Stalinization also
posed problems for Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. In 1956,
Khrushchev grudgingly acquiesced in Gomulka's rise to power as the price for
preserving Communism in Poland, but had also shown by his response to the
Hungarian rising that the USSR would use force to prevent any challenge to its
hegemony over Eastern Europe.'
'Service, Twentieth Centuty Russia, pp.339-346. Crampton, Eastern Europe, pp.283-303.
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Having assumed complete control over the party and government by 1957,
Khrushchev initiated ambitious economic and agrarian programmes, notably the
'Virgin Lands' scheme which opened large tracts of Siberia and Kazakhstan to
agricultural cultivation. At the 22nd CPSU Congress (November 1961), he boasted
that the USSR would overtake the USA in industrial productivity by the end of
the 1960s, and that by 1980 the Soviet system would have established a truly
'Communist' society. This image of the USSR's economic and technological
prowess had been strengthened by the launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957.
However, the Soviet economy suffered not only from the efforts to reach military
parity with the USA, but because of the failure of Khrushchev's agricultural
policies. The 'Virgin Lands' scheme led to widespread soil erosion, the effects of
which were exacerbated by poor harvests. Food shortages contributed to outbursts
of public unrest and an uprising in the South Russian city of Novocherkassk
(June 1962). In 1963, the USSR was obliged to import grain from the West, which
was costly in terms of both foreign exchange expenditure and Soviet prestige.
Within Eastern Europe, there was also growing awareness of the contrast between
the Soviet bloc's austerity and the prosperity of the West European states. The
East European regimes responded to de-Stalinization in different ways. The
Albanians revolted against Soviet 'revisionism' and declared their loyalty to
Stalinist orthodoxy, while the Romanians combined rigid domestic totalitarianism
with a more assertive, nationalistic approach to intra-bloc relations. In Hungary,
Janos Kadar curbed the repressive measures which had followed the rising of
1956, introducing economic and social reforms which eventually acquired for his
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country a reputation as 'the happiest barrack in the Socialist camp'. By contrast,
the Gomulka regime in Poland, having ended the collectivisation of agriculture and
after granting considerable concessions to the intelligentsia and the Catholic
Church, became progressively more authoritarian.2
In London, the MC commented that while Khrushchev's grasp on power
appeared secure, the problem of who would succeed him was 'a potentially
disruptive force' which could provoke a power struggle within the CPSU
Politburo during his lifetime. The JIC's analysts considered Leonid Brezhnev and
Alexei Kosygin as the most likely rivals for the succession, but acknowledged that
Khrushchev could at any time expel both men from the Politburo. As a
consequence of the USSR's economic plight, the Soviet leadership was obliged to
'adapt its policies to the realities of life', and the MC concluded that as the
regime exploited new technological developments to increase industrial
productivity, a more technocratic managerial class would emerge, favouring a more
'efficient and less regimented' social order. There would also be greater popular
demand for increased consumer goods production and improvements in housing
and welfare, and the CPSU would have to adapt in order to survive these trends.3
British diplomats at the Moscow embassy were aware of the failings of the Soviet
economy. The ambassador, Humphrey Trevelyan, quipped that 'Khrushchev's
achievement was to sow wheat in Siberia and harvest it in Canada', while the
2 Service, Twentieth Centuty Russia, pp.349-352, pp.361-364, p.375. G. Hosking, A Histoiy of the Soviet Union,
(HaiperCollins 1992), pp.352-353. pp.388-389. Crampton, Eastern Europe, pp.307-308, pp.311-314, pp.316-319.
JTC(64)43, The Power Struggle in the Soviet Union and the Problem of Succession, 17.4.64,
CAB1SS/53(PRO).
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minister at the embassy, Thomas Brimelow, stated that the 'massive inertia,
conservatism and inefficiency of the Soviet system' would be impediments to
necessary reform. 4 The USSR's economic plight, according to British assessments,
had their implications for the conduct of Soviet policy, which are noted below.
British and Western assessments of Soviet intentions and capabilities in 1964.
The point of departure for official British analyses of Soviet policy was,
unsurprisingly, the build-up of the USSR's nuclear arsenal, and the fact that the
Soviet leadership had at its disposal an army approximately 140 divisions strong.
Ninety of these divisions were deployed facing NATO (either in East-Central
Europe or in the Western military districts of the USSR), 60 of which were
manned at full strength. TIC estimates also took into account the enhanced combat
readiness of the WTO armed forces, notably the East Germans, Czechoslovaks and
Poles. In addition, the USSR was an emerging maritime power, with the second
largest navy in the world (five times the tonnage of the Royal Navy). The Soviets
had increased their military aid to powers such as Cuba and Indonesia, and had
also enlarged their merchant and fishing fleets, while conducting hydrological
surveys across the world. These actions had strategic implications - the trawlers
and merchant ships shadowing Western fleets also had a role gathering signals
intelligence (SIG1NT), while the hydrological surveys provided vital data for naval
T. Bnmelow (Moscow) to E. Orchard (ND), 6.3.64, NS1O15/1 1, F03711177664(PRO). H. Tievelyan to P.
Gordon-Walker, 11.65, F03711182741(PRO).
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operations. The USSR's maritime capabilities remained inferior to those of the
USA, particularly in anti-submarine capabilities, access to port facilities overseas,
and in naval air strength. However, the Soviets used their growing maritime power
to demonstrate their superpower status, and the provision of Soviet naval vessels
to Indonesia was - in the context of the latter's 'confrontation' with Malaysia -
particularly disconcerting for the UK.5
As noted in the previous chapter, British military and intelligence officials
concluded in 1961 that the Soviets were highly unlikely to risk the consequences
of deliberate aggression against the West. Soviet military doctrine had no concept
of 'limited war', and stipulated that in the event of a general East-West conflict
the USSR would use nuclear weapons from the outset. This would, however, lead
to the mutual destruction of both the Western and Soviet bloc powers, and the
JIC remained convinced that the Soviets would be deterred from launching a
Third World War. Three years after the Mottershead report, the COS were
confident that the only contingencies NATO needed to prepare for (other than a
nuclear response to a general WTO offensive) were 'accidental' border clashes or
probing attacks initiated by the Soviets to test the Alliance's resolve (the chiefs
presumably considered it possible that the Soviets could change their minds about
the risks of limited war). The COS's assessment of what would follow displayed
the belief that any conflict with the Soviet bloc could be controlled:
JTC(64)18(Final), Soviet Bloc General Purpose Forces Confronting NATO, 1.9.64, CAB158/52(PRO).
JIC(64)92(Frnal), Soviet Mantime Policy, 5.3.64, CAB158/55(PRO). On Soviet maritime SIGINT, see J. Bamford,
Body of Secrets, (London; Century 2001), p.93. On the 'confrontation', see D. Easter, Bntish Defence Policy in
South East Asia and the confrontation, 1960-66, (1ThD Thesis, London School of Economics 1998).
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[After] a short phase of non-nuclear operations to identify the aim and scope of Soviet
aggression, [if we] were unable to stop [the enemy] by non-nuclear weapons, tactical
nuclear weapons would have to be used. Concurrently with these operations, political
negotiations would be aimed at convincing the Soviets of NATO's resolve to defend
itself and of the dangers of escalation, possibly uncontrolled, to the strategic nuclear
exchange.
The service chiefs were nonetheless convinced that, to quote the Chief of the
Defence Staff (CDS) Lord Mountbatten, 'there is no Soviet objective in Europe
which they consider worth the devastating price they would pay in their attempt
to achieve it'. 6
 Recent research supports the assessment that WTO war planning at
this time involved the instant use of nuclear weapons in any war against NATO,
although given this intention the confidence the chiefs showed towards controlling
the escalation of an East-West war was excessively optimistic. 7 The strategic
concepts summarised above influenced the British attitude towards NATO's
strategic review. While British and American opinion differed with regards to the
force levels NATO needed to deter Soviet aggression, both Washington and
London were agreed by 1964 that the USSR was unwilling to provoke a nuclear
holocaust.8
American impressions of Soviet policy were reflected by one National
Intelligence Estimate compiled in February 1964, which commented that as a
consequence of setbacks over Berlin and Cuba Khrushchev considered the 'present
6 JIC(64)l8(Frnal), CAB158/52(PRO). DP33/64(Final), 26.4.64, DEFE4/168(PRO). C0S245164, 26.8.64,
DEFES/153(PRO). CDS' comments at COS63'/64 meeting, 27.10.64, DEFE4/176(PRO).
See V. Mastny (e'i), 'Taking Lyon on the Ninth Day? The Warsaw Pact Plan for a Nuclear War in Europe
and Related Documents', found on the website for Parallel Histoty Project for NATO and the Warsaw Pact,
http://www.isnethz.ch/php/documents,
 downloaded 30.05.00. Also P. Lunak, 'Planning for Nuclear War The
Czechoslovak War Plan of 1964', in CWIHP Bulletin, 12/13 (Autunin/Wint 2001), pp.289-298.
8 The adoption of 'flexible response' is examined in dail in J. Stromseth's The Origins of Flexible Re.cpmse.
NATO's Debate over strategy in the 1960s, (Macmillan 1988).
Sn
period inauspicious for direct pressures against the West' and had established 'the
relaxation of tensions as the main theme of his [foreign] policy'. Due to the scale
of the USSR's internal economic problems - agricultural failures, slow economic
growth, and hard currency shortages following the import of Western cereals - the
Soviets had an interest not only in easing the burden of military expenditure, but
also in developing trade ties with the West and in securing foreign credits.
However, American analysts asserted that Khrushchev's less strident policies were
also intended to 'aggravate Western differences, which tend to emerge more
strongly when the Soviet threat appears to fade'. Moscow still supported 'wars of
national liberation' and anti-Western regimes in the Third World, and Khrushchev
evidently expected that détente would enable the USSR to 'exploit unstable
situations' in the Southern hemisphere. There was a constituency of opinion in
Washington that presumed that Moscow's interest in détente was not 'likely to
evolve over a longer time into a more serious search for basic settlements with
the West', unless there were 'fundamental changes' in Soviet ideology and the
USSR's outlook on international politics. 9
 Foreign Office officials likewise
concluded that as a result of the USSR's domestic problems, as well as the
diplomatic defeats over Berlin and Cuba, Soviet foreign policy would be passive
and reactive. Moscow would not make, or respond to, any major initiatives on
disarmament or the solution of the German problem, but on the other hand the
NIEII-5-64, Soviet Economic Pmblems and Outlook, 8.1.64; NIEII-9-64, Soviet Foreign Policy, 19.2.64; &
NIEI 1-4-64, Main Trends in Soviet Militaiy Policy, 19.2.64, in The Soviet Estimate: US' Anal ysis of the Soviet
Union 1947-1991, (microfiche) Liddell Hart Centre for Militaty Archives (LHCMA), MFF15/390-392.
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Soviets would also avoid provocations which could lead to a crisis as serious as
that over Cuba in 1962.10
By 1964, the Sino-Soviet schism was, in the opinion of British embassy
officials in Moscow, irreversible. The basic causes of the split involved
fundamental divisions over détente, which the Soviets accepted as a tactical
necessity but the Chinese abhorred, and the competition between the two powers
for leadership of the Communist world. The mutual contempt between Khrushchev
and Mao Zedong exacerbated this ideological rift." By 1963, the Americans were
aware of this split, by which time China was considered by Washington to be 'a
more bellicose and unmanageable international actor' than the USSR. The PRC
became, as one historian notes, 'the primary international devil' as far as both the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations were concerned.' 2 The US Secretary of State,
Dean Rusk, asserted in December 1964 that while the 'Warsaw Pact-NATO
relationship was not now likely to lead to war', Chinese ambitions in South-East
Asia posed a threat to peace, and he complained that 'the Free World had simply
not lifted up its voice as it should as a signal and warning' to Beijing.' 3 Rusk's
comments reflected the Johnson administration's view of the PRC as 'a reckless
power', which had 'usurped the role of the Soviet Union in American perceptions
'° Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy. April-November 1964, NS1022119, F03711177670(PRO). Remarks to
Commonwealth PMs on Overall East-West Relations, 8.7.64, N1075/1, F0371/177420(PRO).
"Moscow to FO, No.711, 17.4.64, NS1072/23, F03711177670(PRO). See C. Pleshakov, 'Nikita Khrushchev and
Sino-Soviet Relations'; Chen han & Yang Kuisong, 'Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet
Afliance', in 0. Westad, Rmthers in Arms. The Ri.ce and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, (Washington DC;
Woodrow Wilson Center Press 2000), pp.226-294.
'2 N Kochavi, 'Washington's view of the Sino-Soviet split; 1961-1963: From Puzzled Prudence to Bold
Experunentation', in Intelligence and National Security, 15/1 (2000), pp.50-79.
13 Ang10-Ameiican Ministenal conversations at White House, 7. 12.64, National Security Files (NSF), UK
Country File Box 214 (UKCF214), Lyndon B. Johnson Library (LBJLIB).
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as their most troublesome adversary'. The Vietnam war and the development of
the Chinese nuclear programme subsequently reinforced this perception.14
For the British, the implications of the Sino-Soviet split were not as clear-
Cut or as favourable as the prospect of continued feuding between the Communist
giants appeared to suggest. Foreign Office officials concluded that although it was
conceivable that the Soviets would 'limit the field of disagreement' with the
Western powers in order to 'gain a freer hand to deal with the Chinese
challenge', it would be 'premature to conclude that a complete reorientation of
Soviet policy towards the West is in prospect', except possibly in the distant
future when China emerged as a major military threat. British officials were also
wary of any obvious efforts to exacerbate the Sino-Soviet split, which in their
opinion would encourage a rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing.' 5 In
addition, the Soviet leadership was asserting the USSR's 'anti-imperialist'
credentials and its support for 'national liberation' movements so as to counter
Chinese efforts to supplant Moscow's influence in the Third World. The CPSU's
chief ideologist, Mikhail Suslov, condemned Beijing for its exclusive attacks on
American 'imperialism', and he declared that 'the Soviet struggle against
imperialism embraces not only [that of] the United States but also that of
England, France, West Germany and Japan'. While the Soviet press assailed the UK
for its 'East of Suez' policy, Moscow provided military aid to the Indonesia and
'4 M. Jones, "Groping Tonrd Coexistence': US China Policy during the Johnson Years', in Diplomacy &
Statecrafi, 12/3 (2001), p.175.
15 DEFE4/174(PRO). FO brief for Sir Alec Douglas-Home's visit to Washington, 3.2.64, NIOJ5/5,
F0371/177409(PRO). FO to Missions, N.349 Guidance, 1.6.64,N1051/21, F03711177410(PRO).
gave its President, Ahmed Sukarno, moral support for his attempts to destabilise
Malaysia. The Conservative Foreign Secretary, R. A. Butler, was warned by his
officials in April 1964 that Chinese ideological challenge served only to intensify
Soviet efforts to supplant Western influence in the underdeveloped world.'6
The general Foreign Office view was summarised by one senior Northern
Department official who commented that although the USSR remained committed
to the expansion of international Communism, 'the more important facts, absolutely
and for our own foreign policy, are the postponement of [this objective] and the
mitigation of the Cold War atmosphere'. 17 The problem for the UK and for the
West in general was how to ensure that détente in the mid-1960s did not suffer
the same fate as the elusive 'spirit of Geneva' of the previous decade. British
officials were also debating the appropriate response to de-Stalinization in Eastern
Europe.
A theory of 'evolution': British policy towards the Eastern bloc in 1964.
Within the Foreign Office, the PUSD examined Britain's policy towards the East
European states, revising a paper entitled United Kingdom Policy towards the
Satellites produced by its Planning Staff in June 1961. This paper had concluded
that although Soviet hegemony and Communist power over the Eastern European
16 H. Smith (ND) to R A. But1, 20.3.64, NS1022/17: & Moscow to FO, No.608, 3.4.64, NS1022/22,
F0371/177610(PRO). Tokyo to FO, No.277, 3.4.64, NS1022132, F03711177671(PRO).
' 7 D. Wilson (ND), Soviet Intentions, 12.9.64, PLAI3/7, F0371J177821(PRO).
region had been consolidated, the ruling regimes faced widespread popular
discontent which had led to open revolt in 1956. This unrest had been temporarily
appeased by improved living standards and greater access to consumer goods.
Furthermore, as a result of 'de-Stalinization' in the 1950s, Communist leaders who
favoured reform had more lee-way to devise less doctrinaire economic policies.
The Soviets would tolerate these limited reforms so long as the bloc regimes did
not attempt to break free from the 'Socialist Commonwealth', and Planning Staff
officials concluded that 'if there is to be any weakening of the Soviet hold over
the Satellites it will come about through evolution rather than revolution'.
The planners argued that the policy of the UK and other Western powers
should aim 'to encourage favourable evolutionary trends, particularly by fostering a
spirit of nationalism in the Satellites and [by] playing up to their sense of
national identity'. Such an approach would produce few tangible results in the
short-term, but Planning Staff officials concluded that in order to assist the long-
term process of 'evolution' the West needed to develop 'closer relations with the
[Communist] regimes' while increasing its cultural contacts and improving
'information work' directed at the East European peoples. This involved British
Council representation and BBC broadcasts on the one hand, and the IRD's
propaganda on a more covert level. The Planning Staff maintained that 'there need
not be any incompatibility' between efforts to improve inter-government relations
between the UK and the bloc states, and efforts to develop East-West contacts on
an informal level which would indirectly stimulate popular pressure for internal
S5
reform. United Kingdom Policy towards the Satellites was approved by the PUSD,
and formed the basis of British policy towards Eastern Europe until 1964, when
Northern Department officials argued for a re-examination of policy towards the
Soviet bloc.' 8 The Planning Stairs revised assessment, Policy Towards the East
European Satellites (27 January 1964), is summarised below.
The planners began by stating that in mid-1961, there was a major East-
West crisis over the future of Berlin, while Poland was the only Communist state
other than Yugoslavia to follow 'an independent approach to Communism'. Two
and a half year's later, most of the Eastern bloc states had 'taken advantage in
varying degrees of the rather greater freedom of political and economic action
permitted' both by the development of détente and the doctrine of 'separate roads
to Socialism' approved at the 22nd CPSU Congress. Most East European regimes
had relaxed centralised economic control, permitted 'rather more freedom of choice
to the consumer and [of] thought to the intellectual', and had limited hitherto
arbitrary police powers. The extent of these changes differed according to each
state, but in general the bloc states had instituted economic and social reforms in
order to avert uprisings similar to those in Hungary and Poland in 1956. In
foreign affairs, the ruling regimes remained aligned with the USSR and committed
to the Warsaw Pact, but in internal affairs the East Europeans had more freedom
SC(61)25, United Kingdom Policy towards the Satellites, 27.6.61, emphasis added; & note by C. Tickell
(Planning Staff), 24.1.64, PLAI 3/1, F0371/177821(PRO). roreign Office officials used the word 'libemlisation'
to describe the process of internal political and economic reform in Eastern Europe although, as shown below,
'liberalisation' was also used to describe efforts to increase British trade th Eastem bloc states by reducing
import quotas. I have chosen to use the phrase 'liberalisation' as well as 'deinocratisation' and 'internal
reform' to describe efforts by certain East European regimes - notably the Poles, Hungarians and
Czechoslovaks - to modify central economic planning and great greater individual freedoms to their subjects. I
ll use 'liberalisation' in both the political and (in discussing trading relations) in its commercial context.
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to develop autonomous policies than during the Stalinist era. Having borne the
brunt of popular unrest eight years previously, the Polish and Hungarian
Communist parties had made the most progress in relaxing state censorship and
limiting secret police authority. The Romanian regime had adopted an avowedly
nationalist character which had led Bucharest to undermine Soviet efforts to grant
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) greater supra-national
authority over the economic policies of its members.
Most of the Eastern bloc states had experimented with more liberal socio-
economic policies, and were more interested in trading with the West. Pro-reform
leaders were encouraged by Khrushchev's efforts to improve the USSR's relations
with Yugoslavia, and by the Sino-Soviet split. Although Albania was alone in
siding with the Chinese - and was, unlike the other East European states,
paradoxically breaking off relations with the USSR and resisting de-Stalinization -
the USSR's allies would seek Soviet acquiescence for their internal reforms in
return for their continued adherence to the ideological line set by Moscow.
However, the USSR was still determined to preserve its hegemony over the region
and to preserve its client regimes. If either of these objectives were threatened, the
Soviets would crush any popular revolt by force. Furthermore, although most of the
East European regimes saw the need for improved living standards and less
repressive policies to gain popular acquiescence towards Communist rule, the ruling
parties would be wary of undertaking systematic reforms which would undermine
their 'leading role'. Ulbricht and the East German leadership were particularly
determined to insulate the GDR from the more prosperous FRG, and East Berlin
was especially hostile to internal reforms in neighbouring bloc states. Above all,
the East European countries were economically dependant upon the USSR -
particularly the supply of raw materials and energy - and also relied upon the
WTO for their military security. Poland and Czechoslovakia in particular feared
that 'a strong and rearmed West Germany' could drag NATO 'into a war for the
revision of Germany's Eastern frontiers'. Foreign Office officials clearly considered
that the fear of West German 'revanchism' was 'a genuinely national rather than
a merely Communist feeling', which 'must be taken into account in any estimate
of the possibilities of political change in Eastern Europe'.
Policy Towards the East European Satellites concluded by refining the
Planning Staff's 1961 assessment on the internal 'evolution' of the Eastern bloc,
and on the means available to the Western powers to encourage this gradual
liberalisation. In the short-term, it was 'most unlikely' that the Eastern bloc's
economic problems and the exacerbation of Sino-Soviet tensions would lead to an
East-West rapprochement. The USSR was in no mood to renounce its ideological
hostility towards the Western world, and the East Europeans could not be 'bribed
or otherwise persuaded out of the Soviet camp' by Western trade or economic
assistance. There was also no sign that the Communist order was on the verge of
collapse, or that the USSR would remain passive if its authority over Eastern
Europe disintegrated. The most likely short-term outcome was, officials concluded,
the continuation of 'evolutionary co-existence' between the Eastern bloc and the
West, in which the 'rather greater freedom and will to develop contacts with the
West' would be 'balanced, but not entirely countered' by Soviet efforts to
integrate the East European economies through the CMIEA, and 'by the natural
conservatism of the Communist party leaders and functionaries'. British policy
should remain focused upon encouraging 'evolution' in the long-term, not only by
developing cultural contacts, but by increasing the number of Ministerial visits to
Eastern Europe, and by reducing discriminatory import quotas on Eastern bloc
goods so as to improve trading relations. These measures were not expected to
reverse the economic dependence and ideological orientation of the East European
countries, but were intended to foster goodwill by treating the latter as sovereign
states, rather than as mere puppets of the US SR.'9
This concept of 'evolution' provided the basis not only for Foreign Office
proposals to liberalise Britain's trade with bloc states, but also for efforts to
improve political relations and develop détente with the Warsaw Pact powers.
Foreign Office officials argued that it was no longer appropriate to call the
Eastern bloc states 'satellites', and asserted that the British government should be
'ready to discuss seriously with [the East Europeans] our attitude on major policy
questions, even if we have little hope of thereby changing their attitude'. 2° Poland
was regarded as a strong candidate for bilateral political contacts because of the
disarmament initiatives associated with both Gomulka and Rapacki. In addition, the
Polish regime was reputed to be distinctly less totalitarian than those of other
' 9 SC(64)1, Policy Totwirds the East Europwin Satellites, 27.1.64, PLAI 3/2, F03711177821(PRO).
20 Northern Department note, 11.6.65; & E. Youde (ND), 16.6.65, F0371/182529(PRO). See FO to Missions,
No.349 Guidance, 1.6.64, F0371/177410(PRO), which is in Appendix 1.
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Soviet bloc states. As one British diplomat stationed in Warsaw from 1959 to
1961 recalled, Poland was 'the only communist country where [Western diplomats]
could talk to people, including party officials and senior figures', without the
restrictions other East European states imposed on contacts between their own
subjects and foreigners. 2 ' However, Poland's reputation as a comparatively liberal
state in Eastern Europe proved to be ephemeral, as Gomulka's regime became
more hard-line during the 1960s.
The MC agreed with the assessment that 'nearly all of the former
"satellites" now enjoy some degree of independence from the Soviet Union',
although its analysts noted that this 'growing diversity and fluidity within the
Soviet bloc' could prove short-lived if détente collapsed and East-West rivalries
intensified. 22 The PUSD approved the conclusions of Policy Towards the East
European Satellites, which received further support from the meeting of British
ambassadors to the USSR and Eastern Europe, which was convened in London in
April 1964. A summary of the Foreign Office's views on 'evolution' was
forwarded to Patrick Gordon-Walker shortly after he replaced Butler as Foreign
Secretary six months later. This memorandum acknowledged that Khrushchev's
downfall had not been taken into account, but concluded that his successors would
21 Interview with R. Braithite, p.2, DOHP. C. Thompson (ND) to J. Whitehead (Washington), 20.10.64,
NIOl 5/22, F0371/177407(PRO).
n JIC(64)25(Final), Relations between the Soviet Union and Communist Countries in Eastern Europe, 17.7.64,
CAB1SS/52(PRO).
6()
not crack down on liberalisation within Eastern Europe unless the USSR's
political and military supremacy over the region was threatened.23
The conclusions of Policy Towards the East European Satellites -
particularly concerning the increased autonomy of the bloc states and the enhanced
freedom of manoeuvre resulting from the USSR's preoccupation with its
ideological rivalry with the PRC - were not unique to the Foreign Office and
were noted by contemporary academic specialists. 24 It is also worth noting that,
despite the references to 'information work', British officials remained unwilling to
openly encourage anti-Communist rebellions behind the 'Iron Curtain', on the
grounds that any Western effort 'to set the governments and peoples of Eastern
Europe against the Soviet Union' would 'be self-defeating and would lead to
sharp reactions'. As a consequence, there were limits imposed on the IRD' s
propaganda effort, because although PUSD officials considered it important 'to
encourage the desire of East European countries to liberalise their regimes, to
concentrate more on their national interests and to reach a less subservient
relationship with Moscow', British policy objectives did not include stimulating
'such a move for independence as would provoke Moscow to intervention to
protect Soviet strategic interests' 25 These conclusions were much the same as
those of PUSC(51)16 twelve years previously, and British remained opposed to
"Conclusions of HM Ambassadors' conference on Eastern Europe, 21-23.4.64, N1015/31, F03711177405(PRO).
II. Smith (ND) to P. Gordon-Walker, 19.10.64, Ni 051/C, F0371/177410(PRO).
24 For instance, see G. lonescu, The break-up of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Eumpe, (London; Penguin 1965),
p150-157; & D. Zagona, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-61, (Princeton University Press 1967), pp.394-401.
FO to Missions, No.349 Guidance, F03711177410(PRO). SC(64)20, Current Trends in the policy of
Communist powers and implications for our propaganda, 1.5.64, PLA13/4, F03711177821(PRO).
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covert operations in Eastern Europe similar to the half-hearted Anglo-American
efforts of the previous decade.
While Foreign Office officials were agreed that the Eastern bloc was
gradually becoming less totalitarian and less doctrinaire, most tended to be cautious
as far as the pace of 'evolution' was concerned. One exception was the assistant
undersecretary of the Northern Department responsible for Soviet affairs, Duncan
Wilson, the author of a paper entitled Forward From Socialism ?. Duncan Wilson's
opinions are worth noting because of his subsequent service as ambassador to
Belgrade (September 1964-October 1968) and then to Moscow. Forward from
Social/sin was based on the presumption that East-West détente would continue,
despite continued ideological rivalry, and that neither de-Stalinization nor the Sino-
Soviet schism could be reversed. The Eastern bloc regimes were obliged not only
to introduce limited concessions to the free market, but also to increase their trade
with the Western 'capitalists'. The process of reform was driven by popular
cynicism towards the ruling regimes, the readiness of pro-reform Communists and
technocrats to respond to new ideas, and by the increased contacts between Soviet
bloc states and the outside world. On the other hand, the Communist parties
intended to preserve their monopoly of power, and there were still no political
alternatives to challenge the established order. Above all, there was the popular
fear that uncontrolled liberalisation could provoke Soviet military intervention and
savage repression. Duncan Wilson referred to the possibility of a 'freeze' in
reform in either Hungary or Poland, but he was confident that in the long-term
6.
the East European regimes would gradually develop their own variants of 'national
Communism'. The increased debate within the Communist parties on economic
policy, greater freedom of expression and, ultimately, improved contacts with the
Western powers would - assuming East-West détente continued to develop - lead
the East Europeans to become more pragmatic in the conduct of foreign policy.
He conceded that the evidence for his thesis was not conclusive, but that gradual
change offered a better alternative to continued unrest, anti-Communist revolutions
and a ruthless Soviet crackdown in the region.26
Forward from Socialism envisaged the development of 'national
Communism' in each Eastern bloc state, with the regimes following Yugoslavia's
lead by developing autonomous policies suited to socio-economic conditions in
their own countries. Given Khrushchev's tolerance of Tito, and the improvement of
Soviet-Yugoslav relations since Stalin's death, Duncan Wilson presumed that the
Soviets would show similar restraint in dealing with states closer to the USSR's
borders. Other officials were less convinced. The PUSD's Steering Committee were
sceptical of the extent to which 'national Communism could develop' -
Communist parties still looked to either Moscow or Beijing for leadership, and so
long as bloc states continued to adhere to the objective of a Communist world,
even 'national Communism' posed a threat to Western interests. Trevelyan regarded
Forward from Socialism as too sanguine, arguing that although the Soviets were
suffering from 'an economic malaise' as a result of Khrushchev's mismanagement,
'[ideology], bureaucracy and the need to maintain the balance of military power'
26 D Wilson (ND), Forward fivm Socialism ?, 4.2.64, N1015/4 & 6, F0371/177404(PRO).
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with the USA 'will all exercise a strong conservative influence on Soviet policy'
and would forestall internal reforms. The CPSU was determined to maintain its
'leading role', and while the German question remained unresolved the Soviets
would never relax their grip on the East European states. As a consequence, the
USSR would not tolerate political pluralism in any of the Eastern bloc states.
Trevelyan also suggested that Duncan Wilson's confidence in the ability of the
Soviet bloc regimes to limited reforms without provoking popular demands for
more radical changes was misplaced, and he commented that there could be future
outbreaks of unrest, such as those experienced in East Berlin in 1953, in Poland
and Hungary three years later, and in Novocherkassk in 1962. Trevelyan's
comments raised the question of whether the USSR would tolerate the limited
liberalisation of its East European clients, particularly if reforms threatened to
arouse similar demands for change within the Soviet system itself. Furthermore,
despite the fact that Khrushchev was more conciliatory in his dealings with Tito
than Stalin was, Yugoslav 'revisionism' was explicitly condemned at the 22'
CPSU Congress.27
Over the previous decade, the British government had been at odds with
other allied powers over the interpretation of Soviet policy and concerning
developments in the Communist world - the disputes which arose during the
Berlin crisis being one obvious example. Yet by 1964, other Western policy-makers
had concluded that the prospects for détente had improved. De Gaulle firmly
SC(64)20, F03711177821(PRO). Comments by H. Trevelyan (Moscow) on Forird from Socialism ?, 27.2.64,
N1015/21, F0371J177405(PRO). Service, Twentieth Century Russia, p.362.
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backed Adenauer during the Berlin crisis, but three years after its climax the
French President spoke of a 'Europe totale', unencumbered by ideological divisions
and stretching 'from the Atlantic to the Urals'. De Gaulle's idiosyncratic vision of
détente was the mirror image of his objective of undermining American influence
and of promoting France as the diplomatic centre of Western Europe. He asserted
that 'Russian' national interests would eventually prevail over Communist
ideology, and that as the USSR became preoccupied with the threat posed by an
increasingly hostile China, Moscow would be ready to consider a European
settlement. The French President was convinced that the Soviet threat would
disappear, along with the Communist order in Eastern Europe, and that this trend
would deprive NATO of its rationale. Once the US-led Atlantic Alliance would
collapse, France would be left to act as Western Europe's spokesman in
negotiations with 'Russia'. Dc Gaulle considered this outcome to be inevitable,
informing the US ambassador to Paris that the growth of East-West trade would
result in 'the end of Communism as the Soviets now conceive it'. 28 Dc Gaulle
had developed his own concept of 'evolution', albeit one far more grandiose and
more ambitious than that of the Foreign Office's Planning Staff.
Following the Hungarian revolt, American 'roll back' rhetoric was replaced
by a more low-key policy towards Eastern Europe, which focused on 'softening'
the ruling regimes by cultural and commercial contacts. President Johnson inherited
the policy of developing détente with the USSR which Kennedy had followed
Paris to State Dept. No.35 17, 11.12.64; & No.4359, 2.2.65, Lyndon Johnson National Security Files. Western
Europe 1963 -1969 (microfilm), LHCMA, MF403. Lacouture, De Gaulle, pp.393-398, pp 401-402. G. Soutou,
'France and the Cold War, 1944-63', in Diplomacy & Statecrafi, 1214 (2001), p.41. pp.48-49.
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before his untimely death. Consciously or not, Johnson employed a Khrushchevite
metaphor when he told the Soviet ambassador, Anatolii Dobrynin, that '[we] do not
want to bury the Soviet Union, but at the same time we do not want to be
buried'. In his 'bridge-building speech' at Lexington, Virginia (May 1964), the
President also declared his interest in establishing stronger cultural and commercial
relations between the USA and Eastern Europe. 29 Some of Johnson's officials
hoped to exploit the Eastern bloc's economic difficulties for political leverage,
arguing that it was folly for the USA to trade with the Soviets while the latter
used aid to the Third World to enhance their influence overseas. The prevailing
view - as expressed by Rusk and McGeorge Bundy (Johnson's special assistant
for national security affairs) - was that restrictions on 'non-strategic' trade with
the Eastern bloc not only undermined the administration's 'bridge-building'
pledges, but also gave West European and Japanese firms a commercial advantage
over American businesses attempting to establish a foothold in trade with Eastern
Europe. 3° Johnson was evidently impressed by these arguments, because a few
months after his landslide victory in the November 1964 Presidential election he
established the Miller Committee to 'explore all aspects of the question of
expanding peaceful trade' with the Eastern bloc countries to support the
administration's declared aim of improving East-West relations. 3 ' The committee's
final report (March 1965) recommended the passage of a trade bill through
20 k Hunganan Revolution, p.24. National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 304, 3.6.64, FRUS XJ'7I
1964-1968, Eastern Europe, p.12.Anatolii Dobiynin, In Confidence, (NY; Random house 1995), pp.128-129.
3°Export Control Review Board meeting, 20.1.64; & M. Bundy to Johnson, 14.4.64, FRUS IX. International
Development and Economic Defense Policy, (Washington 1997), pp.4.46-449, pp.452-453.
31 Bundy to Johnson, 17.2.65; & NSAM No.324, 9.3.65, FRUS LI, pp.481-482, pp.484-485. The Miller Committee
was named after its chairman, J. Irwin Miller.
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Congress, but the Johnson administration's 'bridge-building' objectives were
subsequently thwarted as a result of the Vietnam war.
To summarize, by mid-1964 Foreign Office officials had concluded that the
East European states were undergoing a process of 'evolution' from rigid,
monolithic Stalinism towards a less repressive and more autonomous 'polycentric'
order, with greater scope for reform in individual states. The means available to
Western powers to encourage 'evolution' were limited to trade, cultural exchanges,
and Ministerial visits, but these would in the long-term help develop détente and
would assist East European efforts to gain greater independence from the USSR. It
should also be noted that Washington and Paris derived similar conclusions on
developments within the Eastern bloc. Having discussed official British attitudes
towards de-Stalinization, it is now necessary to turn to Harold Wilson's views on
developments in the Communist world.
Harold Wilson and East-West relations: 1947-1964.
Apart from party-political loyalties, the principal difference between Wilson and his
Conservative predecessors was that because of his pre-parliamentary career in
academia and the civil service he had considerable experience of socio-economic
issues, but showed less interest in diplomatic or military affairs. This aspect of his
character was demonstrated by his peripheral role in Labour's debates during the
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1950s on nuclear deterrence and disengagement in Europe. Wilson's alignment with
the Labour left began when he resigned with Bevan from the Attlee government
in April 1951. Wilson's relationship with his predecessor as party leader, Hugh
Gaitskell, and other leading right-wingers was coloured by intense mutual dislike.
The Labour right did not consider Wilson to be a pro-Communist 'fellow-
traveller' (as was suspected of other left-wing MPs) but considered him to be a
shameless opportunist with neither fixed beliefs nor a sense of loyalty, hence
George Brown's bitter comment 'If we have to die in the last ditch Harold won't
be there. He will have scrambled out'.32
This animosity is worth noting because after his election to the party
leadership in January 1963 Wilson appointed many of his old adversaries to the
shadow Cabinet. After October 1964 the right-wingers held the main Ministerial
posts. Brown became First Secretary of State in the Department of Economic
Affairs (DEA), James Callaghan became Chancellor, Douglas Jay was appointed
President of the Board of Trade, Patrick Gordon-Walker became Foreign Secretary
and Denis Healey was the Defence Secretary throughout Labour's term in office.
Wilson's promotion of his old enemies was partly a measure to preserve party
unity, but was also intended to play his rivals off against each other. This was
significant because the uneasy relationship between the Prime Minister and his
Cabinet colleagues reinforced what David Bruce, the US ambassador to London,
referred to as Wilson's 'lone wolf' tendency. Another senior American official, the
A. Thorpe, A History of the British Labour Party, (Longman 1997), p.142. Brown's comments are in R.
Pearce (ed.), Patrick Gordon-Walker. Political Diaries 1932-1971, (London; Historians' Press 1991), 2.6.60, p.267.
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Under-Secretary of State George Ball, observed that Wilson was 'on guard in the
presence of his own Cabinet colleagues'. 33 Barbara Castle, a left-wing Minister and
one of Wilson's allies, noted that the Prime Minister spoke in 'casual, throwaway
tones' in Cabinet meetings, as if to dull the atmosphere and forestall debate. Under
Wilson, decision-making was devolved from the Cabinet to either ad hoc
committees or standing committees such as Overseas Policy and Defence (OPD).34
The Prime Minister took considerable care to conceal his thoughts from his
colleagues. Nonetheless, with regards to his impression of the USSR and his view
of East-West relations, it is possible to draw some conclusions from both his
career and his public pronouncements.
As a Minister in the Board of Trade in 1947, Wilson led a delegation to
Moscow that April to negotiate an Anglo-Soviet trade treaty. As an opposition MP
he was an 'economic advisor' for the timber firm Montague Meyer Ltd, for whom
he paid a series of visits to the USSR and other bloc states until 1959. These
visits subsequently provided the basis for absurd conspiracy theories alleging that
the future Prime Minister was either recruited, or blackmailed, by the KGB. 35 While
Wilson clearly had no sympathy for the political aspect of Communism, his visits
to the USSR convinced him that central planning enabled the Soviets to organise
33 D. Bruce to R Neustadt, 6.12.64, NSF, UKCF2I6, LBJLIB. Note by Ball on conversation with Gordon-Walker
& PM at No.10,2.12.64, PR XIII, Western Europe Region, (Washington 1995), pp.130.
Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70, (Weidenleld & Nicholson, 1984), 28.4.66, p.11 9. P. Hennessy, The
Prime Minister, (Pengmn 2000), p.289. In October 1963 the Macmillan government amalgamated the Cabinet
Office's Defence and Overseas Policy Committees to form the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee
(DOPC). When Labour entered office the DOPC was renamed the OPD.
35 A. Morgan provides a convincing rebuttal of these conspiracy theones in WiLcon, pp.233-237. See also
Pinilott, Wilson, pp.698-707; & Ziegler; Wilson, p.50!. According to one KGB defector, Soviet intelligence
officers did intend to approach Wilson in order to recruit him, but '[this] development did not come to
fruition'. See C. Andrew & V. Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin A,vhives, (London, Allen Lane 1999), pp.527-528.
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'their economic life in a purposeful and rational manner'. This view contrasted
with that of British diplomats in Moscow, who were aware that despite
Khrushchev's boasts, the USSR was in no position to overtake Western economic
growth. Wilson's famous 'white heat' speech at Scarborough on the need to
harness the 'scientific revolution' and adopt methods of 'democratic planning' to
reverse Britain's economic decline (October 1963) owed much to his impressions
of the USSR's economic and technological achievements. Wilson told Labour party
members that 'those of us who have studied the formidable Soviet challenge
know that our future lies not in military strength alone but in the efforts, the
sacrifices and above all the energies which a free people can mobilise for the
future greatness of our country'. This ambitious pledge to reverse the UK's post-
war economic slump derived in part from the Cold War image of competition
between the Communist and capitalist systems. The establishment of Mintech
(Ministry of Technology) and the history of the ill-fated DEA and the abortive
'National Plan' lie outside the scope of this study, but it is sufficient to note that
Wilson's impressions of the apparent successes of the Soviet command economy
contributed to their creation.36
Wilson's visits to the USSR as a junior Minister and later as an opposition
MP led him to develop his interest in East-West trade, but they also enabled him
to present himself as someone who knew how to deal with the Soviet leadership.
Wilson was by no means a 'fellow traveller'. He returned from the Anglo-Soviet
Pimlott, Wilson, p.1 98, p.276, pp.300-305. Morgan, People's Peace, pp.197-200. D. Homer, 'The Road to
Scarborough: Wilson, Labour and the Scientific Revolution', in The Wilson Governments, pp.48-68.
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trade talks with a reputation as a tough negotiator who had proved to be a match
for his opposite number, Anastas Mikoyan. 37 As President of the Board of Trade in
1949, Wilson suspended commercial relations with Hungary after the regime in
Budapest imprisoned a British businessman, Edgar Saunders, for espionage. In the
same year, Wilson also supported the Attlee government's decision to compile a
list of items which British firms were forbidden to export to the Eastern bloc, an
action which preceded the establishment of COCOM. 38 His early support for East-
West trade was evidently not unconditional, and during the late 1940s he did not
challenge Attlee and Bevin's adoption of a tough stance against the Soviet bloc.
Following his resignation from the government in April 1951, Wilson's enthusiasm
for trade with the Eastern bloc became more pronounced, and paralleled his
protests against both rearmament and the UK's economic dependence on the USA.
In a pamphlet written in 1952 entitled In Place of Dollars, he criticised the
strategic embargo on East-West commerce, and declared that Britain needed
'greater freedom to develop trade with the non-dollar' countries in order to revive
its economy. Wilson maintained that the UK could satisfy the bulk of its raw
material needs by trading with the USSR and Eastern Europe, an assessment
which was based on what he considered to be in Britain's economic interests. It
should be noted, however, that at no point did In Place of Dollars acknowledge
Wilson's role in imposing controls on exports to the Eastern bloc in 1949.
7 The Board of Trade papers on the 1947 Moscow visit are in BT1113417 & 3472 in the PRO. Pimlott,
harold Wilson, pp.99-102, pp.11 1-113. Ziegler, Wilson, pp.65-66. F. Roberts, Dealing with Dictators, (Weidenfeld
& Nicholson), pp.105-106.
On the Saunders case, see A. Gascoigne to FO, 20.5.53, NS1631/10, F0371J106579(PRO). Jackson, Economic
Cold War,p.35.
Harold Wilson, In Place of Dollars, (London, Tribune Pamphlets 1952).
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Wilson's visit to Moscow in May 1953 was one of the first undertaken by
a Western politician since Stalin's death. This visit was ostensibly for business
purposes, but he also had discussions with Mikoyan and with the Foreign Minister,
Vyacheslav Molotov. Wilson's attempts to discuss the main political issues of the
time with the Soviet leadership were, due to his lowly status, of little consequence,
yet he nonetheless sent Churchill a lengthy report on his visit, commenting in
detail on the 'collective leadership' and its internal policies. He argued that
Stalin's successors had limited the powers of the secret police, raised living
standards and seriously intended to improve their relations with the West. He
improbably claimed that there was a 'Bevanite' character to the 'collective
leadership', which in his opinion intended to reduce military spending in order to
concentrate more on domestic problems. This comment suggests that at this time
Wilson shared what one historian refers to as Bevan's 'tendency to pass off
wishful thinking about the Soviet Union as informed analysis'. 4° Although
Malenkov had called for reduced defence expenditure and increased production of
consumer goods, by December 1954 he had lost his struggle for power against
Khrushchev. Given the fact that Churchill followed his own policy of 'easement'
with regards to East-West relations, it is unlikely that the Prime Minister gave
Wilson's report much thought. The visit did, as Richard Crossman (a left-wing
Labour MP) observed, provide another opportunity for Wilson to promote himself
as an expert on Soviet affairs.41
4° Conversation beten Molotov & Wilson, 21.5.53; & Wilson to Churchill, 6.6.53, NS1631/11 & U,
F0371/106579(PRO). J. Campbell, Nye Bevan, (London, Hodder & Stoughton 1992), pp283-284.
Service, Twentieth Century Russia, pp.335-336. J. Morgan (ed), The Backbench Diaries of Richard Grossman,
(London; Hamish Hamilton & Jonathan Cape 1981), 22.6.53, pp.249-256.
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Referring to the Labour right, Wilson spoke of 'running a Bolshevik
revolution with a Tsarist shadow Cabinet', but it is important to note that by 1964
the party leadership had achieved consensus on foreign policy, in particular on
East-West relations. When Wilson spoke of the opportunities for détente with the
USSR, and of the dangers inherent in proposals to create a multi-lateral nuclear
force in NATO, he was expressing beliefs held by Brown, Gordon-Walker, Healey
and the Labour right in general. Prior to the 1964 election, the party had united
behind a pro-disarmament agenda, with an ambiguous pledge to renounce the
British independent deterrent in order to forestall any pressure from the FRG for
possession of its own nuclear weapons.42 The Labour manifesto proclaimed the
party's intention to 'put forward constructive proposals for integrating all NATO's
nuclear weapons under political control' in order to ensure that all alliance
members had 'a proper share in their deployment and control', and no incentive to
develop their own national forces. 43 In addition, while Wilson praised Khrushchev
for his commitment to détente and for signing the LTBT, he also publicly attacked
the 'totalitarian Communism of China', describing Beijing's ideological militancy as
a threat to world peace.
Much to the disgust of the Labour left, Wilson also renounced his earlier
anti-Americanism (reflected in particular by In Place of Dollars), stressing the
Grossman Backbench Diaries, 12.3.63, p.987. Patnck Gordon-Walker, 'The Labor Party's Defense and Foreign
Policy', in Foreign Affairs, 42, 3 (1964), pp.390-398. Notes on discussions with Khnshchev, Gromyko &
Gomulka, June 1963, Gordon-Walker Papers (GNWR1/15), Churchill College.
'° I. Dale (ed.), Labour Party General Election Manfestos 1900-1997, (Routledge 2000), pp.123-124.
'"Speech at Bndgepoit University, Connecticut, 3.3.64, in The New Britain: Labour's Plan. Outlined by Harold
Wilson, (Penguin 1964), pp.90-100.
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importance of the Anglo-American alliance for British foreign policy. His visits to
Washington in March 1963 and the following year were, as Rusk informed
Johnson, partly intended to 'reassure you regarding his reliability as an ally'. Henry
Kissinger later noted that even by 1969 'some in the outgoing administration had
considered [Wilson] too close to the left wing of the Labour Party; this and his
vanity were supposed to make him unusually susceptible to Soviet
blandishments'. 45 The Labour leader's efforts to prove his reliability to Washington
did not prevent him from paying two visits to Moscow (June 1963 and June
1964). The purpose of these trips was to present Wilson as a competent statesman,
and also to establish the basis of a future relationship with Khrushchev.
The first visit took place prior to the conclusion of the LTBT, the main
event being the meeting between Wilson, Khrushchev, Gordon-Walker and the
Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, on 10th June 1963. These talks were
dominated by Khrushchev, who alternated between crude jokes and blustering
threats. Wilson and Gordon-Walker attempted to impress the Soviet leader with
Labour's proposal to renounce the UK's nuclear status in the interests of non-
proliferation. Khrushchev boasted that the USSR did not 'take the French or the
UK [nuclear] capability seriously', and he bragged about the ease with which
Britain and France's nuclear forces would be destroyed in any global war. When
the discussion turned to Germany, the atmosphere became unpleasant. Khrushchev
suggested that he could reopen the issue of access to Berlin, and when Wilson
45 N. D. Lankford, The Last Amencan AnstocraL The biophy of David K E. Bnice, (Boston; Little, Brown
1996), p.329. Rusk to Johnson, 28.2.64, MF41O, emphasis as in original. H. Kissinger, White House Yea,,
(London; Phoenix Press edition 2000), p.91.
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warned that the result would be another crisis the Soviet leader made threatening
comments about what would happen to Britain in the event of war. The
conversation subsequently shifted to Laos, and Khrushchev appeared to calm down.
Wilson's first effort to discuss diplomacy with the Soviet leader had not been a
success - he had hardly distinguished himself by sycophantically comparing
Khrushchev with Lenin, and by asserting that '[we] have no respect either for
Adenauer or for Ulbricht'. The Soviet leader had, for his part, succeeded in
browbeating the Labour leader over Berlin, although his threat to provoke another
crisis was evidently another example of his tendency to intimidate Western visitors
with empty bluster, The visitors' attempts to persuade Khrushchev to conclude a
Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) with the USA and UK met with the
uncompromising response that the USSR would not accept any independent
verification measures, which would be used as a cover for espionage.
Wilson and Gordon-Walker's visit in June 1964 took place with less
embarrassment, and the Soviets treated the former with greater respect, as befitting
a potential Prime Minister. The Labour leader took with him a 'master plan' for
disarmament, involving a halt to the production of nuclear delivery vehicles, a
'bonfire' of obsolete bombers, a non-proliferation treaty, an agreement to 'freeze'
the deployment of nuclear weapons in Central Europe, and the convening of
annual tripartite summits at the United Nations. Foreign Office officials observed
that the 'master plan' simply amalgamated existing US and Soviet proposals on
Conversation betwen Gordon-Walker, A. Gromyko, Khrushchev & Wilson at Kremlin, 10.6.63; Moscow to
FO, No.1211, 15.6.63, PREM1114894(PRO) & GNWRIIIS.
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disarmament, and did not take into account the existing balance of forces or the
problems of verification. As expected, the Soviets rejected the first and second
proposals, which the Johnson administration had initially raised in early 1964.
Khrushchev expressed a vague interest in the annual summit proposal, but given
the fact that Labour was still in opposition, the main purpose of the visit was
symbolic. One noteworthy feature of both visits was Wilson's comments on the
need for frequent contacts between the Soviet and British governments. Wilson
told Khrushchev in June 1963 that it was 'harder for a British Prime Minister to
decide to come to Moscow than to go to the moon', and he commented that if
Labour won the next election he 'would want to come [to the USSR] more
often'. The following year, the Labour leader stated that a 'man-to-man approach'
was needed to improve Anglo-Soviet relations. Given this emphasis on personal
diplomacy it is therefore ironic that at the same time Wilson became Prime
Minister Khrushchev was overthrown by his Politburo colleagues. 47 The impact of
this development on the new British government's approach to East-West relations
is examined in the next chapter.
'7 Moscow to FO, No.1061, 3.6.64; Moscow to FO, No.1070-1073, 4.6.64; & N. Henderson (FO) to J. 0. Wright
(No.10), 10.6.64, PREM1114894(PRO). Pinilott, Wilson, pp.307-308. Meeting in Kremlin on 10.6.63, GNWR1J1S.
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CHAPTER 3: ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE
'STAGNATION' OF DÉTENTE. OCTOBER 1964-FEBRUARY
1966.
Labour won the 1964 general election with an absolute majority of only three
seats in parliament and, as Wilson subsequently observed, the new government had
to address several issues with serious implications for Britain's economic and
foreign policies:
The Chinese had, the previous day, exploded their first nuclear weapon ... There was a
telegram appraising the situation in the Soviet Union following the overthrow, less than
twenty-four hours earlier, of Mr Khrushchev and the appointment of Mr Kosygin
There was anxious news of the 'confrontation', the war between Indonesia and Malaysia,
[and], grimmest of all, there was the economic news.1
The Wilson government inherited a balance of payments deficit of £800 million
which, in addition to declining confidence in the value of sterling, initiated a long
drawn-out struggle to prevent devaluation. 2 These economic problems not only
absorbed much of the new government's time but also affected the UK's ability
to contribute to NATO defence while fulfilling its military commitments 'East of
Suez'. Wilson and his Ministers also had to face foreign policy problems - notably
those concerning Indonesia's 'confrontation' with Malaysia, and the white separatist
rebellion in Rhodesia - which were peripheral to East-West relations but which
l Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970, (Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1971), pp.2-3.
2	 sterling problem, and its impact on Anglo-American relations, is analysed in R. Roy, The Battle of the
Pound: The Political Economy of Anglo-Amencan Relatwns 1964-1968, (PhD thesis, LSE 2001).
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competed for time and attention with policy problems more relevant to the Cold
War.3
After assuming office, the Wilson government had to address the
implications of Khrushchev's downfall (15 October 1964) and the first Chinese
nuclear test (16 October). The Labour government proclaimed its intention of
developing détente in the Queen's speech to Parliament (3 November 1964) and
also committed itself to pursue negotiations towards a nuclear non-proliferation
treaty (NPT).4
 During the following year, Wilson sought a meeting with
Khrushchev's successors, while British efforts to develop relations with the Eastern
bloc focused on improving trading contacts. This chapter examines British policy
towards East-West relations during the first sixteen months of Labour's term in
office, with particular reference to the problems arising from Vietnam, NATO
nuclear-sharing and non-proliferation, and will conclude by analysing Wilson's first
visit to Moscow (February 1966).
China's nuclear test and Khrushchev's downfall: October 1964-January 1965.
Wilson's predecessor, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, was informed that a Chinese nuclear
test appeared imminent when the Director of the CIA, John McCone, visited
London in September 1964. McCone asserted that although the PRC's emergence
3 lnterview with Oliver Wright, p.12, DOHP. Easter, British Defence Policy, pp.257-259.
7O1 H.C.Deb.5s, (HMSO 1964), cols.34-37.
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as a nuclear power would have a profound psychological effect on Asian states,
Chinese military power would not be significantly enhanced. Both American and
British assessments concluded that Beijing was unlikely to develop a short-range
delivery capability before 1968, or to acquire long-range missile systems before
1975. In fact, the Chinese did develop MRBMs by the mid-1960s, but the
deployment of China's first ICBMs was delayed until 1980, by which time the
USSR had become Beijing's main adversary.6
From Washington and London's point of view, the Chinese nuclear test
threatened to inspire other states, notably India, to develop nuclear weapons. During
his visit to London (December 1964) the Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur
Shastri, told Wilson that he was under political pressure to respond in kind to the
Chinese test, and he requested an Anglo-American guarantee to protect non-nuclear
states against nuclear blackmail. 7 British officials were concerned that if India
became a nuclear power, the result would be widespread nuclear proliferation,
which would increase the likelihood of local conflicts leading to global war.
London was also concerned that the Britain's East of Suez commitments would be
threatened by nuclear-capable enemies. 8 Yet despite Shastri's request the non-
aligned Indians later expressed their preference for a US-Soviet guarantee rather
than an all-Western commitment. However, Moscow was not prepared to exacerbate
Conversation between J. McCone & Douglas-Home at 10 Downing St. 21.9.64, PREM11/5147(PRO).
CC(64)2" Cabinet conclusions, 24.10.64, CAB128139(PRO).
J. Les & Hua Di, 'China's Ballistic Missile Programs. Technologies, Strategies, Goals', in International
Security 1712 (1992), pp.9-10, pp 16-19.
1 Conversation between FL Aipharsi (French Ambassador to Washington) & Rusk, 21.5.65, MF404. DO(64)25,
25.3.64, CAB148/2(PRO). Conversation between Shastii & PM at 10 Downing St. 4.12.64, PREM13/973(PRO).
8 C. Minogue (CR0) to J. 0. Wright (No.10), 8.1.65,PREM131973(PRO).
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the Sino-Soviet split by openly aligning with India in concert with the Western
powers. In late March 1965, the OPD was advised by OPD(0) (its official
counterpart) that 'the West should not contemplate giving specific assurances to
India unless we were firmly convinced that the only alternative would be an
Indian nuclear programme'. For both Washington and London, this dilemma
demonstrated the importance of a successful non-proliferation agreement, and it
also contributed to the Labour government's decision to reverse its ambiguous pre-
election pledge to abolish the 'independent' deterrent.9
Unlike the Chinese nuclear test, Khrushchev's downfall was unexpected. On
the evening of 14 October 1964, the Soviet leader was summoned to a plenum of
the Central Committee of the CPSU, during which he was arraigned by Suslov for
his mismanagement of the economy and his high-handed treatment of the East
Europeans and the Chinese. The Soviet leader was also condemned for the
recklessness he had shown over Cuba in 1962. Following Suslov's denunciation of
Khrushchev's record - 'Not leadership but a complete merry-go-round !' - the
Central Committee voted for the latter's dismissal, a decision which was met with
apathy by the Soviet populace.'° Tass surprised Western governments with its
sudden announcement that Khrushchev had been 'relieved of his duties ... in view
of his advanced age and of the deterioration of his health'. British officials were
aware of the failure of Khrushchev's economic policies, but concluded in March
9 ()pJ)(5)9th meeting, 3 1.3.65, OPD(65), CAB148/18. Meeting & report by Committee on Nuclear Proliferation,
7.1.65 & 8.1.65, FRUS XL Anus Control and Disaimament, pp.154-168. Stewart to PM, 3.3.65,
PREM13/973(PRO).
'°Service, Twentieth Centu,y Russia, pp.376-378. D. Selvage, The Warsaw Pact and Nuclear Nonprolferation,
1963-i 965, CWIHP Paper No.32 (2001), pp.10-13. Fursenko & Naftali, 'Hell of a Gamble', pp.353-354.
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1964 that '[barring] his sudden illness or incapacitation, there is no reason to
expect any major changes in the Soviet leadership'." Following Khrushchev's
overthrow, Leonid Brezhnev became CPSU secretary and Alexei Kosygin was
appointed Premier, but there was also a younger generation of Politburo members
- among them Alexander Shelepin (a former chairman of the KGB) and Dmitrii
Polyanskii (who was appointed Deputy Premier) - who had increased their
influence as a result of the coup. As noted above, both Brezhnev and Kosygin had
been identified in Whitehall as possible successors, but the JTC conceded that
'Khrushchev's demise had occurred without warning'. Although there were
'indicators that he might be having trouble' with his Politburo colleagues, 'the
difficulty was to know when the Russian leader ceased to control events'.'2
Khrushchev himself was oblivious to the threat to his position until the moment
he was overthrown and cast into obscurity.
Trevelyan reported that the Kremlin coup was caused by Khrushchev's
'methods and personal idiosyncrasies', the failure of his economic policies and his
mishandling of the Sino-Soviet split. The ambassador's assessment, noted by
Wilson, was that Brezhnev and Kosygin would concentrate on domestic problems
and relations with Mao, and although still concerned with European issues Moscow
would neither undertake, nor respond to, any diplomatic initiatives.' 3 Trevelyan's
superiors agreed with his conclusions that present Soviet policy on détente,
"Moscow to FO, 15.10.64, N.21 70, NS1O1 5/40, F0371/177664(PRO). Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy
April-November 1964,4.3.64, NS1022/1 9, F03711177670(PRO).
MC(64)51 M meeting, 15.10.64, CAB159/42(PRO). Service, Twentieth Centuiy Russia, p.379, p.390. Hosking,
Soviet Union, p.367.
'3 Moscow to FO, 20.10.64, N.2215; Wright to T. Bridges (FO), 21.10.64, F03711177670(PRO).
relations with China and on developments in Eastern Europe were unlikely to
change. Khrushchev's fall would not lead to reconciliation between Moscow and
Beijing because Sino-Soviet differences were beyond repair, and the Foreign Office
considered it 'unlikely that the Russians can force the East Europeans back into
greater subservience to the Soviet Union'. NATO views of the succession and its
implications were expressed in similar terms, the American view being that
Khrushchev's successors would at least be less reckless in conducting foreign
policy. As for the future of the new leadership, the US ambassador to Moscow,
Foy Kohler, perceptively commented that Brezhnev was 'vain and ambitious, and
may well be tempted to follow Khrushchev's example by combining [the] top
party and government roles'.'4
The Soviet ambassador, Alexei Soldatov, assured Wilson on 18 October that
the new leadership would continue to follow Khrushchev's policy on 'peaceful
coexistence', and would 'continue ... to develop co-operation with Her Majesty's
Government in the fields of commercial, scientific and cultural exchanges'.'5
Trevelyan, however, expressed reservations as to the extent to which Anglo-Soviet
contacts would develop, writing his assessments for the new Foreign Secretary
(and for Wilson) in early November. Trevelyan examined the USSR's foreign
policy since 1945, observing that while Stalin had envisaged the possibility that
one day the USSR would be strong enough to win a world war against the
14 FO brief for WEU meeting, 16-17.11.64, NS1O1 5/47, F0371/177667(PRO). Papers from NATO Working
Group on Soviet Policy, 25.11.64, NS1022175, F03711177672(PRO). Moscow to State Dept. No.1333, 28.10.64,
NSF, USSR Country File (USSRCF) 219, LBJLIB.
'FO to Moscow, No.3822, 18.10.64, NSIOI5/65, F03711177665.
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capitalists, the development of thermonuclear weapons led his successors to
develop the ideology of so-called 'peaceflul co-existence'. At the 22" CPSU
Congress Khrushchev distinguished between his opposition to an East-West 'war
of extermination', and Moscow's support for 'wars of national liberation' in the
post-colonial world. Over the course of his tenure of power, Khrushchev discovered
that increased military expenditure did not lead to enhanced security, but was
instead crippling the Soviet economy. The USSR recognised that its interests lay
in détente with the USA and its allies, but this would involve greater commercial
and cultural contact between Eastern and Western Europe - which could
undermine the Eastern bloc regimes - while détente would also anger the more
militant Chinese. Khrushchev's dilemma was that he wanted to improve East-West
relations but was unwilling to remould the USSR's political strategy to achieve
this aim. Trevelyan concluded that there was little evidence to suggest that
Brezhnev and Kosygin would succeed in resolving the dilemma their predecessor
had failed to resolve.16
The conference of Ministers, senior civil servants and service chiefs at
Chequers (2 1-22 November) provided an opportunity to assess the military aspect
of the Soviet 'threat' and the prospects for reducing the British commitment to
NATO.'7
 In opposition, Labour politicians had argued the case for mutual
reductions of NATO and WTO forces in Central Europe - one of the most
16 Trevelyan to Gordon-Walker, 2.11.64 (two parts), NS1022i69 & NS1022/70, F0371/177671(PRO). Holloway,
Stalin and the Bomb, pp.335-345.
' 7 S. Dockrill examines the Chequers conference in tl context of contemporaiy British defence policy in
'Britain's Power and Influence: Dealing 'with Three Roles and the Wilson Government's Defence Debate at
Chequers in November 1964', in Diplomacy & Statecraft, 11/1 (2000), pp.211-240.
prominent exponents of disengagement being the new Defence Secretary, Denis
Healey. The majority of Ministers considered the retention of Britain's military
commitments East of Suez to be a high priority. These commitments included not
only the defence of former colonial territories (such as Malaysia) but membership
of CENTO and SEATO. Although the Conservatives had followed a similar
agenda while in office, the increasing burden of defence led to the establishment
of the OPD(0)'s Long-Term Study Group on defence expenditure in May 1964.
The study group's conclusions were debated at Chequers six months later, when
the costs of defence budget were highlighted by the pound's weakness. Under
pressure from Brown and Callaghan, the Labour government planned to cut
military expenditure from £2,400 to £2,000 million by the end of the decade.'8
The problem was to determine where reductions could be made.
The Long-Term Study Group's report repeated the official consensus that
the USSR would 'avoid war as a deliberate act of policy' and would seek to
ease tensions with the Western powers. The Soviets would not, however, willingly
relax their authority over Eastern Europe in the foreseeable future. Due to the
reduced tensions in Europe there were militarily sound reasons for reducing
BAOR, which was nominally 55,000 strong but was actually under-strength by
3,000 men. WEU arrangements enabled Britain to temporarily withdrawal troops
from NATO whenever any crises erupted East of Suez. However, the study group
warned that a permanent unilateral reduction of BAOR would encourage US troop
'8 Healey, Time of My Life, pp.178-180. Patnck Gordon-Walker, The Cabinet, (London; Heinemann 1972), p.136.
Easter, British Defence Policy,p.183. MISC17/1 meeting, 21.11.64, CAB1301213(PRO).
reductions and thus weaken NATO solidarity, and would lead Washington to
develop closer ties with Bonn at the expense of the Anglo-American alliance. The
study group's report also argued that if Britain reneged on the London agreement
of 1954, Bonn would have a pretext to renounce its pledge not to develop
weapons of mass destruction. Wilson himself was suspicious of West German
intentions. At Chequers he argued that considering the assessment that 'there was
no longer a risk of war with the Soviet Union so long as NATO solidarity
lasted', Alliance force levels were unrealistically high. Yet the reduction of BAOR
'will not only lessen our own political influence in Europe but would in present
circumstances lead to a predominating German influence on European defence'.
The Prime Minister argued that if the Bundeswehr's growing military power was
not counter-balanced, then Bonn's interest in reunification could lead the West
Germans to dominate NATO politically and distort the Alliance's defensive
agenda.' 9
 The Chequers meeting ended with agreement that reductions in defence
expenditure could not be met by cutting BAOR, but Ministers privately hoped that
British forces in the FRG could be reduced in future, either through a review of
NATO strategy, an agreement on mutual force reductions with the USSR, or by
unilateral means.2°
The Chequers meeting also addressed the fate of Polaris, the purchase of
which Macmillan had negotiated with Kennedy at the Nassau summit (December
1962). On 11 November Wilson, Gordon-Walker and Healey agreed to retain
' 9 OPD(O64)6;Regional Study on Europe, 23.10.64, CAB14S/40(PRO).
MISCI7/4th
 meeting, 22.11.64, CAB13Ot213(PRO). OPD(65)12th
 meeting, 3.3.65, CAB14SI4S(PRO). Duflield,
Power Rule.,, p.174.
Polaris, a decision which was endorsed at Chequers the following week. The
Conservatives had intended to build five submarines armed with Polaris missiles,
but in January 1965 the OPD decided that Britain could only afford a fleet of
four.21
 The decision to keep Polaris was partly due to Wilson's concern that the
Conservatives could exploit popular support for Britain's nuclear status and
overturn Labour's narrow majority. It appears that even before the election Wilson
was, despite Labour's manifesto promise, thinking of maintaining the deterrent.22
The Polaris submarines were also regarded by the Foreign Office, MoD and COS
as a counter against any new nuclear threats East of Suez, as well as any future
return to isolationism on the part of the USA, 23
 In strategic terms, the UK's
Polaris fleet was not only overshadowed by the superpower nuclear arsenals, but it
was questionable as to whether it would help defend Britain's worldwide
commitments. The OPD was informed by OPD(0) in March 1965 that the Polaris
fleet could be based in the NATO area or East of Suez, but could not be
deployed simultaneously against both the USSR and China. Polaris was retained
principally for political reasons, although the Labour government's decision was
presented as part of an initiative to replace the proposed NATO Multilateral Force
(MLF).
21 MISCII/16, conversation between Gordon-Walker, Healey & PM at No.10 Donmng St. 11.11.64,
CAB13O/212(PRO). MISC17/2' meeting, 21.11.64, CAB13Ot213(PRO). OPD(65)5th meeting, 29.1.65,
CAB14SJIS(PRO).
Ball, 2.12.64, FRU5 XIII, p.126-132. Hennessy, Secret State, pp.70-77.
C0S278164(Annex); The British Strategic Nuclear Capabiliy, 14.10.64, DEF5I154(PRO). Conversation
between Healey & Dutch Defence Minister at MoD, 14.12.64, PREM13I27(PRO). Heamessy,Muddling Through,
pp.114-117.
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The MLF concept was developed in 1960-1961 by State Department
officials to satisfy the FRG's demands for a role in NATO nuclear strategy.
American officials were as concerned as their British counterparts over Germany's
future, and the MLF was partly intended to forestall Bonn pressing for nuclear
weapons, either independently or in collaboration with France. 25
 Macmillan and
Kennedy had both agreed to 'the development of a multilateral NATO nuclear
force' at Nassau, but the idea of a mixed-manned Polaris surface fleet was
unpopular in Whitehall, not only because of its implications for the UK's nuclear
status, but also because West German participation in the MZLF was bound to
arouse Moscow's wrath. Wilson showed some sympathy for the Soviet point of
view, which in his opinion combined respect for the FRG's post-war economic
revival with the fear that the USSR might again be the victim of German
aggression. 26
 The Prime Minister therefore seized on the concept of an 'Atlantic
Nuclear Force' (ANF), devised by Cabinet Office officials, as an alternative. The
ANF would consist of the British V bomber force (replaced by the Polaris
submarines once they entered service), an American contingent of equal strength
and a mixed-manned element, with the French force de frappe being added should
de Gaulle agree to participate. In addition, participants would sign a treaty blocking
the dissemination of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states.27
Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, pp.41-43. Gavin, 'Flexible Response', p.857.
COS(65)55 meeting, 10.9.64, DEFE4/171(PRO). Conversation between PM & 0. SchrOder (West Gennan
Foreign Minister) at No.10, 11.12.64,PREM13I27(PRO).
27 M1SCI1/12, Defence Study Group Repoil, 9.11.64, CABI3OI211(PRO). S. Schrafstetter & S. Twigge, 'Trick or
Truth? The British ANF Proposal, West Germany and Nonproliferation', in Diplomacy & Statecraft, 11/2
(2000), pp.167-169.
Wilson argued that the ANF option reinforced interdependence within
NATO, thus obscuring his abrupt U-turn on Polaris. National pride would be
appeased by the fact that British nuclear forces would return to national control in
the event of the Alliance collapsing. The ANF was also considered by Ministers
to be less harmful to détente - and less provocative to the Soviets - because of
the dilution of the mixed-manned element, and the fact that the ANF consisted of
existing weapons systems. However, officials approached the issue more in the
context of inter-allied relations, and did not believe that the ANF would be more
acceptable to Moscow than the MLF. 28 The West German Chancellor, Ludwig
Erhard, welcomed the ANF, and when Wilson, Gordon-Walker and Healey visited
Washington (7-8 December) they discovered that with the exception of George
Ball, the MLF had few supporters in the Johnson administration. The President
himself was indecisive on the nuclear-sharing issue, and the Washington visit
concluded with the Americans promising to 'consider' the ANF, and to give time
to the British to consult other NATO governments on their proposals. The MLF
had, as Healey later put it, been 'torpedoed', but as officials had predicted the
Soviets were as hostile towards the ANF as they had been towards the MLF,
declaring that NATO plans for nuclear-sharing involved proliferation.29
One of the Labour government's expressed objectives was to play a part in
negotiations for an NPT, but Foreign Office officials advised Wilson that in the
MISC17/4th
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short-term the Soviet leadership was unprepared to undertake any major diplomatic
initiatives, and would 'go slow' on East-West relations for the time being.3°
Nevertheless, the Prime Minister intended to invite Kosygin to London for the
spring of 1965, and Trevelyan was instrncted to offer this invitation to the Soviet
Foreign Ministry on 9 December. Diplomatic protocol dictated that, following
Macmillan's visit to the USSR it was the British government's turn to welcome
the Soviet Premier. However, Trevelyan informed London on the 12th that the
Soviets insisted that Wilson visit Moscow first. Although both governments agreed
that Gromyko would visit the UK in March 1965, there was deadlock over the
exchange of visits by the respective Premiers. 3 ' The ambassador to Moscow
advised against the Prime Minister visiting the USSR first, because the Soviets
would benefit from the propaganda image of Wilson hurrying to talk to Brezhnev
and Kosygin on their home ground, while the latter would be able to grill Wilson
on NATO nuclear-sharing before any agreement had been reached within the
Alliance. Denis Greenhill, the undersecretary supervising the Northern Department,
expressed the view that the Prime Minister could not travel to Moscow 'until
there are matters of substance to discuss'. Wilson, however, stated that he was 'not
concerned to stand on protocol and would make the first move if necessary', and
he suggested that Kosygin was unwilling to leave Moscow until his position in
the Kremlin had become more secure.32
3° UK Delegation to NATO (UKDeINATO) to FO, No.9(Saving), 11.2.65, N1051/4, F0371/182498(PRO).
0PLX0X64)16, Briefs for PM's visit to Washington, 24.11.64, CAB148/40(PRO).
FO to Moscow, No.4042, 9.12.64; & Moscow to FO, No.2612, 12.12.64, PREM13/598(PRO).
n Trevelyan to FO, 13.12.64; & Conversation between Averell Harriman & PM at No.10, 7.1.65,
PREM13/598(PRO). Note by H. Smith (ND), NSIO5I/3, F0371/182761(PRO).
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By January 1965, Wilson had overcome the Foreign Office argument that
the Soviet Premier would have to visit Britain first. According to Bruce, the Prime
Minister presumed that while Kosygin would feel 'inhibited' in London, in
Moscow he 'would have access to his colleagues, would feel more secure and
would, hopefully, be more forthcoming' with his visitor. The communiqué
announcing the exchange of visits deliberateLy did not specify which country
would play host first. 33
 Yet despite Wilson's readiness to meet the Soviet
leadership on their terms, his planned visit was delayed for a further year. This
was attributed partly to Soviet opposition to the ANF, which Kosygin expressed in
an angry letter to the Prime Minister on 7 January. Kosygin accused Wilson of
appeasing West German nuclear ambitions, and stated that plans for nuclear-sharing
within NATO would rule out Soviet agreement on an NPT. Trevelyan gloomily
noted at the end of the month that '[sooner] or later this year we and the
Russians may be faced with the question of how to avoid increases of tensions
which neither side wants, but which follow from the development of existing
situations'. 34
 The ambassador's prediction was confirmed in early February, when
the dispute over non-proliferation was compounded by the USA's overt military
intervention in the Vietnam war.
London to State Dept, No.79, 16.7.65, MF408. Note by J. Wright (No.10), 11.1.65, NSI 051/6,
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The Vietnam war, East-West relations and Wilson's attempts at diplomatic
mediation: December 1964-January 1966.
The Kennedy administration had provided substantial military aid to bolster the
South Vietnamese regime against the Communist-led National Liberation Front
(NLF), but it was during Johnson's term in office that the USA became actively
involved in the conflict in Vietnam. Washington claimed that responsibility for the
war lay with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRY), which was sending
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops to infiltrate South Vietnam in support of
the NLF. The North Vietnamese, for their part, believed that they had been tricked
into accepting partition in the 1954 Geneva conference, and were determined to
reunify Vietnam by force. The process by which the USA became drawn into the
Vietnam war in late 1964 and early 1965 has been discussed in detail
elsewhere,35
 and the following section concentrates on the implications of the
conflict for East-West relations and, in particular, for Britain's relationship with the
USSR.
The Wilson government publicly supported for US policy in Vietnam in
order to preserve the Anglo-American alliance. There was also an informal quid
pro quo in which Britain supported American policy towards Vietnam in return
35 The origins of American involvement have bn most recently discussed in D. Kaiser's American Tragedy.
Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War, (Cambridge Mass.; Harvard University Press 2000), and
- more controversiaily - F. Logevall's Choosing War. The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of the
War in Vietnam, (Beiteley Ca.; University of California Press 1999). See also R. D. Schulzinger, A Time for
War. The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975, (OUP 1997), pp.154-181. P. Busch analyses tl UK's policy
towards Vietnam during the Kennedy era in Britain and Kennedy's War in Vietnam, 1961-1963, (PhD thesis,
LSE 2001).
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for Washington's backing against Indonesia. 36 The American and British
governments shared the common objective of preventing, in Michael Stewart's
words, 'a complete breakthrough of Communist power from in central land mass
of Europe and Asia into the rest of the world'. Stewart, who succeeded Gordon-
Walker as Foreign Secretary after the latter lost the Leyton by-election (21
January 1965), publicly defended America's actions in Vietnam and was an
exponent of the traditional policy of containment. He informed Cabinet colleagues
in November 1965 that although the Soviet threat to the West had receded in
recent years, Moscow had not renounced its goal of spreading world Communism.
Stewart expressed his views on Western objectives in the Third World as a
whole, and his comments also reflected the British government's attitude towards
Vietnam:
[The] task of the Western alliance [is] on the one hand to keep the direct tension
between the Soviet Union and themselves as low as possible, while at the same time
ensuring that no avoidable gap is created ... which will allow the further extension
either of the militaiy power or the 1,olitical influence of Communism, whether deriving
its authority from Moscow or Peking.
Of the two major Communist powers, China was regarded by Britain as the less
predictable and the more dangerous adversary in Asia. British perceptions of the
Chinese threat placed less emphasis on the PRC's growing military power than on
Mao Zedong's 'wars of national liberation' doctrine and Beijing's support for anti-
Western insurgencies and political movements throughout the Third World.
Interview with Michael Palliser, p.12, DOHP. A. Parker, 'International Aspects of the Vietnam War', in P.
Lowe (ed.), The Vietnam War, (Manchester University Press 1998), p.201. Conversation between Paul Hasluck
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Although British officials favoured the eventual neutralisation of South East Asia,
in the short-term it was deemed necessary for the USA and the Western powers
to maintain a military presence in the Far East to prevent the region from 'falling
under Chinese Communist domination'. American intervention in Vietnam was
supported in principle by London on these grounds.38
Yet as was the case with previous crises, the British were also concerned
that the Vietnam war could escalate into a major East-West confrontation. As
Washington resorted to air attacks on the DRy, officials in Whitehall wondered
whether their American counterparts had any firm objectives in Vietnam, let alone
any idea of the means by which these could be achieved. 39
 Wilson was worried
that if the Americans were 'checkmated' in a limited war in Vietnam, they would
choose to escalate the war despite the risks of Chinese or Soviet intervention.40
An additional problem for the Prime Minister was that Johnson and his officials
frequently pressed the UK to send troops to supplement the US war effort. The
Labour government in no mood to adopt new commitments in the Far East while
the 'confrontation' remained unresolved, and after Indonesia made peace with
Malaysia (August 1966) the British intended to reduce, rather than increase, their
military commitments in South-East Asia. 4 ' In direct contrast to Attlee, who sent
British troops to fight in Korea in 1950, Wilson was unwilling to follow Australia
and New Zealand's example by involving Britain in the war in Vietnam.
Interview with Stewart, 18.2.65,Hetherington Papers A11P813. OPD(0X65)63(Final); Defence Review Studies.
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Wilson's knew that the Labour left resented his refusal to openly condemn
American policy towards South-East Asia, and was aware that left-wing
backbenchers would revolt against the government if the UK sent even a limited
contingent to Vietnam. 42
 Wilson's policy of offering diplomatic support for
American intervention in Indochina while advocating a negotiated settlement to the
war was due to his concerns over escalation, the need to pacify criticism from his
party, and his reluctance to see Britain actively involved in Vietnam. The Prime
Minister argued that the UK's role as co-chairman of the Geneva conference
precluded participation in the war, and that Britain's role was to work with the
other co-chairman, the USSR, to promote a peace settlement. The Geneva Accords
did not grant the co-chairmen a long-term peace-making role, and the 1954
conference could not be reconvened without the consent of all the other
participants - the USA, France, China, North and South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia,
and the International Control Commission (ICC) states (Canada, India and Poland).
Nonetheless, the British government adopted the position that 'the two co-chairmen
can co-operate to ease tensions and restore peace and stability in Vietnam'. 43
 The
Geneva co-chairmanship provided the basis for Wilson's subsequent efforts to
promote a negotiated settlement to the Vietnam conflict.
In early February 1965, the NLF attacked the American bases at Pleiku and
Qui Nhon, providing the pretext for US air-strikes on North Vietnam. The Johnson
Tony Benn, Out of the Wildemes. Dianes 1963-67, (Hutchinson 1987), 265.65, p.262. Pimlott, WiLson, pp.392
-399.
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administration's decision to bomb North Vietnamese targets South of the 19th
parallel was made despite the fact that Kosygin was visiting Hanoi with a high-
level Soviet delegation. American policy-makers presumed that the USSR's
objectives were to gain greater influence over the DRV and to fulfil its pledge to
support a fellow socialist state. Although the Soviets provided the North
Vietnamese with anti-aircraft artillery, surface-to-air missiles, warplanes and
advisors, Washington concluded that the USSR would not risk 'overt, military
action' which would end in a confrontation with the USA. Trevelyan likewise
informed London that the Soviets were obliged 'to honour their obligation to give
"necessary help" against American aggression', but did 'not want any extension of
hostilities' in South-East Asia.45
British assessments of Soviet policy differed from American interpretations
in one respect. US officials regarded the USSR as actively assisting North
Vietnamese-inspired subversion in South Vietnam, and concluded that Khrushchev's
successors considered ideological competition with China to be more important
than détente with the West. The British argued that Moscow's hand had been
forced by the Chinese and that, as the chargé in Beijing commented, the Soviet
objective was to 'recover control over events in Viet-Nam'. The USSR had to
assist the DRV in order to counter accusations of 'capitulationism' from the PRC,
but the Soviets were also determined to prevent the conflict from escalating. From
NSC548th
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the Moscow embassy, Brimelow suggested that the Soviets calculated that the
Vietnamese Communists were independent from Beijing, and a unified Vietnam
would therefore be another element in the 'political containment' of the PRC. Yet
the escalation of the war 'threatens to kill a lot of Vietnamese and throw the rest
into the arms of the Chinese', and Moscow's concerns over Vietnam were
motivated by anti-Chinese as well as anti-American calculations. 47 While Foreign
Office officials were convinced of the need for the de-escalation, if not a
negotiated settlement, to the war, they were unsure of how the Vietnam conflict
could be peaceflully resolved and, as will be argued subsequently, were less
optimistic than the Prime Minister as far as the prospects of mediation were
concerned.
Ilya Gaiduk's study on Soviet policy towards Vietnam shows that the
Foreign Office's interpretations cited above had some substance to them. Gaiduk
states that the Soviet leadership calculated that the war in Indochina would sap
American and Chinese strength, assisting Soviet policy goals in Europe and Asia.
Moscow also hoped to supplant Beijing as Hanoi's principal ally. However, the
Soviets did not want Vietnam to be the casus bell of a Third World War, and
privately counselled the North Vietnamese to negotiate with the Americans. Yet
the Chinese had greater influence in Hanoi until the end of the decade, partly
because Beijing annually provided more aid than Moscow until 1967, but also
because of the close ties between the Chinese and North Vietnamese leaderships.
' Beijing to FO, No 134, 5.2.65, NS10319617, F0371/182757(PRO). Bnznelow to A. de la Mare (SEAD),
18.2.66, N1021/8112, F0371/188487(PRO).
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Although the latter were by no means puppets of the PRC, Hanoi and Beijing had
a shared hostility to peace talks which lasted until 1968.
In December 1964 Wilson was informed by Washington that an air
campaign against North Vietnam was imminent, and had stated that the British
government would support air-strikes as long as these were geographically
restricted so as not to provoke Chinese intervention. Following the first bombing
raids in February 1965 the Prime Minister's concern that the war would escalate
coexisted with annoyance at what he considered to be inadequate consultation on
Washington's part. After a sharp telephone conversation with Johnson on the night
of the 10-11 February, McGeorge Bundy sent a telegram to 10 Downing Street
assuring Wilson that he would be informed in advance of any change in US
strategy. Five days later, Bruce informed Wilson and Stewart that air-raids on
North Vietnam would be restricted to targets South of the 19th parallel. Wilson
was temporarily reassured that the USA would not provoke a clash with China,
but he still wanted to prove to the Labour left that Britain was not merely 'the
tail-end Charlie in an American bomber'.49
On 16 February, Trevelyan informed London that the Soviets proposed to
send a joint message from the co-chairman concerning the US bombing of North
Vietnam. In Washington two days later, Rusk informed the British ambassador,
I. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, (Chicago; Ivan A. Dee 1996), p.18, pp.3O-3l, pp.57-61,
pp.64-67. Qiang Zhai, 'Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965', in CWIHP Bulletin, 617 (1995-1996),
pp.230-237.
Te1ephone conversation between Johnson & PM, 10-11.2.65; M. Bundy to PM, 11.2.65; Conversation between
Bruce, PM & Stewart at 10 Downing St. 16.2.65; & FO to Washington, No.2322, 23.3.65, PREM13/692(PRO).
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Lord Harlecb, that both co-chairman could solicit the views of the other Geneva
states on the situation in Vietnam, in order to 'consider what further action [the
co-chairman] might take'. 5° The British passed this proposal on to the Soviets on
the 19th, and Trevelyan presumed that Moscow's insistence on secrecy while this
message was considered was intended to avoid more Chinese polemics at the
USSR's expense. The attempt to use the Geneva co-chairmanship to initiate peace
talks stalled in mid-March, much to the frustration of Wilson and his Cabinet.5'
Stewart informed Lord Harlech that the Soviets were unlikely to respond to the
British message, and that the initiative had been 'probably killed by the Chinese'.
Moscow issued a statement on 15 March condemning the 'aggressive acts' of the
USA, while Stewart and Gromyko bickered over Vietnam when the latter visited
London the following day. 52
 These exchanges ended the prospects of using the co-
chairmanship to promote peace talks, although Wilson continually sought to
persuade the Soviet leadership to assist his efforts at mediation.53
The Americans were unwilling to see the Geneva conference reconvened,
believing that they would be outmanoeuvred by the Soviets, Chinese and the
French at the conference table - the Johnson administration was particularly
embittered by de Gaulle's public attacks on US intervention in Vietnam. 54 The
5°Moscow to FO, No.326, 16.2.65, PREMI3/692(PRO). Conversation between Lord Harlech & Rusk at State
Dept, 18.2.65,FRU. II, p.319.
' TO to Moscow, N.533, 19.2.65; FO to Washington, N.l378, 20.2.65, PREM13/692(PRO). CCI4(65)14th
conclusions, 4.3.65, CAB128139(PRO).
52 Moscow to FO, N.546, N.550 & N.551, 15.3.65, PREM131693(PRO). Conversation beten C]romyko and
Stewart at No.10, 16.3.65, PREM13/603(PRO).
53 R. B. Smith,An International Histoiy of the Vietnam War. IH, (Macmillan 1991), p.59.
A. do la Mare to D. Allen (No.10), 27.4.67, FCO15/66(PRO). L. Nuti, Transatlantic relations in the era of
détente - or, the "other" end of the Cold War, (Oslo; Nobel Institute Research Seminar Paper, 2002), p.7.! am
grateful to Dr S. Dockrill for providing me th a copy of this paper.
Soviets responded to Wilson's subsequent peace-making gestures (such as the
Commonwealth Mission in July 1965) by maintaining that they had no
authorisation to negotiate on Hanoi's behalf, and that the only way to end the war
was for the USA to unconditionally halt air-strikes against the DRY, and to accept
the 'four points' outlined by the North Vietnamese premier, Pham Van Dong (8
April 1965). The 'four points' called for an American withdrawal from South
Vietnam, the denunciation of the American-South Vietnamese military alliance, the
adoption of the NLF's political programme in the South, and the peaceful
reunification of Vietnam without foreign intervention. 55 These demands were
unacceptable to the Johnson administration, as these effectively involved acceptance
of NLF and North Vietnamese war aims.
In mid-April the British turned to the idea of convening a conference on
Cambodian neutrality which could lead to 'back door' negotiations on Vietnam.
The Soviets had proposed a Cambodian conference in April 1963, and the British
were ready to consider this proposal two years later, despite Washington's obvious
lack of enthusiasm. Cambodia had border disputes with Thailand and South
Vietnam and its sovereign, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, was bound to demand
international endorsement of Cambodia's borders by any conference. The
Americans therefore insisted on prior consultations with the Thais and South
Vietnamese before any announcement concerning a conference. 56 This response
annoyed the normally pro-American Foreign Secretary, who complained that if
Moscow to FO, No.1252, 23 .6.65. PREM13/690(PRO). Smith, Vietnam War III, pp.82-83, 87-89.
CC26(65)26 th
 conclusions, 27.4.65, CAB128139(PRO). Washington to FO, N.1916, 16.4.65, PREM13/694(PRO).
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Bangkok and Saigon were allowed to veto the Cambodian initiative 'the tail
would be wagging the dog'. The British were ready to work with the Soviets on
a joint announcement on a Cambodian conference, despite US objections, when
Sihanouk publicly sabotaged the initiative on 24 April. The Prince declared that
Cambodia would not participate in any conference not strictly confined to the
issue of its neutrality, thereby thwarting hopes that a conference could encourage
discussions to break the deadlock over Vietnam. 57
 The British ambassador to
Phnom Penh reported that Sihanouk's intransigence was encouraged by Beijing, a
judgement which Qiang Zhai has confirmed in a recent study. In retrospect the
Cambodian initiative foundered not only because of Beijing's intervention, but
because of the regional rivalries between Cambodia and its neighbours which
subsequently had tragic consequences for Sihanouk's realm.58
Wilson's attempts at peace-making, like other third-party initiatives, were
rendered irrelevant because of the course of events on the battlefield. In March
1965 the first American combat troops were dispatched to South Vietnam,
following the landing of a force of US Marines at Danang. During the spring of
1965 the air campaign against the DRV (known as Rolling Thunder) intensified,
while American troops were drawn into combat in the South. At the end of July
Washington decided to raise troop levels from 75,000 to 125,000, beginning a
progressive American military build-up to the point when, by 1968, there were
' FO to Washington, N.3156, 16.4.65; FO to Belgrade, N.247, 20.4.65; & Phnom Penh to FO, N.172 & N.175,
24 .4.65, PREMI3/694(PRO).
Phnom Penh to FO, N.264-266, 15.5.65, N.499, 6.9.65, PREM13I1O2(PRO). Qiang Thai, Beijing and the
Vietnamese Peace Talks, 1965-68. New Evidence from Chinese Sources, CWHIP Working Papa No.18 (1997),
pp.4-5. N. Fielding (Phnom Penh) to Bro, 23.9.66, PREM13175O(PRO).
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500,000 US troops in South Vietnam. 59 On 31 May 1965 the Chinese Foreign
Minister, Chen Yi, warned the British chargé that while China would not provoke
a wider war over Vietnam, any American attack on the PRC would lead to a
Sino-American war. 60 Mao's doctrine of supporting 'wars of national liberation'
and the objective of undermining 'revisionist' Soviet influence in the Third World
were two factors behind Beijing's Vietnam policy, but the Chinese also regarded
the American military presence in South-East Asia as a direct threat to their
security. Between 1965 and 1970 320,000 Chinese troops were deployed in North
Vietnam, and Chen's comments to the British chargé, which were passed on to
Washington, were accompanied by efforts to put China on a war footing. 61 The
Americans concluded that because of Beijing's doctrine that 'the US can be
confronted and defeated in South-East Asia by [indigenous] revolutionary tactics',
China would not intervene unless the survival of the DRV was at stake. 62 The
Johnson administration also judged that any damage done to détente by Vietnam
would be manageable, and that while the Soviets would continue to avoid a role
in negotiations, they also hoped to avoid any East-West clash over Indochina. 63 In
London officials of the Foreign Office's South-East Asia Department (SEAD)
concluded that although 'intensified fighting is unlikely to bring decisive advantage
SNIEIO-5-65, Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions, 28.4.65, MFF15-401. D. Anderson, 'The United
States and Vietnam', in Lowe (ed.), Vietnam War,p.107.
60 Beijing to FO, N.722, 31.5.65, PREM13/695(PRO). Bundy to Johnson, 4.6.65, FRUS XXX: China, (Washington
1998), pp.173-174.
61 Chen Jian, 'China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975', in Lowe (ed.), Vietnam War, pp.170-175. Qiang Zhai,
'Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence', in CWIHP Bulletin, 6/7, pp.38-43.
62 N5c553'' meeting, 27.7.65, FRUS III. Vietnam 1965, (Washington 19%), pp.260-263. SNIE1O-5-65, Communist
Reactions to Certain US Actions, 28.4.65, MFF15-401.
McNamara to Johnson, 30.7.65; & Rusk to Johnson, 30.9.65, FRUS' III, pp.280-284, pp.427-428. State Dept to
Paris, TOPOL A-I, Soviet &ternal Policy, 2.7.65, MF404.
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to either side', as the war in Vietnam intensified the belligerents would become
progressively 'less ready to negotiate than they are now.M
The Foreign Office's South-East Asia experts had reached a conclusion that
Wilson seemed unable, or unwilling, to accept - that the prospects for a diplomatic
settlement were slim because both Hanoi and Washington were determined to
continue fighting. Wilson was informed before his visit to Washington in
December 1965 that while neither side could break the deadlock on the
battlefield, there was 'no halfway house' between American and North Vietnamese
war aims and a compromise settlement, though necessary, was impossible to
achieve. SEAD officials presumed that due to the scale of the American military
commitment the DRV and the NLF would eventually have to concede defeat. Like
their American counterparts, British officials presumed that the Americans would
finally prevail in Vietnam, but in the short-term Washington's determination to
press for military victory would thwart third-party efforts at diplomatic mediation.
Wilson was advised that Britain should uphold its support for the USA while
preparing to promote negotiations at the right moment - the question was whether
such on opportunity would actually arise.65
The Wilson government publicly adhered to the argument that the DRV
was responsible both for the outbreak of hostilities, and for blocking efforts to
hold peace talks. However in private the Cabinet was divided, like the party as a
SEAD memorandum, The War m Vietnam, 1.6.65,PREM13/695(PRO), emphasis as in onginal.
65 oPD)(65)78 • Briefs for Prime Minister's Visit to the United Stat& - Vietnam, 3.12.65, CAB148/45(PRO).
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whole, between the left and right-wing, with the former advocating complete
dissociation from American policy towards Vietnam. Wilson's efforts at mediation
were not only intended to appease the Labour left, but also to facilitate the
conclusion of a conflict which threatened to escalate into a wider war. However,
Hanoi consistently rejected third party initiatives throughout 1965, and was
encouraged to do so by Beijing. Furthermore, contrary to Wilson's hopes, the
Soviets consistently refused to involve themselves in the Prime Minister's efforts
to play peace-maker. Wilson was in fact fully aware that 'the Soviet Union was
in no position to break solidarity' with North Vietnam 'otherwise they (sic) would
be accused of being capitalist stooges' by the Chinese. 67
 Yet the main assumption
behind Wilson's attempts at mediation - that Britain had some influence on
American policy and could encourage the USA towards accepting negotiations -
was false. As George Ball retrospectively noted, 'Wilson's reluctance to provide a
wholehearted endorsement of Johnson's Vietnam adventures and his efforts at
diplomatic intervention touched the President's most hypersensitive nerve'. The
tensions behind the façade of Anglo-American unity were exposed when Kosygin
visited London in February 1967, in circumstances which will be examined
below.68
PM to Johnson, 26.166, PREM13/1272(PRO). CCS(65)5th conclusions, 3.2.66, CABI28/41(PRO).
61 Conversation between Averell Harriman & PM at No.10, 24.3.65, PREM13/693(PRO). Moscow to FO,
No.496,23.2.66; & FO to Washington, No.2237, 28.2.66, PREM13/1273(PRO).
George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, (NY; W. W. Norton & Company 1982), p.336.
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'Evolution' and East-West trade policy: December 1964-February 1966.
As noted previously, British governments saw nothing anomalous in maintaining
commercial relations with politically hostile Communist states, aid before the
Labour election victory the Foreign Office had concluded that East-West trade was
one of the few feasible means of encouraging the 'evolution' of Eastern Europe.
Eden and Macmillan paid lip-service to improved commercial links with the
Soviet bloc, while Wilson developed his interest in East-West trade during the
1 950s. There were, however, certain factors which restricted Western commercial
contacts with the Eastern bloc states. The first was the strategic embargo
established in Paris by the members of COCOM in 1950. COCOM consisted of
all the NATO powers (excluding Iceland) and Japan, and its role was to prevent
the export of materials which would enhance Communist military capabilities.
These materials were covered by three lists; Munitions, Atomic Energy and the
'International' ('I') list, which covered raw materials and manufactured goods
which had potential strategic applications. Following the Korean war, COCOM
maintained a stricter embargo on China than on the Soviet bloc states until the
UK unilaterally renounced the 'China differential' in 1957. The British argued that
the Chinese could gain access to embargoed goods through trade with its Soviet
bloc allies, hence the imposition of a harsher embargo against the former made no
sense. The following year, COCOM abolished the 'China differential' and adopted
uniform restrictions for Western trade with the 'Sino-Soviet bloc'. It was ironic
that a decade later Britain proposed to reintroduce the China differential on the
104
grounds that the 'Sino-Soviet bloc' was irreparably split by the feud between
Moscow and Beijing. 69 Within COCOM, the Americans often proposed additions to
the three lists, while the British, French and other European member states argued
for reductions. The 'I' list was the main source of contention, because items such
as machine tools and computers had military as well as civilian applications.70
A second factor concerned the effect of British trade with Communist
powers on Anglo-American relations. Provided that COCOM's rules were upheld,
the Johnson administration considered trade with Eastern Europe to be a positive
means of promoting 'bridge-building', but Washington opposed Britain's readiness
to offer long-term credit agreements to bloc countries. This problem arose in late
1963 when the British decided to extend £100 million in credit to the USSR for
a fertilizer plant, and by January 1965 the UK had concluded three long-term
credit agreements with the Soviets, and one each with Czechoslovakia and
Hungary. The Americans based their objections on the prospect of a 'credit race'
between Western powers which the USSR could exploit to strengthen its industrial
base, and Washington was annoyed that the British blocked agreement within
NATO to limit Western credit.7 ' This issue highlighted a contradiction in American
policy on trade. It was in the interests of 'bridge-building' to draw East European
states closer to the West by developing trading links, but not necessarily to help
the Soviet bloc overcome the failures of central planning, particularly because
ESC(65)8, Memoraiium for Ministerial Committee on Strategic Exports, 3.3.65, CAB134/1906(PRO).
OPD(68)19, International Strategic Emba,go, A. Crosland, 19.3.68, CAB148/36(PRO).
70 NATO to State Dept, 6.1.65, FRUS 1K, pp.476-479.
71 M. Bundy to Johnson, 14.4.64, FRUS 1K, pp.452-453. H. Smith, Conference of Commercial Officers for Eastern
Europe, 12.1.65, , N115113, F0371/182513(PRO). State Dept to Missions, No.9634, 5.1.64, NSF, UKCF2O6,
LBJLIB.
105
Communist methods still had some appeal as a means of promoting economic
development in the Third World. In addition, while the USA tolerated 'non-
strategic' trade with the USSR and East European states, Britain's readiness to do
business with Cuba and China was far less welcome. Anglo-Cuban trade was the
subject of a major row between Johnson and Douglas-Home in the spring of
1964, following the Conservative government's decision to approve the export of
buses to Havana. 72 Its Labour successor likewise had to contend with American
hostility towards trade with the PRC, which influenced subsequent British efforts
to reintroduce the 'China differential'.
The final factor determining East-West trade relations involved the
centralised planning imposed by the Communist regimes on their national
economies. Following the upheavals of 1956 the East European states took
tentative steps to reform their decrepit economies, and by the mid-1960s the most
radical measures had been undertaken by the Czechoslovaks and Hungarians, who
both implemented reforms which gave managers of firms and factories more
authority to respond to consumer demand and to control profits. In 1965, Kosygin
proposed less ambitious reforms for the Soviet economy, which gave greater
autonomy to industrial managers but which maintained central control over
planning, pricing and employment. One potential advantage of these reforms was
that the Eastern bloc required Western technology (particularly computers) to
modernise their industries, yet the ideological orthodoxy of the ruling parties and
72 Speech by Rusk, 25.2.64, & Washington Embassy commentary, 4.3.64, N103145/1, F0371/177409(PRO).
PLA24I1, Cuba and Anglo-American Relations, 11.6.64, PLA24/1, F03711177830(PRO). CM(64)25th Cabinet
conclusions, 30.4.64, CABI2S/38(PRO).
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the devotion of considerable resources to defence limited the scope for East-West
trade. Furthermore, Soviet sensitivity concerning the Western theory of
'convergence' - which argued that as the Eastern bloc states adopted market
reforms the differences between Communism and capitalism would disappear -
showed that ideology still imposed restrictions on commercial ties. 73 In addition to
national planning, the economies of the bloc states were co-ordinated through the
CMIEA (also known as Comecon). East European states were bound by bilateral
agreements with the USSR, and the bulk of their foreign trade was within the
CMEA, thereby restricting commercial contacts with the West. The Romanians had
undermined efforts to strengthen the authority of the CMEA over member states,
but Foreign Office officials noted that existing arrangements still made it 'difficult
for [its] members to pursue more independent policies and difficult for the West
to expand its commercial relations in the area'. The co-ordination of the bloc's
five year plans through the CMEA also fixed limits on East European trade with
the Western powers until the end of the decade. 74 The head of the Northern
Department, Howard Smith, spoke for the Foreign Office as a whole when he
argued that commercial contacts helped détente and was one of the only means
the UK had to encourage 'evolution' and help reduce Eastern Europe's economic
dependence on the USSR, but officials had few illusions on this issue and
believed that the expansion of East-West trade would be a slow process.73
13 Craznpton, Eastern Europe, pp316-317, p.132 1. Hosking, Soviet Union, pp.364-366. R Braithmte (Moscow) to
M. Fretwell (ND), 15.11.65, NS1 102/51, F03711182778(PRO).
74 C. Parrott (Prague) to Stewart, 8.2.65; & annotations by C. Thompson & unnamed official, 24.2.65, NI 102/10,
F037111 8251 1(PRO).
75 Memorandum by H. Smith, 13.1.65, NI 151/3, F0371/182514(PRO).
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The Foreign Office was not the only department with an interest in trade
with the Eastern bloc, and often found itself at odds with the Board of Trade,
which was more concerned about the UK's balance of payments problem in
general and the unfavourable trade gap between Britain and the Soviet bloc in
particular. During a visit to Moscow a fortnight after the general election Douglas
Jay, the President of the Board of Trade, referred Kosygin to the imbalance of
trade between the UK and the USSR, which favoured the latter. Kosygin attributed
the low level of Soviet imports from Britain to the fact that 'the offers of many
British firms were not (repeat not) competitive either technically or financially'.76
Kosygin's comments were not unjustified, as British companies were often outbid
by rivals producing better quality goods - Soviet bloc states preferred to order
merchant ships from Japanese rather than British yards. Yet the scope for
increased East-West trade was also constrained by the bureaucratic obstacles
imposed by the state import-export companies, hard currency shortages, the
inefficiency and delays associated with command economies and the inflexibility
of the national plans and the CMIEA. The Board of Trade adopted an openly
sceptical view of East-West trade, arguing that British exporters could not 'expect
to do a roaring trade in consumer goods' with Eastern bloc states, as the latter
would spend their hard currency on capital goods - a more problematic area of
trade where COCOM rules applied. 78 Throughout 1965, this department, Foreign
Office and other interested departments - in particular the DEA, Treasury and the
16 Moscow to FO, No.2288, 29.10.64, PREM13/1863(PRO). See Morgan, People's Peace, pp.243-246, on the
balance of payments problem in 1964-1965.
71 J. Kronsten, 'East-West Trade: Myth and Matter', in International Affairs, 43/2 (1967), pp.265-281.
L Gray (BoT) to G. Scullard (FO), 16.6.65, & Note for Supplementaries, nd., NI 905/2, F0371/182525(PRO).
Os
Ministry of Agriculture - quarrelled over the extent to which trade with Eastern
Europe should be encouraged.
Before 1964, with the exception of a list of goods on Open General
Licence, Eastern bloc imports could only be permitted by application for a specific
licence. The Conservatives removed quota restrictions on a range of bloc imports
on the understanding that the Soviet bloc states would raise their imports from
the UK and recognise Britain's right to reimpose quotas if it considered such an
action necessary. In East Germany's case, the problem of diplomatic recognition
prevented a formal bilateral agreement on liberalisation, although the British were
as content as other West European states to trade on an informal basis with the
GDR. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland accepted partial liberalisation, with
Bulgaria agreeing to these terms in 1965, but Romania and the USSR refused to
accept the UK's conditions. 79
 While the Foreign Office argued that the East
Europeans should receive the same treatment as any other foreign powers not
bound to Britain by alliance or Commonwealth ties, the Board of Trade opted to
reserve the right to reimpose quota restrictions. The Commonwealth Relations
Office (CR0) was concerned with the implications of liberalisation for
Commonwealth sources of supply, while the Ministry of Agriculture opposed any
removal of quotas on bloc agricultural imports which would harm British
farmers. 8° When officials presented their conclusions in the External Economic
19 D. MacTavish (BoT) to C. Lucas (Treasuiy), 11.8.67, Report by Official Committee on Commercial Policy,
East-West Trade Policy, 11.8.67, FCO28159(PRO).
° R. Wall (MAFF) to D. Allen (DEA), 4.5.65; & A. Welch (B0T) to S. Charles (DEA), 4.5.65, N1151139,
F0371/182514(PRO).
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Policy Committee in November 1965, the Foreign Office position was supported
solely by the Treasury.
British trade with Eastern Europe had grown after partial liberalisation in
1964, but a gap remained between the UK's exports (E58 million) and imports
(87 million). Britain had a modest surplus in its trade with Hungary and
Romania, counterbalanced by deficits with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The
Board of Trade represented the majority view in Whitehall by arguing that there
was little scope for the expansion of trade with Eastern Europe, and that 'in the
present state of the United Kingdom balance of payments', Britain needed what
bargaining power it had to coerce the bloc states into balancing their exports with
British imports. The UK also had no interest in seeing the bloc states use sterling
from their increased exports to buy goods from Britain's Western competitors.8'
The Foreign Office resented its treatment as representing the minority view, and
complained about the fact that other departments continued to refer to the East
European states as 'satellites'. Foreign Office officials argued their case on
political grounds, asserting that it was in Britain's interests to encourage the
'evolution' of Eastern Europe by increased commercial ties. 82 For other
departments, however, 'evolution' was a peripheral concern compared to Britain's
economic problems.
81 W. Nield (DEA) to W. Hughes (BoT), 17.11.65, United Kingdom Trade Policy Towards Eastern Europe. A
Review by OfficiaLc, NI 151/91, F03711182514(PRO).
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In February 1966 the Board of Trade argued that Britain should impose
restrictions on Soviet imports as a punitive measure, and proposed the imposition
of quotas on softwood imports from the USSR. This proposal brought about a
direct intervention from Wilson, who expressed his annoyance over an action
which, in his opinion, threatened to sour the atmosphere prior to his long-awaited
visit to Moscow. The Prime Minister told his Foreign Office Private Secretary,
Oliver Wright, 'I know this trade and this [proposal] seems crazy to me. Positively
no decision without reference to me'. 83 Jay drew Wilson's attention to the fact
that while the UK had imported £119 millions worth of Soviet goods, the USSR
had purchased only £46 millions worth from Britain during 1965. The UK could
not afford to develop a trade gap with the Eastern bloc alongside the deficits
with the USA and other Western countries. Jay argued that if Britain continued to
threaten retaliation without taking action Moscow would 'settle down to a long-
term policy of financing much of their grain purchases at our expense'. He
observed that the threat to reimpose quotas had forced the Poles and East
Germans to act to reduce their bilateral trade gaps with the UK, but he did not
question whether similar measures would work against the more self-sufficient
Soviets, or whether Moscow would simply call London's bluff and turn to the
UK's competitors if import restrictions were tightened.84
The Foreign Office considered East-West trade to be important as a means
of assisting the development of détente, but found itself outmanoeuvred by other
Conversation between Gromyko & Jay at FO, 19.3.65, PREM13/603(PRO). T. Balogh to PM, 9.2.66; Wright
to W. Nicoll (BoT), 10.2.66, PREM13/1863(PRO).
Jay to PM, 15.2.66, PREM13/1863(PRO).
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departments whose attitudes were shaped by the UK's economic difficulties. The
Foreign Office did, however, have the support of the Prime Minister, whose
intervention in January 1966 thwarted the Board of Trade's efforts to reimpose
quotas. Nonetheless, Britain's lack of progress in increasing its exports to the
USSR paralleled the poor condition of Anglo-Soviet relations throughout 1965.
A 'difficult time' 85: Anglo-Soviet and East-West relations from March 1965-
February 1966.
Foreign Office officials concluded that Vietnam had led to the 'deterioration ... of
East-West relations and the current stagnation of virtually all practical measures
where these might be improved'. During his visit to London (17-19 March),
Gromyko quarrelled with Stewart over Vietnam, and also attacked the ANF,
accusing the British of encouraging West German nuclear ambitions. The Soviet
Foreign Minister also made it clear that Kosygin's visit to the UK would be
postponed indefinitely. The Northern Department attributed this decision to the
Vietnam war and the NATO nuclear-sharing problem, and Howard Smith stated
that the Soviets felt 'dangerously vulnerable to Chinese criticism and action'
which would intensify if Moscow made 'any move towards better relations with
the West'. The possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement over Vietnam was
raised by Smith's immediate superior, Denis Greenhill, who suggested that as
Trevelyan to Gore-Booth, 8.7.65, Gore-Booth Papers (MSS Gore-Booth, 91, fol.86-87), Bodleinn Library,
Oxford.
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Conversation between Gromyko & Stenrt at 10 Doning St, 17.3.65, PREM13/603(PRO). Note by Smith,
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Rolling Thunder continued, the Soviets and Chinese would be drawn together by
shared animosity towards the USA. 88 Yet the prevailing opinion in the Foreign
Office was that continued Sino-Soviet competition for supremacy in the
Communist world would continue to forestall Western efforts to foster détente
with the USSR. Following another acrimonious meeting with Gromyko in Vienna
in May, Stewart informed Wilson that 'it does not look as though the Russians
are ready for serious talks on anything at the present time'. Two months later,
Trevelyan informed Gore-Booth that as far as both Anglo-Soviet and superpower
relations were concerned, the following months would be 'a difficult time'.
Despite the conflict in South-East Asia, Moscow showed no inclination to
raise tensions in Europe, even after the FRG decided to hold a Bundestag meeting
in West Berlin in April. In response, the Soviets and East Germans blocked
civilian access and staged military exercises around the city. A worried Erhard was
reassured by the American, French and British ambassadors to Bonn that these
actions were merely short-term protest measures, and did not constitute a new
Berlin crisis. The British ambassador, Frank Roberts, noted that Western military
convoys were unaffected by the dispute, and the COS considered the affair to be
a minor 'irritant'. Soviet and East German harassment ended once the Bundestag's
members left West Berlin, and British officials were reassured by the USSR's
evident interest in maintaining the status quo in Europe.9° In contrast, in both
H. Smith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 16.2.65, & annotated comment by D. Greenhill, NS1O311O!7,
F03711182754(PRO).
Conversation between Gromyko & Stewart in Vienna, 16.5.65, PREM13/603(PRO). Trevelyan to Gore-Booth,
8.7.65, MSS Gore-Booth, 91, foiSti-87.
9°Bonn to FO, No.387-388, 5.4.65, PREM131343(PRO). C0S65/18th meeting, 6.4.65, DEFE4/182(PRO).
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London and Paris there was considerable annoyance over what was considered to
be Bonn's provocative gesture, and when the Erhard government proposed to
follow up the Bundestag visit with a Bundesrat meeting in West Berlin, the
British and the French vetoed the idea. 91
 West European diplomats were unhappy
at the FRG's refhsal to concede that Eastern bloc propaganda attacks on its
policies might reflect a genuine fear of resurgent German nationalism, and West
Germany was regarded by its allies as an impediment to détente because of its
rigid stance on reunification and the Hallstein doctrine. Wilson himself regarded
the FRG as a nuisance, and believed that Bonn simply had to accept the de facto
division of Germany.92
On 7 July Gromyko informed Trevelyan that Kosygin would not visit
Britain in 1965. In one of his last dispatches before completing his service in
Moscow, Trevelyan reported that although the Soviets were bent on preserving
their position in the Communist world, they would have been prepared to risk a
Chinese propaganda onslaught by an exchange of visits if they could gain any
concrete results in the process. However, the Soviet leadership did not wish to
discuss Vietnam with Wilson, and as a result of Britain's support for US military
intervention in Indochina a visit by Kosygin to London 'would cast doubt on
their whole-hearted opposition to American policy' in South-East Asia. 93
 The
cancellation of Kosygin's visit was clearly a disappointment to Wilson, as his
' FO to Bonn, No.724, 13.4.65, & annotated comment by PM on letter from T. Bridges (FO) to Wright,
12.4.65, PREM131343(PRO). Paris to State Dept, No.5647, 6.4.65, MF403. As occupying powers in Berlin, both
Britain and France ere m a position to block the Bundesrat visit
UKDeINATO to FO, No.9(Saving), 11.2.65, F0371J182498(PRO). Haniieder, Germany, America, Europe, p.177.
Interview with Wilson, 20.1.65, AHP8/6.
93 Moscow to FO, No.1376, 7.7.65; & Moscow to FO, No.1385, 8.7.65, NSIO5I/97, F0371/182764(PRO).
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subsequent correspondence with Stewart shows. The Prime Minister could not
accept the fact that the Soviets had put their relations with the UK on ice.
Moscow had ruled out a visit by Kosygin to Britain, so Wilson proposed to make
a trip to the USSR in the autumn of 1965. The Foreign Office was opposed, on
the grounds that any visit would 'probably be a more than usually sterile affair
which could in fact prove bad for our relations'. 94
 Its officials preferred to wait
until the USSR had overcome the Chinese challenge to its authority in the
Communist world before pressing ahead with bilateral visits. Wilson remained
impatient, and in late July he suggested an exchange of visits between the two
heads of state, Queen Elizabeth H and the Soviet President, Anastas Mikoyan.
Again, the Foreign Office expressed its opposition, arguing that the Queen was
unlikely to be happy meeting representatives of a regime which had exterminated
the Romanov dynasty in 1918. Furthermore, Mikoyan was reputed to be a virulent
Anglophobe following his experiences as a prisoner of British forces assisting the
'Whites' during the Russian civil war. Stewart concurred with official advice,
informing Wilson through Wright that an exchange of visits between the Queen
and Mikoyan could be used by the Soviets to embarrass the British government.95
The condition of Anglo-Soviet relations in the summer of 1965 mirrored
the sharp deterioration of relations between the superpowers as a result of the
Note by Smith, 20.6.65, & annotated comment by Greihill, 5.7.65, NS1O5I/104, F0371/182764(PRO).
Smith, 27.7.65, & T. Bridges (FO) to J. Wright (No.10), 2.8.65, NSIO5I/109, F03711182764(PRO). Brief
No.2(b), The Secretaiy of State's Visit to Moscow, 29 Nove,nber-3 December 1965. Soviet Personalities,
NS1OS 1/180(A), F03711182767(PRO).
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Vietnam war. In July, Averell Harriman (who was appointed by Johnson to
explore the feasibility of Vietnam peace initiatives) visited Kosygin in Moscow,
and the former was struck by the Soviet Premier's reference to the unofficial
defence budget cuts agreed by the USA and USSR in 1964. Kosygin seemed to
regret the fact that because of Vietnam and the growth of US defence
expenditure, similar agreements were no longer possible 97 Of all the Western
powers, only France's relationship with the USSR could be described as cordial.
De Gaulle and the Soviet leadership were both opposed to the MLF, apprehensive
over West Germany's future intentions, and condemned US intervention in
Vietnam. Moscow saw an opportunity to exploit the 'contradictions' between the
French and other Western powers, and the appointment of the Deputy Foreign
Minister, Valerian Zorin, as Ambassador to Paris was also a sign of Soviet favour
towards France. Yet there were limits to Franco-Soviet rapprochement, because
despite de Gaulle's private contempt for the West Germans France could not
afford a breach with the FRG. Furthermore, the logical implication of the French
President's concept of Europe totale was the eventual end of Soviet hegemony
over Eastern Europe; an outcome which Moscow was not prepared to accept.98
Although political relations between the UK and USSR remained frozen, the
British and Soviet governments did succeed in negotiating an agreement
CIA Special Report, The Soviet Union Since Khntshchev, 9.4.65; & SNIE! 1-11-65, Soviet Attitudes towards
the W, 26.5.65, FRUS XIV. The Soviet Union, (Washington 2001), pp.273-285, pp.289-290.
Moscow to State Dept. 15.7.65, FRUS' XIV, pp.306-308. Kaiser, American Tragedy, pp.397-398, p.493. Moscow
to FO, No.1436, 15.7.65, NS103145t26, F0371/182771(PRO).
Lacouture, De Gaulle, pp.394-397. M Narinski, 'Les Sovietupies et hi decision Francaise', in F. Bozo, P.
Mélandri & M. Vaise, La France et l'OTAN 1949-1996, (Pans; CEHD 1996), pp.504-505. P. Reilly (Paris) to
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concerning reciprocal rights for consular officials. The Consular Convention was
concluded in December 1965, and was followed by similar agreements with Poland
and Bulgaria two years later. These conventions were considered necessary in
order to protect British consular officials in the USSR and Eastern Europe from
police harassment, and London therefore agreed to the Soviet condition of
extending diplomatic immunity to all consular staff The consular conventions
were, however, controversial because during the Cold War both sides used
diplomatic missions as a cover for espionage - between 1958 and 1964, eight
Soviet and six East European diplomats were declared persona non grata by the
British because of their involvement in spying.'°° Soviet bloc espionage in the UK
aroused strong protests from Conservative MPs, the most outspoken being
Commander Anthony Courtney. The Foreign Office regarded Courtney as a
nuisance, and described his proposals to reduce representation for Communist states
to chargé level, and to withdraw all diplomatic privileges, courier and cipher
services from Eastern bloc missions as 'impractical and unhelpful'. Officials argued
that the existing system was of mutual benefit, as it protected British diplomats in
Communist countries too - needless to say, SIS officers also used diplomatic cover
for their activities. At a meeting with Courtney at the end of June, Wilson
maintained that imposing a quota on Eastern bloc diplomats in the UK would
encourage the expulsion of British diplomats in reprisal, and he claimed that the
Security Service (MIS) were able to keep suspected intelligence officers under
OPD(67)3 meeting, 30.1.67, CAB148130(PRO). OPD(67)4: Consular Conventions with Poland and Bulgaria,
memorandum by Brown, 20.1.67, CAB148/31(PRO).
'°°Note by P. Wright (Private Secretary to Gore-Booth), 24.6.65, N190515/G, F0371/182525(PRO). Brimelow to
L Suthiand (ND), 7.4.66, NSI9OI/10, F03711189001(PRO).
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surveillance. Courtney's campaign led the KGB to take 'active measures' to
discredit the MP with smears concerning his private life, but the issue of Soviet
bloc espionage continued to fester.'°'
Domestic opinion in the UK was also outraged by the arrest and trial of
Gerald Brooke, a British lecturer, in Moscow in July 1965. Brooke received a five
year sentence for bringing into the USSR propaganda material produced by a
Russian émigré group, the NTS. The outcry the verdict aroused in Britain persisted
because of the restrictions imposed on prison visits by the British consul and
Brooke's wife. British appeals for clemency were met by Soviet demands for the
release of two KGB spies imprisoned in the UK, Peter and Helen Kroger. 102 Much
to Wilson's discomfort, Brooke's plight aroused sustained condemnation from the
British press and from Parliament. The following April, the Prime Minister
informed Mikhail Smirnovsky, Soldatov's successor, that the Brooke case was 'a
substantial irritant in Anglo-Soviet relations, which must surely be out of
proportion to its importance for the Soviet Union'. Northern Department officials
argued that the restrictions imposed by Moscow on consular visits to Brooke
contravened the consular convention, and the Soviets were warned that Parliament
could refuse to ratify the convention unless the British consul at Leningrad had
increased access to Brooke.'°3
101 T. Bridges (FO) to M. Reid (No.10), iS 6.65; & conversation between Cdr. A. Courtney MP & PM, 29.6.65,
PREM13/483(PRO). Andrew & Mitrokhin, Mitrdchin A,vhives, p.53 I
'°2 Documentr cr British Policy Ove,was. Seri&s III, Volume I (DBPO IH, 1), (HMSO 1997), fa6, p.7. 'Peter'
and 'Helen Kroger' were actually two KGB 'illegal' agents (i.e. operating without diplomatic cover), Morris
and Lona Cohen. Sen Andrew & Mitrokhin,Mitrokhin A,vhives, pp.534-536.
103 Conversation between PM & Smirnovsky at No.10, 18.4.66, NS1052123, F03711188929(PRO). Greenhill to
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In early September 1965, Wilson again expressed an intention to visit
Moscow the following month, asserting that the time was ripe to discuss Vietnam
and disarmament problems with the Soviets. The Prime Minister was probably also
thinking of the positive effect a trip to the USSR would have on the Labour
Party Conference, scheduled for October. Stewart's response drew attention to the
manner in which Mikoyan received Trevelyan's successor, GeoffiTey Harrison, when
the latter presented his credentials on 9 September.'° 4
 The Soviet President lectured
Harrison on the iniquities of British policy East of Suez, and condemned the UK's
position on Vietnam and NATO nuclear-sharing. Mikoyan declared that while the
leadership 'would personally be glad' to play host to Wilson conditions a 'visit
would not be desirable under present circumstances'.'° 5 The Prime Minister was
unwilling to take 'no' for an answer. He informed officials that his "feel" was
'against the logical evidence', and he called for the Foreign Office to review, on a
weekly basis, the prospects for a future visit to the USSR Near the end of the
month, he again asked the Foreign Secretary if 'he wished to reconsider his earlier
advice' against meeting Kosygin in Moscow, 'given the changed situation in Soviet
relations with the West caused by the Kashmir crisis and the Soviet initiative' -
Wilson was referring to the USSR's offer to mediate between India and Pakistan
following the war between these two powers over Kashmir (August-September
104 M MacLehose (FO) to Stewart, 6.9.65; & Stewart to PM, 9.9.65, NS1O51/123/G, F03711182764(PRO).
'°5 Moscow to State Dept. No.777 & 779, 9.9.65, RG59; stack area 250, row 5-7, box 2788, NARAH.
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1965).b06 Stewart's response was that the Foreign Office's assessment remained
unchanged.
Although the Prime Minister still had no invitation to Moscow, the Foreign
Secretary was scheduled to follow up Gromyko's earlier visit to London with a
trip to the USSR (29 November-3 December 1965). Stewart's visit was, Greenhill
told Harrison on 3 November, an opportunity to assess whether the Soviets would
agree to conclude an NPT if NATO abandoned the MLF and ANF, and whether a
breakthrough on non-proliferation would be the 'first step in a genuine détente'.
The ambassador to Moscow replied a week later, stating that Moscow regarded an
NPT as a means of blocking all nuclear-sharing in NATO, and would not offer
any concessions in exchange for the scrapping of the MLF or ANF. Harrison
compared the non-proliferation issue to the controversy over West German
remilitarisation the previous decade, and stated that the Soviets tended to 'tolerate
under strong protest what they can't prevent'. Moscow had responded to the
FRG's rearmament and admission to NATO by founding the WTO in 1955, an
ostensibly parallel response which still 'left the main burden of military response
to the Soviet armed forces', and Harrison implied that Moscow's response to any
NATO agreement on nuclear-sharing would take a similar form. Harrison
concluded Soviets considered the principal purpose of an NPT as being to block
West German acquisition of nuclear weapons. He took a frankly sceptical view of
'°6 L Sutherland (ND), 21.9.65; Bridges, 22.9.65, NS1O51/134/G, F0371/182765(PRO). On the Kashinir war see S.
Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia, (Boulder Co.; Westview Press 1994), pp.63-78. Calvocoressi, World
Politics, pp.500-501.
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the prospects for improved East-West relations, arguing that although Moscow
preferred 'détente' to 'tension', the Soviet concept of détente involved:
[The] suspension, on the one side, of each and every alliance or military build-up against
the Soviet Union or other Communist states while, on the other, the struggle is
prosecuted, without anti-Communist intervention from outside, in those countries where
conditions are ripe for revolution.107
At the time Stewart visited Moscow, the Labour government had little to show for
over a year of dealing with Khrushchev's successors. Foreign Office officials noted
that Soviet propaganda treated the UK as a lackey of American imperialism, and
that the leadership had 'at no time since [it] assumed power shown any particular
friendliness towards Britain'. While Wilson had met with the Soviet ambassador on
several occasions, Harrison had yet to see Kosygin after two months in
Moscow. 108 Stewart's briefs commented that the Soviets were concentrating on
wooing France, which appeared to be the 'weakest link in the Western Alliance',
and considered Britain to be 'a country which has little to offer them'. The
prospects for 'serious negotiations' with the Soviet leadership on either Germany
or Vietnam were non-existent. The non-proliferation problem was, officials warned,
'a very delicate' issue because the Soviets could force the UK into a position in
which it 'had to recognise that a non-proliferation treaty could not be achieved
because of our NATO arrangements'.'°9
107 Greenhill to Harrison, 3.11.65; & Moscow to FO, No.2343, 9.11.65, NSI 051/157, F0371/182765(PRO).
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Having presented the ANF as an alternative to the MLF at the end of
1964, the Wilson government adopted an equivocal position on nuclear-sharing the
following year. Throughout 1965 there was a three-way dispute between
Washington, London and Bonn, complicated by the fact that none of the
governments involved had established a firm policy on nuclear-sharing. The West
Germans wanted a solution which gave them a role in policy decisions on
NATO's nuclear strategy, but were aware that any demands for a 'hardware
solution' involving access to nuclear weapons would antagonise their allies. Within
Washington, the MLF idea had lost its appeal, but officials like Ball feared that
German resentment over the FRG's 'inequality' within NATO might arouse anti-
Western nationalism, thus contributing to a Soviet-German rapprochement similar to
the 1922 Rapallo Treaty. 11° In July 1965, Anglo-American differences over non-
proliferation were exposed by Washington's reaction to the British draft NPT
submitted to the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This draft ruled out the future
establishment of a European nuclear force and a nuclear-sharing arrangement
within NATO based on majority voting, both of which American officials refused
to rule out so as not to offend West German opinion. As a consequence of this
dispute, the British were excluded by the Americans from the negotiations with the
Soviets on non-proliferation which commenced in the autumn of 1966.111
"°Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, pp.130-132. Ball, Another Pattern, pp.261-262, p115. Conversation
between Ball, Bruce, Healey, McNamara, PM, Stewart & Trend at No.10,26.11.65, PREM13/805(PRO).
" Schrafstetter & Tgge, 'ANF Proposal', pp.175-177. J. Freeman,Bntain's Nuclear Anns Control Policy in
the Contert of Anglo-American Relations, 1957-1968, (NY; St Martin's Press 1986), pp.213-215.
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By late 1965 the Wilson government had switched its support to a
'consultative' solution to the nuclear-sharing problem, as outlined by McNamara's
proposed 'special committee'. This concept, from which the Nuclear Planning
Group originated, allowed for NATO's non-nuclear members (including the FRG)
to be consulted on US nuclear doctrine and strategy. Wilson's reluctance to
promote the ANF derived partly from a conviction that a NATO nuclear force
would prevent agreement on an NPT. The Prime Minister regarded Soviet and
East European protests over NATO nuclear-sharing as being motivated by a
genuine fear of a nuclear-armed FRG. In fact, of all the WTO powers Poland was
particularly frightened at the prospect of West Germany's participation in an
MLF-type force, and encouraged the harsh line the Soviets took towards nuclear-
sharing."2 Wilson also considered deploying the UK's nuclear force East of Suez
rather than in the NATO area. Healey considered Ball's concerns over the
possibility of Soviet-German rapprochement to be unrealistic, and shared the
MoD's view which paid lip-service to 'internationalisation', but favoured national
control over the British deterrent. It was principally due to national interests - but
also calculations over what would prove acceptable to the USSR and the Eastern
bloc states - that the UK chose to support consultation rather than a 'hardware'
solution to the Alliance's nuclear-sharing dilemma.113
112 Freeman, Anns Contra!, pp.218-219. Conversation between PM & Rapacki at No.10, 21.12.64,
PREM13I219(PRO). Conversation between PM & Soldatov at No.10, 21.7.65, PREMI3I22O(PRO). Interview
th Wilson, 20.1.66, ABP11/4. Selvage, Warsaw Pact, pp.4-5, pp.36-45.
113 Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, p.87. Conversation at No.10, 26.11.65, PREM13/805(PRO).
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However, in his discussions with Gromyko and Kosygin, Stewart was told
that the Soviets considered consultation between nuclear and non-nuclear powers
on planning and weapons systems as a form of proliferation. The Foreign
Secretaiy protested that NATO powers would consider this as proof that Moscow
intended to use the non-proliferation issue to meddle with the Alliance's affairs.
As Harrison noted, the visit was expected to achieve little, and lived up to
expectations. The ambassador did, however, draw some comfort from the 'calm and
reserved' tone of discussions, and from the USSR's willingness to preserve
bilateral relations with Britain." 4
 Stewart's assessment of his trip to Moscow
reflected how closely he stuck to his Foreign Office briefs. He informed Wilson
that the Soviets were nervous about the prospects of the FRG having 'access' to
nuclear weapons, and were also happy to play on widespread Western suspicion of
West German motives. Moscow wanted an NPT, but believed that it was the
Western powers who would have to pay the price for such a treaty. Stewart was,
like Harrison, impressed that the Soviet leaders were now more prepared to talk to
their British counterparts. He warned Wilson that this new attitude could not be
taken at face value, because Moscow would exploit any differences between
Britain and its allies. Nonetheless, the USSR's readiness to maintain its contacts
with the UK provided 'an opportunity of discovering whether ultimately they
would be prepared to come to an accommodation on the questions of interest to
both sides'."5
"4 Moscow to FO, No.2595 & 2596, 30.11.65, PREM13/805(PRO). Harrison to Stewart, 11.12.65, NS 1051/206,
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Aside from the conclusion of the consular convention, Stewart's visit did
produce one result, as the Soviet leadership finally agreed to invite Wilson to
Moscow, this trip being scheduled to begin on 21 February 1966.116 Johnson's
officials regarded this visit with some apprehension, believing that the Prime
Minister would be susceptible to Soviet 'wedge-driving'. McGeorge Bundy
informed the President in mid-December that:
Neither the British nor we have made any money with the Soviets on substantive issues,
but British Prime Ministers are always chasing the pot of gold at the end of the
rainbow marked "EastfWest Friendship". The Prime Minister is almost sure to emphasize
the value of a non-proliferation treaty and to place it well ahead of NATO nuclear
arrangements. We should hold him hard to the fact that a good understanding with the
Germans is at least as important and in point of time becomes first.
Johnson cabled Wilson the day before the latter departed for Moscow, warning
him against Soviet efforts to use nuclear-sharing to exploit disputes within
NATO." 7
 In certain respects, the relationship between the two at this point
reflected the tensions that had arisen with their predecessors. Wilson's attitude
towards the escalation of the Vietnam war were reminiscent of traditional British
concerns over the implications of American recklessness in previous Cold War
crises, while like Eisenhower in 1959, Johnson showed misgivings over a British
Prime Minister's visit to Moscow.
116 Moscow to FO, No.2624, 2.12.65, PREM13/805(PRO). Moscow to FO, No.2758, 17.12.65, NS1O51/214,
F0371/182769(PRO).
"7 T. Hughes (State Department Bureau of Intelligence & Resewth - INR) to Rusk, 9.9.65, NSF, USSRCF221;
& M. Bundy to Johnson, 16.12.65, NSF, UKCF2I5, LBJLIB. Johnson to PM, 20.2.66, PREM13/805(PRO).
l's
Wilson's visit to Moscow: 21-24 February 1966.
Wilson's Foreign Office briefs commented on the domestic friction between the
conservative Soviet leadership and the attitude of technocrats and intellectuals who
favoured greater personal freedom and decreased CPSU control. On the subject of
foreign policy, the Sino-Soviet split had stalled East-West détente, and the Soviets
were unwilling to offer any concessions on Vietnam. Moscow favoured the
maintenance of the status quo in Europe, but while the Soviet leadership was
cautious in pursuing foreign policy objectives, the USSR's objectives towards the
Third World and the spreading of Communism remained unchanged. The Soviets
expressed their interest in an NPT, but would not compromise on its opposition to
NATO nuclear-sharing, and considered non-proliferation as an issue solely affecting
Germany, ignoring the threat of proliferation in the Middle East or South Asia.118
Regarding Germany, Moscow remained opposed to reunification, while British
officials noted that 'Berlin is at present quiet and we have no interest in
discussing the situation there'.'19
The Board of Trade reminded the Prime Minister that while Soviet exports
to Britain had risen from £76 million in 1960 to £199 million in 1965, the USSR
imported only £37 millions worth of British goods in 1960, which rose to £55
million in 1963 but had declined to £46 million in 1965. Wilson wanted to
discuss the trade gap with Kosygin, but Board of Trade officials concluded that
118 PMV(MX66)12, Prime Minister's Visit to the Soviet Union. Februaty, 1966. General Brief, & PMV(MX66)5,
Disannament, 152.66, CAB1331345(PRO).
"9 PMV(MX66)6 & 7,Eumpean Securiy & Germany & Berlin, 15.2.66, CAB133/345(PRO).
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due to the USSR's agricultural problems efforts to increase British exports would
be fruitless, because the Soviets would use sterling gained from exports to the UK
to buy wheat. Foreign Office officials also hoped for clemency for Brooke, and
regarded Soviet proposals to exchange Brooke for the Krogers as unacceptable.
The Krogers were convicted spies, and British diplomats feared that a precedent
could be set enabling the KGB to blackmail the UK by arresting British visitors
to the USSR.'2°
Johnson had warned Wilson against Soviet wedge-driving over NATO
nuclear-sharing and non-proliferation, and the Americans clearly had misgivings
about what the latter would say to Kosygin.' 2' At their first meeting in the
Kremlin (22 February), Wilson asserted that bilateral contacts between the UK and
USSR 'could be a causal factor in bringing about an improvement or a
deterioration in [East-West] relations'. He declared an interest in mutual force
reductions in Central Europe, and stated that Britain opposed the creation of a
European nuclear force. Turning to Vietnam, the Prime Minister expressed his
concerns over a conflict which not only soured East-West relations but had the
potential to escalate into a wider war. Wilson tried to persuade Kosygin that both
co-chairmen could encourage the USA and North Vietnam towards a negotiated
settlement. The Soviet Premier bluntly responded that the USSR had no mandate
from Hanoi to discuss a negotiated settlement. Regarding European security,
Kosygin cautiously observed that mutual troop withdrawals 'seemed to open an
120 PMV(MX66)1 Anglo-Soviet Trade, 16.2.66; & PMV(M(66)10, Gerald Brooke, 15.2.66, CAB1331345(PRO).
121 Johnson to PM, 20.2.66, PREM13/805(PRO). M Bundy to Joimson, 16.12.65, LBJLIB.
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interesting avenue for discussion', but asserted that délenle depended on a
reduction of American influence in Europe. He was evidently probing Wilson to
see if he would follow France's example when he maintained that Britain's
expressed interest in improved East-West relations was incompatible with its
support for the USA's policies in Europe and South-East Asia.122
The following day Wilson met Brezhnev for a discussion dominated by the
CPSU Secretary's anti-German diatribes.' 23 The Prime Minister also had a second
meeting with Kosygin, during which he stated that American policy on nuclear-
sharing was 'not monolithic', and that Moscow could wait for 'healthier influences
[to] have their effect without trying to apply too much pressure in the
negotiations for non-proliferation'. Wilson maintained that British policy took
Soviet concerns into account, and therefore favoured consultation within NATO
rather than a hardware solution. He also compounded his indiscreet comments on
American policy-making with the following references to West Germany:
The Germans were not seriousiy committed to the idea of reunification - it had become
to some extent a political slogan. The real interests of the West and of the Soviet Union
lay in inoculating Germany against a revival of militarism. This view was shared by
President Johnson and all proposals for new strategic arrangements within the Western
alliance were aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and particularly at
guarding against the possibility of a nuclear Germany.
Wilson's comments on inter-allied differences, and his slighting references to
American and West German policy-making, would have given the Soviets grounds
for believing that they could manipulate the 'contradictions' between the British
' 22 Conversalion between Kosygin & PM at the Kremlin, 22.2.66, PREMI3/805(PRO).
'23 Conversation between Brezhnev & PM at CPSU building, 23.2.66, PREM13/805(PRO).
and their allies. The Prime Minister was oblivious to these considerations, and his
main objective in this discussion was to make progress on non-proliferation, hence
his suggestion to hold tripartite talks between the two superpowers and the UK at
the Foreign Ministerial level. Kosygin replied that the Politburo would consider
this proposal - he was probably also considering the significance of Wilson's
indiscreet comments about the motives of Britain's allies.'24 At their final meeting
on the 24th, Wilson argued that the possibility of tripartite negotiations towards an
NPT should be cited in the communiqué. Despite the Prime Minister's assertion
that '[the] two governments should be seen to be taking action' Kosygin stated
that the Soviet leadership needed time to consider Wilson's proposal. Moscow
subsequently showed no interest in involving Britain in non-proliferation talks.'25
Following Wilson's return, Foreign Office officials observed that 'little
concrete was expected' from the visit, and that apart from the 'good personal
relationship' the Prime Minister thought he had established with Kosygin the visit
did not surpass its limited expectations. 126 Four days after he left Moscow, Wilson
described his experiences to Johnson in upbeat terms. He depicted Kosygin as a
'tough [and] not very humorous administrative figure', while Brezhnev was 'very
impressive' and 'more extrovert'. The Soviets were obsessed with the Gennan
problem, and while they wanted progress towards an NPT they were 'genuinely
concerned' that the nuclear-sharing issue would block an agreement. There was 'no
between Kosygin & PM at the Kremlin, 23.2.66, PREM13/805(PRO).
' 25 Convee at Kremlin, 24.2.66, CAB16412(PRO).
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progress' on Vietnam because, Wilson argued, Brezhnev and Kosygin were 'boxed
in' by Chinese rivalry and criticism 'in the Soviet bloc' that they were not
offering Hanoi sufficient support. He also told Johnson that Brezhnev and Kosygin
'like us, are politicians', and were 'nervous' about the forthcoming 23th CPSU
Congress. Wilson considered that the Soviet leadership's first Party Congress was
somehow comparable to his problems in contending with a slim government
majority and the truculent Labour left in the House of Commons (a situation the
Prime Minister was faced with before the March 1966 election increased his
parliamentary majority from 3 to 97 seats).
The Prime Minister maintained that throughout his visit he had spoken
'from a position four-square within the Western Alliance'. Wilson did not refer to
the substance of his comments to Kosygin on being presumably aware that
Johnson would have been infuriated by his comments on American indecision and
the need to contain West German ambitions. Wilson's main conclusion was that:
I am convinced that [the Soviets] want to maintain an active dialogue with the West
I think that mainly because of Vietnam they see difficulties in the immediate future in
having too public a dialogue with you, but they may be ready to keep it going through
us. But they are in no doubt as I said earlier that they will be negotiating with us as
your loyal allies. When I said to them that it must be clear that they were in the
Eastern camp and we were unequivocably (sic) in the Western camp, they understood
this.'27
The Prime Minister envisaged a role for himself as an interlocutor between the
two superpowers, promoting détenle while remaining, in a frequently repeated
'27 F0 to Washington, No.2237, 28.2.66, PREM13I8O5(PRO), emphasis added. State Dept to London, N.5006,
26.2.66, RG59: 250, 5-7, 2788, NARAII.
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phrase, 'four square' with the USA and firmly committed to NATO. In this
respect, Wilson drew an explicit contrast between British policy and that of de
Gaulle, who announced France's imminent withdrawal from the Alliance's military
command structure two weeks after the Prime Minister's return from Moscow.
Conclusions:
Following Stewart's visit to Moscow, Wilson told the Cabinet on 7 December
1965 that Britain was 'gradually achieving [its] aims on non-proliferation and a
détente in Europe, but we are waiting a long time with little results so far'. The
Prime Minister was, however, exaggerating the degree to which British policy had
any impact on wider East-West relations. Having committed itself to negotiations
towards an NPT, the Labour government was unable to overcome Soviet
opposition to a consultative solution to the NATO nuclear-sharing problem, and
Wilson failed to persuade Kosygin of the need for three-power talks on non-
proliferation during his visit to Moscow.' 28
 Likewise the Prime Minister could not
persuade the Soviets to support his Vietnam peace initiatives. Despite Wilson's
long-standing interest in East-West trade, Foreign Office efforts to liberalise the
UK's commercial relations with the Eastern bloc were hampered by inter-
departmental disputes within Whitehall. The only practical achievements towards
détente which the Labour government had achieved in 1965 and early 1966 were
the Consular Convention and the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow.
Cast1e, Diaries, 7.12.65, p.75.
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This lack of progress was due principally to circumstances outside Britain's
control, notably the Vietnam war and the ongoing feud between Moscow and
Beijing. Khrushchev's successors were unsure of how to approach relations with
the Western powers, with Brezhnev's inclination for a relaxation of tensions being
countered by Shelepin's demands for a more militant policy towards both the
capitalist world and the Yugoslav 'revisionists'. 129
 Both Wilson and the Foreign
Office's presumption that the Sino-Soviet split was a constraint on détente has
been supported by Qiang Zhai's research on Chinese foreign policy. Mao sought
to promote China as the patron of 'wars of national liberation' in the Third
World, and to usurp the USSR's pre-eminence within the Communist world. This
policy suffered two damaging setbacks in September 1965, the first being the
massacre of the Indonesian Communist Party (PM) and Sukarno's subsequent fall,
which thwarted the developing 'Beijing-Jakarta' axis, and the second being
Moscow's offer to mediate between India and Pakistan, which led to the Tashkent
summit in January 1966. Yet the USSR's constant need to prove its Communist
credentials against Chinese propaganda attacks had an adverse effect on East-West
relations. Despite Beijing's urgings, the USSR was not prepared to respond to
American intervention in Vietnam by challenging the Western powers over Berlin
and the German question. Yet the policy of preserving solidarity with the DRV
meant that the Soviet leadership had to distance itself from the USA, not to
Dobrynin, In Cfidence, p.13!. Service, Twentieth Centuiy Russia, p379.
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mention any other state which supported Washington's policies in Indochina.' 30 It
is also important to emphasise that as far the Soviet side was concerned, the
schism with China was a traumatic event. When he was ousted in October 1964,
Khrushchev was blamed by his Politburo colleagues for exacerbating the split
with Beijing, and it was not until the late 1960s that Moscow finally accepted that
the Sino-Soviet split was irreparable.131
A more pertinent criticism of Wilson's approach to détente relates to his
emphasis on style rather than the substance of East-West relations. This
characteristic was evident in his readiness to visit Moscow after Kosygin's trip to
Britain was indefinitely postponed (March 1965), and in the Prime Minister's
impatience with the Foreign Office's reluctance to endorse his intention to meet
the Soviet leadership during the summer and autumn of 1965. Wilson was not the
first British Prime Minister (let alone the first Premier of any country) to be
seduced by the glamour of international statesmanship, but he was evidently more
concerned with the trappings of diplomacy that with the details of the key issues
of East-West relations (Vietnam being the exception). For example, a more cautious
politician would have avoided Wilson's indiscreet comments to Kosygin on
American and West German policy towards NATO nuclear-sharing (23 February
1966), which was probably interpreted by his hosts as proof of a 'contradiction'
within NATO which the USSR could profitably exploit. Wilson took seriously
'30 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars. 1950-1975, (University of North Carolina Press 2000), pp.3-5,
pp.115-119, 146-151. Qiang Zhai, Vietnamese Peace Talks, p.13. Yang Kuisong, Changes in Mao Ze4oig's
Attitude toward the Indochina War, 1 949-1973, CWIIIP Working Paper 34 (2002), pp.26-34.
131 V. Zubok, 'The Mao-Khnjshchev Conversations 31 July-3 August 1958 and 2 October 1959', in CWIHP
Bulletin, 12113 (2001), pp.249-250.
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Soviet propaganda attacks on West German 'revanchism' - the Prime Minister had
expressed his own concerns over Bonn's future intentions at Chequers (November
1964). Wilson's sentiments reflected the latent suspicion in London concerning
Germany's future policies, which was a legacy of the two world wars. During the
Berlin crisis, Macmillan had shown his antipathy towards the Germans, and
Adenauer in particular, and as noted above Foreign Office officials took seriously
Eastern bloc fears of German 'militarism'. According to Vojtech Mastny, the
Soviets were privately far more concerned with the American military position in
Europe than with the possible resurgence of German nationalism, but it is evident
that the Wilson government's position on NATO's nuclear problem was in part a
response to London's assessment of what the USSR would tolerate as far as far
as nuclear-sharing was concerned.'32
In his telegram to Johnson following his return to London, Wilson stated
that while Britain would remain loyal with its allies, it also had a role in
promoting 'an active dialogue' between the superpowers at a time when direct
contacts between the superpowers was hampered by Vietnam. The Prime Minister
maintained that in direct contrast with France, the UK could contribute to the
development of East-West détente without breaking ranks with the USA and
NATO.' 33 Wilson adhered to his belief that Britain could act as an interlocutor
between Washington and Moscow throughout his term in office, and this concept
was repeatedly employed by the Prime Minister to justify his efforts to establish
Gearson, Berlin Crisis, pp.22-23, p.31. V. Mastny, 'Did NATO Win the Cold War ?', in Foreign Affau, 78/3
(1999), pp.178-179.
'33 F0 to Washington, 28.2.66, PREM13I8O5(PRO).
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close contacts with the Soviet leadership. He maintained that unlike de Gaulle his
policy towards détente was constructive as far as the interests of the UK's allies
were concerned, and was compatible with Britain's commitment to NATO.
However, the Labour government's interest in NATO force reductions, and its
determination to reduce BAOR's foreign exchange costs, contributed to the turmoil
within the Alliance which followed France's withdrawal in 1966. The contradiction
between Wilson's rhetoric of acting 'four square' within the 'Western camp' and
his government's intention of reducing the costs of British forces stationed in
Germany is examined in the following chapter.
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4: EUROPEAN SECURITY AND EAST-
H 1966-JANI.
On 7 March 1966 de Gaulle informed Johnson, Wilson and Erhard of his decision
to withdraw France from NATO's integrated command structure by July. The
French President's action was not unexpected. The US military presence and
NATO integration challenged de Gaulle's objective of promoting France as
Western Europe's spokesman in negotiations with the USSR. French opposition to
the American doctrine of 'flexible response' paralysed NATO's strategic review,
and de Gaulle had argued since early 1964 that gradual East-West rapprochement
in Europe, and the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, meant that the USSR was
no longer a threat to Europe, and that NATO was therefore irrelevant. De Gaulle's
actions did not represent a complete breach with the Western allies - he declared
that France would remain party to the North Atlantic Treaty unless the
improvement of East-West relations justified its renunciation. Paris also concluded
a bilateral agreement with Bonn to retain French forces in West Germany.1
Although no other Alliance member followed de Gaulle's lead, NATO
suffered a blow to its political credibility, which was exacerbated by widespread
sentiment within Western Europe that as the Soviet menace receded, the Alliance's
rationale had diminished. NATO governments were inclined to reduce their defence
expenditure because of this perception that the threat posed by the USSR had
'F. Bozo, La France et I'OTAN De Ia guetre froide au nouvel ordre europeen, (Pans; Masson 1991), pp.79-81.
See pp.233-234 for de Gaulle's letter to Johnson dated 7.3.66.
decreased. 2 Wilson and his Ministers had concluded at the Chequers conference
(November 1964) that while unilateral reductions of BAOR would be politically
harmful, there was no military justification for retaining NATO force levels at
their present size. The Labour government, like its Conservative predecessors, was
also concerned with the foreign exchange costs incurred by British forces in
Germany, and this issue became more pressing after July 1966, when the seamen's
strike led to a run on the pound and the threat of devaluation. In response, the
Wilson government cut defence expenditure further and demanded that the FRG
completely offset BAOR's costs, or accept the 'redeployment' of British troops to
the UK. The offsets crisis, and similar pressures on the American military presence
in Germany, threatened to weaken NATO at a time when the Warsaw Pact was
enhancing its military capabilities.
The aim of this chapter is to examine the state of European security and
East-West relations in the context of France's withdrawal from NATO, the WTO
conference at Bucharest (July 1966), the reappraisal of West Germany's
relationship with Eastern Europe away from the hard-line approach epitomised by
Adenauer, and the tnlateral dispute between the USA, UK and FRG over the
foreign exchange costs of American and British forces stationed in West Germany.
In addition, this chapter discusses London's view of the prospects of the
'evolution' of Eastern Europe, and Britain's efforts to encourage détente by
promoting a 'declaration of principles and proposals governing European affairs
and relations', which was intended both as a confidence-building measure and as a
2 IYjffield, Power Rules, P
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means of ensuring that the agenda of East-West rapprochement was not
monopolised by France.
France's withdrawal from NATO: March-July 1966.
Stewart informed Cabinet colleagues in Januaiy 1966 that both the French and the
Soviets wanted a 'reduction or removal' of US forces from Europe, and the
'break-up of the integrated Western Alliance in its present form'. 3 After France's
withdrawal from NATO, the British encouraged the other thirteen member states to
reaffirm their commitment to the Alliance, yet as Evelyn Shuckburgh (the head of
the UK delegation to NATO) noted, de Gaulle's decision had serious implications.
Shuckburgh stated that French propaganda portrayed the Alliance as 'a ponderous
and rigid organisation', reflecting the character of the Cold War in the 1940s and
'incapable of adapting itself to [the] changing political circumstances and military
needs' of the 1960s. While this was 'a distorted picture', this image reflected
wider political and public opinion in Western Europe. 4 In Britain's case these
comments reflected not only the anti-NATO attitude of the Labour left, but the
conclusions of the Chequers conference. The Cabinet Secretary, Burke Trend, agreed
that 'in minimising the Soviet threat' and 'working for more enduring relations
with the Soviet bloc', the French President was 'playing on a responsive chord in
3 C(66)16: France. General de Gaulle's Foreign Policy over the next tw.	 memorandum by Stewart,
28.1.66, CAB129/124{PRO).
4 B. Heus & C. Buffet, 'Resister a La Tempéte: les reactions Britanniques au depart de in France de
l'intégration militaire de 1'OTAN', m Bozo, Mélandri & Vane, France et l 'OTAN, pp.447-448. Shuckburgh to
Stewart, 23.3.66, CABI64/28(PRO).
sections of French and European opinion'. Moscow could exploit improved Franco-
Soviet relations to drive a wedge between the USA and its West European allies,
while France's withdrawal could encourage Norway and Denmark (both wary of
antagonising the USSR), or Greece and Turkey (both at odds over Cyprus) to
follow suit.5
From London's perspective, de Gaulle was not only a threat to Western
unity, but the exponent of a rival version of détente. Wright told the Prime
Minister on 11 March that 'General de Gaulle is very uncooperative and his
methods could be dangerous, but not all of his ideas are wrong'. Wilson's Private
Secretary shared de Gaulle's view that the threat of war in Europe had greatly
diminished and that there was considerable scope for the improvement of East-
West relations. Wilson was clearly impressed with Wright's arguments, as he
repeated them to the Foreign Secretary four days later. The Prime Minister told
Stewart that de Gaulle's nationalism, visceral anti-Americanism and 'rogue elephant
tactics' were deplorable, but some of his views on international political
developments 'may be more up to date and in tune with the times than our
own'. While British objectives in NATO - to support the American commitment to
Western Europe's defence, avert any revival of German nationalism, and to
maintain a collective deterrent against Soviet aggression - remained valid, the
effort to bolster NATO after France's withdrawal should include efforts to 'parley'
with the Eastern bloc powers. Wilson again argued that NATO could afford to
5 OPLk66)44: France and NATO, memorandum by Trend, 1.4.66, CAB148127(PRO). S the map lii Appendix 4
showing the European alliances in 1964.
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reduce its forces, and that Britain could press 'first within the Alliance and then
with the Russians, for a phased and balanced reduction of forces on either side of
the Iron Curtain'. Regarding Germany, he suggested to Stewart that British policy
should now openly oppose a 'hardware solution' to NATO's nuclear-sharing
debate, as this would be 'totally incompatible' with efforts to promote East-West
détente. 6 Wilson expressed these ideas to Johnson at the end of the month,
although he placed greater emphasis in his message on the importance of
maintaining both the US commitment to Europe and NATO unity.7
Stewart concurred with Wilson's arguments, informing the FRG's Foreign
Minister, Gerhard SchrOder, on the 16 March that other Western states seemed to
share de Gaulle's view 'that the Russian threat was not as strong as before'.
Johnson also agreed with the Prime Minister's assessment on détente, although he
still maintained that Erhard would not accept a nuclear-sharing arrangement which
did not give the FRG 'equality' with the USA and Britain. 8 Healey initially
expressed concerns that any efforts to promote troop cuts in Central Europe
'would be regarded by our allies as a body blow which might complete the work
of destruction done by de Gaulle'. Nevertheless, there was general consensus in
Whitehall that NATO was, in Shuckburgh's words, 'top-heavy and unwieldy', and
that although the Alliance's first aim was the collective defence of Western
Europe, NATO members should place greater emphasis on 'developing the détente
to PM, 11.3.66, PREM13/1043(PRO). PM to Stewart, 15.3.66, CAB164128(PRO).
to Johnson, T135/66, 29.3.66, PREM13/1043(PRO).
8 Conversation between Schroeder & Stewart at FO, 16.3.66, PREM131927(PRO). FO to Washington, No.5288,
23.5.66, PREM13/1044(PRO).
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(sic) with the Communist bloc', and on progress towards 'disarmament and a
permanent settlement in Europe'.9
Trend informed Ministers at the end of March that although NATO was
still needed to deter Soviet expansion, the Alliance had to adapt to the changing
political situation in Europe. The USSR was unlikely to respond to initiatives on
German reunification and conventional force reductions, which would threaten
Moscow's authority over Eastern Europe, yet Britain could contribute to the
development of detente by promoting an NPT and a Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT). The unspoken presumption here was that even if the Soviets
rejected arms control measures, the British and other Western governments could
demonstrate to their electorates that they were responsive to the pro-détente
popular mood. Regarding NATO, the British objective should be 'to take the
opportunity to re-fashion the alliance on a more efficient and more economical
basis' and to 'build a firmer foundation for East-West relations in Europe'. The
OPD discussed the substance of the Cabinet Secretary's suggestions and endorsed
them in early April. Ministers acknowledged 'the need for a militarily viable
United Kingdom contribution to allied defence in Europe', but within the context
of a reduction of NATO force levels. De Gaulle's argument that NATO was a
Cold War relic appealed to West European opinion, and while French policy
threatened Western solidarity the British perceived an opportunity for a 'fresh
9 Healey to PM, 23.3.66, & Shuckburgh to Stewart, CAB164128(PRO).
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start' in the Atlantic Alliance.' 0 Wilson later expressed his views to Rusk in June,
stating that:
If General de Gaulle is sincere in his views about the need for effective détente as a
means towards such desiderata as German reunification, the difference between us is not
over ends but over means. We believe that if everybody in the alliance acted like de
Gaulle, far from détente a Iruly dangerous situation would be created in Europe.
The 'best way to détente', Wilson argued, was to 'preserve a solidarity of purpose'
within NATO, and to approach the Soviets with 'forward-looking policies' on arms
control. The Prime Minister described the Soviets as 'realists' who would use de
Gaulle 'as a divisive factor in NATO', but were aware that 'his real influence in
the world, and above all on the conduct of United States policy, was marginal'.
Wilson argued that Britain, by contrast, 'still had such influence and when it came
to practical politics rather than propaganda ... the Russians would rather talk to
us'.11
Wilson's comments to the US Secretary of State reflected his impression,
derived from his February 1966 visit to Moscow, that Britain could play an active
role in promoting East-West détente. In contrast with France, the UK would
perform this role without breaking ranks with the USA or NATO. The British
therefore sought the approval of their allies for the 'declaration of principles' they
had discussed with the Czechoslovaks. However, after July 1966 the effort to
recover the foreign exchange costs of BAOR forestalled any systematic attempt to
undertake a major initiative in East-West diplomacy.
'°OPD(66)44, CAB148127(PRO). OPD(66)18 th meeting, CAB148/25(PRO). OPD(0X66)6th & 7th meetings, 18.3.66
& 28.3.66, CABI48/68(PRO).
"M. Palhser to M. MacLehose (FO), 4.6.66, PREM13I9O2(PRO). Conversation between PM & Rusk at No.10,
10.6.66, PRIM13f2264(PRO).
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Détente and the 'declaration of principles': March-December 1966.
Like other British and West European politicians, Wilson considered West German
policy to be an impediment to détente because of Bonn's intransigence on the
Oder-Neisse line and the Halistein doctrine. Yet by early 1966 there were signs
that the FRG's policy towards the Eastern bloc was changing. The Erhard
government oversaw a policy of Bewegung (slow movement forward), and although
diplomatic relations had yet to be established between Bonn and the WTO powers
the West Germans opened trade missions in East European capitals. As Frank
Roberts observed, West German public opinion generally favoured rapprochement
with the Eastern bloc states. The FRG's 'peace note' of 25 March was
condescendingly described by the Foreign Office to be 'a move in the right
direction', despite its 'unnecessarily polemical passages' attacking Soviet and Polish
foreign policy. The 'peace note' reiterated Bonn's pledge not to build nuclear
weapons, declared that the Munich settlement had 'no territorial significance', and
offered the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia in particular an agreement for the
mutual renunciation of force. The note, however, made no mention of recognition
of either Germany's Eastern frontier or the GDR.' 2 The British encouraged the
West Germans to be more proactive in improving relations with the East
Europeans, but as Andrew Stark (one of Roberts' subordinates in the Bonn
embassy) noted, détente required greater flexibility on the part of the Communist
states too. Stark commented that while Britain tended to approach foreign policy
12 Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe, pp.177-181. Calvocoressi, World Politics, pp.222-223. MacLehose to
Wright, 24.3.66; memorandum from FRG Embassy in London, 25.3.66, PREM13/928(PRO).
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problems seeking 'what is "realistic" i.e. practical and likely to be obtainable', the
more legalistically-inclined Germans 'always begin by trying to identify what is
"right". Although Bonn was 'self-righteous' concerning the legitimacy of the
Oder-Neisse line and the rights of ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern Europe
in 1945, the Czechoslovaks and Poles were inclined to be as sanctimonious. The
FRG was 'often thick-skinned and insensitive', and 'blind to anti-German feeling
in Eastern Europe', but while many British officials believed that the latter
sentiment was a principally a legacy of Nazi brutality during World War Two,
Stark argued that Bonn did had grounds for arguing that anti-German hostility
was also being 'deliberately fostered' by Prague, Warsaw and Moscow.13
The West German 'peace note' was rejected by the Soviets and their allies
in the declaration issued by the WTO Consultative Committee following its
meeting in Bucharest (July 1966).' On one level, the Bucharest declaration was a
show of unity from a Pact affected by Polish and Czechoslovak demands for an
alliance similar to that of NATO, with a political consultative body equivalent to
the NAC, and a greater role for the East Europeans in the Soviet-dominated
military structure. 15 At the same time, the Romanians intended to reduce the
Warsaw Pact's authority over member states, just as Bucharest had challenged the
increased co-ordination of national economies within the CMEA the previous year.
On 7 May 1966 Nicolae Ceausescu, the Romanian Conmiunist party secretary,
'3 A. Stark (Bonn) to }L Smith, 22.2.66, N1031 18/I, F03711188477(PRO).
14 T Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe. 1945-1970, (Baltimore 1970), pp.285-287. Craig Nation, Red Star, p.247.
Bucharest to FO, No.215, 8.7.66; Moscow to FO, No. 325, 11.7.66, PREM13/902(PRO).
' 5 V. Mastny, "We are in a Bind": Polish and Czechoslovak attempts at Reforming the Warsaw Pact, 1956-
1969', CWIHP Bulletin, 11 (1998), pp.230-249. NIE1 1-15-66, Reliability of the USSR's East European Allies,
4.8.66, MFF15/412.
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publicly attacked the division of Europe into 'military blocs' and asserted that
Romania would follow an 'independent' foreign policy. Ceausescu's condemnation
of the 'foreign' troop presence in Central Europe was, Northern Department
officials argued, implicitly directed against the USSR as well as the USA. British
diplomats correctly concluded that while Romania was unlikely to leave the WTO
or denounce its treaty with the USSR, Bucharest would oppose any extension of
Moscow's authority over Warsaw Pact members.'6
The Bucharest declaration contained the standard Eastern bloc references to
West German 'revanchism', recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and East German
sovereignty, and a blunt attack on US policy in Vietnam. The declaration also
referred to the need for 'good neighbourly relations' and increased commercial,
cultural and scientific exchanges between East and West European states, and did
not explicitly exclude American participation in any future European security
conference. Harrison stated that despite the predictable anti-American and anti-
German propaganda, the declaration was 'a more sophisticated document than the
Russians could produce on their own'. The emphasis placed on 'good-neighbourly
co-operation' between Eastern and Western Europe, in the ambassador's view,
reflected 'the thinking and interests of the Western minded countries of the
bloc'.' 7 The Northern Department concurred with this assessment, and were
disappointed that the Americans regarded the Bucharest declaration as insignificant.
16 H. Smith to Greenhill, N1073/24, 24.5.66; D. Bida11 (Washington) to Smith, 26.5.66, N1073/34,
F0371/188493(PRO). On Romania and the WTO, see Mastny, 'In a Biixl', p.232.
Moscow to FO, No.1325, 11.7.66, F03711188494(PRO). Smith to Greenhill, 15.7.66, N1073/85,
F0371/188495(PRO).
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In contrast, the British concluded that while the Bucharest declaration was 'turgid',
and struck a 'Gaullist tone' in calling on European states to solve their problems
'without interference from outside' (i.e. the USA), it was 'also clearly regarded by
the Warsaw Pact governments as a major Declaration of policy'. The Bucharest
conference provided the impetus for the UK's proposed declaration on East-West
relations.'8
The 'statement of principles and proposals governing European affairs and
relations' originated with a conversation between Stewart and the Czechoslovak
ambassador on 17 March 1966. The Foreign Secretary was handed a 'declaration
of principles', which called upon European powers to respect the sovereignty and
territorial rights of other states, and to avoid taking 'any steps which might result
in aggravating international tensions'. Stewart concluded that while these clauses
were directed against West Germany, the references to trade, cultural agreements
and technological co-operation had some merit. The ambassador to Prague, Cecil
Parrott, was more sceptical, and regarded the declaration to be 'platitudinous' and
open to 'misleading interpretation'. Parrott described the Czechoslovak regime's
foreign policy as 'Stalinist', particularly regarding the German question, and the
ambassador to Prague noted that the Czechoslovaks had assisted the Soviets in
employing 'subversive measures to threaten our interests in third countries (not to
speak of their [intelligence] activities in our own)'. Parrott concluded that the
Czechoslovak initiative was pure 'wedge-driving'. 19 Gore-Booth and other Foreign
Bendall to Smith, 21.7.66, N1073/8l; & I. Sutherland to (}reenhill, 25.7.66, N0173/S1, F0371/188495(PRO).
19 Stewait to Parrott, 17.3.66, N1075/3; Parrott to Stewart, 2.4.66, N1075/1O, F03711188497(PRO).
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Office officials likewise regarded the Czechoslovak declaration with suspicion, but
supported the Northern Department's proposal to approach NATO allies with a
British draft declaration.20
Like the ambassador to Prague, Trend had his doubts about the utility of a
declaration, arguing that at best the document would be 'watered down' into a
'collection of platitudes', while at worst the declaration could provoke questions
from other NATO powers on British intentions - concerning, for example, mutual
force reductions, German reunification, and non-proliferation - 'at a time when we
are not yet ready to answer them'. Michael Palliser, who had replaced Oliver
Wright as Wilson's Private Secretary, considered the Foreign Office draft to be
'like trying to pinch the General's pants'. 2 ' Howard Smith testily responded was
that 'it is de Gaulle who has stolen our trousers and not we his' by claiming to
be Western Europe's spokesman for détente.22 At the beginning of July, the OPD
met to discuss the declaration, which contained broad statements on the need for
increased bilateral and multilateral co-operation in trade, scientific co-operation, on
sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. The Foreign Office proposed to
invite European governments to endorse the declaration unilaterally, thus allowing
neutral states to participate and avoiding a joint WTO endorsement which would
embarrass Western powers by involving the GDR. Stewart conceded that the draft
made no substantial recommendations, but was 'the kind of general declaration to
20 e- 	 A Declaration on Europe, 2.5.66 & annotation by Greenhill, 3.5.66, N1075/11; Stewart to
Shuckburgh, 12.5.66, Ni 075/13, F0371/188497(PRO).
21 Trend to PM, 4.7.66, CABI65/28(PRO). PC(66)30, East-West Relations, 17.6.66; & annotated comments by
Pallis & PM, 21.6.66, PREM13/902(PRO).
Pallmnn to D. Morphet (FO), 25.6.66, PREM13/902(PRO). Smith, A Declaration on Europe, 17.6.66, & Stewart
to PM, 20.6.66,N1075/21, F0371/188498(PRO).
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which eastern European countries attached importance', while 'the reiterated
renunciation of the use of force to settle disputes' would be welcomed by the
FRG's Eastern neighbours.23
The OPD approved the draft, but the declaration received a lukewarm
response from the American and West German representatives in the NAC. The
latter complained that the text made no reference to reunification, and that its
language bore a close resemblance to Eastern bloc propaganda statements.
Washington objected that the draft was 'overly European in tone and could lead
to a misunderstanding by the East on the essential role of the United States in a
European settlement'. The British suspected that Harlan Cleveland, the US
representative to the NAC, was deliberately stalling discussion on the declaration,
and that the Americans wanted 'our proposal for a declaration [to be] submerged
in a great deal of far-ranging discussion of a largely theoretical kind'. 24
 While the
Foreign Office proposed that the declaration be approved within NATO, then
presented to 'one or more countries in Eastern Europe', the Americans preferred a
joint declaration 'without either joint or individual subscription by the countries of
the Warsaw Pact nor any form of bilateral negotiation'.25 Although Johnson
reaffirmed his administrations' interest in 'bridge-building' in a speech on 7
October, by this time the State Department openly opposed the British draft
declaration. Smith presumed that Washington intended to '[whip] in the less
OPD(66)76: East/West Relations; A Declaration, memorandum by FO, 1.7.66, CAB14SI2S(PRO). OPLX66)31
meeting, 5.7.66, CAB148125(PRO). The 'Declaration' is copied in Appendix 2.
24	 Dept brief Visit of UK Foreign Minister George Bmiwi October 14 1966. East-West Relationships,
12.1.0.66, MF41 1. Lord Hood to Shuckborgh, 1.7.66, N1075t27, F0371/188498(PRO).
"Washington to FO, No.2118, 19.7.66; Suth1and to Greenhill, 21 .7.66, N1075/50, F037JJ188499(PRO).
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resolute members of the Alliance' by concentrating on NATO's military problems,
and that any discussions on East-West relations would 'have a disintegrating
effect' on NATO. 26
 Greenhill pessimistically concluded that with Washington
opposing the declaration and in a position to influence the FRG, and Paris
unwilling to support an initiative which detracted from de Gaulle's prestige, the
draft would only attract the support of some of the minor NATO states. He also
considered that the WTO powers were unlikely to respond to any initiative
following the Bucharest conference.27
Despite American concerns, the NAC concurred with the British decision to
pass the draft to the Czechoslovaks and William Barker, Parrott's successor in
Prague, presented the declaration on 12 December. The 'declaration of principles'
made no substantial reference to the central problem of European security, which
was the division of Germany. The Foreign Office's Planning Staff had debated, and
ruled out, a renewed initiative on German reunification in August 1966. From
Moscow, Harrison stated that while the Bucharest declaration indicated greater
flexibility on bilateral diplomatic relations with Western powers, the Soviets still
showed no real willingness to discuss the 'substance of major issues'. The
American attitude towards European initiatives was described by one British
diplomat in Washington as 'ambivalent'. The Americans appeared 'convinced that
the Russians and the Russians only hold the key to a European settlement, and
26 Johnson, The Vantage Point, (Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1972), pp.474-475. Note by Smith, 28.6.66, NI 075/28,
F0371/188498(PRO).
27 Dean to Greenhill, 17.8.66, N1075/6; note by (}reenhill, 25.8.66, N1075177; UKDeINATO to FO, No.593,
3.11.66, N1075/103, F03711188500(PRO).
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that any serious progress must be based on a prior United States/Soviet
understanding'. However, US-Soviet relations showed no sign of improvement.
Washington hoped to see Western Europe emerge 'as a cohesive force capable of
standing up to the Soviet Union on its own with the minimum of United States
support', a sentiment which reflected growing American concern at the financial
costs of the USA's commitment to NATO. Yet paradoxically, Johnson
administration officials were also concerned lest the Europeans show too much
independence, this being due to their suspicion of de Gaulle's motives,
apprehension over any revival of German nationalism, and the feeling that
European security was 'too important to allow control to pass from their own
hands'. 28 In fact, Washington faced a dilemma, in which the political need to
ensure that de Gaulle did not monopolise West European support for détente
coexisted with the suspicion that the Soviets would exploit this sentiment to create
discord within NATO.29
This attitude underpinned the American reaction to the declaration of
principles. While the British considered that the French withdrawal from NATO
presented an opportunity to promote East-West détente, the Americans were
apprehensive that Alliance unity could be undermined by ill-timed diplomatic
approaches to the Eastern bloc. Washington and London addressed the problem of
restoring Alliance cohesion from different directions, the former concentrating on
J. Nicholls to F. Roberts, 12.8.66; Harrison to Nicholls, 26.8.66; & M. Stewart (Minister, Washington Embassy)
to Nicholls, 2.9.66, F095312499(PRO).
F. Costigliola, "Not a Normal French Government": la iaction Américaine au retmit de la France de
l'OTAN', in Bozo, Mélandri & Vaisse, France et 1 'OTAN, p.411, p.41 5.
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intra-Western relations while the latter concluded that de Gaulle should not be
pennitted to monopolise widespread support in Western Europe for détente.
Ironically, having concluded by the spring of 1966 that Britain could rally NATO
and influence the Alliance's strategic doctrine and its approach to détente, Wilson
and his Ministers devoted far less time to the 'declaration of principles' than to
the issue of BAOR's foreign exchange costs.
Assessing the 'evolution' of Eastern Europe: The 'declaration of principles'
and the Ambassador's conference on Eastern Europe, April-July 1966.
When the PUSD's Planning Staff drafted the 'declaration of principles' in June
1966, Gore-Booth wondered whether its text would help legitimise East European
regimes hostile to the UK and its allies. The Permanent Under-Secretary suggested
employing the Soviet tactic of appealing to the subjects of 'imperial' rule,
addressing the draft to (for example) the 'Polish people' as opposed to 'the Polish
Government'. Smith reminded Gore-Booth that British policy towards the Eastern
bloc was intended to avoid drawing 'too sharp a line between the people and the
rulers', or to openly attempt to split the East European states from the Soviet
Union.3° This exchange of opinions, and the biannual conference of ambassadors to
the USSR and East European states held in London (April 1966), raised the
question of what results 'evolution' would have on the Communist regimes, and
whether their moderation, or demise, would suit British interests.
30 e- 	 to Nicholls, 10.6.66; & Smith, East/West Relations, 14.6.66, N1075/66, F0371/188500(PRO).
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The Foreign Office had been frustrated throughout 1965 by the
unwillingness of other departments in Whitehall, notably the Board of Trade, to
reduce restrictions on Eastern bloc trade with the UK. Commerce, cultural relations
and scientific co-operation were the principal means of developing British contacts
with the Eastern European states, but while most restrictions on Eastern bloc
imports had been lifted by the Board of Trade, West European competitors like
France had gone further in liberalising their trade with Eastern European states.3'
Between 27 April and 2 May, the ambassadors to the WTO states, Yugoslavia and
West Germany met with the Foreign Secretary and other officials to discuss the
course of 'evolution', with reference to Eastern Europe rather than the USSR,
where Khrushchev's successors had clamped down on political dissent. The
prospects for increased trading relations were also discussed alongside the political
aspects of East-West relations.32
Participants at the conference were reminded by the MoD's Defence
Intelligence Staff (DIS) that most of the Eastern bloc states had experimented
with reforms to the command economy - Czechoslovakia had initiated proposals
associated with the liberal economist Ota Sik, while Hungary had introduced the
New Economic Mechanism (NEM). 33 The DIS concluded that even with the aid of
computer technology central planning for increasingly large and diverse economies
n inter-departmental meeting at Cabinet Office, 25.12.65, N1151113; P. Rhodes to C. Lowry (BoT), 15.11.66,
Ni 151/47, F03711188509(PRO).
Smith, Secretary of State's Visit to Moscow, Briefs 2(a) & 2(b), NSIO5I/283, F0371/188927(PRO). The
fo11o'ng two pages suimnarise the minutes of the Conference of Ambassadors from Eastern Europe, 27.4.66-
2.5.66, Ni 152/55, F03711188510(PRO).
n For the Kosygin reforms, see Hosking, Soviet Union, pp.364-366. For the Sik reforms and the NEM, see
Crampton, Eastern Europe, pp.316-317, & pp.321-322, and the obituaiy for the Hungarian deputy premier, Jeno
Fock, in the Independent, 28.5.01.
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was increasingly impossible. Harrison noted that the USSR had made less progress
on reform than the East Europeans, attributing this to the fact that the Soviets
would have no one to bail them out if internal liberalisation led to the breakdown
of the centrally-planned economy. He also stated that Kosygin's reforms clashed
with the CPSU's monopolisation of decision-making. Although Sir George Clutton,
the ambassador to Warsaw, commented that the Poles were forced by Moscow to
'buy in Russia what they would rather buy in the West', other diplomats present
were generally optimistic that the process of economic reform would gradually
open up East European markets. Parrott observed that for all the USSR's apparent
technological prowess (as manifested by its space programme) 'all the East
Europeans could see of Russian achievements would be shoddy productions which
flooded their markets'. If the Warsaw Pact states had greater autonomy in internal
economic policies, they would rely less on the CMEA and more on trade with
Western countries.
The Foreign Office objected to the fact that Eastern Europe was regarded
within Whitehall as a 'special case', in which quotas were imposed on certain
Soviet bloc imports which did not apply to other foreign producers. Board of
Trade officials asserted that Eastern Europe remained a 'special case' because the
ruling regimes could make arbitrary decisions irrespective of economic logic, and
due to the lack of transparency in dealing with Communist states. The Board of
Trade also intended to reverse the imbalances in trade between the UK and states
like Poland and the USSR, which involved the Eastern bloc accepting more British
1 51
exports, rather than the reverse. Howard Smith expressed the Foreign Office view
by stating that as reforms opened the East European economies, Britain had to
remove its remaining trade restrictions or surrender the advantage to continental
competitors. The ambassadors and Northern Department officials were concerned
that France and the FRG in particular appeared more successful than the UK in
securing contracts from Eastern bloc states - a sentiment which reflected
contemporary concerns at Britain's poor economic performance in comparison with
its continental competitors. The regional ambassadors concluded that France and
West Germany derived commercial benefits because both imposed fewer
restrictions on East-West trade, although William Marpham, the ambassador to
Sofia, noted that French and West German businesses trading in Bulgaria offered
lower prices than their British counterparts.
As far as political relations were concerned, Stewart admitted that 'he could
not record much tangible progress' in East-West relations during his tenure of
office, and he asked the ambassadors if the East Europeans could encourage the
USSR to adopt a more forthcoming attitude towards détente. Clutton observed that
the Poles and Czechoslovaks favoured the reduction of tensions in Europe, but the
former were still virulently anti-German, and Parrott stated that Prague rigidly
adhered to the Soviet line in international relations. The issue of Eastern bloc
espionage in Britain was discussed in the context of cultural relations, a reflection
of Parliamentary protests that bilateral cultural exchanges be curtailed in reprisal
for Brooke's imprisonment. Harrison in particular showed little sympathy for
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Brooke's plight, stressing instead that efforts to exert pressure on the Soviets by
curtailing cultural activities would be counter-productive, as Western theatre
productions and concerts at least gave Eastern bloc citizens a glimpse of an
alternative to Communism. With the exception of Parrott, who commented on the
activities of the Czechoslovak equivalent of the KGB, the StB, the ambassadors
treated the issue of Soviet bloc espionage in Britain as a secondary concern.
The head of the Northern Department summed up the conference's
conclusions, stating that while the East Europeans would remain aligned with the
USSR, internal reforms would continue to alter the character of the Soviet bloc
states, thus contributing to the alleviation of East-West differences. The conclusions
of the ambassador's conference rested upon the presumption that the process of
'evolution' would not be reversed by the ruling regimes. Smith acknowledged that
British policy had hitherto focused overwhelmingly on the USSR rather than on
the Eastern European countries, yet while 'power still lay with the Soviet Union
the seed of future change (affecting even the Soviet Union itself) might lie
elsewhere'. Foreign Office officials were optimistic about the progress of internal
reform and the enhancement of East-West contacts that would result, and were
sanguine about the ability of the Communist parties to manage economic reform
while controlling pressures for political liberalisation. Smith stated in June that
while East Europeans would choose an alternative to Communism if given a free
choice, 'there is [no] unrest; there is not very likely to be unrest; and I would
doubt whether it is in our interest that there should be unrest' in the region. The
1.ss
process of change in the Eastern bloc was influenced by 'the confrontation of the
Communists with ... objective economic and political realities', and Smith assumed
that the regimes would be influenced by pragmatism rather than dogma when
dealing with these 'realities'.34
Clutton was the only regional ambassador to question this interpretation.
The ambassador to Warsaw agreed that the East Europeans should not be
encouraged to split from Moscow, although the reason he gave was that the only
alternative to Soviet authority over the region was 'German domination'. However,
he reminded Smith that the Poles had been expected to move towards a less
authoritarian and more 'national' variant of Communism after the upheavals of
1956, but Poland had lapsed into socio-economic stagnation, with only marginal
improvements in living standards. Clutton stated that 'in the Communist system
and in an omnipotent state the free intellect is an illusion, since if the intellect is
allowed to be free it destroys the system'. He observed that 'I thought that my
colleagues and I were fairly well agreed that if the present reforms within various
countries were carried out to their logical conclusions they must sooner or later
destroy the system, not only economically but politically'. If the Soviet bloc
regimes continued with the reforms associated with the NEM in Hungary and the
Sik programme in Czechoslovakia, the Communist system would break down, 'and
the leaderships of the East European countries are quite determined that this shall
not happen'. The ruling regimes would therefore reverse the concessions they had
Smith, East!West Relahcms, 14.6.66, N1075/66, F03711188500(PRO).
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made in liberalising the command economy and in allowing greater freedom of
expression:
In short, I regard "national communism", "liberal communism", and all the other so-called
qualified forms of communism as illusions. How long the sort of stagnation that exists in
[Eastern] Europe can in fact endure is hard to say, but my own belief is that the day
will come when the whole system will crack and disintegrate, possibly with an explosion,
but more probably not. This however will not mean the end of the alignment with the
Soviet Union, though it may have a great effect on the Soviet Union itself35
Clutton's conclusion that 'evolution' would be thwarted, and would ultimately lead
to revolution, was criticised by his counterpart in Budapest, Alexander Morley, who
stated that a Communist collapse 'would be less satisfactory' than evolutionary
change as this would 'bring with it tensions and the risk of war'. Morley, Smith,
and other Northern Department officials did not consider it inevitable that the
regimes would arrest the process of 'evolution'. The head of the Northern
Department asserted that he opposed any effort to split the East Europeans from
the Soviets because 'it would not work, not that it would be wrong if it did
work', and he questioned Clutton's argument that the alternative to Soviet
domination over Eastern Europe was hegemony exercised by a united Germany.
Smith admitted that Poland had failed to reform itself since 1956, but did not
accept the conclusion that 'either her example or the logic of the situation should
lead us to assume that Czechoslovakia, say, is going to fail in the same way'.
Authoritarian regimes 'have been known to modify themselves in the face of life
itself', and Smith cited Yugoslavia as an example. He concluded that the
established view of 'evolution' in Eastern Europe offered the best hope of
Chitton to Smith, 7.6.66, NI 152/56 & 21.6.66, NI 152/63, F0371/188510(PRO).
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preserving peace between the USSR and the West, which would be jeopardised by
the sudden 'cracking and disintegration' of the Communist system.36
The debate which followed the ambassador's conference also highlighted an
ambivalence in the official British view of reform in Eastern Europe. The Soviet
military presence in the GDR, Poland and Hungary was a potential threat to West
European security, but Soviet garrisons also ensured stability and order in a region
which, as far as the Foreign Office was concerned, had been an epicentre of
nationalist rivalry and political instability before the Second World War. A
preference for stability over self-determination was a long-established feature of
British foreign policy. Events in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in 1980-1981 and
throughout Eastern Europe in 1989 justified Clutton's scepticism about the
possibility for 'evolution', but it appears that in the mid-1960s his colleagues were
unwilling to contemplate the implications if the Communist regimes simply refused
to 'evolve'.
The Wilson government, the offsets crisis and the East-West military balance:
July 1966-April 1967
The problem caused by the foreign exchange costs incurred by American and
British forces based in West Germany has been described elsewhere, and the
convoluted history of the three-way dispute between Washington, London and
Smith to Clutton, NI 152/60; P. Rhodes' comments on Clutton's letter, NI 152/62; & A. Morley to Smith,
6.7.66, Ni 152/63, F03711188510(PRO).
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Bonn over offsets requires a thesis in itself. The trilateral negotiations from the
autumn of 1966 to the end of April 1967 resulted from an American attempt to
resolve the impasse between the British and West German governments, arising
from London's demand in July 1966 that Bonn should offset all of BAOR's
costs, or accept the withdrawal of troops to the UK. 3'7 The financial crisis that
month reinforced Wilson's conviction - shared by Callaghan and Healey, among
other Ministers - that Britain was carrying a disproportionate share of the Western
defence burden, which included overseas commitments which were deemed to
serve allied interests as a whole. 38 Although the fortuitous conclusion of the
'confrontation' with Indonesia (August 1966) permitted the reduction of British
forces in the Far East, the UK still had the problem of balancing its NATO and
East of Suez commitments. 39 The Wilson government claimed that Britain was
'subsidising' West Germany's defence at an estimated cost of £90 million, but
Bonn maintained that BAOR contributed to the collective defence of NATO as a
whole. The FRG could not afford to cover the foreign exchange costs of both
American and British forces and, as Roberts noted, the West Germans were
unwilling to pay BAOR's costs if, as they suspected, London planned to cut
British forces in Germany in any case. 4° The offsets crisis had financial roots, but
had serious implications for NATO unity and the East-West military balance.
See H. Zimmerman, 'The Sour Fruits of Victory: Sterling and Security in Anglo-German Relations during the
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At the end of August, Johnson cajoled Wilson into agreeing to trilateral
negotiations to resolve the dispute, arguing that if the British acted on their threat
to reduce BAOR the result would be 'a chain-reaction of troop reductions' which
would end with the unravelling of NATO. The President asserted that it would be
'foolish to run down our assets vis a v/s Moscow without some quid pro quo',
but the Americans contributed to the crisis over troop levels by withdrawing
40,000 servicemen from West Germany to serve in Vietnam. 4 ' While Johnson
administration officials complained of the unwillingness of their European allies to
contribute more to their defence, there was considerable support within Congress
for Senator Mike Mansfield's call for a reduction of the US military presence in
Europe.42 McNamara concluded that improvements in air transportation permitted
the timely transfer of US reinforcements across the Atlantic in a crisis, and the
Pentagon planned for the 'rotational' deployment of American forces in Germany,
with some army and air force units being based in the USA. In London, those
who favoured the 'redeployment' of British troops argued that McNamara's
conclusions were more applicable to UK-based forces, which were geographically
closer to NATO's front-line. Although Rusk was more concerned than McNamara
with the strategic implications of force reductions, it should be noted that neither
he nor the Secretary for Defense made matters easier for the Wilson govermnent
41 Johnson to PM, CAP66583, 28.8.66, CAB164189(PRO). Smith, Vietnam War, III, p115. Bonn to State Dept.
No.325, 3.8.66, MF406. Bluth, 'Reconciling the Irreconcilable', pp.97-98.
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by implying that the UK's commitments East of Suez were more important than
the British troop presence in Germany.43
Wilson approached the offsets issue in the context of Britain's economic
problems, and his visits to Moscow in February and July gave him the impression
that the Soviets were likely to agree to informal NATO and WTO force
reductions. However, Kosygin only said that mutual troop cuts 'seemed to open
an interesting avenue for discussion' on 22 February, and he was hardly more
effusive during Wilson's second visit (July 1966). The Prime Minister also
neglected the strategic implications on British policy on offsets. Gore-Booth
informed Trend that 'our forces in Germany are not a commitment to the defence
of [West] Germany alone but represent a contribution to the security of the
NATO area, including indeed this country'. The military rationale for redeploying
units from BAOR was also questioned. Anticipating France's withdrawal in
advance, the service chiefs had observed in August 1965 that if other Western
powers reduced their force contributions, 'the combined effect would be most
damaging, since the determination of NATO to resist aggression would then be in
doubt'. The following summer the COS expressed their concerns over the
implications of any unilateral reduction of BAOR, particularly as this could
OPD(OX66)19 meeting, 3.8.66, CAB148168(PRO). Conversation bween Rusk & Stewart at Bmce's
residonce, London, 2.6.66, PREM13/902(PRO). See also Crossman, 1, 11.12.64, p.95.
44 CC39(66)39 conclusions, 21.7.66, CAB128/41(PRO). Conversation between E. Rostow (US Assistant
Secretary of State for Political Affairs) & PM at No.10,21.11.66, PREMI3/808(PRO).
Kosygin & PM, 22.2.66, PREM13/805(PRO). Kosygm & PM at Kremlin & UK Embassy, 18.7.66,
CAB16412(PRO).
Reilly to Stewart, 18.3.65, PREM131324(PRO). Gore-Booth to Trend, 21.5.66, CAB164/88(PRO). COS/65(148),
France and NATO, 17.8.65, DEFE5/161(PRO).
161
encourage further American troops cuts.47 However, by November the chiefs
acquiesced in the Wilson government's determination to recover BAOR's foreign
exchange costs. Despite his initial concerns over troop reductions, by the autumn of
1966 Healey saw the trilateral talks as a means of persuading the USA and FRG
- and through them the rest of NATO - that the Alliance could afford to reduce
its force levels.48
The Labour government's approach to the offsets negotiations was based
upon the assessment, prepared by the TIC and reflecting the Defence Secretary's
views, that the USSR would not risk a nuclear holocaust, and that there had been
no change to Soviet military doctrine since the Mottershead report's assessment
five years previously. TIC analysts observed that in spite of the Vietnam war
Moscow had maintained a 'limited political dialogue' with the Western powers,
and had resisted Chinese pressure to counteract US intervention in South-East
Asia by raising tensions over Berlin. The TIC ruled out a surprise (or 'standing
start') WTO attack, concluding that NATO would receive 'several weeks' notice if
the USSR adopted a more hostile and aggressive attitude towards the West.
Having received this advance 'political warning', NATO would also have four to
nine days 'military warning' of any Warsaw Pact attack. The period of 'political
warning' would therefore enable the USA and UK to send reinforcements to
bolster NATO's defences as East-West relations deteriorated. The TIC's assessment
theoretically supported a reduction in BAOR, subject to the agreement of NATO





 However, the Commander-in-Chief of BAOR warned that Western
intelligence services could fail to detect indicators of Soviet bloc aggression (for
example, troop movements from the Western USSR to the GDR) if these appeared
to be part of routine military exercises. 5° Percy Cradock, a Foreign Office analyst
who later became chairman of the JIC, retrospectively described the concept of
'political warning' as 'nebulous and controversial', dependant on a subjective
estimate of Soviet intentions. 'Political warning' provided the justification for
Washington and London to 'redeploy' troops from Germany, but it did not allow
for the possibility that in any international crisis NATO governments might be
unwilling to exacerbate East-West tensions by ordering a higher state of military
readiness. 51
 Furthermore, even if the Soviets responded to NATO force reductions
by cutting their garrisons in Eastern Europe, troops located in the Western USSR
were still geographically closer to NATO's Central front than US forces
redeployed across the Atlantic or British units based across the English Channel.
On the offsets issue, both the USA and UK acted as though they had the
right to 'redeploy' troops from Germany without other NATO members taking the
same course of action. However, in 1967 Canada, Belgium and the FRG sought to
cut their force contributions to the Alliance, at a time when the Soviets were
building up their conventional military power, and while the East European armed
forces were being upgraded with more sophisticated weaponry. The JIC's
JTC(66)57, Tnpai1ite Talks. Soviet Intentions and Warning of Soviet Attack in Eumpe, 4.11.66,
CAB158/64(PRO).
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assessments contained the caveat that the Soviets might abandon their 'cautious'
approach towards the Western powers if NATO was significantly weakened, or if
the USA's commitment to defend Western Europe appeared open to question. The
Wilson government overlooked the possibility that other allied powers would use
their arguments to reduce their troop commitments, thus leading to the
disintegration of the Alliance which Johnson had warned the Prime Minister of in
late August.52
The British were not solely responsible for the disarray within NATO
which compounded France's actions in March 1966 - the Johnson administration
contributed to the Alliance's problems by transferring troops from Germany to
Vietnam, and by placing its own demands on Bonn for offsets. Yet Wilson
appeared to take at face value Kosygin's equivocal comments on mutual force
reductions, and the British acted on the assumption that Soviet intentions would
continue to remain passive. Wilson also failed to register the implications of the
Soviet Premier's assertion that détente depended on a reduced American military
presence in Western Europe. 53 British defence policy, as noted above, considered the
US commitment to Western Europe's defence to be crucial to NATO unity.
Conversely, significant reductions of American forces in West Germany would
have a dire impact on the Alliance's cohesion (and would give de Gaulle more
reason to argue that the USA could not be trusted to defend Europe). While we
52 NIEI 1-4-66, Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy, 11.6.66; & NIEI 1-14-66, Capabilities of Soviet Genemi
Purpose Forces, 3.11.66, RG263, 190, 28, 16-17, NARAII. JIC(67)1, Periodic Intelligence summary for NATO
Commands, CABI58/65(PRO). JTC(66)57, CABIS8/64(PRO).
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have scant primary evidence on Moscow's perceptions of NATO's problems at
this time, the Soviets would presumably have been happy to see the Alliance
dissolve under the weight of its 'contradictions'. Dobrynin retrospectively confirmed
that Moscow opposed mutual force reductions, as this could jeopardise its
authority over Eastern Europe.54 This attitude was subsequently shown by the
USSR's rejection of NATO's Reykjavik declaration (June 1968), and the lack of
progress in the NATO- WTO Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR)
negotiations throughout the 1970s and 1980s.55
Conclusions:
British policy towards BAOR's foreign exchange costs changed course as a
consequence of the application for EEC membership and the conclusions of the
1967 defence review. Yet throughout 1966 there was a clear contradiction between
Wilson's expressed intention of rallying NATO after France's withdrawal, and his
government's determination to force Bonn to pay for BAOR's foreign exchange
costs. At the Chequers conference, Wilson and his Ministers had concluded that
NATO's force levels could be significantly reduced, but following the July 1966
financial crisis the case for reducing the British commitment to NATO became
confused with the need to cut defence expenditure. By threatening to reduce
BAOR if its foreign exchange costs were not completely offset, the Labour
Dobrynin, In Confidence, p.146, p.169.
" Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, pp.533-537.
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government contributed to the crisis which threatened NATO's survival. Wilson
had, in his own words to Rusk, argued that 'if everybody in the alliance acted like
de Gaulle ... a truly dangerous situation would be created in Europe', but the
actions of his government over offsets were hardly likely to help 'preserve a
solidarity of purpose' to keep NATO going after France's withdrawal.56
The Prime Minister had informed Stewart in March 1966 that it was still
in Britain's interest to keep the USA committed to Western Europe's defence, but
he and his Ministers overlooked the fact that any cuts to BAOR would encourage
the Americans towards further reductions in their military presence in West
Germany. 57 As noted above, Washington did not help the cause of NATO unity by
withdrawing troops and equipment from Germany to Vietnam - which Johnson
overlooked when he warned Wilson of the danger that the Alliance might
'unravel' - and by insisting that Bonn offset the foreign exchange costs of US
forces in Germany. 58 In this respect, the Americans had the advantage because their
military presence was far larger and more significant than that of the British,
thereby giving Washington greater leverage than London in negotiations over
offsets with West Germany. The Prime Minister neglected this factor, and as noted
above he also placed far too much emphasis on Kosygin's equivocal comments on
mutual troop cuts.
513 PM & Rusk 10.6.66, PREM13/2264(PRO).
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The offsets crisis reflected the problems inherent in the Labour
government's intention to maintain both the NATO and East of Suez roles with
overstretched forces and a weak financial basis. The crisis also took a higher
priority in British foreign policy than the promotion of détente - a priority
demonstrated by the limited discussion within the Cabinet and OPD on the
'declaration of principles'. Regarding the future of Eastern Europe, the Foreign
Office's discussions on 'evolution' - which was the principal topic at the biannual
conference of ambassadors to the Eastern bloc states (April 1966) - had little
impact on Ministerial thinking. The Wilson government did little to back up its
rhetoric of rallying NATO behind the promotion of détente, and as a consequence
it was the Belgian government which played the principal role in co-ordinating
the Alliance's approach to East-West diplomacy in 1967.
The ambassador's conference reflected the consensus within the Foreign
Office that the process of 'evolution' in Eastern Europe was irreversible, and that
by adopting less ideological internal policies the regimes would be able to manage
reform, without provoking either popular demands for greater change or Soviet
intervention. The ambassador to Warsaw, however, called into question the
assumption that Communist regimes would 'modify themselves', and concluded that
even 'national Communism' would lead to stagnation and collapse. Ever since the
drafting of PUSC(51)16 the Foreign Office had shown concern at the implications
of violent upheaval in Eastern Europe. This explains the hope expressed by
Northern Department officials that the process of 'evolution' could be managed by
C0S48th166 ,
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ruling regimes pragmatic enough to ease popular grievances caused by economic
austerity and the authoritarian political and social order. British diplomats
underestimated the degree to which the Communist regimes could enforce social
conformity without the overt use of police terror. The nomenklatura system in the
USSR and each Eastern bloc state made ideological orthodoxy a prerequisite for
advancement not only within the ruling parties, but throughout 'socialist' society -
in industrial management, the armed forces, academia and local government. The
nomenklatura system thereby inhibited the emergence of a more independent-
minded technocratic class that would promote liberalisation. In this respect, Smith's
reference to Czechoslovakia's efforts at internal reform was particularly ironic
because Sik's plans for the command economy were effectively stifled by the
ruling regime during 1967.60 Above all, the concept of 'evolution' also presumed
that the Soviets would tolerate such a process of reform. However, Moscow's
response to the 'Prague Spring' two years later called this assessment into
question.
60 Crampton, Eastern Europe, pp.248-249. Davies, Heart of Europe, pp.47-48. H. Rin, A Histoy of
Czechoslovakia since 1945, (Routledge 1989), pp.37-38.
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CHAPTER 5: KOSYGIN'S VISIT TO BRITAIN AND ITS
IMPACT ON ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS. FEBRUARY-
DECEMBER 1967.
At face value, Kosygin's visit to Britain was a cordial one, with the Soviet
Premier gaining a public relations success with the warm reception he received.
Although still critical of the USSR's treatment of Brooke, press reports on the
visit portrayed Kosygin as being personally committed to East-West détente.' Gore-
Booth was nonetheless annoyed that the Soviet Premier used his speech at the
Guildhall on 8 February to engage in a standard propaganda diatribe against both
West German 'militarism' and American policy in South-East Asia. 2 Two months
previously, the Foreign Office had suggested that an informal request be made to
Kosygin to avoid public attacks on Britain's allies during his trip, but Wilson and
Brown rejected this suggestion. Crossman, hardly the most right-wing of Wilson's
Ministers, expressed astonishment that many Labour MPs approved of Kosygin's
attack on British policy towards Vietnam during his visit to the House of
Commons (9 February). Wilson, however, made no complaint about the Soviet
Premier's conduct and, according to Castle, 'rhapsodised about the [close
relationship] he had built up' with his guest.3
'See, for example, 'He who never smiles, smiles' in The Erpress, 9.2.67; & 'It's a Really British Welcome' in
The Miiror, 7.2.67 on Kosygin's public appearances. Also 'The Surprising Mr Kosygin' in The Sun, 3.2.67, &
'Why Mr Kosygin's Visit to Britain is Important' in The Times, 6.2.67.
2 See 'Kosygin alarm on Germany', in The Times, 9.2.67. FO/CRO to Missions No.20, 14.2.67,
FCO2S/389(PRO). Gore-Booth, With Great Truth, p.358.
3 M. Fenn (FO) to Palliser, 13.12.66; & Palliser to Fenn, 23.12.66, PREM13/1221(PRO). Crossman, Dianes, II,
9.2.67, p.231. Castle, Dianes, 14.2.67, p.220.
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As noted above, Wilson wanted to invite Kosygin to the UK in early 1965,
and having finally achieved this aim he hoped that the visit would produce
practical results. Kosygin's discussions with the Prime Minister, Brown and other
Ministers covered the established topics of disarmament, European security and
bilateral trade, but he main feature of his visit was an abortive peace-making
initiative on Vietnam, given the code-name Sunflower by American officials.
Following Kosygin's visit Wilson expected that bilateral trade and technological
co-operation would be formalised by an Anglo-Soviet 'treaty of friendship'. In this
respect, the Prime Minister was yet again competing with de Gaulle in establishing
closer relations with the USSR. However, during the spring and summer of 1967
British efforts to negotiate a 'treaty of friendship' were stalled by Moscow. The
condition of Anglo-Soviet relations paralleled the generally poor state of East-West
relations at this time, as shown by the Warsaw Pact's diplomatic onslaught against
West German Ostpolilik, and the clash of superpower interests not only in
Vietnam but in the Middle East. This chapter discusses the circumstances in which
the Soviet Premier visited the UK, and then examines the course of Kosygin's
trip, concluding with an analysis of the course of Anglo-Soviet political relations
from February 1967 to Wilson's third visit to Moscow in January 1968.
170
Britain as an 'intermediary': Contacts between London and Moscow, July-
November 1966.
Wilson was disappointed when Smirnovsky informed him on 18 April 1966 that
Kosygin would not visit Britain in the summer, because such a visit would not
produce 'concrete results'. The Prime Minister ignored this implied slight, and
suggested that he could travel to Moscow, ostensibly to attend the British Trade
Fair (16-18 July). Kosygin agreed and arranged to meet him in the Kremlin on
the 18th4 Wilson travelled to the USSR in mid-July despite the seamen's strike
and the ensuing financial crisis, both of which damaged his domestic reputation.
Despite intense press criticism and a suspected conspiracy led by Brown to unseat
him, Wilson refused to cancel his trip. 5 State Department officials concluded that
his objectives were to appeal to public sentiment which (despite the Brooke case)
generally supported détente, and to gain 'the aura and glamor of confidante and
go-between between East and West' which de Gaulle acquired during his own
visit to Moscow in June. 6 The Prime Minister presumably hoped that the visit
would enable him to establish his credentials as a statesman, and he was jealous
of the French President's apparent successes in promoting Franco-Soviet concord.
However, Wilson also intended to have 'frank and private' discussions with
Kosygin on Vietnam.7
4 Conversalion betven PM & Smimovsky at 10 Downing St, 18.4.66, NS1052123, F0371/188929(PRO). Smith
to Palliser, 29.6.66, NSIO51/165; Palliser to M. MacLehose (FO), 4.7.66, NSOI51/173/G, F0371/188923(PRO).
5 See Piinlott, Wilson, pp.419-427, on the July financial cnsis and the alleged Cabinet 'plot'. For media
criticisms of the Moscow visit and Wilson's handling of the UK's fmancial problems see 'Wrong Place
Wrong Time' in The Express, 18.7.66; & 'Sunshine, Moonshine, Lightning, Thunder' in The Mirror, 15.7.66.
'Hughes to Rusk Harold Wilson's Latest Journey to Moscow, 15.7.66, MF409.
7 Castle sheds light on Wilson's envy of de Gaulle in Diaries, 22.6.67, p. 270. FO to Moscow, No.1622,4.7.66,
NS1O5I/174, F03711188923(PRO). FO/CRO to Missions, N2l3 Guidance, 8.7.66, NS1O51/176,
F0371/188924(PRO).
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At the beginning of June 1966 the Johnson administration decided to bomb
targets in Hanoi and Haiphong, both of which were North of the 19th parallel.
Having acquiesced in US air attacks on targets to the South of this line of
latitude, Wilson dissociated Britain from the Hanoi and Haiphong raids, much to
Johnson's fury. The Prime Minister was concerned by both the extension of
Rolling Thunder and the North Vietnamese threat to try captured US pilots for
war crimes. Wilson informed Johnson that he would warn Kosygin that any
maltreatment of American prisoners would have an inflammatory effect on US
domestic opinion. The former concluded that the Soviets were 'thoroughly
worried' by 'the real danger that excessive Chinese intransigence could drag them
into a confrontation with yourselves'. 8
 Wilson repeated this theme in a
conversation with Kosygin shortly after his arrival in Moscow on 16 July. The
Prime Minister asked his host whether he was concerned that 'China and the
United States might get into an "eyeball to eyeball" confrontation over Vietnam',
which could embroil the USSR against its will. The Soviet premier gloomily
responded that 'he had no confidence in China to show restraint if the war
continued to escalate' .
During subsequent meetings in the Kremlin and the British embassy two
days later, Kosygin was less forthcoming. Wilson asserted that the situation in
Vietnam had 'taken a more serious turn' since his last visit to the USSR The co-
chairmen had to address the problem of how to stop the war, thereby removing
8 Johnson to PM, 14.6.66, FRUS' IV. Vietnam 1966, (Washington 1998), pp.426-428. FO to Washington, No.6947,
15.7.66, NS1O51t225, F03711188924(PRO).
9 Note for the record, 16.7.66, CAB16412(PRO).
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'the danger of escalation, which could happen rapidly and outside the control of
either Britain or the Soviet Union'. The Prime Minister admitted that the South
Vietnamese government was 'not his favourite regime', but the North Vietnamese
had by repeatedly rejecting peace proposal shown themselves to be 'dangerously
isolated from the outside world'. Both the UK and USSR were 'realists', and as
'cool-headed and practical nations' both could influence the combatants to settle
their differences at the conference table. However, Kosygin berated Wilson over
Britain's support for American 'banditry' in Vietnam, and he maintained that the
USSR could not undertake any diplomatic initiatives without North Vietnamese
consent. He was also dismissive of Wilson's response to the Hanoi and Haiphong
raids, and pressed the Prime Minister to dissociate the UK completely from
American actions in Vietnam. In response, the Prime Minister reiterated his
argument that total dissociation would undermined British efforts to influence US
policy in South-East Asia.'°
Wilson admitted to Johnson that he had again returned from Moscow with
not much to show from his endeavours, but he was impressed by Kosygin' s
apparent candour over Chinese intentions and the risks of a major confrontation in
South-East Asia. The Prime Minister asserted that he was 'more convinced' that
the 'unsensational relationship that is growing up between Kosygin and myself has
real - if still largely potential - value'. Wilson also retrospectively claimed the
credit when Hanoi opted not to put American prisoners-of-war on trial, a claim
subsequently challenged by Rodric Braithwaite, the Commercial Secretary at the
'°Conversations between Kosygin & PM at Kremlin (am) & at UK Embassy (pm), 18.7.66, CAB16412(PRO).
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Moscow embassy who acted as the Prime Minister's interpreter in his
conversations with Kosygin. Braithwaite recalled that when Wilson tried to discuss
the prisoners issue with the Soviet Premier, the latter simply responded that
Moscow had no influence over Hanoi. This bland exchange did not prevent
Wilson from making extravagant claims in Cabinet on the significance of his
visit, as shown by Castle's diary entry for the 21 July:
Kosygin had talked privately to him in 'a quite fantastic way'. No other Western leader
had ever been given such an insight into Russian thinking. Kosygin had confided in him
about all his problems. There was nothing he would like more, Harold was sure, than to
reconvene the Geneva conference, but he couldn't. [Kosygin was veryJ afraid of escalation
and bitterly critical of the Americans. He believed that Kosygin was anxious for him to
carry a message back to Johnson. Kosygin made it clear that he regarded Britain as a
valuable go-between. 'If there were another Cuba situation, they would want our
services'.11
Wilson blatantly embellished his account of his conversations with the Soviet
Premier - the transcripts of his conversations with Kosygin do not support his
claim that the USSR would seek British mediation in any crisis as severe as that
over Cuba. He also overlooked the fact that, unlike de Gaulle, he did not meet
Brezhnev, who was emerging as the 'top man' within the Politburo. The French
President's meeting with the CPSU Secretary, though principally symbolic, was
intended by Moscow to show approval of de Gaulle's policies towards NATO and
Vietnam. 12 Wilson's statement that the Soviets would 'use the United Kingdom as
an intermediary in any discussions with the United States' was also contradicted
by Harrison, who informed his American counterpart that Kosygin did not consider
the Prime Minister to be an interlocutor between himself and Johnson.
"Wilson,Iaboir Government, p.275. FO to Washington, No.7075,19.7.66, PREM13I1218(PRO). Braithwaite, p.3,
DOHP. Castle, Diaries, 21.7.66, p.151.
12 On de Gaulle's visit to Moscow, see A. Shennan, De Gaulle, (Longman 1993), p.121; & Narinski, 'Les
Sovietiques', in Bozo, Mélandii & Valsse, France et I 'OTAN, p.506. Smith, Secretaty of State's Visit to Moscow,
Briefs 2(a) & 2(b), NS1O51/283, F0371/188927(PRO).
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Furthermore, Wilson had got no further in committing Kosygin to a fixed date for
his visit to the UK. 13 The Prime Minister assumed that this was due to his
concerns for his position in the Politburo. Kosygin was rumoured to have
threatened resignation because of the slow progress of his economic reforms, but
while Brezhnev consolidated his authority throughout the autumn of 1966, British
diplomats saw no reason to conclude that Kosygin's position in the Politburo had
declined. Harrison concluded that the Soviet Premier would only visit Britain
'when he and his colleagues feel that something can be got out of it'. In the
meantime, the non-aligned countries and France would 'have a higher priority in
the Soviet leaders' minds'.'4
By the autumn of 1966, Wilson's opinions on Britain's role as an
'intermediary' linking the two superpowers had been taken up by the new Foreign
Secretary, George Brown. Brown had exchanged portfolios with Stewart in a
Cabinet reshuffle in August, and while his predecessor had been the proverbial
'safe pair of hands', the new Foreign Secretary was a far more dynamic and pro-
active figure. Unfortunately, Brown was inclined to behave erratically after a few
drinks. Furthermore, he had stood for the Labour leadership against Wilson in
1963, and the relationship between the two was blighted by mutual animosity.'5
Nonetheless, Brown shared Wilson's interest in East-West détente, and his first
meeting with Gromyko at the UN General Assembly in October 1966 was far
PMV(2X66)6, Prime Minister's Visit to Moscow. July, 1%6. General Brief, 13.7.66, CAB1331346(PRO).
CC39(66)39th
 conclusions, 21.7.66, CAB128141(PRO). Moscow to State Dept. No.300, 20.7.66, NSF, USSRCF200,
LBJLIB.
14 MacLehose to Palliser, 3.10.66, NS1O5I/228; Moscow to FO, No.1836, 10.10.66, NSIO5I/230,
F0371/188925(PRO).
' 5 lnterview with Donald Maitland, .12 & Interview th Palliser, p.14, DOHP.
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more cordial than earlier encounters between the latter and Stewart. In informal
discussions with Rusk the Soviet foreign minister had reversed Soviet opposition
to a consultative solution to the NATO nuclear-sharing issue.' 6 When Brown told
(iromyko that Britain supported McNamara's proposal for a 'special committee'
within the Alliance, the latter responded that this was acceptable provided there
was no explicit allowance for consultative arrangements in any NPT. Over the
course of the following two years of NPT negotiations, the Americans discovered
that it was far easier to reach agreement with the Soviets than it was to
overcome West European - notably German and Italian - and neutral criticisms
that the NPT discriminated against non-nuclear powers.'7
At the end of the month, Kosygin informed Harrison that he was now
prepared to visit the UK in January or February 1967.' In the ambassador's
opinion, Kosygin's forthcoming visit and the change in Soviet policy towards non-
proliferation were significant. Brown was informed by Harrison the day before his
scheduled visit to Moscow (22-25 November 1966) that since Khrushchev's fall
Soviet efforts to establish détente with the West had been thwarted by their
rivalry with China. Yet Chinese prestige within the Communist world had
deteriorated as a result of the 'Cultural Revolution', and Moscow had a freer hand
in pursuing its foreign policy goals. Harrison asserted that Vietnam was still a
barrier to improved East-West relations, and he acknowledged that the Soviets still
16 CVJOn between Broi & Rusk at State Department, 14.10.66, PREM13/2440(PRO).
Conversation between Broi & Gromyko in New York, 8.10.66 & 10.10.66, NS1052/39,
F0371/188930(PRO). Nuti, Tmnsatlantic relations, pp.21-24.
'8 Moscow to FO, No.1958, 29.10.66, NS1052145, F0371J188930.
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sought to exploit divisions between the Western powers, hence its approaches
towards France. Nonetheless, Moscow had an overwhelming interest in reducing
tensions with the USA in particular, and in this respect Britain had a role to play
as the 'voice of reason' within the West. Like Wilson, Harrison maintained that
while de Gaulle's influence was limited to 'propaganda haymaking', Britain could
promote progress on détente through its dealings with the USSR. The head of the
Northern Department expressed his scepticism, telling Harrison that 'it is hard to
decide whether there is genuine movement or merely a Soviet intention to give
the appearance of [progress]', and he suggested that Moscow's more forthcoming
attitude was intended to split Britain from its allies. The ambassador to Moscow,
by contrast, was far more convinced than he had been the previous year that the
Soviets were serious in seeking to improve relations with the Western powers.'9
Harrison was not alone in concluding that Soviet policy had changed
during in the autumn of 1966. US officials presumed that Moscow's more
forthcoming attitude towards non-proliferation negotiations - as expressed by
Gromyko during his visit to the USA in October 1966 - was due to Soviet
concerns over China's development of nuclear weapons. The Johnson administration
also concluded that the Soviet leadership had become more alarmed at the
prospects of a wider war in Vietnam, and more prepared to encourage Hanoi
towards a negotiated settlement. 2° The Foreign Office's assessment of the reasons
'9 Hanison to Bro, 21.11.66; & Smith to Hanison, 18.12.66, NS1022J69, F03711188906(PRO).
20 G. Chang, Friends and Enemies. The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972, (Stanford
University Press 1990), p.275. Conversation between Brown, Bruce, Patrick Dean (UK Ambassador), Johnson &
US officials at White House, 14.1O.66;& Moscow to State Dept,nA & 28.11.66,FRUS Xp.427,pp.434-441.
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behind Kosygin's forthcoming visit to Britain concurred with the ambassador to
Moscow's view that the USSR's policies towards the Western world showed 'new
signs of life'. While the Soviets still hoped to encourage intra-Western differences,
the USSR and the East European states had an incentive to develop commercial
and technological contacts with Western countries. In this respect, Kosygin's aims
in visiting the UK included that of '[exploiting] the goodwill which exists in this
country toward the Soviet Union and to encourage, perhaps indirectly, anti-
American feeling', but he also wanted to achieve a 'concrete' result from his trip,
possibly in the form of an agreement on technological co-operation similar to that
he had concluded earlier with the French.2'
Brown evidently shared Harrison's view of Britain as the 'voice of reason'
with the ability to influence Soviet policy towards détente. Bruce informed
Washington that the Foreign Secretary had no doubts that his invitation to
Moscow and the Soviet Premier's agreement to visit the UK demonstrated the
'Soviet desire to do business' with Britain. The US ambassador to London stated
that the Foreign Secretary now considered that Kosygin was 'sufficiently
persuaded' of the prospects for both improved East-West relations and a
settlement to the Vietnam war that the 'British can have critical influence on [the]
Russians in the next few months'. Brown's efforts to discuss Vietnam and arms
control during his visit proved fruitless, but Bruce observed that the Foreign
Secretary felt that he had strengthened his 'already sympathetic relationship with
Gromyko' and had established friendly relations with Kosygin. Although Brown
21 KV(67)1, Steering Brief 26.1.67, CAB133/365(PRO).
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returned to London 'with no definite accomplishment' this did not 'disturb his
ever ready optimism'. 22
 However, the outcome of the Sunflower peace initiative
strained both the Foreign Secretaiy's optimism and the Wilson government's
relationship with the Johnson administration.
Sunflower is planted: British diplomacy and the Vietnam war, June 1966-
January 1967.
Wilson was not alone in seeking a diplomatic solution to the Vietnam war.
Among the other third-party initiatives was Marigold, which developed from
contacts between the US ambassador to Saigon and the Polish ICC representative,
Janusz Lewandowski. Lewandowski's activities in Saigon in the summer of 1966
led to discussions in December between the US ambassador to Warsaw, John
Gronouski, and the Polish Foreign Minister. Concurrently with these contacts the
State Department established the 'Phase A / Phase B' formula for military
disengagement in Vietnam, in which the USA would halt air attacks on the DRY,
prior to the cessation of both NVA infiltration and US reinforcements to the
South. Gronouski was due to meet a North Vietnamese envoy in Warsaw when
US air-raids on Hanoi on 15 December led the DRY to demand an end to the
Marigold negotiations. The initiative collapsed with mutual accusations of bad
faith, but provided the background for Sunflower, which involved two separate
contacts - the first involving the US Embassy in Moscow's approach to North
London to State Dept. No.38 14, 7.11.66; & No.4377,27.11.66, RG59, 250, 5-7, 2788, NARAJI.
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Vietnamese diplomats (January 1967), and the second being Wilson's discussions
with Kosygin the following month.23
Despite Marigold and Sunflower, Johnson and many of his officials became
convinced during the course of 1966 that a negotiated settlement to the war was
neither feasible or desirable. The administration's more intransigent attitude was
symbolised by Ball's resignation as Under-Secretary of State and McGeorge
Bundy's replacement by Walt Rostow. Both Johnson's new national security
advisor and the JCS were convinced that the war in South Vietnam could be
won, and that Rolling Thunder was crippling the DRV's war effort. The 'hawks'
favoured more, not less, military action against the DRy, and Rostow compared
Wilson's 'dissociation' from the Hanoi and Haiphong raids to Macmillan's
response to the Berlin crisis, commenting with evident disgust that 'we are up
against a [British] attitude which, in effect, prefers that we take losses in the free
world rather than the risks of sharp confrontation'.24
Brown took a more active interest in negotiations on Vietnam than his
predecessor, and he hoped to use his visit to Moscow (November 1966) to
persuade the Soviets to co-operate with British attempts to mediate. The Foreign
Secretary blamed North Vietnam for the conflict, but as Palliser recalled, Brown
See J. Hershberg, "Who Murdered Mangold"? New Evidence on the Mysterious failure of Poland's Secret
Initiative to Start US-North Vietnamese Peace Talks, CWI}IP Working Paper No.27 (2000), & also J.
Michalowski, 'Polish Secret Peace Initiatives in Vietnam', CWLFIP Bulletin, 617 (1995-1996), p.241, pp.258-259.
Gaiduk, Soviet Union, p.96.
24 A E. Goodman, The Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War, (Berkeley; Institute of East
Asian Studies University of California 1986), p.19. W. Rostow to Johnson, 5.4.66, FR(LS IV, pp.329-333; &
28.7.66, MF411.
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was 'more worried about the American role' in Indochina than Stewart had been.
According to Castle, the Foreign Secretary once declared himself to be 'sickened'
by the extent to which the Labour government had defended American actions in
Vietnam. 25 Despite this outburst, Brown sought to persuade Cabinet sceptics in
November 1967 that if Britain dissociated itself completely from US policy,
Anglo-American relations would be irreparably damaged. Furthermore, if the
Vietnam war ended in disaster, the USA would 'follow a sporadic and
unpredictable foreign policy, withdrawing here and over-asserting herself there'. The
Chinese and Soviets could respond to 'unwise temptations' in response to
American inconsistency, with cataclysmic results. Brown argued that although
British global influence was declining, the UK still had influence in Washington
and with Moscow, and that the British government had 'a duty and a capacity to
maintain a continued readiness to act in the cause of peace when asked to do so
by one of the combatants'. Although these arguments were advanced nine months
after the Kosygin visit, they reflect the mindset of both Wilson and Brown in
early 1967.26
When Brown visited Washington in October, he was given the Phase A I
Phase B formula with no indication of its origins. He was also informed that
Washington would not end Rolling Thunder without Hanoi giving 'substantial
advance information that there was a beginning of a process of dc-escalation' on
North Vietnam's part. The Americans felt that the mercurial Foreign Secretary had
Palliser, p.1 2, DOHP. Castle, Diaries, 18.7.66, p.148.
C(67)180: Vietnam, memorandum by Brown, 15.11.67, CABI29/134(PRO).
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'limitations as an intermediary', but nonetheless acquiesced in Brown's peace-
making efforts on the grounds that Anglo-American relations 'would suffer a
damaging blow if the British government were to conclude that we were not
serious about reaching a negotiated settlement on Vietnam'. 27
 In Moscow, Brown
appraised Gromyko of the Phase A / Phase B formula, only to receive the standard
Soviet response that Moscow was not authorised to discuss Vietnam, and that US
air-strikes had to end before negotiations began.28
The Foreign Secretary knew nothing of Marigold, and when he and Wilson
discovered in early January 1967 where the Phase A / Phase B proposal originated
both were furious that they had not been consulted in advance. Brown's failure in
Moscow was in all probability due to Soviet reluctance to engage in mediation,
but both he and the Prime Minister assumed that his ignorance of the Marigold
discussions had hampered his efforts, as the Soviets would conclude that either the
Foreign Secretary 'was not being frank with them, or that, whereas the Poles were
fully in the picture, the British government was not'. The Prime Minister told
Bruce that Washington had to send an official to London to brief him on
American policy on negotiations, as he intended to discuss Vietnam with Kosygin.
Wilson expressed his preference for Chester Cooper, an NSC official and former
aide to Harriman.29
 The Prime Minister chose to believe that Britain's dissociation
from the Hanoi and Haiphong raids would improve the prospects of Anglo-Soviet
W. Bundy to Rusk, RG59, 250, 5-7, 2788, NARAII. Memojandum of meeting at State Depaitment, 10.11.66,
FRUS IV, pp.820-825.
Conversation between Brown & Gromyko at Soviet Foreign Minisliy, 23.1 1.66,NS1051t29O, F0371/188928(PRO).
FO to Washington, No.92,4.1.67; & conversation between Bruce & PM at No.10,10.1.67, PREM13I1917(PRO).
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mediation, as 'we might now seem slightly less than before to be satellites of the
United States'. Brown informed Cabinet in mid-January 1967 that the prospects for
a negotiated settlement were 'slightly more hopeful than hitherto', with one
possible consequence of the Cultural Revolution being that 'the Chinese
Government might be unable to prevent the Soviet Government from adopting a
rather more positive attitude towards [ending] the [war] in Vietnam'.3°
According to Dobrynin, Hanoi wanted Kosygin to encourage the British to
put pressure on the Americans withdraw from Vietnam, while the Soviet Premier
apparently hoped to achieve a diplomatic success similar to the Tashkent
conference (January 1966), in which he brokered a ceasefire settlement concluding
the Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir. Gore-Booth believed that the Soviets had an
interest in seeing a conclusion to the war in Vietnam, as otherwise the conflict
'might get out of hand in unpredictable ways' - a conclusion corroborated by
Dobrynin's memoirs. 3 ' Kosygin was described as being 'in prompt, confidential
communication' with the North Vietnamese, and his telephone conversations with
Brezhnev, intercepted by M15, suggest that the former saw a chance to achieve a
ceasefire.32 Chester Cooper later expressed doubts as to whether the Soviet party
was initially prepared to discuss Vietnam. Gromyko did not accompany Kosygin,
and the Foreign Ministry staff were all European or trade specialists.33 Wilson was
nonetheless optimistic, and Brown subsequently stated that the former 'wanted so
3°Memorandum by Palliser, 10.6.66, PREM13/1890(PRO). CC I(67)l' conclusions, 12.1.67, CAB128/42(PRO).
31 Dobrynin,In Ccnfidence, pp.155-157. Gore-Booth to de Ia Mare, 23.1.67, FCO15/615(PRO).
32 G. Hmg (ed.), The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, (Austin 1983), p.400. Tony Benn confirms that
MIS had Kosygin inKier surveillance in Out of the Wilderness, 6.2.67, p.468.
33 Chester Cooper, The Lost Crusade, (London; MacGibbon & K 1971), pp.354-355.
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badly some form of political triumph over Vietnam' and imagined that 'he had a
special ability to negotiate with the Russians' which would enable him to enlist
the Soviet premier in his efforts at mediation. Brown's close involvement with the
Wilson-Kosygin talks suggests, however, that the Prime Minister's sense of
commitment and over-optimism were shared by the Foreign Secretary.34
Wilson regarded the forthcoming Tet truce, which coincided with Kosgyin's
visit, as an opportunity for a breakthrough. The Prime Minister hoped that his
guest would recommend the Phase A / Phase B proposal to the North Vietnamese,
and he employed Cooper as his link to Washington to ensure American approval
of his efforts. 35 The Phase A I Phase B proposal was only concerned with military
de-escalation, which as Johnson informed Wilson was to lead to 'private and
direct' discussions between Washington and Hanoi. The President also described
American terms for de-escalation using language which later proved controversial:
[We] are prepared to and plan through established channels to inform Hanoi that if
they will agree to an assured stoppage of infiltration into South Viet Nam, we will
stop the bombin of North Viet Nam and stop further augmentation of US forces in
South Viet Nam.
Kosygin arrived in London on 6 February, and Wilson sought his endorsement of
Phase A I Phase B. The Prime Minister stated that Washington was in 'a difficult
position' on Vietnam, and while many Americans supported East-West détente, this
attitude contrasted with growing support for 'a stronger prosecution of the
Bro, In My Way, p.137. Hing, Secret Dplomacy, pp.430-431.
35 Conversalion between Cooper & Wilson at No.10,16.1.67; Washington to FO,N.321 ,1 .2.67, PREM13/1917(PRO).
Johnson to Wilson, CAP67038, 6.7.67, PREM13/1917(PRO). Emphasis added to original. Hing, Secret
Diplomacy, pp.436-437
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conflict' against the DRy. Despite Kosygin's insistence on an unconditional end to
Rolling Thunder, Wilson was impressed by his guest's anti-Chinese attitude. 37 The
Prime Minister assured Johnson that Kosygin was showing 'a great sense of
urgency', which in his opinion reflected the USSR's interest in ending the
Vietnam war and countering Chinese influence in Hanoi.38
On the 7th, Kosygin requested a written copy of the Phase A / Phase B
formula, which was discussed at a meeting in his hotel suite on the 9th Cooper
drafted this paper with Bruce, Trend, Palliser and a SEAD official, who all
interpreted 'assured stoppage' as involving a bombing halt, followed by an end to
NVA infiltration into South Vietnam and American troop reinforcements. Kosygin
informed Wilson and Brown that he would refer the formula to Hanoi. The Soviet
premier may have considered the Phase A I Phase B formula to be militarily
advantageous to the DRy, but both Ilya Gaiduk and James Hershberg argue that
Kosygin's conduct reflected a change in Soviet policy in early 1967, and that
Moscow was now prepared to use private mediation to avert a US-Soviet
confrontation over Vietnam. The British believed they had a breakthrough, as on
previous occasions the Soviets had flatly refused to co-operate with any peace
initiatives. Such was Brown's optimism that he even proposed to Kosygin that
both co-Chairman should reconvene the Geneva conference without the Chinese,
KV(67)1 meeting at No.10, 6.2.67, CAB1331365(PRO). Conversations between Kosygin & PM at No.10,
6.2.67 & 7.2.67, PREM13/1917(PRO).
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although the Soviet Premier refused to consider this. 39 That afternoon, Cooper
assisted in drafting an additional paper on Phase A / Phase B. He forwarded this
paper to Washington, and considered the lack of response to indicate approval. The
British wanted the Phase A / Phase B formula forwarded to the Soviet Premier
before he left for a short tour of Scotland on 10 February. Prior to the Soviet
party's departure, Kosygin was assured by Wilson that all Washington required
was a private assurance that NVA infiltration would cease if Rolling Thunder
stopped. The Prime Minister was enthusiastic about his apparent breakthrough,
informing Ministers that 'the Russians regarded us as the real mediators over
Vietnam'. 4° However, Wilson's attitude changed when the Johnson administration
belatedly responded to the Phase A / Phase B formula.
Sunflower is uprooted: The failure of 'Phase A / Phase B', February-May 1967.
Cooper and British officials had interpreted 'assured stoppage' in terms of an end
to Rolling Thunder, followed by mutual de-escalation on the ground. Having acted
on this assumption, Cooper spent the evening of the 10th at the theatre, only to be
summoned backstage to receive a telephone call from an enraged Rostow. The
NSC official rushed back to the US Embassy to receive a new message from
Washington which stated that Rolling Thunder would end once the Johnson
Conversation between Kosygin & PM at Claridges, 9.2.67, PREM13I1715(PRO). The Kosygin Visit, (Febniazy
1967), pp.10-12, FCO1S/634(PRO). Gaiduk, Soviet Unicvi, pp.100-101. Hershberg, Mart gold, pp.81-82.
Cooper, Lost Crusade, pp.356-357. Kosygin Visit, pp.16-17, FCO15/634(PRO). Conversation between Kosygin
& PM at No.10, 10.2.67,PREM13/1715(PRO). Castle, Dianes, 9.2.67, p.217.
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administration was 'assured that infiltration from North Vietnam to South Vietnam
has stopped'. Not only were both he and the ambassador obliged to inform the
British of this message, but an amended version of Phase A / Phase B had to be
hastily drafted and passed on to Kosygin before he took the train to Edinburgh.4'
Wilson was furious that Washington had changed its conditions. The Prime
Minister, who faced a difficult meeting with Kosygin at Chequers on 12 February,
bluntly told Johnson that he was in 'a hell of a situation'. Wilson asserted that
'peace looked like being within our grasp', and in an acrimonious meeting with
Bruce and Cooper during the evening of the 1 1th he stated that either the Phase
A / Phase B proposal outlined by the latter 'did not reflect American policy or
that policy had been changed during the course of the week'. Wilson threatened
outright dissociation from American policy, and questioned the sincerity of
Washington's commitment to peace negotiations. Brown sharply stated that the
Johnson administration had made 'a bloody mess of things'. With the Sunflower
initiative in tatters, the tensions between the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary
also erupted. Cooper recalled that 'Wilson and Brown just went for each other' in
front of both himself and Bruce, and that the Foreign Secretary made repeated
threats to resign. As Cooper wryly recalled, 'It was a pretty rough night'.42
Johnson had no sympathy for Wilson's position, and he argued that North
Vietnam had exploited the Tet bombing pause by infiltrating more troops into the
41 TransCrIpt, Chester Cooper Oral Histoiy Interview ifi, 7.8.69, LBJLIB, pp.17-19. Rostow to Trend, 10.2.67,
PREM13/1918(PRO). Emphasis added. Kosgin Visit, pp.17-18. FCO15/634(PRO).
PM to Johnson, T30/67, 12.2.67. Conversation beten Brown, Bruce, Cooper & PM at No.10, 11.2.67,
PREM13/1918(PRO). Lankford, Last American Aristocrat, p.335. Cooper Interview, p.21.
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South. He also expressed surprise at the manner in which Cooper and British
officials had interpreted the phrase 'assured stoppage'. 43 The dispute between
London and Washington was not merely a matter of mixed tenses. While Kosygin
was in London, the Johnson administration sent a message to Hanoi for Ho Chi
Minh on 8 February, calling for bilateral talks and stating that the President would
halt both Rolling Thunder and troop reinforcements to South Vietnam 'as soon as
[he is] assured that infiltration into South Vietnam by land and sea has stopped'.
The British were furious that they had not been informed of the content of this
text. McNamara retrospectively attributed this discrepancy between the Johnson-
Ho letter and the Phase A I Phase B text to the administration's failure to co-
ordinate its diplomatic approach to the Vietnam war with military strategy, in
contrast with the North Vietnamese strategy of 'fighting while negotiating'. 45 In
contrast, Cooper concluded that Washington considered the Kosygin visit to be a
'sideshow', and was less concerned with the phrasing of the Phase A / Phase B
formula, as agreed by American and British officials in London, than with
Johnson's message to Ho. Cooper also suspected that the President and his
advisors did not want Wilson to get any credit for a diplomatic breakthrough. The
Pentagon Papers volume examining diplomatic contacts over Vietnam supports this
conclusion, stressing that if Washington remained 'aloof' from the Kosygin-Wilson
talks, 'the results could be harmful to the US'. This indicates little confidence in
Johnson to PM, CAP67043, 12.2.67, PREM13/1918(PRO).
' Goodman, Vietnam War, pp.26-27. Palliser to PM, 23.3.67, PREM13/1919(PRO).
Robert McNamara, In RetrospecL The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, (Random House 1995), pp.250-252.
Nguyen Vo Tung, 'Coping th the United States: Hanoi's Search for an Effective Strategy', in Lowe (ed),
Vietnam, pp.52-56.
Cooper, Lost Crusade, pp.355-356, pp.367-368. Secret Diplomacy, p.396.
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either Wilson's efforts to mediate or the potential for the London talks to achieve
a decisive result.
While Kosygin and Wilson met at Chequers on the 12th, Cooper discussed
with Trend the possibility of extending the Tet truce, should Hanoi agree to halt
NVA movements. He telephoned Washington with this suggestion, and waited for a
response while Wilson tried to stall Kosygin's departure to London. Rostow
eventually informed Cooper that Washington agreed to this proposal, but Hanoi
had to make its response by 1O.00am, London time. 47 Wilson tried to persuade
Kosygin to accept this proposal early on the morning of the 13th, only for the
latter to protest about the limited time he had to get an answer from the North
Vietnamese. Wilson and Brown countered by commenting on the NVA build-up
during Tet and on Hanoi's lack of response to the original Phase A I Phase B
proposal. Wilson told Kosygin that 'peace was more important than victory', and
the latter pledged to pass the NVA halt / Tet truce extension proposal to Hanoi,
expressing the opinion that it would be rejected by the North Vietnamese.48
Wilson begged Johnson for an extension of the deadline, and was grudgingly
granted six more hours. Bruce tried to request a further extension from
Washington, but the ambassador failed to influence Rusk. 49 Hanoi made no
response to the proposals Kosygin pledged to pass on, and the Soviet party left
Britain on 13 February without a deal being struck.
Secret Diplomacy, pp.471-472. Johnson to PM, CAP67045, 12.2.67, PREM13/1918(PRO). Cooper, Lost Crusade,
pp.364-365.
Conversation between Bron, Kosygin & PM at Claridges, 13.2.67, PREM13/1715(PRO).
Johnson to PM, CAP67046, 13.2.67, PREM13/1918(PRO). Kosygin Visit, pp.27-28, FCO15/634(PRO). Lankford,
Last American Aristocrat, p.336.
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At a Cabinet meeting on 14 February Wilson 'stressed how near he had
been to pulling it off over Vietnam'. He later claimed that 'hawks' in the White
House had sabotaged his efforts to achieve a cease-fire while Chinese influence in
Hanoi was hampered by the Cultural Revolution, and 'when the Soviets were
willing to use their good offices in Hanoi'. 5° Brown likewise blamed American
'hawks', but also criticised Wilson for his excessive optimism. In addition, he
accused Kosygin of 'leading everybody up the garden [path]', and of having no
authority from his peers to act as a mediator. In the aftermath of Kosygin's visit,
the Foreign Secretary concluded that Moscow would lose interest in mediation, as
the Soviet Premier's conduct in London would have antagonised the North
Vietnamese, driving Hanoi closer to the Chinese in the process. 51 The Foreign
Office view was that Washington was too focused on achieving military victory in
Vietnam, but officials were privately critical of Wilson and Brown's conduct. Gore-
Booth stated that his political masters 'tended to overrate their ability' to
influence American policy towards Vietnam, with peace initiatives being determined
by the need to appease domestic critics rather than by a 'cool estimate' of what
British diplomacy could actually achieve. 52 The Permanent Under-Secretary later
commented with regards to Marigold that Wilson and Brown had no right in
'claiming to be "mediators" as though they had invented or had some special
copyright to the plan' - his comments are equally applicable to Sunflower. 53 It
5°Castle, Dianej, 14.2.67, p.220. See Wilson's account in Labour Government, pp.346-365.
51 Broi, In My Way, pp.139-140. Memorandum of conversation at State L)ept, 19.4.67, FC0151619(PRO).
52 D. Murray to A. de Ia Mare (SEAD), 10.3.67, FCO15/598(PRO). Gore-Booth to de la Mare, 23.1.67,
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53 Gore-Booth, With Great Truth, p.357, pp.361-362. Note by de la Mare, 24.2.67, FCO1S/615(PRO).
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should also be noted that Phase A I Phase B only involved de-escalation, and did
not address the practicalities of negotiations. Even if a Phase A / Phase B formula
acceptable to both Washington and Hanoi had been found (and assuming that both
belligerents would have maintained a cease-fire), Wilson still had little reason to
claim in his memoirs that 'a historic opportunity [for peace] had been missed'.54
Like their British counterparts, US officials concluded that following the
abortive talks in London, the Soviets 'had no alternative but to help Hanoi cany
on the war, hoping that changes of attitude in either Hanoi or Washington, or
both, will make a [negotiated] solution possible latter'. Administration officials
blamed the failure of Phase A / Phase B on the NVA's violation the Tet truce,55
and were also furious that Wilson had implied in Parliament that they were
responsible for the failure of his talks with Kosygin. 56 The British ambassador to
Washington, Patrick Dean, commented that the Johnson administration was at fault
for failing to inform the British of the discrepancy between the letter to Ho and
the formula agreed in London. Palliser noted Rostow's comment (as reported by
Dean) that Washington 'had not thought about [the Phase A / Phase B formula]
very much' until American officials realised that it had been handed to Kosygin
as a diplomatic note. 57 Cooper subsequently recalled that in his conversation with
Rostow on the night of the 10th the latter bluntly stated 'we don't give a
Goddamn about you, and we don't give a Goddamn about Wilson !'. When the
Conversation at Claridges, 9.2.67, PREMI3I1715(PRO). Koygin Visit, p.14, FCO15/634(PRO). Wilson, Labour
Government, p.365
55 SNIE1 1-11-67, Soviet Attitudes and Intentions ToinI the Vietnam War, 4.5.67, MFF15-419. Washington to
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Prime Minister met Rostow in London in late February, the latter stated that
Johnson felt that he 'had to achieve a balance between readiness to negotiate and
a determination to prosecute the war with firmness but moderation' in order to
win a second term in office in 1968. Rostow thus expressed Johnson's
determination to press for a military victory in Vietnam, and his complete
disinterest in third-party efforts to promote peace negotiations. It should be noted
that following Sunflower the Americans attempted to use the USSR as a channel
for diplomatic contacts with the DRy, while keeping would-be mediators such as
Britain in the dark.58
Wilson emerged from the Marigold and Sunflower flascos privately
suspecting that Washington was responsible for the failure of both peace
initiatives. Against the Foreign Secretary's advice, he pestered Johnson over the
'apparent failure of communication' which had occurred during Kosygin's visit.59
Wilson's preoccupation with the failed peace initiatives disturbed both Brown and
the Foreign Office. When meeting Rapacki at 10 Downing Street on 24 February,
Wilson had suggested that London and Warsaw could compare notes on the
collapse of Marigold. 60 Whitehall's reluctance to undertake an Anglo-Polish post
mortem was reflected in Gore-Booth's instructions to Thomas Bnmelow (who had
replaced Clutton in Warsaw) in which the former cautioned against Polish efforts
to stir up trouble between London and Washington. Following Brimelow's
Cooper Interview, I, p.19. Conversation between Rostow & PM at No.10, 24.2.67, PREM13/1918(PRO).
Gaiduk, Soviet Union, pp.156-193.
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consultations with Polish diplomats, SEAD concluded that the 'the Poles probably
never had a sufficiently clear mandate from the North Vietnamese' to mediate.6'
Wilson's persistence in requesting a detailed analysis of Marigold exasperated
SEAD officials, one of whom protested that his department was 'unwilling to
undertake this entirely profitless analysis'.62 Brown's visit to Moscow in May
1967, seen by Wilson as another opportunity to press the Soviets to encourage
Hanoi to negotiate, eventually distracted the Prime Minister's attention from
Marigold. The Foreign Secretary's failure to reach any consensus with Gromyko
marked the end of British efforts to promote peace talks on Vietnam.63
Wilson's persistence in pressing for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam was
partly a response to criticism from the Labour left, and partly due to his personal
desire to play peace-maker. Yet his continued commitment reflects Crossman's
description of the Prime Minister as a 'Yorkshire terrier' who 'having got his
teeth into an idea ... worries at it and never gives it up'. His concerns that the
Vietnam war could escalate coexisted with genuine disgust at the suffering caused
by the conflict. Wilson's preference for negotiation as opposed to confrontation
was demonstrated by his handling of the Rhodesian rebellion. Crossman noted that
the Prime Minister 'regards himself as ... a statesman able to achieve what no
diplomat could achieve' - a comment supported by Wilson's smug comment to
Cooper that the Marigold initiative proved that mediation 'was not a task to be
61 Gore-Booth to Briinelow, 20.3.67; Bninelow to Gore-Booth, 5.4.67; D. Mun-ay, Vietnam. The Lei.ndowski
A/fair. 14.4.67, FCO15/646(PRO).
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entrusted to amateurs.M However, until Kosygin's visit it was unclear as to
whether Moscow could or would be seen to collaborate with a Western power by
encouraging Hanoi to participate in peace talks. As a consequence of China's
opposition to a negotiated settlement and the USSR's unwillingness to jeopardise
its relations with the DRY, the Soviets were not prepared to work with the British
through the Geneva co-chairmanship. The crucial fact which Wilson ignored was
that both the Americans and the North Vietnamese believed that a military
solution was feasible, and were therefore unwilling to accept a negotiated
settlement. Peace-makers have a tendency to presume that the horrors of war are
so self-evident that the belligerents will eventually settle for a compromise peace,
a sentiment Wilson echoed when he told Kosygin that 'peace was more important
than victory'. Yet as far as policy-makers in Washington and Hanoi were
concerned, victory was far more important than peace.65
Kosygin's visit to Britain (6-13 February): Arms control and European security.
Wilson was advised by the Foreign Office to refer Kosygin to the 'declaration of
principles' handed to the Czechoslovaks in December 1966. Prague's only response
was that the document should endorse both Germany's Eastern frontier and the
legitimacy of the GDR. Foreign Office officials also suggested that Wilson should
"716 IiC.Deb.5s (HMSO 1965), cols.1123-1 127. Crossman, I, 4.1.65, p.120; & IT, 24.10.66, p.87. Conversation
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raise the issue of mutual force reductions in Central Europe, which would not
only contribute to East-West détente, but would 'also help towards substantial
reductions of NATO forces in Western Europe and alleviate our financial
problems over offset and relations with our allies on this problem'. The British
presumed that Kosygin would enquire about the establishment of the NATO
Nuclear Planning Group (which had originated with McNamara's 'special
committee' idea), while for its part Britain's concerns on arms control focused on
the prospects for a CTBT and the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) problem.
While Rusk's conversations with the Gromyko in New York (October
1966) led to bilateral negotiations on non-proliferation, a CTBT was blocked by
Washington's insistence on on-site inspections, which Moscow opposed. During a
meeting with Soviet scientists in late September Soily Zuckerman, the Prime
Minister's chief scientific advisor, proposed that a tripartite conference could be
convened to discuss alternative means of verification, in particular the use of
seismic technology to detect underground nuclear tests. Zuckerman suggested that a
tripartite meeting could be held in London, with the British government taking the
credit for breaking the impasse over CTBT negotiations. 67 Brown supported
Zuckerman's proposal, but American officials were sceptical as to whether tripartite
talks could produce a test-ban treaty, even if the Soviets agreed to participate.68
Brown's proposal of a tripartite scientific conference was vetoed by Gromyko on
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23 November, who stated in English 'We definitely disfavour it'. The Foreign
Secretary expressed his disappointment in Cabinet, commenting on Zuckerman's
initial contacts that his Soviet interlocutors had 'gone beyond their brief' in
agreeing to technical talks, and that the Soviet military intended to continue
carrying out underground tests. (iromyko had also made it clear that the USSR
preferred to deal directly with the USA on non-proliferation. 69
 Foreign Office
officials expressed the hope that Kosygin could be persuaded to reconsider the
CTBT proposal during his visit, and also hoped to clarify Soviet policy towards
ABMs.7°
The Soviets had deployed ABMs to defend Moscow, and US intelligence
assessments commented on the stationing of a new missile system, known as
Tallinn, in the North-West of the USSR. While the CIA argued that Tallinn had
an anti-aircraft role, American military intelligence concluded that it could be
upgraded as part of a country-wide ABM defence network. 7' This controversy was
grist to the mill for the JCS and for Congressmen who supported a national
ABM system, but McNamara believed that a 'thick' anti-missile deployment would
not only be prohibitively expensive, but would also encourage Soviet efforts to
build up their ICBM arsenal, thus escalating the arms race. McNamara won a
temporary victory when Johnson decided at a meeting in Austin, Texas (December
1966) that while American research and development into ABMs would continue,
Visit of the Foreign Secretary to the Soviet Union 22-25 November 1966, NSIO5 1/290, F0371/188928(PRO).
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the USA would seek agreement with the USSR to limit anti-missile systems.
Johnson wrote to Kosygin in January, and his new ambassador to Moscow,
Liewellyn Thompson, suggested a superpower summit to discuss ABMs, but the
Soviets delayed their response. 72 The British had sought bilateral talks on missile
defence with the Americans in September 1965, but Rusk had informed Dean that
Washington still had to make a decision on ABM deployment. The Foreign Office
was not only concerned that anti-missile defences 'might incidentally cast doubts
on the credibility of United Kingdom strategic nuclear weapons', but expressed
fears that an intensified US-Soviet arms race would increase superpower tensions,
'with particularly serious implications for arms control and disarmament'.73
As noted above, the meetings between Wilson, Brown and Kosygin were
focused on Vietnam, although their discussions in Downing Street on 10 February
concerned problems closer to home. Brown referred to the draft 'declaration of
principles' and expressed cautious interest in a European security conference, as
proposed in the Bucharest declaration. Britain 'thought it essential that such a
conference should be prepared very carefully in advance', and that American
participation should be mandatory. The Foreign Secretary turned to West Germany,
stating that the 'Grand Coalition' government of Helmut Kiesinger (which had
assumed office in November 1966) was 'entirely sincere in desiring to renounce
the past and to act peacefully and democratically'. Kosygin responded with a
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predictable anti-German tirade, maintaining that the emergence of the far-right
National Democratic Party heralded the return of Nazism, and he asserted that the
FRG should renounce its 'revanchist demands' and recognise Europe's post-1945
frontiers. Wilson proposed 'an agreed and phased troop withdrawal in Europe',
claiming that his aim was not 'to save money but to preserve the military balance
and reduce tension'. Kosygin responded that in order 'to bring this about there
was one prerequisite; a declaration on the inviolability of existing boundaries'.
Despite what Wilson had previously presumed, the Soviets were clearly not
interested in any NATO / WTO mutual force reductions.
Kosygin did not complain about the establishment of the Nuclear Planning
Group, but was contemptuous of the British attitude towards ABMs. Brown stressed
that an ABM race would block agreement on a CTBT and could interfere with
progress towards non-proliferation. The Soviet Premier sarcastically commented that
the British supported the 'attitude of President Johnson and Mr McNamara
[which] seemed to be to ask why they should start making anti-missile systems
when it was cheaper to make offensive weapons'. Brown and Wilson stressed that
an ABM build-up would lead both superpowers to increase their nuclear arsenals
in order to saturate anti-missile defences, which would 'give a very dangerous
further twist to the arms race spiral'. Kosygin's retort had ominous implications
for American efforts at an agreement to limit ABMs, and indicated that the Soviet
leadership was in two minds about further developments in missile defence. He
1 QS
maintained that he opposed ABM development because of its costs, but that the
missile defence issue was 'very complex'.74
Apart from the failure of the Phase A / Phase B proposal, Wilson had made
no progress with Kosygin on ABMs or mutual force reductions in Europe. The
Soviet Premier showed no interest in the 'declaration of principles', and continued
to express hostility towards West Germany. Furthermore, Kosygin insisted that any
European security conference should exclude the USA. The Prime Minister was,
however, pleased with the outcome of the discussions on trade and technological
co-operation on the 7th (discussed in the next chapter), and regarded the draft
Foreign Office communiqué's treatment of these issues as 'quite unsatisfactory'.
Wilson informed Brown that Kosygin had originally suggested a 'non-aggression'
treaty, but was persuaded to accept a treaty of 'friendship and peaceful co-
operation', which would establish a framework for bilateral cultural, commercial
and scientific contacts, and would be compatible with the existing alliance
commitments of both powers. Wilson was annoyed that the Foreign Office merely
wanted to 'examine the possibility' of a treaty, and 'watered down' the 'positive
discussions' he had with Kosygin. The section on trade in the final communiqué,
with its references to ministerial contacts and the need for regular bilateral
consultations, was based on a paragraph drafted by Wilson himself, rather than his
Private Secretary."
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The Kosygin visit and its impact on Anglo-Soviet political relations: February-
December 1967.
Harrison argued in March 1967 that after over two years of acrimony, the 'spirit
of Kosygin' had a positive impact in promoting Anglo-Soviet dialogue. 76 In their
final discussion on 13 February, Wilson and Kosygin had agreed to establish a
hot-line link between London and Moscow. The Prime Minister had sought a
teleprinter link similar to that established between the superpowers ever since his
second visit to Moscow, and the hot-line was operational by the end of October
1967. Kosygin also suggested that the Prime Minister could visit Moscow in the
autumn of 1967, in time for the Fiftieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution.
This prospect horrified Brown and his officials, who felt that it would be
embarrassing if 'a Social Democratic Prime Minister assisted in the celebration of
a Communist coup d'etat'. 78 At the end of 1967, the Soviets agreed to invite the
Prime Minister for a third visit to Moscow, scheduled for the 22-24 January
1968. By this time, the 'spirit of Kosygin' which Harrison had earlier referred to
had effectively evaporated.
This deterioration of Anglo-Soviet relations reflected the political stalemate
in East-West relations in 1967. With the exception of Romania, which established
diplomatic relations with the FRG (January 1967), the East European states did
little to promote detente. At the conference of Communist parties at Karlovy Vary
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in Czechoslovakia (April), the WTO states called for the abolition of NATO,
recognition of the GDR, and an 'all European' treaty (deliberately excluding the
USA) renouncing the use or threat of force. While NATO's European members
had sought to develop their contacts with bloc states - the UK's 'declaration of
principles' had originated with Anglo-Czechoslovak discussions, while the Belgians
had informal consultations with the Poles - the Americans in particular felt that
the Eastern bloc states were employing individual contacts with Western states to
divide NATO. 8° While the USA was sceptical of the value of diplomatic contacts
with the bloc states, the Belgians took the lead in promoting a review of Alliance
policy. This review - named after Belgium's Foreign Minister, Pierre Harmel - and
its concluding report (December 1967), was intended to meet the 'Gaullist
challenge' and to address the growing perception in Western public opinion that
NATO had lost its validity.81
The Harmel report established defence and the promotion of détente as the
'two pillars' of NATO policy. The Wilson government supported the Belgian
initiative as its conclusions reflected the British view that, as Brown put it, NATO
was not 'an old-style Cold War crusade against a Communist attack which may
never come', but was 'constructive in terms of détente as well as watertight in
terms of defence and deterrence'. However, the argument that both the Soviet
threat and East-West tensions had diminished had been used by London to justify
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efforts to reduce BAOR, and Ministers were aware that a British version of the
Harmel report would have been regarded by other NATO powers as merely a
pretext for Britain to reduce its commitment to West European defence.82
There was no Warsaw Pact equivalent to the Harmel report. Poland, which
had hitherto been considered by the British to be the most détente-minded of
Eastern bloc states, was by 1967 particularly rigid in its defence of the status quo
and its hostility to the FRG. As one Warsaw embassy official noted in August
1967, the Gomulka regime was encouraging popular anti-German sentiment, with
considerable (and understandable) success. 83 As noted above, Czechoslovakia
undermined the proposed 'declaration of principles' in January 1967, insisting that
it should recognise existing frontiers in Europe. The Czechoslovaks also informed
the British that the declaration was a purely bilateral matter, thus defeating the
original purpose of the exercise. 84 In contrast, the Romanians favoured increased
trade and technological co-operation with the Western powers, and Bucharest had
defied the rest of the bloc by recognising the FRG. Yet even though Ceausescu
favoured improved East-West relations, he was not prepared either to risk a breach
with Moscow, or to reform Romania's Stalinist regime. Although the Foreign
Office linked the internal 'evolution' of individual bloc states with the
development of détente, it was ironic that the East European state that was most
OPD(67)38 meeting, 28.11.67, CAB148130(PRO). OPLX67)87, France and the Atlantic Alliance, by Broii,
20.11.67, CAB 148/34(PRO).
Bro to Brimelow, 23.3.67,; & D. Tonkin (Warsaw) to Rhodes, 17.8.67, FCO2S!271(PRO).
Smith to Hayman, 13.1.67; & FO to Prague, No.31, 17.1.67, FCO2S/1(PRO).
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willing to improve its relations with the Western powers was also ruled by the
most repressive and least liberal of the Soviet bloc regimes.85
In the same way that contacts between Eastern and West European states
remained frozen, US-Soviet relations were affected both by the ongoing war in
Vietnam and Moscow's reluctance to discuss strategic arms limitations with
Washington. After months of frustration, the Johnson administration announced that
it would build a 'thin' ABM force, ostensibly to counter the emerging Chinese
nuclear threat (19 September 1967). This decision was particularly unwelcome to
the British because any superpower ABM race could render the UK's nuclear
force obsolete soon after the first Polaris submarine - HMS Resolution - was due
to enter service (March 1968). The Wilson government had decided not to
purchase the next-generation of US-designed submarine-launched missiles
(Poseidon), but to increase Polaris's prospects of breaching Soviet ABM defences
its warheads needed to be 'hardened' and fitted with dummy 'penetration aids'.
While the MoD, Foreign Office and Mintech supported the upgrading of Polaris,
the Treasury and DEA were opposed on financial grounds, particularly after the
devaluation of the pound (November 1967). Zuckerman also argued that the
proposed upgrading of the British deterrent was strategic nonsense, as the UK
would never wage nuclear war alone against the USSR.
J. Chadck (Bucharest) to Brown, 15165, FCO281271(PRO). Crampton,Eastem Europe, pp.311-314.
Gaiduk, Soviet Union, pp.109-1 11. Newhouse, Cold Dam, pp.89-92, pp.95-99. McNamara justified this decision
in The Essence of Secunly.Rejlections in Office, (Hodder & Stoughton 1968),pp.163-l66.
Conversation between Brown & Eugene Rostow at FO, 14.9.67, FCO7fl67(PRO). C0S23/64, Polaris -
Command and Control of Firing Orders, 15.3.67, DEFES/173(PRO). OPD(0X67)16, British Nuclear Weapons
Policy, 10.10.67, CAB148IS1(PRO). Zuckennan, Monkeys, Men, pp.386-396.
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The debate on Polaris was confined to the Cabinet's Nuclear Policy
Committee (PN), established by Wilson in September 1966, and came to a head in
December the following year. Healey argued that the prospects of further
proliferation and the political consequences of leaving de Gaulle's France as the
only nuclear power in Western Europe made Polaris's retention and upgrading
vital. The Defence Secretary also hinted that the future reliability of the US
nuclear deterrent was uncertain, and claimed that 'the Soviet Union might wish to
attack this country without also attacking the United States'. Under these
circumstances, Healey argued, the USSR 'might only be deterred from such an
attack on our cities if we ourselves had the capability to inflict heavy damage on
her'. On 5 January 1968 the majority of the PN, including Wilson, sided with
Healey, and authorised further studies into redesigning the Polaris warheads so that
they could survive Soviet ABM defences. 88 In December 1973 the Heath
government commissioned the upgrading of Polaris, and the costs of this
programme - known as Chevaline - subsequently spiralled out of control.
Furthermore, due to the need to test the redeveloped warheads the British lost
interest in pursuing a CTBT.
The proposed Anglo-Soviet 'treaty of friendship', which Wilson and
Kosygin had agreed to in February, had caused controversy within NATO. The
Prime Minister informed Johnson that both he and Brown saw 'no particular
Hennessy, Prime Minister, p.291. PN(67)4th meeting, 5. 12.67, CAB13413120(PRO). Tony Benn, Office Without
Power. Diaries 1968-72, (Hutchinson 1988), 5.1.68, p.5. E. Rose (Cabinet Office) to Trend, 18.1.68, CAB165/310.
The actual minutes of this PN meeting remain classified.
Hennessy, Muddling Thmugh, pp.117-121. Henley, Time of Ap Life, p.313.
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harm' in the proposed treaty, and the OPD endorsed the Foreign Office's draft
text in early April. 90 However, Shuckburgh's successor in NATO, Bernard Burrows,
warned his superiors that most Alliance members were critical of the treaty, and
he recommended that the NAC be consulted on the draft text. Senior Foreign
Office officials were annoyed by the allied response, and were unwilling to submit
a draft text for 'nit-picking' within NATO. Smith slyly suggested that Burrows
would 'find it easier, in conscience' to face his NAC counterparts if he too
remained uninformed about the content of the draft treaty. 9' An exception was
made for West Germans, who were consulted on the treaty text in advance. One
Bonn embassy official stated that '[the] skeleton of the original MacMillan (sic)
visit to Moscow is ... still apt to pop out of German cupboards at a moment's
notice', and British officials conceded that Bonn needed to be reassured that the
FRG was not going to be 'abandoned' as the price of any Anglo-Soviet treaty9
The Americans made no effort to conceal their displeasure with the
proposed treaty. Rusk was informed by one State Department official that 'we do
not see any particular good which can come of [this treaty] and are concerned at
the divisive effect it is having on the Alliance', while Cleveland criticised the
concept of a 'friendship' treaty with the Soviets in similar terms within the NAC.
The British nonetheless pressed ahead, with Greenhill travelling to Moscow in
mid-April to present the draft text to Soviet officials. The Soviet response was
to Bro, 9.2.67, FCO28/374(PRO). PM to Johnson, PMUK003/11, 11.2.67, PRIM13/2114(PRO).
OPLX67)25, Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Frtendship and Peaceful Co-operation, 4.4.67, CABI48/34(PRO). The British
draft of the treaty is copied in Appeadix 3.
91 B. Burrows to Hood, 8.3.67; Hood to Hayman, 10.3.67; & note by Smith, 13.3.67, FCO281376(PRO).
A. Goodison (Bonn) to A. Campbell (Western Department), 9.3.67, FCO281376. E Tomkins (Bonn) to
Campbell, 2 1.3.67, FCO28/377(PRO).
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that the draft's 'general approach [was] acceptable', but had to address additional,
but unspecified, issues beyond bilateral relations. This was the last heard from the
Soviets on the treaty for nine months. 93 During his second visit to Moscow (23-26
May) Brown pressed Gromyko for a Soviet response to the draft text. The Foreign
Secretary stated that '[the] Treaty of Friendship had been a Soviet initiative which
the British had followed up with enthusiasm' and that it was 'surprising that the
Soviet side were moving so slowly'. Although Gromyko promised that Moscow
would soon produce its own draft, Brown returned to London empty-handed.94
The Foreign Secretary's visit to Moscow was overshadowed by the
increased tensions in the Middle East caused by Egypt's closure of the Gulf of
Aqaba. In order to avert any embarrassment during Brown's visit, the Foreign
Office insisted on an embargo on RAF SIG1NT flights close to Soviet territoiy
from the 19-26 May, but the escalation of Arab-Israeli hostilities provided an
inauspicious background to the Foreign Secretary's visit. 95 Brown's conversations
which Kosygin and Gromyko revolved around the Middle Eastern crisis, which his
hosts blamed on Israel. In his analysis of the visit, Harrison told Brown that in his
opinion Brezhnev and the CPSU ideologues - who were 'temperamentally probably
more suspicious of the West, less pragmatical (sic), tougher and more dogmatic
than Kosygin' - were more active in foreign policy-making. The ambassador
described Anglo-Soviet relations as a 'delicate plant' which could not be turned
J. Leddy (State Dept) to Rusk, 15.4.67, MF409. Burrows to Hood, 16.3.67: & FO to UKDeINATO, No.733,
18.4.67, FCO28/377(PRO).
Conversation between Broi & (3romyko at UK Embassy, 24.5.67, Visit of the Foreign Secretaty to the
Soviet Union, 23-26 May 1967, FCO28/406(PRO).
Healey to Broi, 19.4.67, A1R2W12133(FRO). RAF SIGINT flights in close proxunity to the Soviet frontier
were resumed in July 1967; see Vice-Chief of Air Staff (VCAS) to Healey, 19.6.67, ALR2O/L2133(PRO).
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into 'magic beanstaiks' by an injection of the 'Kosygin spirit' evident in London
three months previously. The UK and USSR were on opposite sides on the major
international issues, and Soviet policy was difficult 'even in the best of
circumstances' to 'influence or deflect', particularly for a medium power like the
Britain. Nevertheless, Harrison again drew comfort from the apparent readiness of
the Soviet leadership to talk to their British counterparts, who they considered to
be 'sensible men whose views are worth hearing and with whom one can do
business'. However, Smith concluded that Britain had shown too much eagerness
in developing contacts with the USSR. The 'treaty of friendship' was in limbo, the
Soviets had shown no interest in a long-term trade agreement, and Moscow
remained uncompromising on Germany, Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli crisis and the
Brooke case. Smith suggested that it was time for the UK to wait and see what
concessions the Soviets were prepared to make for improved relations. 97
 Smith's
comments reflected the growing concern within the Foreign Office at the USSR's
increasingly contemptuous attitude towards Britain, a sentiment which became more
prevalent the following year.
In the aftermath of the Six Day War, Harrison suggested that Kosygin's
position within the Politburo had suffered as a result of the Arab defeat. One of
the Foreign Office's Soviet experts, Edward Orchard, concurred with Harrison that
Kosygin was in disfavour within the Politburo as a result of his visit to Britain.
The Soviet Premier had failed to encourage Wilson to break ranks with the USA
Broii to Harrison, 26.5.67; & Harrison to Brovn, 1.6.67, FCO2S/406(PRO).
Smith to Haman, 2.6.67; Ha)man to Smith, 6.6.67, FCO281406(PRO).
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and West Germany, and the USSR had been 'placed in a difficult position' with
Hanoi because Kosygin had responded to the Prime Minister's peacemaking
overtures on Vietnam. In contrast at the beginning of August 1967 Gore-Booth
painted a gloomy picture of Anglo-Soviet relations. In his view, Moscow did not
see the UK as an 'interlocuteur' in Europe - even de Gaulle was considered by
the Soviets to be merely a disruptive force within the Western world, rather than
as a potential negotiating partner. Gore-Booth concluded that if Britain's efforts to
join the EEC failed, the USSR could approach the UK with 'some apparently
attractive but probably specious offers of economic and other forms of co-
operation with us', but opportunities for genuine bilateral co-operation were
limited.98 The Permanent Under-Secretary's conclusions reflected the general mood
of the Foreign Office six months after Kosygin's visit, and contributed to the
reassessment of British policy towards the USSR which followed Wilson's third
visit to Moscow (January 1968).
Conclusions:
The 'spirit of Kosygin' which Harrison referred to in March 1967 proved to be
as ephemeral as the 'spirit of Geneva' had been the previous decade. In practical
terms, the Wilson government gained nothing from its contacts with the Soviet
leadership on arms control, European security and Vietnam. The ongoing
Harrison to Hayman, 1.6.67; Harrison to Gore-Booth, 26.6.67; E. Orchard to L Sutherland, 13.7.67; Gore-Booth
to Harrison, 2.8.67, FCO2S/371(PRO).
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negotiations between the USA and USSR on non-proliferation were welcomed by
the British, although in contrast with the LTBT in 1963 the UK was not even
peripherally involved. As far as the failure of Sunflower was concerned, both
Wilson and (to a lesser extent) Brown were more inclined to blame Washington
for its collapse than Moscow. Nonetheless, the outcome of the Kosygin talks
punctured the illusion entertained by the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and the
ambassador to Moscow that the UK was an 'intermediary' facilitating contact
between the superpowers.
The fate of the proposed Anglo-Soviet 'friendship treaty' reflected the
general state of East-West relations during 1967. As noted above, despite the
efforts of other Western European powers to develop diplomatic contacts with
Eastern Europe détente remained stagnant. For all de Gaulle's anti-American
posturing, France gained no practical results from its own dealings with the
Eastern bloc. Moscow ignored the French President's proposal for four-power
negotiations (involving the superpowers, the UK and France) to diffuse the Arab-
Israeli crisis in May 1967, and Gomulka made his disdain for de Gaulle's Europe
totale rhetoric evident during the latter's visit to Poland four months later. Despite
West Germany's efforts to improve their relations with its East European
neighbours, Romania was the only bloc state to respond to the Kiesinger
government's early attempts at Ostpo1itik. The British were not alone in having
little to show for their efforts to develop détente.
Lacouture, De Gaulle, pp.762-769. Narinski, 'Las Sovietiques', in Bozo, Mélandzi & Vaisse, France et l'OTAN,
p.S 15. Haniied, Ge'many, Amenca Europe, pp.182-186.
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A more pertinent criticism concerns the fact that Kosygin became the focus
of London's efforts to foster Anglo-Soviet goodwill. Wilson treated contacts with
the Soviet Premier as being intrinsically important, and showed little interest in
determining who the balance of power in the Kremlin favoured. This was probably
due to the fact that the Prime Minister felt that he had established a rapport with
Kosygin. An additional factor was that the Soviet Premier, in British official
opinion, represented the technocratic class who would promote the internal reform
and 'evolution' of the Soviet system. Yet despite being the head of government,
Kosygin was by no means 'first among equals' within the Politburo. Brezhnev
adopted a lower profile as far as relations with the Western powers were
concerned, and it should be noted that he did not assume a direct role in dealings
with American Presidents and other Western leaders until the 1970s, once he had
emerged as the dominant figure in the Politburo. Nonetheless, the fact was that the
source of power within the Soviet system lay in the CPSU, rather than the state
structure, and this was a factor which Wilson and other Western politicians failed
to appreciate.
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CHAPTER 6: BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS EAST-WEST
TRADE. FEBRUARY 1967-AUGUST 1968
Wilson's interest in East-West trade derived from his Ministerial career in the
1 940s, and by the time Labour returned to government the Foreign Office regarded
commercial contacts with the Eastern bloc as one of the only means Western
countries had of encouraging the internal 'evolution' of Eastern Europe. However,
the Foreign Office's attempts to remove import quotas on Soviet bloc imports in
1965 had been thwarted by inter-departmental rivalries within Whitehall. In January
1967, the President of the Board of Trade pessimistically concluded that the
bilateral trade imbalance would continue to widen, but the Prime Minister hoped
that Leyland and the British Motor Corporation (BMC) would follow on from
Fiat's success in negotiating a contract to build a car factoiy in the USSR.'
Much to the Board of Trade's chagrin, Britain had taken no retaliatory
measures in spite of Moscow's failure to redress the Anglo-Soviet trade
imbalance. A week before Kosygin's arrival, Wilson expressed the hope that the
visit would produce a 'striking new initiative' on bilateral trade, preferably in the
form of an equivalent of the Franco-Soviet 'Grand Commission' on scientific and
technological co-operation established following Kosygin's visit to Paris (December
1966).2 The Prime Minister was persuaded by the Board of Trade and the Foreign
Office to settle for Ministerial discussions between Jay and the Minister of
'A. Halls (No.10) to W. Nicoll (BoT), 14.1.67; & Jay to PM, 23.1.67, PREM13/1863(PRO).
2 Pans to FO, No.137, 2.2.67, & annotated comment by PM, PREM13/2406(PRO). On bilateral co-operation
between France and the USSR, see Loth, Overcoming the Cold War, pp.90-91.
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Technology, Tony Benn, and their Soviet counterparts. Wilson clearly wanted to
have something to show from Kosygin's visit, and Ministers felt that the success
of BMC and Leyland's bids would depend on the course of Wilson's discussions
with the Soviet Premier on political issues.3
As noted above, Foreign Office officials concluded that one of the main
objectives of Kosygin's visit was to promote Anglo-Soviet trade and technological
co-operation. The Foreign Office's assessment did, however, question the extent of
the Soviet Premier's authority within the Kremlin. Brezhnev had consolidated his
position within the Politburo, while the increases in defence expenditure and the
'failure of the leadership to produce the details of the 1966-1970 five year plan',
suggested that Kosygin's reform programme had been delayed. The Soviet
Premier's proposals to decentralise the command economy were never
implemented. According to Geoffiey Hosking, Kosygin's reforms were abandoned
because of resistance from CPSU officials determined to retain control of
economic planning, and because 'serious implementation of [these reforms] would
have threatened the priority accorded to military production'. Robert Service argues
that it was Brezhnev who undermined the Soviet premier's efforts to shift
economic policy from party control.4
Jay and Benn were present when Wilson and Kosygin discussed trading
relations at 10 Downing Street (7 February). When the President of the Board of
3 Nicoll to Palliser, 6.2.67; & MacLehose to Palliser, 7.2.67, PREM1312406(PRO). MISC136(67)1 meeting at
House of Commons, 30.1.67, CAB13O/31 1(PRO).
4 KV(67)1, CAB1331365(PRO). Hosking, Soviet Union, p.365. Service, Twentieth Centwy Russia, pp.379-380.
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Trade protested at the £40 million gap in bilateral trade, Kosygin responded that
Britain traded 'from a position of strength' because of the strategic embargo,
thereby implying that Soviet resentment over COCOM restrictions was a barrier to
increased imports of British goods. Kosygin called for the abolition of COCOM, to
which Wilson responded that he believed that the lists of embargoed items should
be reduced. He observed that 'a common list had come to be applied to the
Soviet Union and to China', and that this was arguably 'an out-of-date conception
which needed looking at'. The Prime Minister was 'attracted' by Kosygin's
suggestion of a long-term trade agreement, and both agreed to regular consultations
between their two trade Ministers.5
While Benn successfully negotiated a technological agreement with his
opposite number, V. A. Kirillin, in January 1968, British exports to the USSR for
1967 as a whole reached the record level of £64.2 million. However, as one
Foreign Office brief from January 1968 noted, this 'still leaves too large an
imbalance' in bilateral trade. 6
 Furthermore, the devaluation crisis of November 1967
distracted Whitehall's attention from the issue of liberalising trade with the
Eastern bloc states. The COCOM review of 1968 therefore became the focus of
the 'striking new initiative' in East-West trade that Wilson had expressed his
hopes for.7
 When Kosygin claimed that the UK 'traded from a position of
strength' as a consequence of the strategic embargo, no one on the British side
Smith, Kosygin Visit. Communiqué, 11.2.67, PREM13/1842(PRO). KV(67)2 meeting between Benn, Jay,
Kosygin & PM at No.10,7.2.67, CAB133/3s(PRO).
6 PCO(68)5th meeting, 24.4.68, FCO28/60. PMV(MX68)1, Prime Minister's Visit to Moscow Januai'y, 1968.
Steering BrieJ 17.1.68, FCO2S/400.
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pointed out that COCOM's restrictions applied to all Western trade with
Communist countries, not merely that of the UK. 8 Kosygin's intention in referring
to the strategic embargo seems to have been to play on British suspicions, which
were widespread within Whitehall, that other Western powers were not abiding by
COCOM's rules when trading with the Eastern bloc. The Soviet Premier's
comments merely reinforced British intentions to liberalise the strategic embargo
and reduce the number of items proscribed by COCOM.
The development of British policy towards the COCOM review: February-
October 1967.
Previous reviews of the strategic embargo had, in the opinion of officials in the
ESC(0) (the official Strategic Exports Committee), 'produced few results at the
cost of much time and energy', and officials resented the fact that throughout the
1966 review their American counterparts had been unwilling to share intelligence
information or to justify their objections to proposed reductions in the COCOM
lists. The DIS estimated that the 'I' list in particular could be cut by half without
compromising Western security, permitting the export of items such as motor
vehicles, synthetic oils and rubber, metal alloys and machine tools. The principal
obstacle, in British eyes, was that COCOM restrictions applied to all Communist
countries, and that as far as computer exports were concerned, 'some valuable
markets in Russia and Eastern Europe were denied to us because the United
States did not want certain items to be exported to China'. The Americans
8 KV(67)2'" meeting, 7.2.67, CAIB133/365(PRO).
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proposed the reintroduction of the China differential in February 1966, but the
French objected, because of the impact this would have on Sino-French trading
relations. The idea of a China differential was therefore shelved before the British
had time to consider it. 9
 The following year both the ESC(0) and its Ministerial
counterpart (ESC) debated the adoption of the China differential as a means of
relaxing the embargo on the USSR and the East European states.
By mid-1967, the Johnson administration's intention of using trade as a
means of 'bridge-building' had come to grief Following the conclusions of the
Miller Committee on East-West trade (March 1965), the administration had half-
heartedly supported the introduction of the East-West Trade Relations Bill in
Congress (May 1966). However, many Congressmen opposed the relaxation of
trading relations with bloc states because of the Vietnam war and Soviet and East
European support for the DRy, and Johnson was unwilling to risk defeat by
pressing the case for the trade bill.' 0
 David Bendall, a British diplomat based in
Washington, noted that the State Department's East European experts were
demoralised by the failure of the administration's 'bridge-building' policy in the
face of Congressional opposition. 1 ' In addition to domestic political hostility
towards trade with North Vietnam's Eastern bloc allies, the internal debate over
ABMs and the concern over the Chinese H-bomb test (May 1967) highlighted
American concerns that Western exports of high-technology goods could enhance
ESC(O66)2' meeting, 15.12.66, CAB134/2798(PRO). ESC(0X67)13; International Strategic Embargo -
Review of Policy, 2.3.67, CAB13412799(PRO).
'°Rusk to Johnson, 7.1.66; & M Bundy to Johnson, 18.2.66, F7?(hS' IX, pp.506-507, pp.511-512.
"ESC(0X67)6th meeting, 4.10.67, CAB13412799(PRO). Bendall to FL Smith, 6. 10.67, FCO28114(PRO).
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China's nuclear programme. In a critical analysis of British policy towards
COCOM, Bruce observed that while the UK supported the strategic embargo in
principle, it adopted 'a liberal, and frankly commercial, view towards the question
of what could be considered strategic'. Britain's livelihood depended upon foreign
trade, and the UK was less inclined than the USA 'to sacrifice export earnings for
what we may consider to be the greater good'. The British therefore supported the
relaxation of COCOM restrictions, considering the American position to be
excessive and not entirely altruistic - the calculation being that the USA employed
COCOM to bar its Western rivals from markets it was unable, or unwilling, to
exploit. Bruce acknowledged that the Americans had not made their case easier in
disputes over the embargo, and were considered to be 'crying wolf' over Chinese
military capabilities.' 2 The Wilson government had approved computer sales to
China in late 1966, despite Washington's objections, and COCOM had again
become a cause of Anglo-American dispute, compounding the impact of Vietnam,
the offsets crisis and the ABM problem.13
When the ESC(0) discussed COCOM restrictions in April-May 1967, there
was general consensus that the embargo lists were in need of revision. The
strategic embargo was regarded by 'informed opinion' in Parliament and the
business community as a commercial own-goal, because rival firms in Western
European were flouting COCOM's rules and had an unfair advantage in their
trade with the Eastern bloc. According to one contemporary study on East-West
' 2 London to State Dept, 9.12.66, FRUS LV, pp.525-528. See Clearwater, Strategic Anns Czt,vl, pp.280-283. &
Newhouse, Cold Dawn, pp.81-86, on contemporaly concerns over the Chinese nuclear programme.
'3 OPD(66)34 & 45th meetings, 5.8.66 & 18.11.66, CAB14S/25(PRO).
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trade, there was some substance to these suspicions, although the fact that West
European states bent the embargo's rules did not give them a significant
commercial advantage over the UK. American opinions on COCOM could not be
simply disregarded, because apart from the larger aspect of Anglo-American
relations the British computing industiy was dependent upon US components.
Britain could use the 'special national interest' clause in COCOM's rules to
permit exports of high-technology goods, but if the items exported were
constructed with American as well as British components the USA's approval was
required. In addition, the Board of Trade was uncertain about restoring the China
differential, particularly if this involved increasing existing restrictions on trade
with the PRC. The Board of Trade and the CR0 argued that if the UK took the
lead on reintroducing the China differential, Beijing would retaliate against British
trade and possibly cause trouble over Hong Kong - the second concern became
more pronounced as the Cultural Revolution intensified.'4
The ESC(0) accepted a compromise that would form the basis of Britain's
approach to the 1968 COCOM review. The UK would accept the present
restrictions as applicable to China, but would propose that reductions would apply
to the 'Soviet bloc' alone, on the grounds that '[not] only do we now regard
Soviet aggression as less likely but also the Soviet bloc had made such
technological progress' that the COCOM lists had lost much of their validity. In
their report to the ESC, officials observed that the rationale behind the abolition of
Kronst, 'East-West Trade', pp.273-274. ESC(OX67)1 & 2id meetings, 7.4.67 & 4.5.67, CAB134f2799(PRO).
Ian Mikardo's coimnents in Parliament on 20.11.67 (H.C.Deb5s, 754 (HMSO 1967), cols.921-922) reflected
opinion on COCOM within the Labour Party.
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the China differential the previous decade - that of a unified 'Sino-Soviet bloc' -
was no longer valid, and that since 1959 the Soviets had imposed their own
embargo on transfers of high-technology (especially nuclear) materials to the
Chinese. British policy towards Eastern Europe was based on the principle that
East-West détente could be reinforced by improved commercial relations. Yet the
Americans had opposed potentially lucrative computer and telecommunications
sales to the Eastern bloc states on the grounds that these could be re-exported to
the PRC. Due to the Vietnam war and the long-term threat posed by Chinese
military power, Washington would not reverse its China policy, and the only means
of easing the embargo for the 'Soviet bloc' would be to accept existing
restrictions as applicable to the PRC only. Officials concluded that the Americans
would accept this quid pro quo in order to preserve the embargo as a whole, and
to prevent France from withdrawing from COCOM altogether. Of the other
COCOM members, the French could accept covert discrimination against the PRC
if there were substantial reductions in the embargo for the USSR and Eastern
Europe. If COCOM was reformed on these lines, the UK would face greater
Western competition for bloc markets, but on the other hand one source of
contention in East-West relations - which Kosygin had complained about to
Wilson - would be removed.15
Ministers approved the ESC(0)'s recommendations reversing the UK's
decade-old policy against the China differential, and accepted the need to consult
' 5 ESC(0X67)3th meeting, 16.5.67, CAB134I2799(PRO). ESC(67)9 International Strategic Embargo - Review of
Policy, 6.6.67, CAB134!2795(PRO).
the French in advance and prepare for the 1968 review as applicable to the
Soviet bloc alone.' 6 During subsequent consultations, French officials stated that
while they were unwilling to sponsor discriminatory measures against China, they
would back a British initiative on this issue. Consultations with the Americans in
October 1967 suggested that Washington could accept a compromise which
retained existing restrictions on the PRC and preserved the strategic embargo.
However, Washington's response to the Anglo-Soviet technological agreement of
January 1968 showed that the compromise on COCOM was a fragile one. Dean
informed London in early March that Pentagon officials and Congressmen opposed
the agreement as the Soviets could by-pass the strategic embargo, and had hinted
that Anglo-American co-operation in defence matters could suffer as a result.
Greenhill retorted that the agreement did not violate COCOM's rules and was
confined to civilian technical exchanges. Mintech was aware that the success of
the agreement depended on reciprocity, while the main role in bilateral exchanges
would be played by British businesses, who would not give away their industrial
secrets to the Soviets for free.'7
Wilson regarded American complaints concerning the technological
agreement as absurd, and Foreign Office officials were privately convinced that
Washington's concerns about Western security were superficial. Greenhill informed
Dean in May that due to the importance of American assistance in defence
matters, US concerns over the technological agreement had to be addressed on a
l6ESC(67rd meeting, 12.7.67, CAB134/2795(PRO). Jay to PM, 15.6.67, PREM13/1863(PRO).
"l)ean to Greenhill, 2.3.68, DBPO III, 1, pp.28-30. Greenhill to Dean, 19.3.68, FCO2S/372(PRO).
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case-by-case basis. Yet he also suspected that once the Vietnam war was over,
American computing firms like IBM would seek to break into the Eastern bloc
market, and that in the short-term the USA had a commercial interest in restricting
British sales of high-technology goods to the USSR and East European states.' 8 As
Bruce had noted, there was widespread feeling within Whitehall that American
policy towards the strategic embargo was based on similar calculations, and these
suspicions were expressed within the ESC and OPD in the months before the
COCOM review in October 1968.
COCOM and Anglo-American relations: December 1967-August 1968.
Wilson retrospectively claimed that the Cabinet row over South African arms sales
(December 1967) led him to propose a general review of trade policy after
devaluation. He argued that if the embargo on arms sales to the apartheid regime
was relaxed, then so too should the 'indefensible and anomalous restrictions on
trade with Eastern Europe'. In this respect, the Prime Minister had an ally in
Benn, who subsequently asserted that the UK had sacrificed opportunities to trade
with bloc states because of its rigid adherence to COCOM's rules.' 9 While there
was widespread agreement within Whitehall that the strategic embargo should be
relaxed, there was a prolonged debate throughout 1968 concerning the means by
which this was to be achieved.
' 8 Conversation between PM and Zuckerman at No.10, 8.4.68, PREM1312405(PRO). Greenhill to Dean, 15.5.68,
FCO281373(PRO).
'9 Wilson, The Labour Government, p.470. Benn, Office Without Power, author's note, pp.17-18.
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Jay was removed from the Cabinet in August 1967 because he opposed
EEC entry, and his successor as President of the Board of Trade, Anthony
Crosland, supported both the liberalisation of trade with the Eastern bloc and the
reform of COCOM. The ESC and the OPD endorsed the policy of promoting a
'China differential' and the relaxation of the embargo on the Soviet bloc in the
forthcoming COCOM review, but Crosland intended to go further. 2° He
recommended that Britain should propose firstly that the review should be
rescheduled for June 1968, and secondly that changes to COCOM's rules should
no longer require the unanimous consent of all member states. Crosland also
argued that Britain should reserve the right to export items it believed should not
be on the embargo lists, although COCOM would receive advance notification of
any such case. The OPD debated these proposals on 21 March, with Stewart (who
had replaced Brown as Foreign Secretary the previous week) leading the attack on
Crosland's recommendations. Stewart argued that Crosland's proposals could bring
about COCOM's collapse, with minimal benefits for British trade. The OPD
overruled the President of the Board of Trade's first two recommendations, but the
issue of unilaterally exporting embargoed items remained unresolved.2'
In October 1967, the Americans had agreed in principle to a deal in which
tighter restrictions on trade with China would be counter-balanced by fewer
restrictions on the USSR and Eastern Europe, but were unclear as to what
20 See Pimloti, WiLson, p.468, on Croslaixi's appointineet	 meeting, 7.368, CAB13412796(PRO).
OP[X68)6th meeting, 21.3.68, CAB14S/35(PRO).
21 0PD(68)19, International Strategic Embargo, 14.3.68, CAB148I3(PRO). OPD(68)6th, CAB148135(PRO).
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practical form this arrangement would take. The British proposed to remove 21
items from the COCOM lists, 10 of which concerned both the PRC and the
Soviet bloc. In discussions on the 7th and 22 May 1968, however, American
officials proposed to add 58 items to the embargo lists, nearly all of which
concerned China. There were further complications, the first being Japan's
opposition to the proposed China differential. Although Tokyo did not recognise
the PRC, the Japanese were unwilling to jeopardise their trade with China by
endorsing an overt embargo which discriminated in favour of the USSR and its
East European allies. The second problem arose when Sweden (which although not
a member of COCOM had hitherto agreed to abide by its rules) proposed to
remove restrictions on all exports to the Soviet bloc, with the exception of
military goods. The British were alarmed by the Swedish action, which could
encourage COCOM members to follow suit, and were exasperated by Japanese
objections. A covert 'China differential', as proposed by Japan, would not satisfy
British domestic opinion, and would also antagonise the Soviet bloc states. Both
Wilson and Crosland remained committed to an overt 'differential' and envisaged
the eventual collapse of the strategic embargo, or that Britain might have to
withdraw from COCOM.22
During the summer of 1968, the issue of COCOM reform was complicated
by the debate over computer sales to bloc states. One British firm, ICL, intended to
export computers to the USSR and Romania. Benn argued that ICL's computers
ESC(68)6, International Strategic Emba,o: Review of Policy, 7.6.68; ESC(68)2' meeting, 17.6.68,
CAB13412796(PRO). ESC(OX68)5, 25.6.68, CAB134t2800(PRO).
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had a purely civilian application, but the DIS reported that their export could help
the USSR bridge the technological gap separating the Eastern bloc from the West.
Furthermore, as Dean noted, these computer sales would exacerbate American
suspicions concerning the Anglo-Soviet technological agreement, and establish the
impression that Britain was an unreliable ally. Within the ESC, the MoD and
Foreign Office representatives argued that Washington could cripple British
computer firms by blocking access to US-made components. In response, Mintech
stated that France's dependence on American components had not prevented Paris
from agreeing to a deal between Czechoslovakia and the French firm Machines
Bull. 23 Mintech's position was similar to that adopted by the ambassadors to the
Eastern bloc states at their bi-annual conference (7-10 May). Brimelow stated that
he could not see 'how the sale of even the most advanced computers to the
Soviet Union would increase the chances of Soviet aggression'. Harrison reminded
his colleagues strategic embargo was being criticised by Ministers, MPs, and by
businessmen, and that its rationale had been called into question because of the
USSR's technological achievements, and due to 'scepticism about the present
nature of the Soviet threat to our defence'. He concluded that the Soviets were
only a few years behind Western technological developments, and that Moscow
could easily buy, or steal, industrial secrets from Western companies to make good
the difference. This was an accurate observation, as industrial espionage was one of
the KGB's principal activities throughout the Cold War.24
ESC(68)9, COCOM and Computers for Eastern Europe, 28.6.68, CAB134/2796(PRO).
24 Benn, Office Without Power, 10.7.68, pS9; & 1.8.68, pp.94-95. Conference of HM Rer&centative.s in East
European Count,ie. 7-10 May 1968, 7 meeting, 10.5.68, FCO28145(PRO). Andrew & Mitrokhin, Mitrhin
Archive, pp.244-247, p.553.
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While Benn wanted to overrule US objections to computer sales, and both
the Prime Minister and Crosland envisaged the collapse of COCOM the majority
opinion within the ESC(0) were unwilling to risk the disintegration of the
strategic embargo. If the UK withdrew from COCOM, British firms would
theoretically be well-placed to exploit the Eastern bloc market, but this advantage
would soon be lost as other Western European powers would be expected to
follow suit and denounce the embargo. In such an eventuality, the Soviets and
Chinese would be in a position to exploit the collapse of COCOM and to build
up their military and technological capabilities. Above all, British withdrawal from
the strategic embargo would arouse American anger, jeopardising the bilateral co-
operation in defence, nuclear and intelligence matters which was crucial to
Britain's security interest s. 25
 As a consequence, the British government did not
want to be seen to be threatening both the future of the embargo and alliance
ties with the USA by taking unilateral action over COCOM. This issue remained
unresolved as the crisis over internal reform in Czechoslovakia culminated in the
Warsaw Pact invasion in August 1968.
Trade with the Eastern bloc and policy towards 'liberalisation': June 1967-
August 1968.
Wilson's discussions with Kosygin in February 1967 forced the Board of Trade to
prepare for Jay's negotiations with his opposite number, N. S. Patolichev, for a
23 ESC(0X68)6th
 meeting, 6.868, CAB13412800(PRO). OPD(68)51, Future of COCOM, 10.7.68, CAB148138(PRO).
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long-term trade agreement. In the same way that the Prime Minister's intervention
had cajoled the Foreign Office into treating seriously negotiations on a 'friendship
treaty' with the Soviets, he aLso undermined the Board of Trade's established
opposition to long-term commercial agreements with bloc states. Northern
Department officials concluded that if such an agreement was concluded between
the UK and USSR, the East Europeans would demand similar treatment. The Board
of Trade, however, doubted whether the Soviets would treat trade negotiations with
the British seriously, and considered the UK's potential bid for EEC membership
as an additional obstacle. Apart from the USSR's opposition to European
integration, existing agreements between EEC members and the CMEA states were
due to end in 1969, after which the former were supposed to adopt a common
policy on East-West trade. If Britain was accepted into the EEC, then any Anglo-
Soviet trade agreement would require renegotiation.26
In May 1967, the Board of Trade proposed to extend the terms of
liberalisation offered to the bloc states in 1964. This was partly because France,
the FRG and other European competitors had removed most of their import
quotas and - as shown by the ambassador's conference the previous year - there
was also a widespread impression that Britain's competitors had the upper hand in
trading with the Eastern bloc states. Board of Trade officials proposed to offer
unilateral liberalisation to the East European states, including Romama (which
rejected the UK's terms in 1964) and the GDR (which was exempt from the
B. Crowe (Economic Relations Dept), 24.2.67; Smith to G. McMahon (BoT), 13.3.67; Rhodes to J. Fish (BoT),
20.2.67; & Fish to Rhodes, 22.2.67, FCO2S/59(PRO).
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previous liberalisation offer). These proposals were approved in principle by the
inter-departmental Commercial Policy Committee in June 1967, but the subsequent
devaluation crisis delayed implementation of liberalisation. 27
 The Commercial Policy
Committee had excluded both China and the USSR from the terms of
liberalisation. In the latter's case, this decision was due to the impact of the
Cultural Revolution, while as far as the USSR was concerned, Wilson's optimistic
expectations following Kosygin's visit had not matenalised. Moscow had rejected
the BMC and Leyland offers and showed no interest in liberalisation during Jay's
visit to the USSR in April. The Soviets were perceived to be, in the words of one
Moscow embassy official, 'hard bargainers' who tended 'to pocket concessions and
ask for more'.28
By December 1967, the inter-departmental discussions on trade liberalisation
had stalled, mainly because the ministries involved were distracted by the impact
of devaluation. During the spring of 1968, the argument on unilateral liberalisation
of Eastern bloc imports shifted in favour of the argument that Britain's West
European rivals would dominate the East European market if import restrictions
were not lifted. The official Commercial Policy Committee finally agreed to
'unilateral' liberalisation not only for the four bloc states who had originally
agreed to 'conditional' liberalisation - Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Poland - but for East Germany, Romania and the USSR as well. 29 However,
Kronsten, 'East-West Tra', pp.265-181. CCP(67)17; East-We.ct Trade Policy, 31.5.67. CCP(67)8th meeting,
7.6.67, FCO28/59.
CCP(67)14, Anglo-Soviet Trade, 18.5.67, FCO281429(PRO). CCP(67)1 1th meeting, 18.7.67; & J. Bullard
çMoscow) to McMahon, 14.6.67, FCO2S/430(PRO).
C. Lucas (Treasury) to G. MacMahon (BoT), 5.2.68; & PCO(68)5 th
 meeting, 24.4.68, FCO28160(PRO).
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Crosland was reluctant to include the GDR due to East German harassment of
West Berlin, which imposed a further delay. The problem of when to introduce
liberalisation, and concerning which bloc states would be included, was also
unresolved as the crisis in Eastern Europe over the Prague Spring' reached its
climax.30
Conclusions.
Political relations between London and Moscow deteriorated in the aftermath of
Kosygin's visit to the UK, but the Wilson government was determined not to
curtail trade with the Soviet bloc, and the technological agreement concluded in
January 1968 remained sacrosanct. This was partly due to the UK' s traditional
readiness to keep politics and business separate, but also due to Britain's
dependence on overseas trade and the need to restore its balance of payments
deficit. The trading contacts established by other Western European states with the
Eastern bloc were regarded with jealousy by the UK, which was uneasy at its
inferior economic performance in comparison with its competitors. Yet there were
political as well as purely commercial reasons underpinning British trade policy
towards the Eastern bloc. East-West commerce was a means of promoting the
long-term evolution of Eastern Europe from dogmatic Communist orthodoxy, thus
helping to overcome East-West tensions and develop détente. Wilson (like Eden
and Macmillan before him) also wished to produce tangible results from his
3°Comments by C. Giffard & T. (iarvey, 24.5.68; & G. Roberts to Crosland, 24.5.68, FCO28160(PRO).
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contacts with the Soviet leadership. As was the case with the 'friendship treaty',
the Prime Minister made his interests in developing commercial contacts with the
USSR clear.
However, in the same way that the 'friendship treaty' was a non-starter,
bilateral contacts between London and Moscow failed to produce the 'striking new
initiative' in trading relations that the Prime Minister wanted. By the end of 1967
there was still a significant imbalance of bilateral trade in the USSR's favour -
Britain had imported £123.5 millions worth of Soviet goods, while in return the
USSR had purchased British goods worth a mere £64.2 million.31 The strategic
embargo affected the development of Anglo-Soviet trade, particularly in computers,
and British officials felt that there were limits to which the UK could not go as
far as technological transfers were concerned. Both Wilson and the Foreign Office
dismissed American complaints concerning the agreement concluded by Benn and
Kirillin, but British officials were unwilling to risk a major breach with the USA
over COCOM, in case Washington cut off defence and intelligence links with
London in response. It should be noted that British policy towards the strategic
embargo was also affected by other COCOM members - France and Japan had, at
certain points, posed problems with regards to the 'China differential'. Nonetheless,
the lack of progress in Anglo-Soviet commercial relations paralleled the
deterioration of political relations between the two powers in 1967-1968, the
course of which will be discussed in Chapter Eight.
31 PC(68)27, Tmde with Eastern Eumpe in relation to evenLc in Czechoslovakia, 3.9.68, FCO2S/61(PRO).
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CHAPTER 7: BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY AND THE SOVIET
'THREAT'. MARCH 1967- JANUARY 1968.
It was during the Wilson government's term in office that Britain shed itself of
its East of Suez commitments, concentrating on the defence of Europe. The March
1966 defence review reduced British forces committed to the Eastern
Mediterranean and announced that the base in Aden, the scene of an anti-British
insurgency, would be abandoned by 1968. The conclusion of the 'confrontation'
with Indonesia in August 1966 enabled London to withdraw the bulk of the
50,000-strong force committed to the defence of Malaysia.' In March 1967, the
OPD decided to withdraw all British forces from the Persian Gulf and South-East
Asia (excluding Hong Kong), with half pulled out by 1970-197 1 and a complete
withdrawal by 1975-1976. After the devaluation of the pound the Cabinet decided
in January 1968 that the military withdrawal would be completed by December
1971 2 The Americans and other regional allies, notably the Australians, were
already alarmed by the British withdrawal from South-East Asia, and London's
decision to accelerate this process caused outrage in Washington and Canberra.3
Over a decade later, critics argued that the East of Suez withdrawals created a
power vacuum for the Soviets to exploit, and that by reducing defence expenditure
and commitments on purely financial grounds 'the Labour government chose to
Easter, Bntish Defence Policy, pp.392-399, pp.413-416. According to Cmnd.3203, Statement on the Defence
Esthnates, (HMSO, February 1967), in early 1967 British fames in the Far East stood at 51,800, including
37,300 troops. In comparison, the UK had 63,460 personnel in Central Europe, with 55,700 troops committed
to BAOR and Berlin. 20,300 servicemen were committed to the Meditmnean and 20,850 to t1 Middle East
20p[k67)14th meeting, 22.3.67,CAB148/30(PRO).CC6(68)6 th & CC7(68)7th
 conclusions,12.1.68, CAB128143(PRO).
3 Washington to FO, No.54,11.1.68, CAB129135(PRO). T. Petersen, 'Crossing the Rubicon? Britain's withdran1
from the Middle East', in international History Review (2000), p.3 18, p.339.
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ignore an increasingly obvious fact that Soviet Russia was mounting a global
threat which would soon effectively outflank NATO in Europe'.4
The defence cuts and the shedding of commitments was a result of
Britain's grave financial difficulties, and in the East of Suez withdrawals were the
culmination of the long-term retreat of British power in the post-war era. The
traditional anti-colonialist sentiment of Labour politicians also played a part,
particularly with regards to the withdrawal from Aden. It is worth noting that
during the defence reviews the principal challenges to British and Western
interests cited were China, in addition to regional adversaries such as Indonesia.
The USSR was hardly referred to as a potential strategic threat, the exception
being the anonymous participant at the second Chequers conference (13-14 June
1965) who warned that a withdrawal from the Middle East would be followed by
'widespread disorders' which would interrupt Western oil supplies and enable the
Soviets to extend their influence in the region. Since 1955, the USSR had used
transfers of high-technology weaponry - tanks, warplanes and conventional missiles
- to clients such as Egypt and Indonesia as a means of extending its influence
overseas. MoD officials were concerned with the supply of Soviet arms to Egypt,
Iraq and Indonesia, but Healey's proposal for a multilateral 'agreement to limit the
export of sophisticated weapons' to Third World powers was unrealistic, given
Moscow's use of military aid to enhance political influence.5
4 M. Chichester & J. Wilkinson, The Uncertain Ally: British Defence Policy 1960-1990, (Aduhot Gower
Publishing 1982), p18. P. Kennedy offers a less stndent critique in The Rise and Fall j British Nawxl
Mastery, (3th edition, HarperCollins 1991), pp.393-398.
M[SC17/5 meeting on defence, 13.6.65, CAB13O(213(PRO). OPD(0X65)37(Revise): Defence Erpenditure
Review, 2.6.65, CAB14S/43(PRO).
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This chapter will firstly examine British (and American) assessments of the
USSR's military capabilities, not only with reference to the Warsaw Pact forces
facing NATO, but also regarding the development of Soviet maritime power and
of Moscow's policy towards the Third World. Secondly, it will discuss the political
factors which encouraged the Labour government, which had initially favoured a
reduction of the British commitment to NATO, to focus its defence policy on
Europe. The final section analyses the impact of the Six Day War (June 1967)
between Israel and its Arab neighbours, a conflict in which the USSR played an
ambiguous role. In its conclusions, this chapter will assess what impact, if any, the
East of Suez withdrawals had on East-West rivalries, and as to whether, by
deciding to end Britain's 'world role' the Wilson government underestimated, or
ignored, the perceived Soviet threat.
British and American assessments of Soviet military capabilities: 1967-1968.
During the 1960s the USSR built up its nuclear arsenal in order to achieve
strategic parity with the USA. The Soviets also sought to develop their
conventional military power and to expand their naval capabilities. 6 However, the
USSR faced an emerging strategic from China. While Wilson was impressed by
6 Goff Détente and Confrontation, p.19. Nation, Red Star, p.261. B. Ranft & G. Till, The Sen in Soviet
Stmtegv, (Annapolis Ma; Naval Institute Press 1989), pp.53-54.
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Kosygin's overtly anti-Chinese attitude during his visit to London, 7 Johnson's
officials were likewise aware of what Foy Kohier (serving as Assistant Under-
Secretary of State for Political Affairs) called 'the profound fear and hostility all
Russians feel towards China'. Kohier attributed this sentiment to the Sino-Soviet
border dispute and ethnocentric fears of invasion from the East, and Walt Rostow
retrospectively commented on the alarm the Chinese nuclear programme aroused
amongst the Soviet party at the Glassboro summit. 8 The excesses associated with
the Cultural Revolution worried not only Moscow, but Washington and London
too. The JIC had concluded in April 1966 that China was unlikely to risk war
with either the USA or USSR, but the Cultural Revolution strengthened the British
impression of the PRC as an unpredictable threat. The Hong Kong riots in the
summer of 1967 and the sacking of the British mission in Beijing by 'Red
Guards' led officials in Whitehall to question whether Mao Zedong could control
the revolutionary extremism he had unleashed.9 Although the Cultural Revolution
was considered to be in a 'diminishing stage' by November 1967, this internal
upheaval reinforced the American and British perception of China as a potentially
irrational and more dangerous power than the Soviet Union.'°
British intelligence assessments concluded that despite the deterioration of
Sino-Soviet relations, the bulk of the USSR's armed forces were still committed to
7 Roberts, Soviet Union, p.56. PM to Johnson, T22/67, 72.67, PREM13/1917(PRO).
Conversation betuen Kohier & M. Stenrt (UK Embassy) at State Department, 22.1.67, M1F409. Transcript,
Walt W. Rostow Oral History Interview, 21.3.69, p.59, LBJLIB. Chang, Friends and Enemies, p.247.
9 cOS22'/66, 26.4.66, DEFi4/199(PRO). Trend to PM, 24.5.67, PREM13/1458(PRO).
'°J. Bushell (UKDeINATO) to D. C. Wilson (Far Eastern Dept), 30.11.67, FCO21124(PRO). JIC(67)4O, 7.9.67,
CAB159/47(PRO). On the course of the 'Cultural Revolution', see W. Rodzinski, The Walled Kingdom, (London;
Fontana Press 1988), pp.416-428.
Europe. According to DIS estimates, at the beginning of 1967 the USSR had 13
front-line divisions in the Far East, with another 11 stationed in Central Asia (a
total of about 238,000 troops). By contrast, the Soviets maintained about 58
divisions of 748,000 troops in the military districts of the Western USSR, with a
further 20 divisions (285,000 troops) in the GDR, 4 divisions in Hungary and 2 in
Poland. These figures made no reference to the strength and readiness of these
divisions, but it was clear that the bulk of Soviet military power was directed
towards Europe. 1 ' HC estimates depicted the Soviet army as 'the largest modern
army in the world', with the bulk of its manpower in 'small, but mostly armoured
and mobile, line divisions'. Although Soviet military doctrine stipulated that any
East-West war would begin with an all-out nuclear exchange (and despite the
expansion of the USSR's tactical nuclear stockpile), Soviet military theory was
beginning to envisage the possibility of conventional operations. The JTC also
noted that the combat capabilities of the East European armed forces, in particular
those of the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, had improved during the past
decade. By the late 1960s, the WTO member states possessed more sophisticated
weaponry and improved logistical support, although ultimately their forces were
firmly integrated with those of the USSR and incapable of independent action.
Nonetheless, it was evident to Britain and other NATO powers that the Warsaw
Pact had during its first decade transformed itself from a 'cardboard castle'
"NATO &pert Working Group on Soviet Policy. Soviet Policy May-October 1967. United Kingdom
Contribution, 2.11.67, FCO28/25(PRO). DIS memorandum, Order of Battle - Soviet Ground Forces, 25.1.67,
FCO281455(PRO).
derided by Western analysts into a fully-functioning and powerful military
alliance.12
American assessments likewise concluded that the bulk of the USSR's
military power was still directed towards Europe, and likewise noted the qualitative
improvements in the Warsaw Pact's forces, with particular reference to armour,
artillery and tactical air-power.' 3 Washington was nonetheless aware that the PRC
posed a long-term threat to the USSR's security. US estimates reported that by the
end of 1967 Soviet forces facing China had grown from 15 to 21 divisions, and
that while neither Moscow nor Beijing intended a complete breach, 'so long as the
Sino-Soviet conflict persists Soviet military planners will have to consider [both]
the possibility of large-scale war with China and China's emerging strategic
nuclear capabilities'.'4
The Foreign Office considered it inevitable that the USSR would, like any
major power, seek to extend its influence overseas. One Moscow embassy analysis
of Soviet foreign policy, drafted in September 1966, noted that for reasons of
Realpolitik, the Soviets had to deal with independent-minded Third World leaders
such as the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdul Nasser. The USSR also faced
competition from China and (in Latin America) Cuba, both of which were more
12 flC(67)3, Soviet Bloc War Potential, 16.2.67, CAB158/65(PRO); & JIC(68)1, Periodic Intelligence Summaiy
for LITO Commands, 1.6.68, CAB158/68(PRO). Mastny, 'In a Bind', pp.231-232. Appendix 5 summarises
estimates regarding t1 deployment of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces prior to August 1968.
' NIE1 1-14-67, The Soviet and East Eumpean General Purpose Forces, 16.11.67, RG263, 190, 28, 16-17,
NARAII. W. Odom, The collapse of the Soviet Military, (Yale University Press 1998), pp.72-73. A. & I. Seaton,
The Soviet Anny, (London, Bodley Head I 986), pp.192-193, pp.194-199.
' 4 P. Jessup to W. Rostow, 27.1.67,FR( XtX', pp.512-523; & note p.644. ME11-4-67,Main Trends in Soviet
Military Policy, 20.7. 67, MFF15-422.
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inclined towards instigating revolution in the underdeveloped world. Moreover, the
extent of Soviet influence was restricted by rivalries between the non-aligned
states - the USSR could not, for example, improve relations with India without
alienating Pakistan.' 5 In Bonn the following April one Assistant Under-Secretary,
Peter Hayman, informed West German officials that the Soviets were 'first of all
motivated by a nationalist desire to avoid problems on their borders', hence their
mediation between India and Pakistan at Tashkent, and that their intervention
elsewhere was selective. The USSR had not meddled in Rhodesia, but was far
more involved in the Middle East.'6
British officials observed that the Soviet leadership, in particular Brezhnev,
intended to build up the USSR's conventional forces, and to develop its capacity
to intervene overseas and counter the USA's superior global military capability.'7
The CIA's analysts were at odds with the Pentagon in their assessments of the
USSR's military build-up. Like the JTC's estimates, the former stated that while the
Soviet armed forces were more mobile, especially in terms of air transport and
maritime power, Moscow would rather manipulate indigenous proxies than risk a
direct confrontation with the USA by employing Soviet military power overseas.
The Vietnam war had demonstrated that the USSR was still, unlike its superpower
rival, unable 'to apply its conventional power effectively to areas beyond' the
frontiers of the Soviet bloc. American military intelligence sources, however, argued
H. Matthews (Moscow) to Bro, 17.9.66, NS1022/59, F03711188906(PRO).
16 C. Barclay (IRD), Communist Activities in Africa, 14.2.66, F0371118S487(PRO). SC(67)17, 6.3.67,
FC049/58(PRO). Anglo-German talks on the Soviet Union and Eastern Eumpe, 20-21 April 1967, 1 meeting,
20.4.67, FCO29f29(PRO).
17 Soviet Policy May-October 1967, FCO2Sf25(PRO). JTC(65)64, Soviet Inter.'ention Capability, 27.6.66,
CAB1SS/59(PRO).
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that the Soviet military build-up was intended to support 'the aggressive pursuit of
[Moscow's] objectives' across the globe.'8
Like the CIA, British military and intelligence analysts took a more
sanguine view of the emergence of the USSR as a maritime power. The increased
Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean region, was regarded partly as a
response to US Polaris submarine patrols and also as part of the USSR's attempt
to enhance its prestige with its Arab allies. The Soviets had regularly deployed
naval forces in the Mediterranean since 1964, but did not have the capabilities or
the bases needed for extended operations in wartime. Soviet maritime activity
served a political rather than a military purpose, the USSR's objective being, in the
words of one CIA estimate, to forge an alliance 'between the "socialist camp" and
a broad front of revolutionary forces to constrict and weaken the world position
of the Western powers' in the Mediterranean region. However, the USSR could not
establish permanent bases in the region without raising tensions with the Western
world and damaging its 'anti-imperialist' credentials, and so the Soviets provided
Arab clients such as Algeria, Egypt and Syria with arms and used them as
proxies.'9 The political and prestige factors behind the Soviet naval build-up in the
Mediterranean have been cited in recent studies. 2° Nevertheless, by associating itself
with the 'progressive' Arab regimes the USSR risked embroilment in the volatile
NIE1 1-4-67, MFF15-422. CIA memorandum, Soviet Militaiy Policy in 1967,14.6.67, MF343.
19 DIS report D14(N)1 19, The Soviet Naval Presence in the Mediterranean, 1.1.67, FCO281455(PRO)L JIC(67)1 1,
Soviet Policies in the Middle East and North Africa and their likely development, 21.3.67, CAB158/66(PRO).
NIEII-6-67, Soviet Strategy and Jntenticvzs in the Meditemmean Basin, 1.6.67,RG263, 190,28,16-17.
20 Ranft & Till, Soviet Strategy, p.56. p.86. Odom, Soviet Militasy, pp.80-Si.
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Arab-Israel conflict, the potential consequences of which were shown by the
outbreak of the Six Day War (June 1967).
Britain regarded the expansion of Soviet maritime capabilities as part of
the USSR's intention to demonstrate its prestige as a superpower. The JTC, MoD
and Foreign Office's assessments also concluded, correctly, that the bulk of the
Soviet armed forces was deployed facing the NATO powers. Given the fragile
state of the Alliance after de Gaulle's actions in March 1966 and the offsets
crisis,2 ' the Labour government had sound strategic reasons for reversing its initial
intention to reduce the UK's military presence in Europe in order to concentrate
on the East of Suez role. Yet there were also political factors which led Wilson
and his Ministers to focus on the continent in the spring of 1967.
Turning towards Europe: April-December 1967.
The first of these factors was the collective mood of the Cabinet concerning the
future orientation of British foreign policy. Brown was a firm supporter of EEC
entry, and during the July 1966 sterling crisis he was quoted by Castle on the
need to 'pull the troops out: all of them. I don't want them out of Germany. I
want them out of East of Suez'. Having initially supported Britain's 'world role',
Healey also favoured greater involvement in European defence matters by the
spring of 1967. Wilson, who had hitherto shared the Labour left's hostility to
21 Gavin, 'Flexible Response', pp 865-866.
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European integration, was a firm advocate of EEC entry by January 1967.22 Roy
Jenkins' appointment as Chancellor in December 1967 reinforced this pro-European
trend.23 It would be incorrect to argue that there was a clear Europe-East of Suez
split in the Cabinet - in the bitter debate on defence in January 1968 Brown
spoke out against accelerating the abandonment of the UK's overseas
commitments. Nonetheless, when the Wilson government was forced in the
aftermath of devaluation to chose between ending the world role or withdrawing
troops from NATO, Ministers opted for the former.24
The second factor concerned the souring of Anglo-American relations, the
catalyst being the failure of the Sunflower initiative in February. While Washington
was dismayed by the East of Suez withdrawals and the devaluation of the pound,
the Wilson government was worried by the escalation of the Vietnam war and the
administration's decision to develop a 'thin' ABM force to counter a future
Chinese nuclear threat. Healey quarrelled with McNamara over the ABM decision
at the NATO summit in Ankara (September 1 967).25 The feeling that the Johnson
administration was acting recklessly over Vietnam and ABMs paradoxically
coexisted with concerns that the USA would disengage from European defence.
Patrick Dean informed Brown that many officials and Congressmen were angered
by the lack of support from the USA's allies regarding Vietnam. The ambassador
to Washington also concluded that the Johnson administration believed that the
Broi is quoted by Castle, Diaries, 18.7.66, p.148. Catteml (ed.), 'East of Suez', pp.636-637. Pimlott, Wilson,
pp.434-435, pp.437-442.
Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, (Macmillan 1991), p.172.
24 CC6(687th conclusions, CABI28/43(PRO).
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USA could have a 'stable, working relationship' with the USSR, and that while the
Americans would not abandon their NATO allies, in the NPT negotiations in
particular the US objective was to gain Soviet agreement to a draft text, and then
approach the West Europeans, rather than the reverse. The West Germans were
even more concerned that the USA would seek agreement with the USSR at its
expense. As far as Anglo-American relations was concerned, for all the tensions
concerning Vietnam and missile defences Britain remained committed to
maintaining NATO and concerned at the implications of significant US troop
withdrawals from Europe. However, by Januaiy 1968 the majority of Ministers
were less ready to heed US protests concerning the East of Suez withdrawals and
devaluation, concurring with Wilson's statement that 'both we and the United
States should recognise, especially now that we were both seeking to eliminate our
external deficits, that we each look after our own interests'.27
In April 1967 the Wilson government committed itself to make another bid
for EEC entry (the first being Macmillan's abortive effort in 1961). Ministers were
aware that the 'decline' of British influence overseas had been demonstrated by
Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) and the Tashkent
summit.28 To the chagrin of the Labour left, Britain had 'to a substantial extent
felt bound to follow the policies of the United States', notably in South-East Asia.
The Cabinet's discussions on the 30 April echoed the debates within the Attlee
government between the 'Atlanticist' and 'Third force' schools of thought, with
Dean to Browii, 23.1.67, FC071767(PRO). Gavin, 'Flexible Response', pp.869-870.
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some Ministers arguing that if Britain remained outside the EEC Western Europe
'would become increasingly estranged' from the USA. An alternative argument was
that Britain's involvement in the EEC could 'provide the political stimulus
formerly given by our imperial role', and that the consequences of remaining
outside the Community would be disastrous:
We must not in any event allow ourselves to become totally dependent on the United
States nor on the other hand could we contemplate aligning our policies with the Soviet
bloc: joining the [EECJ was essential ii we were to avoid finding ourselves increasingly
isolated and powerless in world affairs.29
Throughout 1967, London sought to improve relations with Bonn, partly in order to
ensure West German approval for British membership of the EEC, but also to
encourage Kiesinger and the Foreign Minister, Willy Brandt, to improve the FRG's
relations with the East Europeans. The Foreign Office applauded the new
Chancellor's offer to open diplomatic relations with the bloc states (13 December
1966), describing the renunciation of the Hallstein doctrine as a 'refreshingly
sensible and far-sighted' action. Two years previously, Northern Department
officials had considered consultations with their West German counterparts on
Eastern bloc developments to be 'a waste of time', but by May 1967 Anglo-
German consultations on East-West relations were considered necessary 'in order
to avoid being at cross purposes with an ally whose support and understanding
we need as much as they need ours'. However, there were limits to which the
Kiesinger government was prepared to risk the FRG's ties with France. One factor
behind Erhard's downfall in late 1966 was that a sizeable faction within his party,
CC26(67)26 conclusions, 30.4.67, CAB 128/42(PRO).
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the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), regarded him as excessively pro-American.
The tensions between the CDU's 'Gaullists' and 'Atlanticists' also affected the
policies of the 'Grand Coalition', where the Social Democratic Party (SPD)
coexisted with Kiesinger's CDU. In this respect, any improvement in Anglo-German
relations would could for little, as de Gaulle remained opposed to British entry to
the EEC.3°
One consequence of the policy of mending fences with Bonn was that
London adopted a lower profile in NPT negotiations. As noted above, Britain had
been excluded from US-Soviet discussions on non-proliferation in the autumn of
1966, but West German and Italian complaints at the supposedly discriminatory
nature of an NPT placed the UK in a dilemma, as British interests in non-
proliferation conflicted with London's unwillingness to antagonise two states which
supported Britain's membership of the EEC. This dilemma, in addition to American
unwillingness to involve the West Europeans in non-proliferation negotiations with
the USSR, explains why the UK played a minimal role in promoting the NPT,
despite the fact that the Labour government had initially declared non-proliferation
to be a policy priority. 3 ' In addition, the Wilson government also modified its
position on offsetting BAOR's foreign exchange costs. The trilateral negotiations
ended on 27-28 April, with the UK being permitted to redeploy one brigade from
BAOR and one squadron from the RAF contingent in Germany. In return, the
° Note by Fretwell, 5.1.65; & Smith to A. Stark (Bonn), 15.1.65, N107211, F0371/182509(PRO). Stark to
Hayman, 1.5.67; & Smith to Hayman, 19.5.67, FCO28129(PRO). Hanried, Germany, Amerion. Ewvpe, pp.182-
186. pp.350-351
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Labour government surrendered its objective of forcing Bonn to pay for all of
BAOR's foreign exchange costs. The Americans were also permitted to 'rotate' 2
army brigades and 96 warplanes back to the USA, rather than the 2 complete
divisions that McNamara had envisaged. 32 The outcome of the trilateral
negotiations had more to do with intra-alliance politics than military strategy.
There was a clear danger that NATO would 'unravel', and as such neither the
British nor the Americans could make troop cuts to the extent originally
intended. "
In the same way that the trilateral talks represented a compromise solution,
the eventual outcome of the NATO strategic review, following the adoption of
MC 14/3 in December 1967, effectively ratified existing force levels. As Beatrice
Heuser argues, MC14/3's doctrine of a 'symmetrical response' to any WTO
attacks, of 'controlled escalation' and of delaying an all-out nuclear response to
Soviet aggression was similar to the strategic concepts expressed by the COS and
MoD officials. MC14/3 ruled out a conventional forces build-up which no NATO
power, including the USA, was prepared to undertake. 34 However, as Brown
informed the OPD in July 1967, there was a danger that Belgium, Canada, and the
USA could reduce their force contributions. Given Wilson's earlier concerns for
West German military preponderance in the continent, it was ironic that a
According to Zimmerman, in 1969 Bonn agreed to purchase civil and militaiy goods from the UK to offset
80% of BAOR's costs. The last Anglo-German offset agreement was in 1971. See Zimmerman, 'Sour Fruits',
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reduction of the Bundeswehr was also likely. Kosygin had made it clear that the
Soviets were disinterested in force reductions in Central Europe, so BAOR could
not be cut back further without jeopardising both NATO's integrity and the UK's
security. In response to the Foreign Secretary's arguments, the OPD conceded that
the best means of offsetting BAOR's foreign exchange costs was increased
bilateral co-operation with the West Germans in defence-related research and
development.35
For a combination of economic, political and strategic reasons, the Wilson
government gradually shifted from a defence policy supporting a 'world role' to a
strategy focused on European defence and NATO. As noted above, the OPD
decided in March 1967 upon a complete military withdrawal from 'East of Suez'
by 1976. However, the furious debate which preceded the decision in January 1968
to accelerate the withdrawal showed that some Ministers felt that Britain could
afford to retain its global commitments into the mid-1970s. Wilson subsequently
blamed the devaluation crisis - which made further reductions in defence
necessary - on the economic impact of the Six Day War (5-11 June 1967).36
While this argument paints a rosy picture of Labour's management of the
economy, the circumstances in which Israel and its Arab enemies went to war
contributed to British and American perceptions of the USSR's involvement in the
Middle East.
35 0PD(67)28th
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The Six Day War and Western views of Soviet policy: June-November 1967.
The immediate cause of the Six Day War was Nasser's expulsion of the UN
peace-keeping force (UNEF) from Sinai in May, following which Egypt closed the
Gulf of Aqaba, imposing a partial blockade on Israel. The Soviet role in the
ensuing crisis was, as one historian comments, 'contradictory'. Moscow had inspired
Nasser's actions by disseminating false reports of Israeli mobilisation against
Syria, but as Israel's neighbours prepared for war the Soviets then sought to
restrain their clients and denied them further arms supplies. 37 It was due to this
apparent confusion that Soviet intentions acquired three distinct contemporary
interpretations. The more hard-line view was that the USSR was exploiting
Washington's embroilment in Vietnam by triggering a war in the Middle East.
This conflict would provoke US intervention, thus dissipating American power and
enhancing the USSR's political standing in the Arab world. This was essentially
the Israeli view and was shared by some officials within the Johnson
administration where, as Dean observed, a 'harder and more suspicious line' on
Soviet intentions was emerging. 38 A slightly less hostile variant of this
interpretation, expressed by Rusk, the CIA and British diplomats, was that the
USSR had an interest in promoting continued Arab-Israeli tensions, but had
expected neither Nasser's expulsion of UNEF nor the threat of a war which could
A. Bregman & J. E1-Tahri, The Fifty Yeai War. Israel and the Arabs, (Penguin 1998), pp.61-63, pp.64-65. G.
Golan,Sov,et Policies in the Middle East, (Cambidge; Cambtidge University Press 1991), p.58, pp.61-63.
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PREMI3t22L3(PRO). Dean to Bro, 12.5.67, FCO15/667(PRO).
244
embroil the two super-powers.39 A third view was shared by Wilson and Brown,
who were aware of the Soviet role in provoking the crisis, but placed greater
emphasis on Kosygin's assertion that the USSR did not want a Middle Eastern
war and would 'do all in [its] power to prevent conflict in the area'.40
De Gaulle proposed a quadripartite conference to discuss the Middle-
Eastern crisis, and the Foreign Secretary sought Soviet support for the French
initiative during his visit to Moscow in May. Brown informed Cabinet colleagues
that the USSR did not want a war in the Middle East, but Gromyko made it
clear to him that the Soviet leadership would not assist any Western power,
including France, in efforts at diplomatic mediation. 4 ' Gore-Booth observed that
while the Soviets were unlikely to intervene militarily in any conflict, they had
'taken a highly partisan line' and were encouraging anti-Western feeling amongst
the Arabs. Britain could not tolerate a diplomatic and strategic triumph for Egypt
and its Soviet ally, but Wilson and his Cabinet were aware that military
intervention would have the same dire results as the Suez invasion of 1956.42 The
Americans faced a similar dilemma, sharpened by the ongoing war in Vietnam,
which remained unresolved until Israel launched a pre-emptive attack on Egypt on
5 June. The ensuing war ended on the 1 1th with a decisive Israeli victoiy over
Egypt, Jordan and Syria.
NIE3O-67, The Arab-Israeli Dispute: Current Phase, 13.4.67, in FRIJS XVIII. D. MunBy to Palliser, 28.5.67,
PREM13/1618(PRO). Washington to FO, No.1949-1950, 6.6.67, PREM13/1620(PRO).
4°FO to Washington, N.5505, 28.5.67; & Moscow to FO, No.870,24.5.67, PREM13/1618(PRO).
4t Conversation betswen Brown, Gromyko & Kosygin in Krenilin, 24.5.67, Visit of the Foreign Secretary to the
Soviet Union, FCO28/406(PRO). Moscow to FO, No.885, 25.5.67, PREM13/1618(PRO). CC32(67)32'
conc1usions 25.5.67, CAB128/42(PRO).
Note by Gore-Booth, 24.5.67, PREMi3/1618(PRO). CC33(67)331d conclusions, 30.5.67, CAB12S/42(PRO).
24S
The consensus in Whitehall was that, as Harrison informed Brown, the
Soviets had blundered badly, expecting 'a political and diplomatic victory' for their
Arab allies rather than an Israeli military triumph. Although Moscow had provoked
the crisis by its reports of Israeli mobilisation, the USSR did not expect the
Egyptians to expel UINEF and close the Gulf of Aqaba. Furthermore, the Soviets'
'total underestimation of Israel's capabilities and over-estimation of the Arabs' has
left them in a position where their protégés have been disastrously defeated
without their lifting a finger'. Egyptian propaganda allegations that Israel's victory
was due to Anglo-American military intervention (the 'big lie') paradoxically
highlighted the USSR's failure to protect its Egyptian and Syrian allies. As a
consequence of their embarrassment, the Soviets would recoup their influence in
the region by supporting the Arab cause in the UN and by replenishing the
arsenals of their clients. The ambassador to Moscow was also concerned that the
USSR's contradictory policies before and during the war were due to an internal
dispute within the Kremlin between the proponents of 'co-existence' and those
who favoured harder 'anti-imperialist' policies (Harrison suggested that Alexander
Shelepin could be included in this faction), and that the debacle in the Middle
East would serve to strengthen the latter.43
Howard Smith responded that although a faction of the CPSU could be
concerned that 'the Soviet Union had lost its sense of mission and that the path
OPD(OX67)5' meeting, 16.6.67, CAB14S/8O(PRO). Moscow to FO, No.1005, 10.6.67, FCO28131(PRO).
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of ideological rectitude must be followed', the leadership would still avoid any
'policy which could carry serious risks of nuclear confrontation with the USA',
although Moscow could follow a 'harder line' towards the West as a result of the
war. The head of the Northern Department suggested that the Soviets perceived
that it was the 'imperialists' who had the upper hand in international politics, a
judgement reinforced by the Vietnam war, American intervention in the Dominican
Republic (April 1965), the purge of the PKI (September 1965), the Greek military
coup (April 1967) and the Six Day War. Subsequent Foreign Office assessments
concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that there was any split within
the Soviet leadership, and that while the USSR was rearming its clients and
increasing its naval presence in the Mediterranean, the extent of Soviet aid would
be tempered by Moscow's interest in averting another Middle Eastern war and a
clash with the Americans. Officials also concluded that states like Egypt had an
interest in preserving links with the West, and would avoid excessive dependence
on Soviet aid.
Although Johnson had attempted to avert the pre-emptive Israeli attack,
Dean reported that due to concerns in Washington over the growth of Egyptian
and Soviet influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, Israel's actions were 'probably
not entirely unwelcome to a number of officials here'. The ambassador to
Washington reported that the Americans considered that 'the Russians have not
really made up their minds on where to go from here in the Middle East'.
Smith to Lord Hood, 26.7.67, FCO28133(PRO). NATO Middle East Experts Meeting 14-17 November 1967;
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Liewelyn Thompson predicted that US-Soviet relations would suffer as a result of
the war, and Dean found him to be 'depressed and sombre, though by no means
panicky'. 45
 Kohier commented that the Soviets had been in 'black despair'
following the Israeli victory but had recovered some prestige by re-arming the
Egyptians and Syrians. The USSR's dilemma was that it had to 'stick with the
Arabs to hurt the West', but the Arab-Israeli feud was 'hard to control', and could
deteriorate into a superpower confrontation. Regarding Harrison's comments on the
leadership, Dean observed that American officials thought that any dispute over
policy was between the Politburo and lower-level party officials, not within the
Soviet leadership itself. He stated that the consensus in Washington was that the
Soviets still intended to undermine Western influence in the Middle East, and that
there was a 'real danger' that the USSR would use arms shipments and the
presence of Soviet military advisors to gain more control over the 'progressive'
regimes.
Dean wondered if Kohier 'was perhaps not telling me the full story' about
American attitudes, and the British ambassador remained unaware of the exchange
of 'hot-line' messages between Kosygin and Johnson on 10-11 June. The Soviets
had threatened military intervention on Syria's behalf if Israel did not cease its
offensive in the Golan Heights. Johnson responded that he had urged the Israelis
to cease their operations, but he also ordered the Sixth Fleet into the Eastern
Mediterranean in order to deter the Soviets. A potential superpower crisis was
45 Washington to FO, No.1936, 5.6.67, PREML3/1620(PRO). Dean to Hayinan, 18.7.67, FCO28/33(PRO). Dean
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defused when Israel accepted a ceasefire on the 1 1th, yet this was the first
occasion in which the Washington-Moscow hot-line was used in earnest. 47 At the
end of the month Kosygin attended the UN General Assembly debate on the
Middle East, and Johnson took the opportunity to arrange a meeting with the
Soviet Premier. However, the latter was unwilling to travel to Washington, while
the President was equally determined not to meet Kosygin in New York. As a
compromise, both leaders met in the small town of Glassboro, New Jersey (23-25
June 1967). The Glassboro summit did little to break the US-Soviet impasse on
ABMs, Vietnam or the Middle East. Yet the discussions were free from acrimony
and Johnson - like Wilson and Brown before him - expressed his satisfaction at
having finally met the Soviet Premier. Dean observed that the establishment of
personal contact between both leaders was the most significant part of the
Glassboro summit, and concluded that Glassboro would reinforce the tendency of
both superpowers towards bilateral, rather than multilateral negotiations. This
judgement was confirmed both by the course of US-Soviet negotiations on the
NPT text, and by Johnson's efforts to discuss arms control with the Soviet
leadership.48
At the end of June, Harrison informed Gore-Booth that as a consequence of
the Six Day War, the Soviets were exaggerating, rather than minimising, their
differences with the Western powers. The ambassador also suggested that
Bregman & E1-Tahri, Ffly Years War, pp.94-98. Golan, Soviet Policies, pp.64-65. McNamara, In Retrospect,
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Kosygin's position within the Politburo had suffered as a result of the Arab
defeat. Gore-Booth responded that the Soviets needed to remain in contact with
the Americans because of the risks of a superpower confrontation, but the same
did not apply to the British, who did not 'carry the same weight in the Middle
East and because it is not of a military clash with us that [the Soviets] are
afraid'. Gore-Booth's comments also reflected a widespread feeling within London
during the summer of 1967 that Britain had no influence over events, and simply
had to weather all the consequences of the Six Day War - the closure of the
Suez canal, the exacerbation of Arab-Israeli hostility, the increase in Soviet aid to
Egypt and other regional clients, and the 'big lie' - as best as possible.49
Harrison's assessment that Moscow had blundered in its handling of the Middle
East crisis reflected Foreign Office opinion as a whole. However, in order to
recover its position in the region, the USSR provided Egypt, Syria and other
clients with sufficient stocks of weapons to replace those lost in June 1967. By
May 1968, JIC officials observed, the Soviets had 'largely succeeded' in
overcoming the loss of prestige resulting from 'their failure to intervene militarily'
during the Six Day War, and were determined to 'maintain their stake' in the
Middle East.5°
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Conclusions:
In October 1967, Wilson proudly told Labour party delegates at the Scarborough
conference that 'we have switched resources from defence to the social services -
the right priority for a Socialist government'. While the Prime Minister was clearly
content to cut military expenditure, his actual role in the defence reviews was
minimal. Wilson was never personally involved in military issues, and the fact that
Healey served as Defence Secretary throughout Labour's term in office was
significant. Despite his poor relationship with the Prime Minister, Healey's
continued service at the MoD reflected his central role in implementing Labour's
defence policy. 5 ' If Wilson showed negligence in cutting back defence expenditure,
as the Conservatives argued in Parliamentary debates on the East of Suez
decision, then Healey too deserves some of the blame. 52 Within the Cabinet, critics
of the defence cuts hardly, if at, referred to the USSR as a growing threat. British
policy-makers were more concerned with regional adversaries and, in South-East
Asia, with China. 53 Brown did retrospectively assert that 'the growing Russian
advance in the Indian Ocean' led him to support the sale of naval weaponry to
South Africa in December 1967, but he made no reference to this threat at either
the OPD or Cabinet meetings.54
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For all their protests, the Conservatives could not answer the question of
how Britain could maintain a 'world role' with its weak economy, and in response
Brown argued that the opposition's interpretation of international relations was
'both too black and white and a little old-fashioned'. The Foreign Secretary's
comments reflected Labour's concern over the emergence of Third World
nationalism, which Brown himself showed in late 1967 through his personal
interest in re-establishing diplomatic relations with Cairo. 55 As the Soviets
themselves discovered when their advisors were expelled from Egypt in 1972, a
military presence in any given region did not necessarily ensure lasting
influence. 56
 Furthermore, Britain's commitments to CENTO and SEATO were
rendered void by the fact that both alliances were moribund by the mid-1960s.
SEATO was hopelessly divided over Vietnam, while Pakistan (a member of both
CENTO and SEATO) regarded India, rather than the USSR or the PRC, as its
principal foe. Despite Iran's membership of CENTO, Teheran enjoyed good
political and commercial relations with the Soviets. Stewart had declared in
November 1965 that the UK's 'task' was to work with other powers to block
'the further extension either of the military power or the political influence' of
the USSR and China, but it was clear that the South Asian neighbours of both
Communist giants did not share this objective.57
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If the Labour government was complacent in its assessment of Soviet
intentions world-wide, then there is no evidence to suggest that it disregarded
official advice. In the summer of 1967, Shuckburgh (serving as ambassador to
Rome) did express concern at the reduction of the Royal Navy's presence in the
Mediterranean, arguing that Soviet political ambitions in the region illustrated the
'continuing requirement for British as well as United States vessels in the area to
neutralise [this] effort'. One British diplomat assigned to NATO commented that
the Alliance's naval commanders were concerned at the expansion of Soviet
maritime power. 58 However, the COS concluded that NATO naval commanders
'over-emphasised the offensive nature of Soviet maritime strategy', while the
Foreign Office considered press reports on the USSR's intentions in the Eastern
Mediterranean and Middle East to be alarmist. 59 Gore-Booth informed Shuckburgh
that the reductions in naval forces in the Mediterranean made in the 1966 defence
review were irreversible, and that in the context of its economic problems Britain
could not afford to 'field in the Mediterranean naval forces which would add
much to the vast bulk of the United States Sixth Fleet as a counterbalance to the
Soviet naval presence'. Gore-Booth also noted that an increased British
commitment in the Mediterranean would not have stopped the Arab oil embargo
which followed the Six Day War, and would have instead contributed to the 'big
lie' of Anglo-American intervention on Israel's side.6°
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As far as Soviet maritime capability was concerned, during the spring of
1968 the MC was split over whether the USSR possessed the capacity to maintain
a permanent naval presence outside its territorial waters. Some officials argued that
the build-up of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean had involved the reduction
of the Baltic fleet. British intelligence analysts also argued that despite the
enhancement of the USSR's maritime and airlift capabilities 'it was improbable
that an opposed intervention could be attempted outside a general war in areas
not contiguous with the Soviet bloc'. 61 The MC assessments forwarded by Palliser
to Wilson in August 1968 concluded that while the Soviets would continue to
aim to weaken Western influence in the Middle East, exploiting the Arab-Israeli
conflict to this end, the USSR was still concerned about the risks of a clash with
the USA. Soviet ambitions were also hampered by the volatility of client regimes
(including those of Syria and newly-independent South Yemen), Arab nationalist
opposition to any form of foreign hegemony and the ideological tensions between
Islam and Communism.62
Other West European powers showed little intention in supporting
commitments which, as Healey and Rusk frequently claimed, served Western
interests as a whole. France in particular displayed complete disinterest in
developments outside Europe, was an entirely reluctant member of SEATO, and
showed no concern over Soviet activities in the Third World.63 American concerns
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over the East of Suez withdrawals focused almost exclusively upon the Far East,
and with the exception of Rusk, Johnson's officials were less worried about the
fate of Africa and the Middle East. Washington was, in the words of one British
diplomat, 'resentfiul of our failure to support [their] anti-Communist crusade', and
generally 'contemptuous of our economic and financial difficulties and diminished
power influence'. By late 1967-early 1968 the Johnson administration no longer
pretended that the UK was a partner with an extra-European role."
As Gore-Booth observed, a military presence did not automatically translate
into political influence, and the argument that the East of Suez withdrawals
contributed to the more assertive Soviet policy of the 1 970s draws a neat link
between cause and effect which - without access to Russian source material -
remains hypothetical. Furthermore, the end of the British military presence overseas
did not necessarily enhance Soviet (or Chinese) influence. The withdrawal from
Aden was followed by the establishment of a Marxist regime in South Yemen, but
the extermination of the PKI and the fall of Sukarno represented a significant
gain for Western influence over Indonesia and South-East Asia as a whole.65
Despite Britain's fortuitous success in containing the Indonesian threat to
Malaysia, the Aden insurgency and UDI in Rhodesia demonstrated the limits of
British power overseas. Outside official circles contemporary academic specialists
generally favoured the withdrawal from East of Suez and the concentration on a
Conversation between Ball, Healey, McNamara & Stewart at No.10,26.11.65, PREM13/799. Conversation at
White House, 29.7.66, CAB16413. D. Swan,Anglo-American Relations, 4.12.67, FCO7/775. Petersen, 'Crossing the
Rubicon', p.334, pp.339-340.
Dunbabin, Cold War, pp.240-243. J. Dunbabin, The Post-Imperial Age: The Great Poweii and the Wider
World, (Longman 1994), pp.361-363.
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European role. In terms of East-West competition a reinforced British contribution
to NATO counted more than the retention of the 'world role', and it is significant
that the East of Suez decisions were made at the same time at a time when the
Wilson government concluded that British interests lay in assuming a greater role
in European affairs. Yet the end of the 'world role', combined with the devaluation
crisis, strengthened the impression that the UK was in decline. In Kenneth
Morgan's words, Britain was regarded at home and abroad as a weak power,
'unheeded in Europe, a token head of the Commonwealth, a largely powerless
client of the Americans, unable to retain what had for so long been its own'.
The tone of Anglo-Soviet relations in the months which followed probably
reflected this image of British decrepitude.
On contemporary academic opinion, see A Buchan & M. Howard's essays in International Affairs, 42t2
(1966). Morgan, People s Peace, p283.
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CHAPTER 8: THE IMPACT OF THE 'PRAGUE SPRING'.
JANUARY-AUGUST 1968.
Five years after the 'white heat' speech at Scarborough, the Labour government
had failed to revive the British economy. The pound remained fragile after
devaluation, and de Gaulle's veto against the UK's attempt to join the EEC
(December 1967) was an additional humiliation. Wilson's tense relationship with
his leading Ministers deteriorated as a result of the former's paranoia, fed by
rumours of conspiracies to overthrow him. 1 While the Labour government's
attention was focused upon Britain's domestic economic difficulties, other Western
states were beset by their own internal troubles. In France's case, de Gaulle was
almost toppled by student riots in Paris in May 1968.2 In January 1968, the
Johnson administration was shaken by the Tet offensive in Vietnam and the
seizure of the USS Pueblo by the North Koreans, and the President assumed that
these two crises were co-ordinated by the Communist powers. The Tet offensive
was a military defeat for the NLF and the NVA, yet it made a mockery of
administration claims that the USA was winning the conflict in Vietnam. The war
effort had already widened the American balance of payments deficit, and had
provoked anti-war protests. On 31 March Johnson announced that he would not
seek re-election, and his status as a 'lame duck' President hampered his plans for
strategic arms talks with the Soviets. Increased anti-war agitation, widespread racial
t Pinilott, Wilson, pp.493-509. Bro	 gives his account of his resignation in In My Way, pp.162-178. See also
Healey, Time of My bfe,pp.335-337 for an unflattering portrait of Wilson's relationship th his Cabinet
2 Morgan, People's Peace, pp.283-284. Lacouture, De Gaulle, pp.470-471. Young, Cold War Europe, p.69, pp.95..
96, p.139.
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violence and the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy
contributed to the impression that the USA was in a state of crisis. 3 When
examining the international response to events in Eastern Europe in the summer
of 1968 it is important to remember that the British and other Western
governments devoted considerable attention to their own internal problems.
The Soviet leadership could have contemplated this turmoil in the capitalist
world with ill-disguised schadenfreude had it not been for the fact that the
Eastern bloc had its own internal troubles. Student riots in Warsaw and Krakow in
March 1968 provoked a harsh crackdown by the Gomulka regime, combining
repression with state-supported anti-Semitism. Prominent Jews like Rapacki were
demoted, and thousands of Polish Jews and intellectuals emigrated. As noted below,
British officials had previously considered Poland to be the least authoritarian of
the bloc states, but as Clutton had predicted two years previously, in the spring of
1968 Gomulka renounced 'national Communism' in favour of dogmatic
conservatism.4
These events in Poland were overshadowed by the overthrow of the First
Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS), Antomn Novotny, on
5 January 1968. The failures of the command economy, student protests, nationalist
discontent in Slovakia and Novotny's increasing unpopularity within the CPCS all
contributed to his downfall and replacement by Alexander Dubcek. At the end of
3 SchuIzing, Time for War, pp.242-244, pp.259-267.
4 Crampton, Eastern Europe, pp.318-319. C. Thompson to J. Whitehead, 20.10.64, F0371/177407(PRO). Clutton to
H. Smith, 7.6.66, F03711188510(PRO).
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March, Novotny was forced to resign the Presidency in favour of Ludvik Svoboda.
The new leadership - Dubcek, Svoboda and the Premier, Oldrich Cernik -
introduced an 'Action Programme' in April, promising a reduction of state control
over the economy, freedom of speech, travel and debate, and the curtailment of StB
powers.5 Although Novotny's successors reaffirmed Czechoslovakia's loyalty to the
USSR, the Soviets were alarmed by the implications of what Dubcek termed
'socialism with a human face'. Brezhnev visited Prague in December 1967, but did
not intervene to defend Novotny against his enemies. However, the gradual
democratisation of Czechoslovakia under Dubcek provoked widespread concerns in
Moscow, Warsaw, East Berlin, Budapest and Sofia not only over Prague's continued
allegiance to the Communist cause, but over what would happen if the 'Prague
Spring' encouraged similar demands for reform throughout the Soviet bloc.6
While the CPCS leadership made tentative efforts at domestic reform, the
Soviet leadership retreated into inflexible ideological dogmatism. Brezhnev and his
peers did not oversee a return to state terror on a Stalinist scale, but nonetheless
intellectual dissidents and non-Russian nationalists were dealt with ruthlessly by
the KGB. The JIIC had noted in April 1964 that 'there is no reason to believe
that the KGB has more than an advisory role' as far as domestic or foreign
5 Crampton, Eastern Europe, pp.318-319. The 'Action Programme' of April 1968 is in J. Navratil, A. Bencik, V.
Kural, M Michalkova & J. Vondrova (eds.), The Prague Spring 1968. A National Security Archive Documents
Reader, (Budapest; Central European University Press 1998), pp.92-95 (cited as Prague Spring 1968). Other
studies on Czechoslovakia in 1968 include K. Lwisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, (Berkeley Ca.;
University of California Press 1984); H. Gordon Skilhing, Czechoslovakia's Internipted Revolution, (Princeton
University Press 1976); & J. Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia: Anatomy of a Decision, (Baltimore
Ma.; Johns Hopkins University Press 1979).
6 Hosking, Soviet Union, pp.431-433. W. Loth, 'Moscow, Prague and Warsaw Overcoming the Brezhnev
Doctrine', in Cold War History, 112 (2001), pp.103-105. See Prague Spring 1968, pp.18-19 for Brezhnev's
comments to CPCS officials on 9.12.67.
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policy was concerned. Yet three years later the KGB's Chairman, Yuri Andropov,
assumed a significant position in Soviet decision-making. Andropov was appointed
to his post in April 1967, and in June he became a candidate (non-voting)
member of the Politburo. His mindset was illustrated by a report presented to
Brezhnev in May 1968 summarising the KGB's activities the previous year.
Andropov took it for granted that the USA (the 'main enemy') and other Western
powers were bent upon subverting the USSR, although he was also concerned
about the implications of China's 'splittist' (sic) policies for Soviet security. He
informed Brezhnev that the KGB had established a separate department (the Fifth
Directorate) directed against internal dissidents, and he placed considerable
emphasis on the threat posed by nationalist unrest in Ukraine and the Caucasus.
However, Andropov commented regretfully that 'agent access to governmental,
military, intelligence and ideological centres of the enemy' was unsatisfactory, and
that the 'struggle with the enemy's ideological subversion is not sufficiently
effective'. 7 He was convinced that Western efforts to develop détente and to
increase commercial and cultural contacts with the Eastern bloc were intended to
undermine Communism, and that internal dissidents were inspired by external
powers. The fact that Dubcek permitted both debate on the future of Communism
and the establishment of independent civil society groups in Czechoslovakia
frightened the KGB Chairman and his Politburo colleagues. 8 The 'Prague Spring'
posed a clear threat to the Communist order and Soviet authority over Eastern
7 JIC(64)43, The Power Structure in the Soviet Union, 17.4.64, CAB158/53(PRO). Andropov to Brezhnev, 6.5.68,
in R. Garthofi & A. Knight (eds.), 'New Evidence on Soviet Intelligence. The KGB's 1967 Annual Report', in
CWIHP Bulletin, 10 (1998), pp.211-217. Savice, Twentieth Century Russia, pp.380-382.
8 Dawisha, Prague Spring, pp.15-18, pp.22-32.
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Europe, and the main aim of this chapter is to analyse the impact of events in
Czechoslovakia on British policy-making from the downfall of Novotny to the
Warsaw Pact invasion (August 1968) and its aftermath.
London's reassessment of Anglo-Soviet relations: January-June 1968.
Wilson's visit to Moscow (22-24 January) was his last trip to the USSR during
his term in office. Four days before his departure from London, the Americans and
Soviets had presented identical draft NPTs to the UN's Disarmament Committee.
Johnson pressed the Soviets for a fixed date for strategic arms talks, and in
comparison Washington's attitude towards Wilson's visit the USSR was apathetic.
Rusk punctured the Prime Minister's image of Britain as an intermediary between
the two superpowers when he told Brown in December 1967 that 'the Americans
and Russians held high level conversations on any subject which was of interest
to them', and that the British should recognise that their contacts with the Soviet
leadership 'formed only a part of the Americans' knowledge of Soviet attitudes,
most of which they got first hand'.9
Foreign Office assessments of the Soviet leadership still depicted Brezhnev
as pre-eminent within the 'triumvirate' consisting of himself, Kosygin and the
President, Nikolai Podgorny. Yet Kosygin's position was considered to have been
Clearwater, Anns Control, pp.297-298. Freeman, Aims Control Policy, pp.249-250. D. Day (FO) to Palliser,
15.12.67, PREM13!2402(PRO).
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weakened because of his tendency to undertake personal initiatives during his
foreign visits - the two examples from his trip to Britain being the Phase A I
Phase B negotiations and his proposal for a 'treaty of friendship'. Officials
presumed that within the CPSU the elderly leadership was challenged by a
younger generation of party apparatchiks, particularly Shelepin and the Deputy
Premier, Polyanskii. The Foreign Office considered the leadership as a whole to be
rigidly conservative, and officials incorrectly presumed that Brezhnev had tried to
defend Novotny when he visited Prague.'° Gore-Booth stated that 'the Russians are
being the reverse of easy and helpful' on the principal issues in East-West
relations - Vietnam, the Middle East and European security - and the Permanent
Under-Secretary felt that Britain's economic troubles provided 'an unhappy
background' to the Prime Minister's visit. Harrison informed the head of the
Northern Department that the UK had been given 'an unrelievedly bad press' by
the Soviet media, with frequent references to the devaluation crisis and the East of
Suez withdrawals." Harrison, like other British diplomats, concluded that the Soviets
would try to exploit Britain's economic plight and would put pressure on Wilson
to break ties with the USA. The Foreign Office's approach was to play down the
significance of the visit, presenting it as one in a series of bilateral contacts. Its
officials did not, as one under-secretary stated, 'wish to encourage the idea that the
visit is going to produce anything at all sensational'.'2
Day to Pallis, 21.11.67, PREM13t24O5(PRO). PMV(MX68)1, Prime Minister's Visit to Moscow, Januai'y
1968. Steering Brief, 17.1.68, FCO28/400(PRO).
t1 Gore-Booth to Hayman, 8.1.68, FCO2S/399(PRO). Hairison to Smith, 17.1.68, in G. Bennett (ed.),DBPO Ill. I,
(HN4SO 1997), pp.5-8.
12 Hanison to Smith, DBPO IH, I, pp.5-8. Hood to Dean, 17.1.68, FCO281399(PRO). PMV(M)(68)1,
FCO2S/400(PRO).
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This attitude contrasted with that of the Prime Minister, who intended 'if
not to take a new initiative on Anglo/Soviet trade, to stimulate some further move
in our relationship with the Soviet Union in both the trade and technological
fields'. Benn and his Soviet counterpart, Vladimir Kirillin, signed an agreement on
technological co-operation in London on 19 January, and Wilson hoped for
progress on either a long-term trade agreement, or on a reduction of the COCOM
lists. As noted previously, there was widespread support within Whitehall for a
relaxation of the strategic embargo, at least as far as the Soviet bloc was
concerned, but the next COCOM review was not due until October 1968. Foreign
Office officials therefore argued that Britain was 'not in a position to give any
undertaking about action by COCOM to reduce the Embargo list'. The Prime
Minister was also informed that inter-departmental deliberations on the
liberalisation of trade with the bloc countries had yet to reach their conclusion.'3
Following his arrival in Moscow on 22 January, Wilson nonetheless
informed Kosygin that the British government favoured the reform of COCOM, as
it was 'no longer reasonable to apply the same kind of limitations to the Soviet
Union as to China'. The Prime Minister asserted that 'he himself favoured a
liberalisation with (sic) the Soviet Union and tighter controls in regard to China'.
Kosygin maintained that the USSR had its own embargo on strategic trade with
the PRC, and in discussions the following day he sought to play on British
suspicions that other Western powers were violating COCOM's rules. He asserted
13 A. Halls (No.10) to B. Meynell (BoT), 8.1.68; Meynell to Halls, 18.1.68, FCO2S/399(PRO). Day to Halls,
19.1.68, CAB164/406(PRO). British policy on East-West trade is discussed in Chapt Six.
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that 'if the Soviet Union had any difficulty buying from Britain, then she bought
from Japan or the United States'. On the subject of long-term trade Kosygin also
suggested that the USSR could increase its exports to the UK 'in order to free
Britain from dependence on the United States' (ironically enough, this was roughly
what Wilson had recommended in his 1952 essay, In Place of Dollars).' 4 This
theme was continually raised by Wilson's hosts throughout his visit, hence
Kosygin's comment on the afternoon of the 22nd that it was 'a pity ... that
[Britain] could not follow the same kind of independent policy as de Gaulle'. The
following day Brezhnev treated the Prime Minister to another lecture on the threat
the FRG posed to peace in Europe. Brezhnev proposed the mutual abolition of
NATO and the WTO and a German peace treaty 'on the basis of the original
Potsdam Agreement' of 1945. The Prime Minister's reference to the possibility of
mutual force reductions also fell on deaf ears. As noted previously, Wilson took
Soviet hostility towards Germany for granted, but British diplomats considered
Brezhnev's 'back to Postdam' theme to be particularly disturbing.'5
The Prime Minister's conversation with Podgorny and Gromyko on the
morning of the 24th focused principally on the Brooke case. Wilson yet again
pleaded for increased consular access for Brooke, stating that many Labour MIPs
shared the public's impression that the punishment of this 'foolish young man'
did not fit the crime. Wilson maintained that he 'deplored every minute that had
'4 Conversation beten Kosygin & PM, 22.1.68 (am), Visit of the Pnme Minister to the Soviet Union, 22-24
Januaiy 1968, CAB164/406(PRO). Conversation between Kosygin & PM in Kremlin, 23.1.68 (pm), DBPO 111,1,
8-13. Wilson, In Place of Dolla,s, passim.
Conversation between Kosygin & PM, 22.1.68 (pm); & conversation between Brezhnev & PM in the
Kremlin, 23.1.68 (am), PREM1324O2(PRO).
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to be devoted to this subject and thereby denied to serious discussion of other
deeper problems', even though his efforts to discuss these 'deeper problems' with
Brezhnev and Kosygin had produced little of substance. The only noteworthy
feature of this discussion was a rare attempt at humour from Gromyko. Wilson
sourly commented on the criticism he was receiving from the British media over
the Brooke case, and stated that the press 'expected him to send in a detachment
of Marines to break open [Brooke's] prison'. Gromyko quipped that the rescue
party would have to apply for their visas first. Brooke was to remain in custody
for one more year, and was eventually released in exchange for the Krogers.'6
Following Wilson's return, British officials exchanged views on the balance
power within the Soviet leadership. Edward Orchard, who had served as the Prime
Minister's interpreter, described the Politburo's members as being of 'moderate
intelligence', dependant on officials like Gromyko and lacking any 'vision' in
policy-making. Orchard also concluded that Polyanskii was after Kosygin's job.
Palliser agreed that Kosygin was clearly less confident and more guarded than he
had been in London the previous year, and was constrained by Polyanskii's
presence, but he questioned Orchard's conclusion that the Soviet Foreign Minister
and other secondary officials held the leadership in thrall. Gromyko had served as
a diplomat since the Stalinist era, but Wilson's Private Secretary did not regard
him as a decision-maker. Trend seconded this assessment, depicting the Foreign
Minister as one of 'nature's henchmen', possessing 'technical competence' as a
'6 Convjon between Gi-omyko, Podgorny & PM in the Kremlin, 24.1.68 (am); & D. Wilson (Moscow) to
Greenhill, 29.10.69, DBPO III, I, pp.14-21, pp.188-189.
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diplomat but being temperamentally 'frightened of being responsible for major
policy decisions'. The Cabinet Secretary showed some sympathy for Kosgyin, who
appeared more prepared than his peers to 'take a calculated risk in going some
way to meet the other chap's point of view', provided this was compatible with
the USSR's long-term interests. Trend also suggested that Brezhnev's position in
the leadership could be adversely affected by his failing health.'7
As noted previously, Kosygin and Wilson agreed to negotiate a 'friendship'
treaty in during the former's visit to the UK. The British had presented their draft
in April 1967, which focused on trade, scientific co-operation and the establishment
of closer cultural, education and sporting links. However, London had to wait until
the end of Wilson's visit for the Soviet version. This text had, in the words of
one Moscow embassy official, 'objectionable features which stick out a mile'.
Howard Smith stated that the Soviet draft did not 'even attempt to be a treaty of
friendship', but instead contained 'unacceptable' clauses demanding British
endorsement of the USSR's policy on the German question. The text's language
was also implicitly aimed against Britain's alliance with the USA and its
membership of NATO.' 8 Smith concluded that the Soviets were trying to 'kill' the
treaty and place responsibility for its failure on Britain. Foreign Office officials
were concerned that Moscow might publicise their draft in order to exploit the
tensions over the 'treaty' which had arisen between the UK and other NATO
powers the previous spring, and Harrison was instructed to refer Gromyko to the
'7 Orchard to Pallis, 30.1.68; Palliser to Orchard, 21.2.68; & Trid to Palliser, 29.2.68, PREM1312405(PRO).
P. Maxey (Moscow) to C. Giffard (ND), 24.1.68, FCO2S/372(PRO). Smith to Hayinan, 30.1.68,
FCO28/380(PRO). The Soviet draft 'friendship treaty' is in Appendix 4.
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original draft. However, the latter simply stated that a 'friendship' treaty was
impossible as long as Britain remained part of NATO.'9
Harrison informed Hayman on 6 February that while Wilson had been
received courteously, the Soviets had been unenthusiastic about the visit. The final
communiqué made no reference to the recently concluded technological treaty. The
Soviets had deliberately downgraded the importance of Anglo-Soviet contacts, and
had consistently stated that the UK's loyalty to the USA was a constraint on
bilateral relations. The only positive point the ambassador could make was that
'contact had been maintained' with the Soviet leadership. 2° Within the Foreign
Office, however, the tone of Soviet rhetoric during Wilson's visit had touched a
raw nerve. Four days before Wilson's arrival in Moscow, Gore-Booth informed
William Rodgers (the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)
that '[asj regards the Soviet Union, the situation has been extremely difficult for
officials'. The Permanent Under-Secretary noted that both he and his subordinates
were considered by Parliamentary critics to be 'anti-Soviet' and 'Russophobe', and
he was frustrated that the USSR's pronouncements on détente appeared to be
taken at face value by domestic opinion. Gore-Booth also expressed his concerns
over Wilson's refusal to confront Kosygin over his public attacks on British
foreign policy in February 1967. The Permanent Under-Secretary was evidently
worried that Soviet propaganda was having a divisive effect on the Western world
as a whole, and that Parliamentary and public opinion overlooked the fact that the
t9 Smith to Hayman, 25.1.68, FCO281372(PRO). Day to Pallis, 1.2.68, FCO28/380(PRO).
20 Hanison to Hayman, 6.2.68, PREM13/2402(PRO). Harrison to Brown, 31.1.68, FCO281402(PRO).
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USSR remained a threat to British security. Gore-Booth felt that it was time that
Ministers re-appraise the UK's policy towards the Soviets.21
This belief was shared by the Deputy Under-Secretary, Greenhill, who
argued that for all the supposed improvements in the 'atmosphere' of Anglo-
Soviet relations in recent years, Wilson's recent trip to Moscow had been a
failure. The Soviets had attempted to bully the Prime Minister into changing
British policy, and the only hopeful development, other than US-Soviet agreement
on an NPT, was that Moscow seemed ready to for arms control talks with
Washington. Gore-Booth informed Brown on 1 February that Greenhill's analysis
was, in his opinion, 'the genuine article'. The Soviets would continue to manipulate
differences between the UK and its allies, and would seek the dissolution of
NATO. They would also exploit Britain's willingness to develop commercial and
scientific contacts with the Eastern bloc, and would hold out the prospect of
increased co-operation in these fields if the British renounced their alliance ties
with the Americans. Moscow presumed that it possessed the advantage because of
the UK's financial problems, and would continue to discredit Britain through its
propaganda. Gore-Booth sought to remind Brown that the Soviets would persist
with these objectives until either the UK resorted to neutralism, or the 'evolution'
of Soviet society led to the adoption of a less ideological foreign policy. Brown's
response was to write on Gore-Booth's letter 'I don't see where this minute
leads'. 22 This exchange of notes led to a reassessment of British policy towards
21 reJth to W. Rodgers, 16.1.68, MSS Gore-Booth, 93, fol.95-96.
Greenhill to Gore-Booth, 29.1.68; & Gore-Booth to Bro, 31.1.68, FCO2S/402(PRO).
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the USSR, with the Foreign Secretaty being encouraged by his subordinates to
adopt a harder line towards the Soviets. The form which this assessment adopted
reflected not only the state of East-West relations at the time, but the limitations
imposed on a medium power seeking to improve its relations with an
ideologically hostile superpower which was also a potential enemy.
British diplomats resented not only Wilson's treatment during his visit to
Moscow, but also the increased scale of Soviet espionage in the UK. Three years
previously, Foreign Office officials considered the complaints of Conservative MPs
like Commander Courtney to be a nuisance,23 but by February 1968 Eastern bloc
intelligence activities aroused greater concern within Whitehall. The catalyst for
Foreign Office complaints was the apprehension of a Soviet embassy official, V.
A. Drozdov, at a 'dead letter-box' (a location for concealing sensitive materials) in
London. Drozdov was declared persona non grata, but while the Northern
Department wanted to publicise this scandal, Brown was disinclined to make much
of Drozdov's case. The Foreign Secretary stated that SIS officers in the Eastern
bloc also employed diplomatic cover, and that one had been apprehended in
Warsaw and, like Drozdov, expelled. If the UK and USSR engaged in tit-for-tat
expulsions of embassy personnel then the British would come off worse because
they had fewer diplomats and intelligence officers The Foreign Secretary also
thought that 'there was an inherent contradiction between the [Foreign] Office's
wish on the one hand to bring home to Parliament and public the iniquities of
Conversation between Courtney & PM, 29.6.65, PREM131483(PRO).
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the KGB and, on the other, to increase délente with the Russians in every possible
field'.24
On 23 February Brown met with Goronwy Roberts (the Foreign Office
Minister of State), Greenhill, Smith and Hayman for what the latter perhaps
euphemistically termed a 'most useful and stimulating discussion' on Anglo-Soviet
relations. By the end of this meeting, the Foreign Secretary was persuaded that,
while the UK's essential objective of promoting détente should remain unchanged,
there should be 'less running after the Russians' and fewer Ministerial visits to
the USSR. Britain should take a 'tough and realistic line' with the Soviets
whenever disputes arose, whether over foreign policy issues or over KGB activities
in the UK. Brown's subordinates had concluded that the British government had
been 'over-enthusiastic' in pursuing agreements with the USSR, and that in
response to Soviet propaganda invective against the UK, British propaganda should
'attack the Russians in the area where they are most vulnerable', namely the
KGB's suppression of Soviet dissidents. Foreign Office officials also considered
that the UK should increase its contacts with the East European states in response
to their 'desire to break free' from Soviet hegemony.25
Harrison's own analysis of Anglo-Soviet relations, sent to London in early
March, struck a more cautious note. The ambassador to Moscow repeated his
24 D Maitland (FO) to Gore-Booth, 12.2.68, FCO281372. DBPO HI, I, lIi.4, p.28. Brown was presumably referring
to the case involving Adam Kaczmarczyk, a cleik in the Polish Defence Ministiy recnnted by SIS.
Kaczmarczyk was caught and executed in late 1967, and an SIS officer in the Warsaw embassy was expelled.
See M. Urban, UK Eyes Alpha. The Inside Story of Bnflsh Intdligence, (London; Faber & Faber I 997), p.100.
25 Hayman to Harrison, 27.2.68, DBPO Ill, I, pp.25-28. Note by Maitland, 23.2.68, FCO2S/372.
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argument that despite the USSR's ideological hostility to the West 'the Soviet
leaders are careflul not to get themselves into situations where an open conflict
could be damaging to the basic interests of the Soviet Union'. In their relations
with the British, the Soviets favoured trade and scientific co-operation - which had
clear economic benefits for the USSR - over cultural and educational exchanges
which would expose Soviet society to the corrupting influence of the capitalist
West. Harrison drew a distinction between attacking Eastern bloc espionage in
Britain and criticisms of the KGB's repressive activities against dissidents.
Although the latter would embarrass the Soviets and 'have the "incidental" effect
of educating people at home on the iniquities of Communism', propaganda attacks
'could well have a prejudicial effect on Anglo-Soviet relations' in general:
I like to believe that we have long outgrown our role as world governess. Is [our
objective] retaliation for hurtful attacks by Russian propaganda on our own policies? Or
is it part of the battle for the hearts and minds of the neutral, uncommitted peoples of
the world? In other words, is this a continuation of the "cold war"? ... I repeat that I
am not opposed to embarrassing the Russians on these issues; I am simply supporting
the Foreign Secretaiy's view that there could be a certain inconsistency here with the
pursuit of better relations and that we should therefore be clear what our objective is
and that it is a worth while (sic) one.
In contrast, William Rodgers asserted that '[the] genuine wish of most people for
peace and reconciliation has led to a good deal of sentimentality towards the
Soviet Union, and not only from the left'. Kosygin's trip to Britain had influenced
public opinion to a greater degree than less savoury aspects of the Soviet system
such as the persecution of dissidents. Nonetheless, Rodgers expressed confusion as
to the apparent contradiction between the USSR's readiness to split the West
Europeans from the USA, as opposed to Moscow's expressed fear of an
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unrestrained FRG. The Northern Department's response was that without the USA,
the West Europeans would be unable to withstand Soviet pressure, and that
Moscow calculated that it could get its way on the GDR and Berlin. In other
words, Northern Department officials were less inclined to treat Soviet concerns
over West German 'revanchism' as genuine. A strong and united Western alliance
would not only deter the Soviets from 'engaging in adventurist (sic) policies', but
would also encourage the East Europeans to reduce their dependence on the
USSR.26
Brown's discussions with his Foreign Office subordinates on 23 February
led to the presentation of a paper entitled Relations with the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe to the OPD in mid-June. By this time Stewart was again Foreign
Secretary. The previous March the feud between Wilson and Brown had reached
its climax, and the latter finally resigned from the Cabinet. Brown had shown
hesitancy in approving the Foreign Office's interpretation of Soviet policy, but
Stewart evidently supported the conclusions contained in the OPD paper, which
need to be summarised at length. Relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe argued that the Soviet leadership recognised that the command economy
was in dire need of reform and de-centralisation, with greater initiative and
responsibility granted to the managerial and technocratic classes. However, such
reforms would 'run counter to ideological prejudice, vested interests, and the
authority of the [CPSUI', and could also encourage demands for social and
political change. The Soviet leadership could no longer implement state terror on
26 Harrison to Hayman, 6.3.68; It Samuel to Hayman, 22.3.68; Smith to Hayman, 1.4.68, FCO281372(PRO).
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the Stalinist scale, but was obsessed with the suppression of internal opposition,
however mild, and accused foreign governments and émigré groups of inspiring
these dissidents.
In their external policies, the Soviets 'not only continue to profess but
actually believe that it is their mission to spread world Communism'. Yet despite
this goal the USSR's conduct of foreign policy was determined by 'a cool
estimate of national self-interest', even when dealing with the West:
The basis of the Soviet approach to the developed Western countries is still one of
hostility. They seek to disintegrate Western alliances and are particularly concerned to
create friction between the United States and other Western countries and to undennine
NATO ... The Soviet Union is, however, ready to conclude specific and limited
agreements with other countries even when maintaining a broadly hostile front towards
them or their governments. Thus Khrushchev concluded a partial nuclear test ban treaty,
and the Russians wish to conclude a non-proliferation treaty.
Moscow hoped to develop trading links and technological exchange agreements
with the West in order to enhance the USSR's economic base, but opposed any
genuine cultural contacts or exchanges of ideas - this was demonstrated by the
Soviet response to the proposed 'friendship treaty'. While expressing their concerns
over supposed Western-inspired 'subversion' within the Communist world, the
Soviets were actively involved in spying on Western countries - there were an
estimated 120 officers of the KGB and GRU (Soviet military intelligence) in the
Soviet embassy and other missions in the UK. Western states should not allow
any notion of 'getting on with the Russians' to obscure the fact that the Soviets
'regard concessions as a sign of weakness, unless they result from hard
bargaining'. When seeking any agreement with the USSR, '[the] test should be
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whether a given act of co-operation benefits the Western side as well as the
Soviet side'.
Moscow was still determined to avoid a nuclear war, and NATO blocked
Soviet expansionism in Europe. Furthermore, the Chinese threat could force a
change in the USSR's foreign policy, although it was unlikely that the Soviets
would adopt a less hostile approach towards the Western world in the short-term.
Relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe referred to the Foreign
Office's concept of evolution, stating that:
There is an analogy to be made between the internal and external attitudes of the Soviet
Union. Internally, the regime has been obliged to re-examine its policies because of the
facts of life, [namely] the irresistible demands of an industrially developing society. There
is a reasonable hope that in the long nm the facts of life will lead to similar
modifications in Soviet external attitudes.
In the immediate future, however, 'Soviet propaganda and the way in which the
Russians are conducting themselves towards us reflect their hope that the United
Kingdom may be vulnerable to pressures', and as such Soviet doctrine would
'exaggerate' the possibility of exploiting Britain's economic difficulties in order to
alter British foreign policy in Moscow's favour. Gromyko's blunt statement that a
'treaty of friendship' was incompatible with Britain's NATO membership was
interpreted as an affront to British prestige - 'This sort of language ... has in the
past been used by the Russians with Norway and Denmark, but not with us'.
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Relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe recommended that
policy towards Eastern Europe should remain unchanged. Britain should continue to
encourage 'evolution' through bilateral contacts, without openly seeking to set East
European states against Moscow. However, with regards to the USSR the paper
called for a change in tone in Anglo-Soviet relations. Trade and technological
exchanges were acceptable provided that the UK as well as the USSR profited as
a result. Britain should remain committed to dëtente but 'should also be careful
not to appear to be running after' the Soviets in its efforts to reach agreement.
Ministerial visits should be 'directed to a specific practical purpose', rather than
for nebulous concepts of creating 'goodwill', and a similar criteria should be
applied to Soviet Ministerial visits to the UK. The British government should
respond 'clearly, firmly and seriously' whenever the USSR 'addresses itself to us
officially in terms which show less than proper respect', and public opinion should
be discreetly appraised of 'the subversive and repressive aspects of the Soviet
regime', in particular the KGB's domestic role and its activities in the West. In
this respect the Foreign Office felt, despite Harrison's remarks, that 'a generally
false picture of the Soviet Union and its intentions' gave the latter 'opportunities
to attack not only the interests but even the security' of the UK.27
The only Minister to openly criticise these conclusions was Benn, who was
particularly proud of the agreement he had concluded with Kirillin, and
contemptuous of what he dismissed as the entrenched hostility of the Foreign
27 opI685 Relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 17.6.68, CAB148/37(PRO). This is also in
DBPO III, I, pp.48-57.
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Office and the intelligence services towards the US SR.28 Although his diaries give
the opposite impression, Benn was not alone in supporting bilateral scientific and
commercial contacts with the Soviet bloc, but his naïve views on the USSR made
him unique among Wilson's Ministers. Three days before the technological
agreement was signed, Benn told Kirillin that Britain was 'an isolated country
whose relations with the United States were now somewhat strained and who had
been locked out of Europe, and therefore Soviet friendship was of great
importance'. The Minister of Technology considered Relations with the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe to be 'barely post-Dulles' in its outlook, and in
Cabinet on 20 June he passed a note to Crossman, arguing that the OPD paper
should be discussed by the whole Cabinet. The latter responded with a note with
the simple statement 'Pure Cold War', but otherwise took no action.29
The Minister of Technology's idiosyncratic views on East-West relations
aside, by mid-1968 British Ministers and officials blamed the decline in Anglo-
Soviet relations on Moscow's ideological stridency. Goronwy Roberts epitomised
this view when he told the Foreign Secretary that Soviet propaganda would
continue to heap abuse on the UK and other Western powers, as the Politburo
required 'some cry of external danger to consolidate their public opinion and their
own alliance'. In response, the British government had to 'meet toughness with
toughness. Utter clarity, bordering on crudity, pays with the Russians'. 3° At the time
Roberts wrote these words, relations between Czechoslovakia's pro-reform
Benn, Office Without Power, 19.1.68, p.21; 3.6.68, p.74; 5.6.68, p.77.
Benn, Office Without Power, 16.1.68, p.18. Note dated 20.6.68, p.84.
G. Roberts to Stewart, 13.6.68, FCO28154(PRO).
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government and its WTO allies had deteriorated drastically. While Stewart's
subordinates stressed the need for 'toughness' and 'clarity' in bilateral contacts
with Moscow whenever British and Soviet interests clashed, London's response to
the Czechoslovak crisis was noticeably restrained.
British policy and the 'Prague Spring': January-August 1968.
The ambassadorial conference on Eastern bloc affairs in April-May 1966 had
concluded with the majority of participants expressing confidence in the prospects
for the internal 'evolution' of Eastern Europe. However, the British ambassador to
Prague's annual report for 1967 showed that as far as Czechoslovakia was
concerned, such confidence was misplaced. The ambassador, William Barker,
described the Novotny regime's record as 'dismal'. In foreign affairs, Prague had
merely 'parroted' the Soviet line on Germany, Vietnam and the Middle East, and
had undermined Britain's efforts to promote a European 'declaration of principles'.
The Czechoslovak economy was in dire need of both de-centralisation and an
input of Western technology, but the hard currency earnings needed to purchase
the latter required competitive, efficient businesses free of inefficient central
economic planning or CMEA ties. The problem was that the conservatives within
the CPCS were unwilling to implement the reforms which Ota Sik and other
radical economists had proposed two years previously. 3 ' Like other Western
diplomats, Barker regarded the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia as a
"W. Barker to Bro, 9.1.68, FCO28/89(PRO). Renner, Czechoslovakia, pp.37-38.
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backward-looking lackey of Moscow, and no one in London, Washington or any
other Western capital foresaw the consequences of Novotny's downfall.
Barker's initial assessment was that Novotny had not been overthrown
because of his tyranny, but because of his mishandling of the Czechoslovak
economy. Dubcek, Cernik, Svoboda and their colleagues were still dedicated
Communists, who showed no solid commitment to internal reform. In fact,
Novotny's enemies included not only the more liberal-minded members of the
CPCS, but hard-line conservatives too. Dubcek was only appointed as Novotny's
successor because he was a compromise candidate initially acceptable to both
reformers and conservatives alike. 32
 In response, Hayman maintained that Novotny's
downfall was due to his authoritarian methods, and that Dubcek was personally
committed to domestic reform. Hayman agreed with Barker that while the new
leadership maintained that there would be no change to its foreign policy, socio-
economic change within Czechoslovakia could threaten both the CPCS's monopoly
of power and Prague's allegiance to Moscow. He concluded that the 'big question'
was whether Dubcek could control popular pressure for internal reforms, or
whether domestic support for change would become 'a tide ... which will either
carry him along or drown him'. Hayman expressed the hope that 'things do not
go so far and so fast that the situation in Czechoslovakia becomes intolerable to
the Russians' and others Soviet bloc states.33
W. Bark	 to Hayman, 26.3.68, FCO28190(PRO). Renner, Czechoslovakia, pp.41-50. Skillmg, Interrupted
Revolution, pp. 161-1 79.
Hayman to W. Barker, 4.4.68, FCO28/90(PRO).
Hayman's conclusions epitomised the tone of Foreign Office assessments
throughout the Prague Spring, highlighting one of the paradoxes of the
departmental attitude towards 'evolution' in Eastern Europe. British officials hoped
that in the long-term Eastern bloc states would assert their independence and
loosen their economic and military ties to the USSR, but also wished this process
to be a gradual one, controlled by the East European regimes rather than being
driven by popular protest. In Gorowny Roberts' words to Stewart in June 1968, the
Foreign Office presumed that 'the present ferment of thought will undoubtedly
humanise [the] internal policy and external attitudes' of the Eastern bloc
governments, but British interests would not be served by a revolution similar to
that in Hungary in 1956, as 'it is not change by major disturbances that we wish
to see but an evolution of effective co-existence' between East and Western
European countries. 34 As a consequence, the UK adopted a low profile throughout
the Czechoslovak crisis, avoiding any gesture which could be represented as
'driving wedges' between Moscow and Prague. It was for this reason that the
Foreign Office ruled out another approach to the Czechoslovaks concerning the
'declaration of principles'.35
The Americans were also concerned that Dubcek's attempts at internal
reform could backfire and antagonise the Soviet leadership. The US ambassador to
Prague, Jacob Beam, optimistically concluded that unlike the Hungarians in 1956,
the Czechoslovaks would be pragmatic enough to pursue internal reform gradually.
G. Roberts to Stewait 13.6.68, FCO28/54(PRO).
W. Barker to Hayman, 8.4.68; & Hayman to W. Barker, 17.4.68, FCO2S/98(PRO).
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However, Rusk believed that while the Soviets tolerated Romania's wayward
foreign policy because Ceausescu's regime was 'stable and its internal policies
unobjectionable', Czechoslovakia had 'democratic traditions' and shared a border
with the FRG. Any concessions towards democratisation made by Dubcek could
eventually lead to Czechoslovakia's defection from the Soviet bloc. 36
 This was
precisely what worried the Soviet leadership and the more hard-line of their allies.
At the WTO meeting in Dresden (23 March 1968) Dubcek and Cernik were
assailed by Brezhnev, Gomulka and Ulbricht for their commitment to reform and
their negligence in the face of the 'counter-revolutionary' threat to Communist
rule. The Soviets, East Germans and Poles were concerned with the future of both
the CPCS, and Czechoslovakia's alignment with its WTO and CMEA partners. The
Bulgarians and, more reluctantly, the Hungarians subsequently sided with Moscow
in waging a 'war of nerves' against Prague throughout the spring and summer of
1968.
The response of Britain and the other Western powers to the crisis over
Czechoslovakia was affected by the tensions which had arisen within the Atlantic
Alliance since March 1966. NATO members had agreed to the Harmel study's
conclusions in December 1967, which emphasised the Alliance's collective role in
pursuing détente with the Eastern bloc. Following on from the Harmel report, the
NATO ministerial meeting at Reykjavik (June 1968) formally proposed
negotiations with the WTO on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. As
Prague to State Dept. No.1667, 25.3.68; & State Dept to Prague, No.1627, 21.2.68, in Soviet Flashpoints
document collection, Czechoslovakia 1968, boxes 6-7, National Security Archive, George Washington University.
37 Excepts from record of Dresden meeting, 23.3.68, Prague Spring 1968, pp.64-72.
John McGinn argues, Alliance members were 'anxious to avoid conspicuous
declarations of support for the Prague Spring' which would antagonise the Soviets
and raise East-West tensions. The Reykjavik declaration was also a response to
domestic pressure within Western countries for unilateral troop reductions in
Central Europe. 38 Due to the Western world's political and socio-economic
problems, the general interest in détente and the mood in Britain and other
countries for retrenchment in defence, NATO powers followed what McGinn calls
a policy of 'collective inaction' over Czechoslovakia, being anxious not to provide
any justification for Soviet propaganda attacks of 'imperialist' interference in the
Prague Spring. The West Germans in particular shied away from any gesture
which could be seen as provoking Warsaw Pact accusations of 'revanchist'
plotting. No Western power was prepared to do more than issue a 'gentle
warning' to the Soviets that intervention in Czechoslovakia could harm détente.39
Significantly, the Czechoslovaks never asked the Western powers for any support -
moral or practical - as their relations with their 'fraternal allies' deteriorated.
British diplomats were aware of the significance of the Dresden meeting,
and Guy Millard, the ambassador to Budapest, commented that even the more
reform-minded Hungarians were worried that the Czechoslovaks could go too far.
Harrison guessed that Prague was reviewing its foreign trade policy and was
interested in increased commercial links with the West, and presumed that the
J. C. McGinn, 'The Politics of Collective Inaction. NATO's Response to the Prague Spring', in Journal qf
Cold War Studies, 1/3 (1999), pp.112-123, pp.126-127. NSC587th meeting, 5.6.68, NSF, NSC meetings (1-2),
LBJLIB. Williams, Senate, pp.155-159. OPD(68)42, Bnhsh Policy in the event of W force withdraw&s from
Europe, 20.6.68, CAB148137(PRO).
McGinn, 'Collective Inaction', pp.130-131, p.134. Bushell (UKDeINATO) to Smith, 28.3.68, FCO28f22. D.
Laskey (Bonn) to Stewart, 4.5.68, FCO28/30(PRO).
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Dresden meeting was intended to stop the Czechoslovaks from loosening their
economic ties with the CMEA. In fact, while reformers in the CPCS hoped to
develop trade with Western countries, there were also calls from within the
Czechoslovak military for the adoption of a 'national' defence doctrine. Harrison
believed that while Soviet military intervention was unlikely, Moscow could use
economic sanctions to force Czechoslovakia back into obedience. 4° One Foreign
Office assessment from late April commented that the main problem for Dubcek
was not the 'over-enthusiasm of the reformers' but the 'continued existence of
latent conservatism' within the CPCS. Dubcek was expected to defeat his hard-line
opponents in the forthcoming Party Congress, but he still had to appease the
USSR. The Soviets were alarmed at the possibility of Czechoslovakia pursuing an
independent foreign policy, and feared that the Prague Spring could infect the
GDR, Poland and other bloc states. 4 ' The consequences of the Action Programme
for Eastern Europe assumed a significant part in the meeting of British
ambassadors to the Eastern bloc states, which was convened in London in early
May 1968.
One of the conclusions the Foreign Office reached during its review of
Anglo-Soviet relations was that Britain 'should be giving more attention to Eastern
European countries other than the Soviet Union', and in March arrangements were
made for Stewart to visit Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in late August-early
Millard to Hayman, 20.3.68; & Harrison to Hayman, 27.3.68, FCO28/47(PRO). Loth, 'Moscow, Prague and
Warsaw', p.106.
41 T. Barker; East-West Relations. Office Meeting with the Secretaiy of State, 26.4.68, FCO2S/47(PRO).
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September 1968.42 On the first day (7 May) of the ambassadors conference the
Foreign Secretary commented on the 'intellectual restlessness' throughout Eastern
Europe, and he asked the assembled diplomats if there were any signs of
'fundamental change' behind the Iron Curtain. In contrast with the previous
conference (April 1966), participants were less optimistic concerning the prospects
for reform in Eastern Europe, commenting on the hard-line nature of the Polish,
East German and Bulgarian regimes. John Chadwick, the ambassador to Bucharest,
stated that while Ceausescu had defied Moscow by opening diplomatic relations
with Bonn, Romania was 'internally the most Stalinist [state] in Eastern Europe',
and was unlikely to undergo its own version of the Prague Spring. Millard
stressed that despite the NEM reforms, the Hungarian leadership was in no mood
to risk another 1956-style upheaval, and would neither leave the WTO or request
the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Harrison stressed that while nationalism was a
'liberalising force' in Eastern Europe, nationalist sentiment was a tool of
conservative patriotism in the USSR - evidently, he was referring to Russian
nationalism rather than that of the Ukrainians, Balts or other non-Russian
nationalities. The only hope for the 'evolution' of the USSR's domestic and
external policies required the Soviet peoples to be more active in pressing for
socio-economic reforms, but Harrison saw few signs of such a change in the
short-term.
Barker stated that despite the 'Action Programme', the Dubcek regime
remained unstable, and the reformers had yet to overcome the strong conservative
Smith to Hayman, 19.3.68; Smith to Millard, 16.4.68, FCO28138(PRO).
element within the CPCS. Developments in Czechoslovakia had, nonetheless, shown
that economic failure could force changes in even the most doctrinaire of
Communist states. Czechoslovakia's priority was to reform the centrally-planned
economy. Prague had publicly reaffirmed its allegiance to the USSR, but had
declared that Czechoslovakia's foreign policy would focus primarily on Central
European affairs. Barker concluded that Czechoslovakia would not pursue a
Romanian-style foreign policy because of the need to focus upon internal reforms.
For their part, there was little the Soviets and their allies could do to put pressure
on the Czechoslovaks, as economic sanctions would merely force the latter to
develop closer commercial links with the West.43
At the last meeting on 10 May, the participants concluded that there was
'little the West could do or say to help the liberals in Eastern Europe', except to
continue to encourage East-West trade and technological co-operation. Harrison
asserted that:
EThel ferment in Czechoslovakia must have serious implications for the Kremlin, both
internally and externally. He was sure that the Soviet regime would be able to control
internal disturbances, but he wondered what effect the developments in Czechoslovakia
would have on the Soviet Union's foreign policy. II the Czechoslovaks succeed in
working out a distinctive road to socialism, this would have important ideological
implications for the Soviet leadership, Eastern Europe as a bloc, for the Warsaw Pact in
relation to Germany, and for the World Communist movement. These developments were
touching very serious nerves in the Kremlin. The Russians must now be considering
whether the implications were so serious that the Czechoslovak deviation must be
crushed, or whether they should live 'vith it and restrict as far as they could the damage
which it might do to their position.
Amba.csado, Conference, l' & 2'' meetings, 75.68, FCO28/45(PRO).
'Amba.sador's Conference, 10th meeting, 10.5.68, DBPO HI, I, pp.42-48.
The ambassador's conference reflected the British approach to the Czechoslovak
crisis as a whole. The participants concurred with Stewart's conclusion that the
existing policy of encouraging 'evolution' through trade and cultural contacts
should be maintained, and that Western countries should not 'make use of present
trends in Eastern Europe to drive wedges between Czechoslovakia and other East
European countries'. 45 Barker reinforced this low-profile policy with his despatches
from Prague, and the British government maintained this approach despite pressure
from MPs and popular opinion to give the Czechoslovaks moral support against
Soviet pressure. The Foreign Office also remained convinced that despite threats
from Moscow the Soviets would not use military force against Czechoslovakia.
During the late spring and summer of 1968, the USSR and its hard-line
allies grew increasingly agitated over the democratisation of Czechoslovakia. The
relaxation of censorship and the emergence of independent civil society groups
were regarded in Moscow, East Berlin, Warsaw and Sofia as evidence of 'counter-
revolutionary' activity. The Soviet, East German, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian
leaders met in Moscow on 8 May to discuss how to rally the CPCS conservatives
(the so-called 'healthy forces') against Dubcek. Although Kadar half-heartedly tried
to defend the Czechoslovak leadership, Brezhnev, Gomulka, Ulbricht and the
Bulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, openly favoured the use of coercion in support of
the 'healthy forces'. 47 Thereafter, the leaders of these states (referred to as the
Amba.sadors Conference, 3 & 4th meetings, 8.5.68, FCO28/45(PRO). Hayman to Harrison, 30.5.68,
FCO2S/46(PRO).
W. Barker to Stewart, 6.5.68, FCO28/90(PRO). Hayman to W. Barker, 1.8.68, FCO28/49(PRO). FO/CRO to
Missions, No.71(Guidance), 15.3.68, PREM13I2114(PRO).
47 Excerpts from Moscow meeting, 8.5.68, Prague Spring 1968, pp.132-143.
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'Five') proceeded to apply pressure on the Czechoslovaks by staging a series of
military manoeuvres, culminating in a major command-post exercise on
Czechoslovak soil (code-named Sumava) in late June. Prior to Sumava, no Soviet
troops were stationed in Czechoslovakia, but during the course of the 'exercise'
25-30,000 Soviet soldiers entered the country, with the bulk remaining even after
Sumava concluded on 30 June. As David Miller states, in any invasion the main
problems to overcome are 'command-and-control, telecommunications and logistics,
together with transport, movement control and supplies'. Another significant
indicator, overlooked by Western intelligence services, was the call-up of thousands
of Soviet reservists and the staging of manoeuvres at a time when Eastern bloc
states used troops to gather in the summer harvest. The staging of Sumava, the
delayed troop withdrawals, and the Niemen exercise staged in the Western USSR
in late July were intended both to threaten Prague and to rehearse for intervention
against Czechoslovakia.48
On the 14-15 July, the leaders of the 'Five' met at Warsaw, issuing an
ultimatum to the CPCS leadership known as the 'Warsaw letter'. The
Czechoslovaks were bluntly warned that their domestic policies were 'no longer
your affair alone'. If the process of democratisation was not halted, then
Czechoslovakia's fraternal allies would intervene to crush what they regarded as a
threat to the survival of Communism. 49 Harrison stated that that the USSR had
made it clear that they would not tolerate 'the disruption of its dominance in
' Dawisha, Pmgue Spring, pp 96-97, p.116, pp.130-133. Cradock, Know Your Enemy, pp.243-244. D. Mill, The
Cold War. A Military Histopy, (London Pimlico 2001), p.60.
Excerpts from Warsaw meeting & 'Warsaw 1ett', 14-15.7.68,pp.212-233,Pmgue Spring 1968, pp.234-238.
Eastern Europe', irrespective of international opinion. Both ambassador and the
chargé in Moscow, Peter Dalton, doubted that the Soviets would invade
Czechoslovakia, but suggested that Moscow could engineer an 'internal coup' by
the CPCS hard-liners prior to the party congress in September. 5° Barker observed
that the 'Five' had failed to intimidate the Czechoslovaks, and that Dubcek had
held his own against the conservatives. The ambassador to Prague, who was now
more convinced of Dubcek's reformist credentials, expected that the Czechoslovak
reformers would hold their ground with moral support from the Romanians and
Yugoslays, and he wrongly presumed that the Hungarians would tolerate a
controlled programme of internal reform. Foreign Office officials concluded that
while the Warsaw letter demonstrated that the Prague Spring was 'completely
unacceptable' to Czechoslovakia's fraternal allies, the latter were unlikely to
intervene. The Soviets and their allies would nonetheless continue to put pressure
on Prague through military manoeuvres and by encouraging the CPCS hard-liners
to resist Dubcek. Although Palliser commented that 'the temptations to which
Russia is exposed are very great', the consensus within the Foreign Office was
that the Soviets would 'bully and cajole, bribe and threaten [the Czechoslovaks]
until they got the stabilisation of a regime they could live with'.5'
Despite this assessment that 'the Russians would try to avoid direct
military intervention in Czechoslovakia', the British sought through their
5° Moscow to FO, No.1108, 11.7.68; & No.1138, 18.7.68, PREM13/1993(PRO). P. Dalton (Moscow) to Smith,
23.7.68, FCO2S/48(PRO). Renner, Czechoslovakia, p.60.
51 Prague to FO, No.370, 15.7.68, PREM1311993(PRO). T. Barker to Hayman, 18.7.68, FCO2S/47(PRO). Cradock,
Know Your Enemy, p.251.
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Washington embassy to consult with the Americans as to whether the Western
powers could take action to deter such an outcome. Both governments agreed that
there were few feasible options. The Foreign Office concluded that discussions
within NATO would be seen as provocative, and that Western military assistance
to the Czechoslovaks was out of the question. British officials were also reluctant
to threaten political and economic retaliation, and were not prepared to renounce
efforts to promote détente if the Prague Spring was crushed by force. At a
Cabinet meeting on 18 July, both Healey and Stewart maintained that Britain and
its allies would be powerless to intervene if the Soviets invaded. 52 Like the
British, the Americans were reluctant to inflame the situation in Eastern Europe,
and although McNamara's successor, Clark Clifford, suggested at a National
Security Council (NSC) meeting in late April that the Soviets might resort to
force to prevent the spread of the nationalist 'virus' in Eastern Europe, the State
Department considered Soviet intervention to be unlikely. Johnson himself was
more concerned with Vietnam and plans for a long-awaited summit with the
Soviets than with Czechoslovakia, and the President ruled out using the hot-line to
warn Moscow of the implications of intervention. 53 The Czechoslovaks were aware
that, in Cernik's own words, 'the capitalist countries [did] not wish for a radical
turn in the situation' in Czechoslovakia. In his comments to the CPCS leadership
on 27 July, Cernik stated that the USA, France, West Germany and Italy all
considered Czechoslovakia to be 'in the Soviet "sphere of influence" and had
adopted 'a cautiously neutral official position' as tensions between Prague and the
52 F0 to Washington, No.1948(Saving), 22.7.68; & Washington to FO, No.100(Saving), 27.7.68, FCO28199(PRO).
Crossman ifi, 18.7.68, pp.142-145.
53 MemOrandUm by N. Davis on NSC meeting dated 244.68, FRUS XVII, pp.69-71.
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'Five' intensified. It is a significant comment on the British approach to the
Prague Spring that in his summary of Western attitudes the Czechoslovak Premier
did not even refer in passing to Britain.54
The West's 'collective inaction' was partly intended not to provide any
corroboration for Soviet allegations of 'imperialist' subversion, which intensified
after an arms cache was 'discovered' in Western Bohemia in late July. Moscow
claimed that the weapons were planted by the CIA, an accusation which led Rusk
to summon Dobrynin to his office for a dressing-down. Responding to an enquiry
from Wilson, the Foreign Office commented that neither the Americans nor the
West Germans were willing risk the consequences that covert operations in
Czechoslovakia would entail. According to British intelligence sources, the
Czechoslovaks believed that the East Germans had planted the arms, although the
Foreign Office correctly presumed that the weapons cache was a KGB provocation
intended to give substance to Moscow's propaganda attacks. 55 While waging a
'war of nerves' against Dubcek, the Soviets also maintained that they had no
intention of intervening in Czechoslovakia. On 30 July, Stewart told Smirnovsky
that while Britain would not interfere in the internal affairs of any East European
state, 'if events went badly over Czechoslovakia, the opportunities for increasing
understanding' between the UK and USSR 'would be frozen'. 56 These comments
were as far as the British government were prepared to go in issuing any warning
54 Report by Cemik to CPCS Praesidium, 27.7.68,Prague Spring 1968, pp.281-283.
53 Washington to FO, No.2245, 23.7.68; Palliser to Day, 29.7.68; & Day to Palliser, 1.8.68, PREM13/1993(PRO).
Andrews & Mitrokhin,Migrokhin Archives, pp.7-8, p.333.
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against Soviet intervention. Similar 'gentle warnings' from other Western
governments clearly convinced the Soviets that the West would do nothing to help
the Czechoslovak reformers.
From 29 July to 1 August the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaderships met at
the border town of Cierna-nad-Tisou. The only agreement reached at Cierna was
that both sides should meet again, along with the other four signatories of the
'Warsaw letter', at Bratislava on 3 August. Following the Bratislava meeting, the
Czechoslovaks and the 'Five' issued a declaration containing the standard
denunciation of 'the aggressive forces of imperialism', and stressing the need for
solidarity within the Warsaw Pact. However, the Bratislava declaration also stated
that 'each fraternal party' could determine 'all questions of further socialist
development' in their countries, 'taking into account specific national features and
conditions'. 57 Barker informed London that the Bratislava declaration represented a
solution to the Czechoslovak crisis. Dubcek and his colleagues had renewed their
'vows' to their WTO allies in order to continue their reform programmes, yet the
ambassador doubted that the Czechoslovaks had made any pledges to reverse the
process of democratisation, and concluded that Prague had kept its nerve despite
threats from the 'Five'. Barker suggested that the Soviets presumed that after
twenty years of subservience the Czechoslovaks would be easy to bully into
obedience, but despite the threatening military manoeuvres and the 'brutal
ultimatum' contained in the Warsaw letter, Prague remained committed to internal
51 Excerpts from the Ciema negotiations, 29.7.68; & Bratislava Declaration, 3.8.68, Prague Spring 1968, pp.284-
297, pp.328-329. Crampton, Eastern Europe, pp.334-336.
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reform. The ambassador was confident that the CPCS hard-liners would be routed
in the September party congress, after which Dubcek could progress with his
reforms. 58
In contrast, Harrison stated that Moscow was bent upon overthrowing the
reformers. If Czechoslovakia defected from the Warsaw Pact, the strategic and
political implications for the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe would be
catastrophic. However, Moscow's efforts to coerce Prague had backfired. The
Czechoslovaks had stood their ground, and if the Soviets used force to crush
reform in Czechoslovakia, their international reputation would be irreparably
damaged. Yet if Moscow did not intervene, Dubcek would triumph and the Soviet
leadership would be humiliated. Harrison noted Brezhnev's apparent indecision over
how to respond to the Prague Spring, and asserted that middle-ranking CPSU
apparatchiks had already shown signs of impatience with the leadership's dithering
during the Six Day War. The ambassador to Moscow suggested that if Brezhnev
did not take control of the situation in Czechoslovakia, he could suffer the same
fate as Khrushchev.59
Despite Harrison's assessment, the British government, like its allies, still
believed that the Soviets were unlikely to invade Czechoslovakia. Wilson, Stewart
and the Foreign Office were unaware of the sharp deterioration of personal
relations between Brezhnev and Dubcek following the Bratislava meeting, as shown
W. Barker to Stewart, 12.8.68, FCO28/49(PRO).
Harrison to Stewart, 22.8.68, FCO28/49(PRO).
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by the hostile tone of their telephone conversations. The Western powers were also
unaware that during the Bratislava meeting Vasil Bilak, one of the leading CPCS
conservatives, passed a 'letter of invitation' to Brezhnev from the 'healthy forces',
requesting Soviet military intervention. 6° On 17 August, the Soviet Politburo
decided to authorise the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which was given the code-
name Operation Danube 6' On the night of the 20-2 1 August, Soviet paratroopers
landed in Prague, while an army of about 250,000 Soviet, East German, Polish,
Hungarian and Bulgarian troops invaded Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak armed
forces offered no resistance, and Dubcek, Cernik and other leading reformers were
arrested and taken to Moscow. 62 Within the course of a day, Czechoslovakia was
under total military occupation.
The end of the 'Prague Spring': August 1968-April 1969.
The decision to invade Czechoslovakia was the result of several factors. Kieran
Williams argues that until mid-August 1968 the Soviet leadership was still
prepared to give Dubcek the benefit of the doubt, believing that the Czechoslovak
leadership had promised at Cierna and Bratislava that the Action Programme
would be halted and reversed. When the Czechoslovaks did not follow up these
meetings by re-imposing state censorship and cracking down on the 'counter-
'° Telephone conversations between Brezhnev & Dubcek, 9.8.68 & 13.8.68, Prague Spnng 1968, pp.336-338,
pp.345-356. See also 'A Letter to Brezhnev: The Czech Hardliners "Requesf' for Soviet Intervention. August
1968',CWIHP Bulletin,2 (l992),p.I6.
61 Excerpts from Politburo meeting, 17.8.68, Prague Spring 1968, pp.376-383.
62 5ee J. Valenta, 'From Prague to Kabul. The Soviet Style of Invasion', in International Securny, 5/2 (1980)
pp.133-134, on the strategy behind Operation Danube.
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revolutionaries', the Soviets and the other members of the 'Five' decided that
Dubcek could no longer be trusted, and that the 'counter-revolution' in
Czechoslovakia could only be crushed by external intervention. 63
 Harrison's
argument concerning the threat to Brezhnev from hard-liners within the Kremlin
resembled the conclusions drawn by one of Dubcek's supporters, Zdenek Mlynar,
who asserted that the CPSU General Secretary was obliged to sanction
intervention to stay in power. Yet Brezhnev's telephone conversations with Dubcek
in mid-August show how concerned he was at the threat of 'counter-revolution' in
Czechoslovakia. If Brezhnev believed that the survival of 'socialism' in Eastern
Europe was at stake, he would have readily agreed with 'hard-liners' that military
intervention was a necessity. Karen Dawisha argues that Kosygin would have
opposed the invasion because of its potential impact on détente and on economic
reform. The Soviet Premier was initially sceptical of the ability of the 'healthy
forces' to seize power, but at the Cierna meeting he was particularly
uncompromising in his condemnation of Dubcek's reforms. The records of the
Politburo's meetings from 14-17 August 1968 remain inaccessible, but given his
antipathy towards the Czechoslovak 'counter-revolutionaries' Kosygin would
probably have given his consent to the intervention.M
Among the hard-liners advocating intervention was the USSR's ambassador
to Prague, Stepan Chervonenko, who informed Moscow that the only means of
63 K Williams, 'Political Loves' Labours Lost: Negotiations between Prague and Moscow in 1968', in Slow,, 7/1
994), pp.72-87.
Dasha, Prague Spring, pp.300-302. Zdenek M1uer, Night Frost in Prague, (London; C. Hurst 1980), p.163,
p.168. For Brezhnev & Kosygin's attitudes, see the Cierna negotiations & Brezhnev-Dubcek telephone
conversations in Prague Spring 1968, pp.284-297, pp.336-338, pp.345-356.
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preventing 'counter-revolution' was to support a hard-line coup against Dubcek.65
According to Mark Kramer, both the Soviet military and the KGB supported
intervention, the former being concerned by the fact that there were no Soviet
troops permanently stationed in Czechoslovakia. Andropov had been ambassador to
Budapest during the 1956 revolution, and was determined to prevent the collapse
of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia over a decade later. The KGB had close
contacts with the StB, whose officers assisted the invaders, while the hard-line
commanders of the Czechoslovak armed forces ensured that Danube faced no
resistance. Another significant figure was the Ukrainian Communist Party secretary,
Petro Shelest, who feared that the Prague Spring could spill over into his republic.
Shelest was Brezhnev's principal contact with Bilak and other CPCS
conservatives, and played a key role in conveying the 'letter of invitation' to the
Soviet leadership. Kramer argues that Andropov, Chervonenko and Shelest
contributed to 'the Politburo's mistaken impression that a viable hard-line
alternative existed in Czechoslovakia'. Moscow's intention was that Operation
Danube would take place concurrently with an internal coup, in which Bilak and
his associates would overthrow Dubcek and his fellow reformers.
Yet although Operation Danube was a military success, it was a political
failure. The so-called 'healthy forces' were incapable of going beyond mere
plotting, and although Prague was under Soviet military control, the CPCS
See Prague to Moscow, 7.8.68,Pmgue Spnng 1968, pp.333-335. Valenta, 'Prague to Kabul', p.126.
MI Krama, 'The Prague Spnng and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia: New Interpretations', in CWIHP
Bulletin, 3 (1993), pp.2-10; & 'Ukraine and the Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 (Part 1): New Evidence
from the Diaiy of Petro Shelest', in CWIHP Bulletin, 10 (1998), pp.234-244.
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Congress was convened in secret, issuing a statement condemning the invasion.
This was an embarrassment to the Kremlin, which had instructed Soviet
ambassadors in Western capitals to inform their host governments that the
Czechoslovak government had appealed for intervention by its 'fraternal' allies.
The WTO occupation force also had no means of dealing with the widespread
passive resistance and popular hostility it faced across Czechoslovakia. 67 Having
arrested Dubcek, Cernik and other pro-reform Communists, the Soviets discovered
that they had no alternative leadership to install in Prague. As a result, Brezhnev
and his colleagues browbeat the Czechoslovaks into accepting the demands
outlined in the Moscow Protocol (26 August), which involved the re-introduction
of censorship, the abolition of all civil society groups, an end to economic reform
and the complete subordination of Czechoslovak foreign policy to Soviet interests.
The protocol also gave no date for the withdrawal of the occupation forces.68
The minutes of the NSC meeting on 20 August show that the Americans
had been caught unawares by Operation Danube. Rusk was particularly concerned
that the Soviets could 'put pressure on the West' by provoking a new crisis over
Berlin. The Americans faced a further problem because on the 19 August
Dobrymn informed the Secretary of State that Moscow was prepared to receive
Johnson during the first ten days of October. 69 The superpowers were due to issue
a joint announcement on strategic arms negotiations on 21 August, but as a
67 DaSha, Prague Spring, pp.320-325. P. Windsor & A. Robeits, Czechoslovakia 1968. Refrnn, Repression and
Resistance, (London; IISS 1969), pp.111-116.
Excerpts from Moscow meeting between Soviet & Czechoslovak leaderships, 23.8.68; & Moscow protocol,
26.8.68,Prague Spring 1968, pp.465-480.
NSC589th meeting, 20.8.68, NSF, NSC meetings (1-2); & CAPS2O8O, 19.8.68, W. Rostow Files 11, LBJLIB.
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consequence of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Americans postponed this
announcement.7° After Danube, Johnson's officials were also worried that the
Soviets could seek to settle scores with two other troublesome Communist states
in Eastern Europe, Romania and Yugoslavia. On 20 September, Rusk warned the
Soviet ambassador that any military action against Berlin, Romania or Yugoslavia
would raise East-West tensions to dangerous levels. Dobrynin responded that the
USSR wanted détente, but would not tolerate the break-up of the Warsaw Pact,
and Rusk regarded these comments as an indication that the Soviets would take
no further action in Eastern Europe. 7 ' In Moscow, Liewelyn Thompson argued that
Soviet intentions were 'defensive', insofar as the USSR was determined to preserve
Communist rule in Eastern Europe, and he doubted whether the Romanians or
Yugoslays were at risk of attack. Thompson also stated that the Soviet leadership
was still interested in arms talks with the USA. However, having postponed
strategic arms negotiations because of Czechoslovakia, Washington discovered -
much to the President's dismay - that the Soviets preferred to wait until
Johnson's successor entered office.72
London received no advance intelligence warning of Operation Danube,
although members of the British military mission (BRIXMIS) based in East Berlin
apparently concluded that Soviet and East German troop movements during the
summer months indicated an intention to invade. BRIXIvHS reported their
conclusions to BAOR headquarters, but these warnings remained unheeded.
70 Clearwater, Strategic Anna Control, pp.390-393. Dobrynin, in Confidence, pp.180-181.
71 Conversations between Dobtynin & Rusk at State Dept. 20.9.68, RG59, 150, 64-65,2664, NARAII.
72 MW to State Dept. No.5775, 1.10.68, Soviet F1ashpoinL. Clearwater, Anna Control, pp.417-418.
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According to Cradock, the DIS was divided as to whether the Soviets would
intervene in Czechoslovakia, and as a consequence the MC 'sat on the fence'
when preparing its assessment on the prospects of intervention. 73 After the invasion
Wilson, Stewart, Lord Chalfont (a Foreign Office Minister of State), Trend and
Greenhill met at 10 Downing Street on 21 August to discuss its implications. The
Foreign Secretary stated that '[the] situation did not represent an immediate threat
to Western Europe', but constituted 'a return to 'cold war' conditions and was as
such a grave setback to East-West relations'. Like the Johnson administration, the
Wilson government tempered public condemnation with caution, and the meeting at
Downing Street ended with agreement that Britain should confine itself to securing
a UN resolution condemning the invasion. In the Cabinet the following day, the
Foreign Secretary told his colleagues that 'our objective should be to obtain
world-wide condemnation of the Soviet Union but to avoid being singled out as
particularly hostile' by Moscow. This resort to a debate within the UN was similar
to Western efforts to promote a resolution condemning the Soviet intervention in
Hungary the previous decade. Britain and other Western powers attempted to pass
a UN resolution condemning the invasion as a violation of international law, but
the Soviets blocked the resolution with their veto.74
Unlike Rusk, Stewart concluded that the Soviets were unlikely to assault
the Romanians and Yugoslays, or to threaten West Berlin. 75 The Foreign
S. Dorri], M16, (London; Fourth Estate 2001), p.727. T. Geraghty, BRLIMIS, (HarperCollins 1997), pp.159-162.
Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p.249.
MISC(219X69)l e
 meding at No.10, 21.8.68, CAB134W134(PRO). CC(68)38 th conclusions, 22.8.68,
CAB12S/43(PRO). Bekes, Hunganan Revolution, pp.17-21. Skilhing, Interrupted Revolution, p.753, p.757.
"Conversation between G. de Courcel (French ambassador) & Stewart, 30.8.68, PREM13/1994(PRO).
297
Secretary's planned visits to Hungary and Bulgaria were cancelled, but his
Romanian trip went ahead because Bucharest had condemned the Warsaw Pact
invasion. Other Ministerial visits to the five 'aggressor' states were suspended and
cultural exchanges curtailed. On the other hand, commercial trips were permitted 'if
important business is involved'. Wilson retrospectively described Parliament's
response to the invasion as 'impotent'. The same can be said of Britain and
Western Europe's response to Danube which was, in particular, regarded as a fatal
blow to de Gaulle's concept of Europe totale.76 One less welcome consequence for
the Soviets was that domestic political pressure in the USA and Western Europe
for unilateral troop withdrawals from Germany diminished significantly.77
Harrison ended his service as ambassador to the USSR on 25 August, and
the initial analyses sent by the Moscow embassy that September were written by
Peter Dalton. The chargé argued that the invasion of Czechoslovakia did not
signify a more aggressive Soviet foreign policy. Dalton depicted the Politburo as
being 'a prisoner, rather than an instigator, of events' in Eastern Europe. The
Soviet leadership had acted on an ad hoc basis, vacillating at the time of the
Cierna and Bratislava negotiations, and taking the decision to invade on the
assumption that there would be a hard-line coup in Prague. The Soviets had then
discovered after the invasion that the Czechoslovaks were solidly behind Dubcek,
and as a result had been obliged to negotiate with the very same leadership that
76 FO to UKDe1NATO, No.991(Saving), 27.8.68, FCO2S/49(PRO). Wilson, Labour Government, p.553. Michel
Debre, de Gaulle's Foreign Minister, reflected on France's inability to do more than protest over Danube in
his memoirs, Trois Répub/iques Pour Line France. Gouverner Autrement, (Pans; Albin Michel), p.258.
Duffield, Power Rules, pp.182-183. F. Costigliola, 'Lyndon B. Johnson, Germany and "t1 end of the Cold
War", in W. Cohen & N. B. Tuck Lynckm Johnsoi confronts the World. American Foreign Policy 1963-1968,
(NY; Columbia University Press 1994), p.208.
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they had intended to overthrow. Dalton informed Stewart that the decision to
intervene was 'not the action of strong "expansionist" leaders, but of frightened
men reacting indecisively to a situation they knew to be dangerous, but which
they did not know how to deal'. Moscow was determined that Czechoslovakia
should neither defect to the 'imperialist' camp, nor become a 'neutral vacuum'
susceptible to West German influence. In either case, the Communist regimes in
both the GDR and Poland would be at risk. The USSR would suppress similar
upsurges of dissidence throughout its East European sphere of influence, an
observation confirmed by the enunciation of the 'Brezhnev doctrine' during the
CPSU General Secretary's speech at the Polish Communist Party Congress
(November 1968). Dalton acknowledged that the occupation force in
Czechoslovakia enhanced the WTO's military capabilities in Central Europe, but
concluded that the Soviets did not intent to attack NATO. The chargé also
counselled against a strident Western response to the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
arguing that 'a return to the 'cold war' could ... substantiate fears, revive
suspicions and put relations back to where they were before all the patient work
of recent years'
From Prague, Barker likewise observed on 25 August that the WTO
intervention had been a political fiasco. The invaders had 'overestimated' the
ability of the CPCS hard-liners to seize power and had 'underestimated the degree
to which the Dubcek line corresponded with the aspirations of the Communist
Dalton to Smith, I 1.8.68 & 19.9.68; Dalton to Stewart, 29.9.68, FCO2S/69(PRO). Dalton to Stewart, 30.9.68,
DPBO III, I, pp.76-80.
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Party's rank and file and the population as a whole'. The Soviets had to choose
between resorting to outright military occupation, or the humiliation of having to
negotiate with Dubcek. A month later, however, Barker's analysis was more
pessimistic as far as the prospects of reform within Czechoslovakia were
concerned. The Czechoslovaks had been forced by the Moscow protocol to
renounce democratisation and economic reform. Barker also presumed that the
Soviet military had 'at some point' in mid-August 'ceased to be a mindless tool
and became a significant political force in its own right', forcing the Politburo to
resort to force against Czechoslovakia. 79 Northern Department officials disagreed
with this last comment, as did Dalton, who maintained that while the Soviet
military may have favoured intervention the political leadership remained in
control of the decision-making process. The chargé guessed, correctly, that the
Soviet leadership made the decision to intervene on either the 17 or 18 August.
Greenhill asserted that while the 'build-up of Soviet forces in certain sectors (e.g.
Navy)' showed that Brezhnev was far more receptive to the military leadership's
opinions than Khrushchev, there was no evidence to support Barker's hypothesis.
The Northern Department also presumed that despite the Moscow Protocol, the
apparent lack of a conservative alternative meant that the Soviets had to work
with the existing leadership. Dubcek therefore had some opportunities to introduce
moderate reforms, similar to those Kadar initiated in Hungary.8°
Prague to FO, No.562, 25.8.68, PREM13/1994(PRO). W. Bark to Stewart, 17.9.68, FCO28/69(PRO).
80 Dalton to Stewart, 29.9.68; Smith to Hayman, 20.9.68; comments by Hayman (20.9.68) & Greenhill (23.9.68);
Giffard to Hayman, 27.9.68, FCO2S/69(PRO).
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The JIC's assessment on the future of Eastern Europe after the Prague
Spring, dated December 1968, conceded that the short term outlook for
Czechoslovakia was 'bleak', but that despite the Soviet military occupation 'some
elements of the Dubcek reform programme', including economic reform, 'will
continue'. 8 ' This conclusion contradicted Barker's report to the Foreign Office on
30 August, which stated that:
I think we must recognise that for practical purposes the Soviet takeover has been
complete. All the key Ministries will have their quota of supervisory Russians or Soviet
stooges; the cherished freedoms of the last seven months or so will be stamped upon;
economic venturesomeness (sic) will be choked; co-operation with the West in the fields
of trade, technology and culture will be limited; and politically the Czechoslovaks will
have to learn again to parrot the Soviet Part' and State lines without bothering to
consider their own views or their own interests.8
Barker's grim prognosis was borne out by the course of events in the autumn and
winter of 1968. On 16 October Prague and Moscow signed a treaty on the
'temporary' stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, and under the USSR's
auspices the CPCS hard-liners gradually supplanted the reformers as part of the
process of 'normalisation'. 83 The pretext for Dubcek's eventual removal was
provided in late March 1969, when the Czechoslovak ice-hockey team beat the
USSR in the world cup finals. KGB and StB agents provocateurs provoked riots
in Prague in order to justify a Soviet crackdown. On 17 April, Dubcek was
replaced as CPCS First Secretary by Gustav Husak, who set about restoring a
regime as rigidly authoritarian and as slavishly pro-Soviet as that of Novotny. The
British embassy in Prague reported that Husak was unpopular even in his native
81 J1C(68)54(Final), The Soviet Grip on Eastern Europe, 2.12.68, CAB 158/71(PRO).
Smith to Hayman, 3.9.68 & 5.9.68; W. Bark to Hayman, 30.8.68, FCO28/91(PRO).
Crampton, Eastern Europe, p.337. Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty, 16.10.68, Prague Spnng 1968, pp.533-536.
Renn, Czechoslovakia, pp.86-101
Slovakia, and that the Czechoslovaks had acquiesced in the change in leadership
rather than risk Soviet repression. Yet Foreign Office officials considered the new
leadership to be 'centrist rather than conservative', and clearly believed that the
authoritarian crackdown was merely a temporary development.84
Conclusion:
The British and other Western governments responded cautiously to the Prague
Spring and its brutal suppression, taking no action which could arouse Soviet
anger and jeopardise East-West détente. It should be noted that NATO's treaty
commitments involved collective defence, rather than assistance to Soviet clients
seeking to exert their independence from the Eastern bloc. The general failure of
Western powers to anticipate the suppression of the Prague Spring should be
recognised, although this miscalculation reflected the problems involved in
determining Soviet intentions, given the secretive nature of the decision-making
process in the Kremlin. As noted above, the Politburo only made the final decision
to intervene in Czechoslovakia three days before Operation Danube took place.
The Soviets were confident that the invasion of Czechoslovakia would not
significantly raise tensions in Europe, and Moscow was ready to risk Western
protests as the price to pay for preserving Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe.
Crampton, Eastern Eumpe, p.338. Mdre	 & Mitrokhin, Mitrhin Archive, pp.342-343. Prague to FCO,
18.4.69; & Day to E. Youde (No.10), 18.4.69,PREM1312553(PRO).
George Brown criticised NATO's response to the Czechoslovak crisis, and he
argued in November 1968 that the Alliance powers should have explicitly warned
the Soviets against intervention in Czechoslovakia's domestic affairs. This, he
argued, would have encouraged Kosygin and other 'doves' to veto the invasion.
However, Brown did not say what he thought the Western allies should do if the
USSR had called their bluff and still invaded. It is also doubtful that Brown
would have adopted such a tough approach had he still been Foreign Secretary.85
The harsh fact was that Britain and other Western powers were above all
concerned that the status quo in Europe should be preserved. NATO members
were not prepared to risk either the Alliance's credibility or the intensification of
East-West rivalries by making unsolicited pledges to support Czechoslovakia.
Britain's muted response to the Czechoslovak crisis reflected the Foreign
Office consensus that Western powers should not be seen to be encouraging East
European states to challenge Soviet authority. Although this was a consistent
feature of British policy towards the Eastern bloc during the 1960s, Foreign Office
officials had also concluded in early 1968 that Anglo-Soviet relations had suffered
as a result of the USSR's lack of goodwill. The implications of this assessment
will be examined subsequently.
85 Dawisha, Prague Spring, pp.355-356. George Bron, 'How we could have stopped the Russians', in The
Evening Standard, 14.11.68, & 'Alas the Brinkmanship was Missing', in The Evening Standard, 15.11.68. 1.
Barkor to Hayman, 15.11.68, FCO28169(PRO).
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CHAPTER 9: 'BUSINESS AS USUAL'? ANGLO-SOVIET AND
EAST-WEST RELATIONS AFTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
OCTOBER 1968-JUNE 1970.
The long-term impact of the invasion of Czechoslovakia on East-West relations
was minimal. After assuming office in January 1969, the new Republican President,
Richard Nixon, and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, sought the
agreement on superpower arms control which had eluded Johnson. After de Gaulle
resigned as President of France in April 1969, his successor Georges Pompidou
sought improved relations with the USSR, although without indulging in his anti-
American rhetoric. Six months later, Willy Brandt became Chancellor of the FRG,
and his conduct of Ostpolitik contributed to the non-aggression agreement between
Bonn and Moscow (August 1970), the Polish-West German treaty ratifying the
Oder-Neisse frontier (December 1970), the quadripartite agreement on Berlin (3
September 1971), and the reciprocal recognition of the FRG and GDR (22
December 1972). As Garthoff observes, there was a distinction between superpower
détente, which focused on arms control and conflicts of interest in the Third
World, and European détente, which involved a greater emphasis on trade and
'trans-national' contacts. While superpower détente faltered in the late 1 970s,
European détente endured until the end of the Cold War.'
1 Dunbabin, Cold War, pp.279-281. Garthofl Détente and Confrc,itazion, pp.l23-l27. M E. Sarotte's Dealing th
the Devil. Ea.st Germany, Détente & Oszpolizik (University of North Carolina Press 2001) covers Brandt's
conduct of Ospolitik from tl GDR's perspective.
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In late October 1968 Stewart, now in charge of an amalgamated Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO), asserted that after Czechoslovakia British policy
towards the Soviet bloc could not operate on a 'business as usual basis'. Britain
would not break off diplomatic or commercial relations with the 'aggressor
countries', but the Foreign Secretary stipulated that British diplomats abroad should
'avoid public expressions of goodwill' towards Soviet, Polish, Hungarian and
Bulgarian officials, but 'should as far as possible keep in step with the
representatives of other NATO countries' in their dealings with representatives of
the 'aggressor states'. 2 Stewart's instructions illustrated the contradiction inherent in
British policy towards East-West relations following the Czechoslovak crisis.
Ministers were under pressure from Parliament and the public to condemn the
invasion of Czechoslovakia, but were also anxious to avoid 'petty pinpricks' which
would irritate the Soviets and worsen already fragile bilateral relations. This
dilemma was highlighted by a ludicrous quarrel between Wilson and Stewart in
Cabinet on 17 December arising from the Prime Minister's intention to send
Christmas cards to the leaders of the 'aggressor countries'. This row over Wilson's
willingness to send season's greetings to the avowedly atheist rulers of the USSR
and their henchmen in Warsaw, Budapest and Sofia raises the question of whether,
despite the Foreign Secretary's comments, British policy towards the Eastern bloc
after the Prague Spring was indeed that of 'business as usual'. 3 This chapter
assesses whether there was any substantial change in the British government's
2 FCO to Missions, 29.10.68, DBPO HI, 1, pp.85-86. On 14 October 1968 the Foreign and Commonwealth
Offices were amalgamated into one department, the FCO-, one consequence of this amalgamation was that the
Northern Department was renamed the East European and SOVi Department (EESD).
CC52(68)52' conclusions, 17.12.68, CAB128143(PRO). Crossman, III, 17.12.68, p.289. Ulbricht would not have
received a card from Wilson because the UK had no diplomatic relations with the GDR, but this presumably
would not have concerned the former much.
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perception of Soviet policy, and in the conduct of relations with the Soviets and
other bloc powers, from late 1968 to the Labour government's election defeat in
June 1970.
The impact of the Prague Spring on Anglo-Soviet relations.
As far as trading relations with the 'aggressor states' were concerned, the
Ministerial Commercial Policy Committee conceded in early September that the
proposed unilateral liberalisation of Eastern bloc imports would be delayed, but
British policy would continue to operate on the principle that political disputes
should not affect non-strategic trade. Ministers believed that British firms should
continue to seek business in Eastern Europe because Britain could not afford to
be 'less forthcoming to the aggressor countries in commercial relations than our
competitors are'. Wilson, Benn and Crosland wanted to postpone the COCOM
review until early 1969, when the impact of the Czechoslovak crisis on Western
public opinion would have diminished, but this proposal was dropped in the face
of American opposition. 4 Both Ministers and officials agreed that the invasion of
Czechoslovakia had not affected the strategic balance between East and West, and
that there was no need for a reassessment of British policy towards the strategic
embargo. Furthermore, 'Britain's need for trade has certainly not lessened', and on
PC(68)27, FCO28/61(PRO). Bin, Office Without Power, 5.9.68, p.99. ESC(0X68)S th meeting, 20.9.68,
CAB13412800(PRO).
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'these grounds alone there would be no reason to alter British policy and
objectives [towards COCOM] in the long-term'.5
Yet after the suppression of the Prague Spring the tentative compromise
agreed with the Americans the previous year was superseded by the USA's
unwillingness to relax the strategic embargo. When COCOM members met in Paris
on 14-16 October 1968, the British discovered that with the possible exception of
France, no other state would support reduced embargo lists. In addition, Washington
insisted on blocking ICL's proposals to export computers to the USSR. Benn
argued that the ICL sale should go ahead, as otherwise its French competitors
could step in and reap the profits, but the ESC concurred with official
recommendations not to challenge the Americans. The British were, nonetheless, still
interested in ICL's exports to Romania, which were less controversial as far as
Anglo-American relations were concerned. 6 From 1968 onwards, the Romanians
received preferential treatment from Britain and other Western countries, notably in
trading relations, as a consequence of Ceausescu's apparent 'independence' from
the Soviet bloc. At the ambassador's conference in May 1968, John Chadwick
praised the Romanian leader for his 'tremendous political ingenuity and
toughness', 'personal modesty' and 'humanistic ideals'. The British ambassador to
Bucharest could not have predicted that during the 1970s Romania's leader would
develop a despotic regime, egregious even by contemporary East European
5 Esc(68)1O, Invasion j Czechoslovakia: Effect m Strategic Exports Policy, 4.9.68; & ESC(68)4th meeting,
8.9.68, CAB134/2796(PRO).
6 ESC(68)13, COCOM Review, 18.10.68; & ESC(68)5 th meeting, 21.10.68, CAB13412796(PRO). ESC(0X68)12th
meeting, 19.12.68, CAB134t2800(PRO).
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standards. Yet it should be noted that the British and other Western governments
courted the Romanian regime in spite of its dire domestic record, even though the
Foreign Office concept of 'evolution' linked internal liberalisation in the Eastern
bloc with the easing of East-West tensions.7
The Prime Minister, the President of the Board of Trade and the Minister
of Technology were particularly committed to relaxing the scope of the strategic
embargo, but when British policy towards COCOM was debated within the OPD
in mid-December there was considerable pressure from the FCO, MoD and COS
for a compromise agreement with Washington. Stewart informed colleagues that by
insisting on relaxing the embargo on high-technology exports to the Eastern bloc,
the UK was in danger of jeopardising its alliance with the USA. As noted above,
Washington's hackles had already been raised by the Benn-Kirillin technological
agreement, and the Foreign Secretary expressed the concerns of the service chiefs
and FCO and MoD officials that the Americans would no longer consider Britain
to be 'a reliable ally'. Stewart warned his colleagues that there was 'some
evidence' suggesting that the USA was imposing restrictions on bilateral military
co-operation as a result of the COCOM dispute. Given Britain's dependence on
collaboration with the Americans in the intelligence and defence fields (particularly
concerning the upgrading of Polaris), the Foreign Secretary felt that the UK's
ability to bargain over COCOM was weak. Although a minority within the OPD
maintained that American motives were purely commercial, the majority of
Ambassadors Ctmference,	 meeting, 7.5.68, FCO28/45(PRO). M. Percival, 'Britain's 'Political Romance' ith
Romania in the 1 970s', in Contemporwy European Histoy, 4/1 (1995), pp.67-87.
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Ministers agreed with Stewart that Britain had to modify its policy towards the
strategic embargo.8
The British would have been less concerned had they realised that
American policy-makers were at odds over how to resolve the dispute over
COCOM, which divided the USA from both the UK and France. While the
Department of Defense proposed punitive measures to restrict West European
access to US-made computer components, State Department officials were unwilling
to exacerbate inter-allied quarrels by attempting to force London and Paris into
compliance with Washington. The change in administrations also had its own
impact on US trade policy towards the Eastern bloc. Nixon and Kissinger favoured
increased trade with the bloc states in principle, albeit as part of the policy of
'linkage' in which Soviet compromises on arms control or Vietnam would be
'rewarded' by American concessions in commercial and other fields. The US
business community, supported by the State and Commerce Departments, favoured
a relaxation of trade restrictions with the Soviet bloc, and due to the Paris Peace
talks, Vietnam was by early 1969 less of an obstacle to trading relations than it
had been in previous years. 9
 The American and British governments therefore
reached a compromise in January 1969 which formed the basis for the completion
of the COCOM review. Washington agreed to permit the export by Western
businesses of all but the most powerful computers to Soviet bloc states. London in
COS6O'I68, 17.12.68, DEFE41234(PRO). OPD(68)76, COCOM. The 1968 List Review, 18.12.68,
CAB148138(PRO). OPD(68)24th meeting, 18.12.68, CAB148135(PRO).
9 'Memorandum on the Export of Computer Technology to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union by our
Allies' by State Dept, 21.12.68, FRUS L pp.548-550. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, pp.103-104.
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turn agreed that the UK would not export any computers to China, or provide the
more sophisticated machines to the WTO states, without the unanimous consent of
the USA and other COCOM members.'° Crosland informed the OPD that the
results of the 1968-1969 review presented 'increased opportunities for British
exports in the field of computers, radar and other electronics' to the Eastern bloc,
although in return the UK had to accept more restrictions on trade with China
and some 'limited strengthening' of the embargo on the Soviet bloc states. Wilson
and his Ministers accepted the outcome of the review which, considering British
policy towards COCOM represented a compromise on both London and
Washington's part.11
In the aftermath of the invasion, senior NATO commanders expressed alarm
that they had received no 'military warning' of the WTO intervention in
Czechoslovakia. The occupation of Czechoslovakia took place concurrently with
both the movement of 10 divisions from the Western USSR to the GDR and
Poland, and the positioning of Soviet forces on the Bohemian-Bavarian frontier. In
Miller's words, 'the Soviet Union had not only restored its control over
Czechoslovakia, but had also greatly strengthened its front-line against NATO'.
Miller argues that the Warsaw Pact's ability to execute an operation as complex
as Danube demonstrated the vulnerability of Western Europe to a 'standing start'
offensive (a 'standing start' being defined as a surprise attack mounted without
'° ESC(0x69)1 M meeting, 20.1.69; & ESC(0X69)13, Outccine of 1968/69 COCOM Review, 5.6.69,
CAB134/2801(PRO).
U OPD(69)13 neting, 28.7.69, CAB148I91PRO).
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mobilising reserves, using military exercises to conceal preparations).' 2
 One analysis
drafted by British military planners in late September noted that before the
invasion NATO powers felt 'that events were moving towards a settlement'
between Czechoslovakia and the WTO 'Five', and that the latter had achieved
'tactical surprise' as a consequence of 'the prevailing atmosphere of détente in
Europe'. Although mobilisation and large troop movements within Eastern Europe
would give NATO 'political warning' of possible military action, the unexpected
intervention against Czechoslovakia showed that 'NATO cannot guarantee to
predict the enemy's intentions reliably'.'3
Despite this assessment, senior military and civilian officials in London
were far more sanguine about Danube's strategic implications than their opposite
numbers in NATO. The JIC sought to play down its failure to anticipate the
WTO intervention, arguing that 'while Czechoslovakia was threatened with
aggression, NATO was not'. Although there is no indication as such in declassified
documents, it is possible that this judgement was partly based on SIG1NT
intercepts. The Americans successfully intercepted Soviet military communications
during the invasion, and it is conceivable that this SIG1NT information was passed
on to the British.' 4
 The COS noted on 1 October that there were 35 Soviet
divisions stationed in the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, compared to 22 before
the invasion, but that on the other hand as a consequence of the Prague Spring
the Czechoslovak armed forces could no longer be regarded by Moscow as
l2TJI DJATO to FO, No.509, 23.8.68, FCO28/100(PRO). Mill, Cold War, p.39, pp.60-61, pp.322-323.
'3 DP2 19/68, Br,tish Defence Policy - The Impact of Recent Events in Czechoslovakia, 23.9.68, DEFE6/106(PRO).
' 4 OPD(68)58, CAB14S/38(PRO). Bamford, Body q( Secrets, p.153.
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reliable. The chiefs concluded that there had been 'no significant increase in
Soviet [bloc] capability as a result of the Czechoslovak crisis', that NATO's
military officials exaggerated the threat to Western Europe, and that the Americans
in particular were trying to 'coerce' Alliance members into raising their force
levels.' 5
 Healey informed his OPD colleagues on 25 September that 'it was
significant that the Russians had used force to maintain the status quo, not to
challenge it'. According to Bruce, the Defence Secretary felt that both the strategic
balance in Europe and the assumptions underpinning the NATO strategic review
(MC 14/3) remained unchanged.' 6
 On 31 October, the OPD approved Healey and
Stewart's recommendations to increase the UK's naval presence in the
Mediterranean, and to eannark army units for contingencies involving a threat to
the Alliance's Northern and Southern flanks, but the British decided not to
accelerate the withdrawal from East of Suez to reinforce NATO. In addition,
London refused to send the infantry brigade redeployed to the UK after the
offsets agreement back to BAOR.'7
The consensus within Whitehall that Soviet intentions were limited to the
suppression of the Prague Spring proved correct, although it can be argued that
the potential military implications of a WTO surprise attack in Central Europe
were dismissed too readily. A common error in policy-making is to arrive at a
preconceived conclusion, and to overlook intelligence information which contradicts
COS5Oli/68, 1.10.68, DEFE4F234(PRO). C0S62/68, Briefs for the 41 meeting of the MCJCS, 10.9.68,
DEFE5I178(PRO).
I6OpD)j7th meeting, 25.9.68. London to State Dept. No.12398, 5.9.68, NSF, UKCF2I 1, LBJLJB.
' OPD(68)63, NATO and Czechoslovakia, 28.10.68, CAB148138(PRO). OPD(68)19th meeting, 31.10.68,
CAB14S/35(PRO). FCO to Canberra, No.1677, 8.11.68, FC046/249(PRO).
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this hypothesis. The prevailing view in London was that, as Wilson was informed
by one of Trend's subordinates, 'the main hazard for us as a country (and
therefore as a usefl.il member of NATO) remains our economic position', and that
Britain could not afford to increase its defence expenditure. During the summer of
1968 the COS felt that it was 'most important that no attempt should be made to
inflate the Soviet threat lest it should be misconstrued in Whitehall to as an
attempt to justify greater forces'. Although the chiefs were specifically referring to
emerging Soviet maritime capabilities, a similar attitude possibly underpinned
assessments of the implications of the Czechoslovak crisis.'8
Anglo-Soviet political relations were already strained before the invasion of
Czechoslovakia, partly because of the extent of Soviet espionage in the UK. On 12
July the counsellor of the British embassy in Washington, Edwin Bolland, met with
Malcolm Toon, the State Department's principal Soviet expert, to discuss this
problem. Bolland stated that the Foreign Office was 'considerably disturbed at the
substantial increase in Soviet personnel assigned to the United Kingdom over the
past four years', and was itself under pressure from the Home Office and M15 to
act. Before presenting recommendations to the Cabinet the Permanent Under-
Secretary had instructed the Washington embassy and the High Commission in
Ottawa to examine how the Americans and Canadians dealt with the same
problem. Bolland asked Toon whether the USA had imposed a limit on Soviet
embassy staff, whether known and suspected KGB and GRU officers were denied
18 j • Hughes-Wilson, Mililaty Intelligence Blwu1e,, (London, Robinson Publishing 1999), p.13. H. Laence-
Wilson (Cabinet Office) to PM, 24.9.68,PREM13/1996(PRO). COS29th/68, 21.5.68, DEFE41228(PRO).
diplomatic visas, and under what circumstances a Soviet diplomat would be
declared persona non grala. Toon told Bolland that there were four categories of
Soviet personnel in the USA; embassy staff, members of the UN Secretariat in
New York, journalists (genuine or otherwise) and staff on the state agency for
Soviet-American trade, AMTORG. The American government could easily expel
Soviets in the last three categories, although in the second case the UN Secretary-
General had to be informed. If the number of Soviet embassy personnel rose, the
USA could respond by increasing its representation in Moscow, and Soviet
diplomats caught spying would be declared persona non grata. 19 The intensification
of the Czechoslovak crisis during the summer of 1968 drew Foreign Office
attention away from this issue, but on 27 September Stewart wrote to Wilson,
arguing that the time had come to challenge the Soviets over recent spy scandals
involving their diplomats in London.
The Foreign Secretary asserted that the British government had 'tolerated
for far too long' the fact that many Soviet diplomats were 'instead of
contributing to the development of relations between us and the Soviet Union'
actually posed 'a threat to these relations'. Apart from the security implications of
KGB and GRU activities in the UK, the overstaffing of Soviet missions had
reached absurd levels. The Soviet embassy had 64 diplomats in 1964, a figure
which had risen to 80 four years later. Sixty two were suspected intelligence
officers, in addition to 32 of the 95 support staff, and a further 28 out of the 180
officials in the Soviet trade mission. Compared to this, the British embassy in
'9 Conversation between E. Bolland & M Toon at State Dept. 12.7.68; RG59, 160,64-65,2665, NARAH.
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Moscow had only 40 diplomats (although Stewart did not say how many were
actually SIS officers). Unlike the USA, Britain could not insist on parity of
representation, because of the small size of its diplomatic corps, so the Foreign
Secretary instead recommended that the Soviets should be told to limit embassy
staff numbers to present levels. In mid-October, James Callaghan (who was now
Home Secretary) gave his support to Stewart, although M15 complained that the
proposed measure did not cover the Soviet trade delegation or consular offices
outside London. Wilson subsequently gave his approval to Stewart's proposal. 2° On
11 November, Gore-Booth told Smirnovsky that the British government wanted
Soviet embassy staff levels to be set at 80 diplomats, 60 non-diplomatic staff and
8 service personnel. The latter's response was that this 'unfriendly gesture'
reflected the 'general hostility' Britain showed towards the USSR. Having had
restrictions imposed on the size of the London embassy, the Soviets simply
increased the number of staff at their trade delegation.2'
GeoffIey Harrison's successor, Duncan Wilson, began his service in Moscow
in October 1968. His last posting was as ambassador to Belgrade, and as noted
previously he was one of the FCO's more optimistic exponents of the 'evolution'
of Eastern Europe. On the 9 December, Duncan Wilson provided a lengthy analysis
of Soviet foreign policy, with particular reference to Brezhnev's speech at Warsaw
the previous month. The CPSU General Secretary reiterated the argument that the
20 Stewart to PM, 27.9.68; memorandum to A. Halls (No.10), 16.10.68; Pa11is
	 to Day, 21.10.68,
PREM13/2009(PRO).
21	 to D. Wilson (Moscow), 11.11.68; & R. Maudling & A. Douglas-Home to E. Heath, 30.7.71, DBPO
III, 1, pp.91-93, pp.359-362.
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ideological struggle between Communism and capitalism had intensified, and that
the 'counter-revolution' in Czechoslovakia was due to imperialist subversion,
disguised as 'bridge-building'. Brezhnev justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia on
the grounds that the Prague Spring threatened the survival of the 'Socialist
Commonwealth'. Duncan Wilson maintained that the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' was not
a 'charter for expansion', and he distinguished between Moscow's readiness to use
force against rebellious states within the Eastern bloc, and the USSR's 'cautious
and pragmatic' policies elsewhere:
I would conclude that the Soviet Government is not anxious to take any further
military-political action inside the area covered by the Warsaw Pact, but would do so if
they thought necessary, undeterred by fear of reprisals from the West; and that outside
the Warsaw Pact area they will be constrained by economic pressures and fear of
nuclear war to display considerable caution.
The ambassador to Moscow stated that a return to 'a general Cold War' over
Czechoslovakia would be contrary to Western interests, which were best served by
the promotion of détente, and he also argued that Britain was in danger of being
seen to be waging a 'private Anglo-Soviet cold war', and to be lagging behind
other Western powers (including the USA) in the pursuit of East-West détente.22
Duncan Wilson's comments reflected the Moscow embassy's impressions of
Soviet foreign policy priorities at the end of 1968, the first being considered to be
'the defence of the Soviet Union ... as the heartland of Socialism', the second
being the preservation of the USSR's 'sphere of influence' in Eastern Europe, and
D. Wilson to Stewart, 4.11.68 & 9.12.68, DBPO III, 1, pp.87-89 & pp.100-110. Brezhnev's speech to the
Polish Communist Party Congress in Warsaw is summarised by Roberts, Soviet Union, p.72.
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after these objectives the expansion of Soviet world power 'concurrently with the
expansion of Marxism/Leninism as a doctrine'. Stewart responded to Duncan
Wilson's assessment in early January 1969, expressing his concerns that Moscow's
'Socialist Commonwealth' rhetoric could be employed to justify Soviet intervention
outside Eastern Europe. Stewart expressed particular concern for the possible
implications of the 'Brezhnev doctrine' for the Soviet maritime build-up in the
Mediterranean. The Foreign Secretary expressed his scorn for the 'Russian humbug
about a private British vendetta', seeing this as a prime example of the USSR's
habit of 'wedge-driving', and expressed his dissatisfaction with the 'note of
contempt in the manner in which the Russians deal with and speak of this
country'. 23
 Stewart clearly considered Soviet propaganda attacks on British
'hostility' to be empty talk, while Duncan Wilson was far more concerned at the
deterioration in Anglo-Soviet relations. Palliser observed that Moscow's anti-British
diatribes were 'understandable' because there was 'no important place' for Britain
in Soviet foreign policy. Like other FCO officials, Palliser had concluded that the
preceding four years of Wilson's dealings with the Soviet leadership had done
little for bilateral relations.24
G. Clark (Moscow) to C. Giffard (EESD), 4.12.68, FC0491241(PRO). Stewart to D. Wilson, 7.1.69, DBPO HI,
I, pp.111-115.
24 D Wilson to Stewart, 28.1.69; & Palliser to Trend, 28.1.69, PREM13!2959(PRO).
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British assessments of Soviet foreign policy: February 1969-June 1970.
In Stewart's opinion, the Czechoslovak crisis 'illuminated the uneasy balance
between defence and offence in Soviet foreign policy'. In February 1969 he
presented to the OPD an assessment by the FCO on the future course of East-
West relations, which in his sombre words concluded that the prospects for
rapprochement between the Western powers and Soviet bloc were 'less hopeiW
than we thought two years ago'. Although Moscow's intentions towards Western
Europe had not changed since August 1968, the USSR was still intent on
weakening and subverting the Western powers, and on expanding its influence
across the world. The FCO paper ominously noted that 'Soviet interest in the
Mediterranean, the Middle East and Indian Ocean will be intensified, possibly to
the point of risking local defeats' like that suffered by the Arabs in June 1967
'to which the Soviet Government might react dangerously'. In Eastern Europe, the
ideological inflexibility of the ruling regimes conflicted with popular demands for
increased contacts with the West and for 'greater political and economic freedom
from Soviet hegemony'. The Soviet leadership could control unrest within the
USSR because of the 'dead weight of Russian bureaucracy' and the conservative
'sense of patriotism' among the Soviet populace, but Eastern Europe would
continue to be a source of instability due to Moscow's intolerance of reform.
The Foreign Secretary informed his colleagues that the prospects of an
East-West war caused by 'accident or miscalculation' were slim, 'except in the
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unlikely event of uncontainable explosions in Eastern Europe'. Yet with the
exception of the contacts established between the superpowers on arms control,
Stewart believed that there was little scope for negotiated agreements with the
Soviets on other outstanding problems, including Germany and European security.
The Foreign Secretary concluded that while the UK and other Western powers
should continue their efforts to promote détente, the invasion of Czechoslovakia
'made it clearer than ever that the achievement of this goal depends on changes
in the basic attitudes of the Soviet leadership'. Stewart concluded that such a
development was unlikely in the near future, and that '[we] are in for a long
haul'. The OPD approved this analysis without comment.25
Throughout this paper, and the FCO's thinking on East-West relations, there
was a contradiction which remained unresolved. Discontent with socio-economic
austerity and pressure for political change would continue to fester in the Eastern
bloc, but the Soviet and East European regimes would not introduce any reforms
which would alleviate this pressure. The logical result would be the 'uncontrollable
explosions' of revolutionary upheaval which Stewart considered unlikely and
which, as noted above, FCO officials hoped would not occur. The British continued
to hope for the eventual 'evolution' of the Eastern European countries away from
Marxist-Leninist dogma and towards a more liberal political and economic order,
but there were few signs of such a development taking place in early 1969. The
FCO's analysis of 'normalisation' in Czechoslovakia, and its erroneous conclusions
OPD(69)8, The Longer Term ProspecL for East-West Relations after the Czechoslovak crisis, 18.2.69, &
cover note by Stewail, PREM13.2114(PRO). OP[k69)4th meeting, 18.3.69, CAB14SI91(PRO).
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on the prospects for continued reform, displayed a tendency towards wishful
thinking. The British government's conclusion that there was little that the UK and
other Western powers could do to help promote 'evolution' was probably realistic,
given Moscow's hyper-sensitivity towards 'bridge-building', but Ministers and
officials alike were unable to explain how leaders like Brezhnev, Ulbricht,
Gomulka, Husak and Zhivkov would ever allow 'evolution' to take place.
The invasion of Czechoslovakia and the 'Brezhnev doctrine' led the
American and British governments to examine the possibility of Soviet
intervention against Romania or Yugoslavia, yet neither government expected that
the suppression of the Prague Spring would intensify the Sino-Soviet feud. Recent
research suggests that Beijing initiated the two clashes between Chinese and
Soviet border troops on the Ussuri river (2 and 15 March 1969) in order to deter
the USSR from using the same methods employed against Dubcek to overthrow
Mao's regime. However, these clashes led to a series of bloody battles along the
Sino-Soviet frontier which threatened to escalate into all-out war. 26
 On 9 April,
Duncan Wilson informed Stewart that the Soviets were likely to reinforce their
military presence in the Far East. The threat of confrontation with China would, he
argued, make Moscow more inclined to negotiate with Washington on arms
control, and to be more 'respectable' in its relations with the West Europeans.
However, the USSR was unlikely to ease its strategic burden by agreeing to
mutual force reductions in Europe, as Czechoslovakia had demonstrated that
See Yang Kuisong, 'The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American
Rapprochement', in Cold War Hzstoy, 1/1 (2000), pp.21-49; & W. Bun, 'Sino-American Relations 1969: The
Sino-Soviet Border War and Steps Towards Rapprochement', Cold War History, 1/3 (2001), pp.73-105.
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without a strong Soviet military presence the Communist system in Eastern
Europe would collapse. Duncan Wilson noted that although the Soviet leaders
'probably take more seriously than we do the possibility of a rapprochement
between the US and China', any 'radical' attempts to improve relations with the
USA would divide the Politburo, arouse increased hostility from China and
encourage 'liberal and revisionist tendencies' within the Eastern bloc. The
ambassador therefore considered a US-Soviet entente aimed against China to be
unlikely.27
Duncan Wilson's supposition that Soviet concerns over a Sino-American
alignment were unrealistic were invalidated by Nixon's visit to China in 1972, but
represented British opinion in mid-1969. During the Prime Minister's meeting with
Nixon at the US air base at Mildenhall (3 August 1969), the former described the
USSR as a 'conservative' country, which would 'naturally respond to any
opportunity for disruptive penetration' in Asia, but was more inclined 'to see
stability in the area rather than arouse the more revolutionary Communist country,
China, to scoop the pool'. Nixon expressed his agreement with this view, and also
reiterated American concerns over the Chinese nuclear programme. 28
 The FCO's
analysis of the implications of the Sino-Soviet border conflict focused on the non-
existent prospects of reconciliation between Moscow and Beijing. The PUSD's
examination of the feud, produced in December 1969, commented on the benefits
of the Sino-Soviet split for Western interests, in particular the USSR's greater
D.Wilson to Stewart,9.4.69,DPBO III, J,pp.127-129.
E. Youde (No.10), Conversation between Nixon & PM at USAF Mildenhall, 3.8.69, PREM13I3009/1(PRO).
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willingness to discuss arms control with the USA. British policy had consistently
maintained that China could not be isolated in perpetuity, and envisaged that in
the long-term Beijing would moderate its hostility towards the West. However, the
PUSD concluded that 'the card of flirtation with China is one to be used with
great caution', otherwise Western efforts to improve relations with the USSR
would suffer. In response, Duncan Wilson suggested that the PUSD overlooked the
possibility of a diplomatic coup similar to the 1939 'Molotov-Ribbentrop' Pact, but
in this respect he was referring to possibility of Sino-Soviet reconciliation. 29 The
FCO's failure to foresee the improvement of Sino-Western relations was not a
product of official short-sightedness. Both Yang Kuisong and William Burr show
that Nixon and Mao had to overcome a legacy of mutual suspicion, intense
ideological animosity and clashes of interest over Indochina and Taiwan. The
consensus in Whitehall was that there would be a 'triangular' relationship between
the USA, USSR and PRC. In Washington, both Kissinger and the State Department
regarded the future tnlateral relationship in similar terms.30
Wilson's discussions with Nixon at Mildenhall (August 1969) represented
an effort on the former's part to establish good relations with the new President.
Like his relationship with Johnson, Wilson's attempts to befriend Nixon had mixed
results. Kissinger recalled that when the Prime Minister suggested to the President
that they could talk on first-name terms, a 'fish-eyed stare from Nixon squelched
OP[XOXLTX69)2, The Sino-Soviet Dispute, 4.12.69; & D. Wilson to P. Cradock (PUSD), 3.12.69,
FC0491255(PRO).
3°Kuisong, 'Sino-Soviet Clash', pp.41-49. Burr, 'Sino-American Relalions', pp.103-105. JIC(A), Soviet Foreign
Policy, 15.12.69, DBPO Iii, I, pp.200-205.
this idea'. 3 ' Kissinger commented that the new President 'distrusted' Wilson, yet
the former was far more diplomatic in his dealings with the Prime Minister than
Johnson had been. The Mildenhall meeting took place during a brief stop-over
following Nixon's Asian tour, and was a symbolic gesture towards the 'special
relationship'. Yet during his talks with Wilson the President paid extravagant
tribute to Britain's 'great expertise in foreign affairs', and stated that the British
could contribute to American policy through their 'analysis and prognosis' of
world affairs. Wilson acknowledged that the President had a reputation for
insincerity (or 'Nixon charm', as he put it), but chose to believe that the latter's
comments on British diplomatic expertise were genuine. 32
 Nixon's statements on
Britain's diplomatic role were not only what Wilson wanted to hear, but were
linked to the Prime Minister's intention to visit Moscow a fourth time.
In May 1969 Benn visited the USSR for discussions with Kirillin, and
Wilson asked the Minister of Technology to pass a message to Kosygin. Despite a
warning from Stewart to steer clear of politics during his trip, Benn told Kosygin
that Wilson regretted the fact that Anglo-Soviet contacts had been frozen as a
result of the Czechoslovak crisis. The Prime Minister also felt that 'it might be
useful to have a personal visit' to meet the Soviet Premier, in order to discuss
'matters of common interest'. 33 This was a reference to the Middle East, which
was the subject of a Soviet 'peace' initiative. Following the Six Day War, Egypt
31 Healey, Time of My Life, p.318. Kissing, White House Yea,, p.92, pp.417-418.
Kissinger, White House Yea,, p.933. Nixon & PM, 3.8.69, PREM13I3009I1(PRO).
Benn, Office Without Power, 12.5.69, 13.5.69 & 14.5.69, ppp.161-173. Moscow to FCO, No.464, 14.5.69,
PRM13/3429(PRO).
and Israel waged a war of attrition along the Suez Canal and efforts at mediation
by the UN Special Representative, Gunnar Jarring, had proved fruitless. The
USSR's 1969 initiative repeated the terms of a plan produced the previous year,
which advocated an Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967,
followed by the recognition of Israel by the Arab powers. The initiative was a
dead letter because both belligerents were unwilling to compromise on the issues
of land and recognition, but Wilson considered it a subject worth discussing with
Kosygin. By using Benn as his intermediary with the Soviets, Wilson had not
consulted the Foreign Secretary, as he was presumably aware that Stewart would
oppose a trip to Moscow. The Prime Minister also regarded the suppression of the
'Prague Spring' as a mere impediment to his efforts to establish his ties with the
Soviet leadership.34
Kosygin suggested that the Prime Minister visit Moscow in June or July.
On previous occasions, the Soviets had delayed their invitations to Wilson, and the
alacrity with which Kosygin accepted the former's proposed visit reflected Soviet
concerns to salvage the USSR's diplomatic respectability after the Prague Spring.
The FCO was, however, unenthusiastic and persuaded the Prime Minister to delay
any visit to the USSR until after his trip to Washington. In late May Stewart
reminded Wilson that the NATO powers had agreed that 'in their bilateral
contacts with the Soviet Union and the four invading Warsaw Pact members the
Allies will continue to exercise restraint on political exchanges'. The criteria for
Calvocoressi, World Politics, pp.396-397. Golan, Soviet Policies, pp.71-72. Tl Soviet 'peace plan' is in
OPD(69)35, The Arab/Israeli Dispute, 2 1.7.69, Annex C, CABI48/92(PRO).
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any visit would not be the level of representation, but the prospects for
constructive agreement, and the Foreign Secretary did not consider that Wilson's
intended trip to the USSR would have any practical purpose.35
The Prime Minister was not prepared to give this idea up lightly, and he
stated that during the Mildenhall meeting Nixon had shown interest in his
proposal to meet Kosygin, seeing this as an opportunity to sound out the Soviets
on strategic arms talks, Vietnam and the Middle East. Nixon was perhaps
displaying a tendency he showed on subsequent occasions, as unlike Johnson he
showed more willingness to listen politely to the opinions of foreign leaders.36
Stewart was unmoved by Wilson's account of the Mildenhall talks, arguing that
while the British government had several issues it wished to discuss with the
Nixon administration, there was 'relatively little' to raise with the Soviets. The
Foreign Secretary asserted that unless the President specifically requested
otherwise, Wilson should still visit the USA first. In conversation with the British
ambassador to Washington on 16 September, Kissinger gave no special reason for
the Prime Minister meeting Kosygin before his planned American trip (scheduled
for January 1970). Nixon's National Security Advisor diplomatically commented
that 'the President would have found it valuable ... to hear the Prime Minister's
judgement, for which he had the highest respect, on Soviet attitudes', but this did
not lead Stewart or FCO officials to change their minds.37
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From late 1968 onwards there was a clear difference of opinion between
the Moscow embassy and the FCO on the conduct of relations with the USSR.
Duncan Wilson was concerned that in comparison with other Western powers
Britain appeared to be 'rigid and disinterested' in improving East-West relations. In
contrast, FCO officials believed that it was up to the USSR to show compromise
in its relations with the UK and other Western powers, and some felt that the
ambassador to Moscow was 'too ready to put the best construction on Soviet
behaviour'. 38 Duncan Wilson believed that the Warsaw Pact states were winning
the propaganda war by calling for a European security conference at their
meetings in Budapest and Prague (March and October 1969). However, Soviet bloc
proposals for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) were
regarded by the FCO with misgivings similar to those officials had felt when
Churchill had called for a summit in 1953. FCO officials had yet to conclude that
the CSCE could be used to force concessions from the Eastern bloc states on
trans-national contacts and human rights.39
Duncan Wilson's differences with mainstream opinion in the FCO were
illustrated by his meeting with Stewart, Greenhill (who had succeeded Gore-Booth
as Permanent Under-Secretaiy) and Brimelow (now the Deputy Under-Secretaiy)
on 16 January 1970. The Foreign Secretary commented on the latter's argument
that 'we should be more active in dialogue with the Russians', and rhetorically
Garthoff, Détente and Confivntaticn, p.131.M. Hopkins "Worlds Apart': The British Embassy in Moscow
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enquired as to what the Soviet and British governments could 'profitably talk
about ?'. Like Brimelow and Greenhill, Stewart believed that discussions with the
Soviets were pointless, and that the proposed CSCE would be exploited by the
Warsaw Pact powers to split the Americans and West Europeans. 4° Bnmelow and
Greenhill's reluctance to see Wilson pay yet another visit to the USSR reflected
the opinion - which Stewart shared - that Britain had shown too much eagerness
to develop Anglo-Soviet goodwill, and that the UK's efforts to promote détente
had been spumed by Moscow. Although Wilson did receive another invitation to
the USSR on 13 June 1970, Labour's general election defeat five days later left
its acceptance to a new Prime Minister, Edward Heath.4'
Conclusions:
The WTO intervention in Czechoslovakia had no fundamental effect on the
essential features of British policy towards the USSR and other Soviet bloc states.
The UK remained committed to East-West détente, and was not prepared to
sacrifice its commercial relations with the Eastern bloc or to increase defence
expenditure. Contrary to Stewart's comments, Britain did operate on a 'business as
usual basis' after August 1968, as did other Western countries. The military and
strategic consequences of the invasion of Czechoslovakia did not create much
concern in Whitehall, and it is significant that there was no 'war scare' following
Meeting between Briinelow, Gi-eenhill, Ste'nrt & D. Wilson, 16.1.70, PREM13/3429(PRO).
41 Memorandum by P. Moon (FCO), 13.6.70, PREM1313495(PRO).
the suppression of the Prague Spring. 42 In fact, it is fair to say the foreign and
security policy issues which concerned the Wilson government the most were
those related to the Nigerian civil war and the outbreak of civil strife in Northern
Ireland in the summer of 1969.
The Czechoslovak crisis did have an impact on political and popular
perceptions of the USSR. Stewart and FCO officials were particularly anxious to
impress on the Cabinet the Soviet leadership's inflexibility both in its dealings
with Western governments, and in the face of demands for reform within the
Eastern bloc. The Foreign Secretary also blocked Wilson's attempt to meet
Kosygin in Moscow, arguing that there was little that the British and Soviet
governments could 'profitably' discuss. According to Ben Pimlott, Stewart insisted
that he be given security of tenure when he was reappointed Foreign Secretary in
March 1968. Pimlott also argues that as Wilson's relationship with his Cabinet
colleagues deteriorated in the final months of his Premiership, Stewart was one of
the few Ministers he could confide in and trust. In this respect, it is significant
that the Foreign Secretary was able to thwart the Prime Minister's efforts to
undertake a fourth visit to the USSR. Wilson clearly wanted to maintain contact
with the Soviet leadership, and sought to overcome Stewart's opposition to a visit
by using Benn as a contact with Kosygin. However, Stewart and the FCO
considered that a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Soviet Premier
D. Wilson, 'Anglo-Soviet Relations', pp.390-391.
Morgan, Peoples Peace, pp.290-292. Pinhloit, Wilson, pp.491-492, pp.548-550.
would have little value, and whatever his personal feelings Wilson did not
overrule, or confront, the Foreign Secretaiy.
While Benn regarded Stewart's thinking on policy towards the Soviet bloc
as 'barely post-Dulles' in its outlook, the latter did have a point. As Duncan
Wilson noted, Khrushchev had dealt mercilessly with the Hungarian rebels in
1956, but had also accepted the rise of Polish 'national Communism'. However,
Brezhnev and his colleagues had displayed a complete intolerance for any reform
whatsoever in Eastern Europe, even if undertaken by the Communist regimes. The
cynicism the Soviet leaders had shown in August 1968 discredited the USSR's
reputation in Britain and elsewhere, and disillusioned many who would have
shared Crossman's feelings, as confided in his diary over a fortnight after the
invasion of Czechoslovakia:
[Somehow] I had persuaded myself over the past three or four years that a change was
setting in and that with the policy of peaceful coexistence, the Russians would grow
more civilised. But now they're exactly as bad as they were.45
44 Piinlott, Wilson, p.502, p.546.
45 D. Wilson to Stewart, 28.1.69, PREM13/2959(PRO). Crossman, ifi, 1.9.68, p.179.
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CONCLUSION.
According to one study of the Heath government's term in office (1970-1974), one
aspect of British foreign policy which 'remained strangely under-developed
[was] relations with the Soviet Union'. The new Prime Minister's principal policy
objective was to take Britain into the EEC, and unlike both Macmillan and
Wilson, Heath had no intention of even visiting the USSR.' In September 1971 the
British government expelled 105 KGB and GRU officers from the Soviet embassy
and trade mission. The pretext for this mass expulsion (known as Operation Foot)
was provided by a KGB defector, Oleg Lyalin, who informed M15 of the Soviet
embassy's plans for widespread sabotage across Britain in the event of an East-
West war. Operation Foot came as an unpleasant shock to the Soviets, who had
expanded their intelligence activities in the UK throughout the 1960s. The KGB's
aim, according to one defector, was to 'swamp the overstretched MIS with more
intelligence officers than they could hope to keep under effective surveillance', and
Foot caused irreparable damage to Soviet espionage in Britain. For both the Heath
government and the FCO, these expulsions were an opportunity to show the
Soviets that the British government could not be pushed around.2
Operation Foot was a by-product of the re-assessment of Anglo-Soviet
relations which had began within the Foreign Office in early 1968. Officials felt
'C. Hill & C. Lord, 'The foreign policy of the Heath Government', in S. Ball & A. Seldon (eL), The Heath
Government 1970-74. A Reappnnsa/, (Longman 1996), p.309. Edward Heath, The Course f My Life, (Hodd &
Stoughton 1998), pp.474-476.
2 Meeting at Greathill's office, 25.5.71. Douglas-Home to R. Maudling, 11.9.71, DBPO III, 1, pp.339-43, &
pp.378-379. Andrew & Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archives, pp.499-500, pp.538-539. Hopkins, "Worlds Apart", p.144.
that the USSR had treated British intentions to foster bilateral goodwill with
contempt, and that Britain had to 'meet toughness with toughness' when dealing
with the Soviets. Expelling over a hundred suspected intelligence officers after
months of complaint at their abuse of diplomatic immunity was one means of
showing 'toughness'. During the early 1970s, the USA, France and the FRG were
proactive in seeking détente with the Soviets, but the Heath government was in no
mood to 'run after the Russians', and FCO officials took pride in the UK's
reputation as the 'Cassandra to the Western alliance'. Although Britain did not
respond to either the Czechoslovak crisis or the growth in Soviet naval power by
increasing defence expenditure, this lack of alarmism was combined with a
sceptical response to Soviet declarations of goodwill. 3
 During the 1970s, as White
notes, West Gennany claimed the leading role as Western Europe's exponent of
détente, with Brandt developing a working relationship with Brezhnev that Wilson
had failed to achieve. Osipolitik was supported by London because it helped
defuse the tensions inherent in the German question. Bonn's overtures to the
USSR and the East European states also helped dispel the suspicions concerning
future German intentions which British officials privately maintained. However, the
FRG's new approach towards East-West relations had profound implications for
British policy towards détente. Given the essential importance of the German
problem as a source of Cold War tensions, it was inevitable that increased
contacts and better relations between West Germany and the Soviet bloc states
3 G. Roberts to Stewart, 13.6.68, FCO28154(PRO). DBPO III, HL Détente in Europe 1972-76, (London Frank
Cass 2001), pp.xv-xvi.
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would mean a reduced role for other West European states with an interest in
promoting détente.4
Osipolitik also posed its own problems for Western solidarity. Both Heath
and the Foreign Secretary, Douglas-Home, were concerned that France, the FRG
and other Western powers would engage in 'competitive détente', and that as the
continental allies scrambled for increased trade with the Soviet bloc Western unity
would be eroded. The FCO were likewise worried that negotiations for the CSCE
would be exploited by the Soviets to divide Western Europe from the USA. As a
consequence of American apathy, it was the British who took the lead in co-
ordinating NATO's position in the preliminary negotiations from 1972 onwards.
While the Soviets intended to use the CSCE to formalise the status quo on the
continent, Britain and its allies forced the WTO powers to make concessions on
trans-national contacts and human rights in the 'Final Act' signed by participants
at Helsinki in 1975. It is also worth noting that following Nixon's visit to
Beijing in 1972 the Conservative government sought to improve relations with
China. Western efforts to develop closer ties with the PRC were regarded with a
mixture of concern and annoyance in Moscow. China posed a serious threat to
Soviet security, and after the border clashes of 1969 up to one third of the
USSR's armed forces were deployed in the Far East.6
4 Loth, Overcoming the Cold War, p.124. White, Bntain (and) détente, p.121, p.131.
5 White, Britain (and) détente, p.127. (jazlhoff, Détente and Confronlaikl?, pp.531-535. Stoning Brief for UK
delegation to CSCE, 13.9.73,DBPO III, IL Conference on Security & Cooperation in Europe. 1972-75, (HMSO
1997), pp.179-186.
6 j Stecle, World Power. Soviet Foreign Policy under Brezhnev and Andropov, (London; Michael Joseph 1983),
pp.266-268. Hill & Lord, 'Foreign policy', p.309.
Under Brezhnev, the USSR emerged as 'a real world power', and Soviet
objectives towards détente were partly intended to re-affirm superpower status.
Moscow's aims were firstly to stabilise the arms race and to achieve strategic
parity with the USA, secondly to gain international acceptance of the post-1945
order in Europe, thirdly to increase its trade with the West, and finally to prevent
Sino-American collusion. However, during the 1970s Soviet policy towards détente
clashed with the USSR's efforts to expand its influence overseas, and by the end
of the decade superpower détente had collapsed as a result of repeated clashes
between American and Soviet interests in the Third World. Furthermore, Soviet
efforts to reach military parity with the USA contributed to the USSR's internal
woes, as increased defence expenditure crippled its economy. The Soviet
leadership's inability to address this problem was a consequence of the
concentration of power on an increasingly infirm Brezhnev. The Politburo became
a gerontocracy, and between 1973 and 1975 younger challengers to Brezhnev's
position, including Polyanskii, Shelest and Shelepin, were expelled from the CPSU
Central Committee. Kosygin was side-lined and gradually deprived of authority.
Although the FCO had placed its hopes on the emergence of a technocratic class
less supportive of Communist dogma and more inclined towards reform, under
Brezhnev the Soviet system became even more bureaucratic, rigid and corrupt. The
decline of the USSR was symbolised by the deterioration of Brezhnev's physical
and mental health, and well before his death in 1982 the Soviet leader had
become, in Robert Service's words, a 'helpless geriatric case'.7
7 Roberts Soviet Union, p.66. Steele, World Power, p.ix. Craig Nation, Red Star, p.232. Svice, Twentieth Centuiy
Russia, pp.391-393, pp.403-404.
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Duncan Wilson observed in 1974 that '[the] Soviet Union stands as the
Great Power successor to the Tsarist Empire - expansionist and repressive'. The
USSR had lost any ideological magnetism it had possessed, and the suppression of
the Prague Spring had tarnished its reputation. Having completed his service in
Moscow in 1971, Duncan Wilson maintained three years on that commercial and
cultural contacts with the Soviets were necessary in order to encourage détente.
Another former diplomat in the Moscow embassy, Roderic Braithwaite (who served
as the Commercial Secretary from 1963-1966, and returned as ambassador from
1988-199 1), was more sceptical about the value of East-West contacts. In his
opinion, the Wilson government's dealings with the Soviet leadership did not make
'a huge difference':
Harold Wilson had his own connections with Eastern Europe and Russia, but the truth of
the matter is that ... the substance of Anglo-Russian or Anglo-Soviet relations has
always been very thin. As a bilateral relationship neither country has actually cared very
much about the other. We cared about the Soviet Union as a huge potential threat. But
the policy issues which that gave rise to were mainly conducted with the NATO
Alliance and within our relations with the Americans. Most of our dealings with the
Russians directly were over things like who was going to throw out whose spy first,
things which are not actually the mainstream of normal, bilateral, international relations.
Braithwaite asserted that, as was the case with Macmillan's 'voyage of discovery',
Wilson's contacts with the Soviet leadership were merely 'gesture politics'. The
British input into the LTBT in 1963 was peripheral, but was far more substantial
than the UK's role in the NPT in 1968. Braithwaite's critique raises four
questions about the Wilson government's role in Anglo-Soviet relations. What were
8 D. Wilson, 'Anglo-Soviet Relations', pp.388-389. Braithuite, pp.2-3, DOHP.
its objectives as far as East-West relations were concerned? To what degree was
the Labour government's approach to the Cold War conditioned by the policies of
its predecessors? What did his government achieve in practical terms? Finally,
were there any missed opportunities to improve relations with the USSR?
In contrast with de Gaulle there is no evidence of any systematic analysis
on Wilson's part on the nature of détente, or on how East-West rivalries could be
overcome. To use Kissinger's words, Wilson showed 'almost no interest in abstract
ideas',9
 and only two Cold War-related issues attracted the Prime Minister's
consistent attention, these being East-West trade and the Vietnam war. Wilson was
a practitioner of 'magpie diplomacy', temporarily seizing on specific issues to
discuss with the Soviet leadership only to drop them once they had lost their
appeal. His initial interest in an NPT faded after his visit to Moscow in February
1966, and as one study of British arms control policy notes, Wilson devoted a
mere six pages of his memoirs to an issue which the Labour government initially
declared to be a priority. Other short-term interests included NATO and Warsaw
Pact force reductions and the Middle East. It is particularly important to note that
although Foreign Office officials developed the hypothesis of 'evolution' within
the Soviet bloc, there is no sign that the Prime Minister was in any way
concerned with Britain's contacts with the East European states. Wilson paid three
visits to Moscow, but unlike the French President - who visited Poland (1967) and
Romania (1968) - Wilson did not visit Eastern Europe.'° Furthermore, in his
Kissinger, White House Years, p.92.
'°Freeman,Anns Control, pill. KOrbel, Détente in Europe, p.6!.
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contacts with Kosygin in mid-1969 he showed scant concern over
Czechoslovakia's fate, and considered the suppression of the Prague Spring to be a
mere impediment in his efforts to develop ties with the Soviet leadership.
Although Foreign Office officials conceded by early 1968 that British policy had
neglected the East European states, Wilson continued this tradition of neglect.
Of the three Foreign Secretaries in Wilson's Cabinet, Patrick Gordon-Walker
spent only three months in his post (from October 1964 to January 1965). George
Brown served for longer (from August 1966 to March 1968) and was closely
involved with efforts to mediate between the USA and North Vietnam, and an
abortive attempt to start CTBT negotiations. Yet although there was little to
distinguish Brown from Wilson on issues of policy, their mutual hostility led to
Brown's eventual resignation from the Cabinet. Chris Wrigley correctly suggests
that Michael Stewart's role as Foreign Secretary is open to reassessment. His
Cabinet colleagues regarded him as a dull and uninspiring figure, although from
Wilson's point of view Stewart's lack of ambition meant that he posed no
political threat." Much to the Labour left's chagrin, Stewart represented continuity
with the 'Atlanticist' foreign policy followed by Attlee and Bevin. He also fully
endorsed the reassessment of relations with the USSR undertaken by the Foreign
Office in early 1968, and the following year he thwarted Wilson's efforts to
undertake a fourth visit to Moscow. As far as defence policy was concerned, the
principal initiative for the decisions made during the defence reviews came from
the Defence Secretary. Despite an earlier flirtation with Communism, Healey did
Wrigley, 'Labour's Foreign Policy', in Coopey, Fielding, & Tiratsoo, Wi1s.z Govemmts, p.129.
not share the Labour left's faith in Soviet goodwill, but he also showed no alarm
over either the expansion of the USSR's maritime power overseas or the
suppression of the Prague Spring.' 2 The decision to withdraw British forces from
East of Suez and to focus on the defence of Western Europe had more to do
with political calculations, notably with regards future membership of the EEC,
than on assessments of the Soviet 'threat'.
Braithwaite's comparison between Wilson and Macmillan showed that the
Labour government's approach towards East-West relations was fundamentally
similar to that of its predecessors. Despite his left-wing past, Wilson retained the
British nuclear deterrent and was more emotionally committed to the 'special
relationship' with the USA than Heath. British policy towards Communist powers
during the first two decades of the Cold War showed distinct characteristics.
Firstly, the UK's defence policy involved a close alignment with the USA and
membership of NATO, and the British generally presumed NATO's existence and
the American military presence in Europe meant that the 'Soviet threat' could be
contained without recourse to war. At the same time, the possibility that the US
deterrent could be 'decoupled' from the defence of Western Europe was used by
successive British governments to justify the UK's status as a nuclear power.
Healey used this argument to encourage fellow Ministers to approve further
studies towards the upgrading of Polaris. Secondly, during successive Cold War
crises, London was concerned that excessive American belligerence could provoke
'2 Ce's comment that the Defence Secretaiy 'seems determined to scotch any reconciliation with Russia' is
exaggerated, but is was certainly true that Healey could not be accused of being pro-Soviet See Castle,
Diaries, 7.12.65, p.75.
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an East-West conflict - this sentiment had manifested itself over Korea, Berlin and
Indochina, and was present, albeit in a more muted form, throughout the Vietnam
war. Thirdly, the British did not regard political and ideological hostility to be an
impediment to trade, and although the American attitude towards East-West
commerce was less hostile during the 1960s than before, London and Washington
continued to quarrel over the strategic embargo. The problem here, as Gore-Booth
later admitted, was that the British tendency to neglect ideology as a factor in
international relations affected the UK's assessment of the influence of Communist
doctrine on East-West relations.' 3 As noted above, the FCO's concept of 'evolution'
underestimated the dogmatism and orthodoxy which characterised the Soviet bloc
regimes.
Fourthly, British politicians and officials did not subscribe to the Manichean
view of the Cold War that was prevalent in Washington during the early Cold
War period, and which briefly re-emerged in the 1980s. In his analysis of US-
Soviet détente in the 1970s, Garthoff identified three schools of thought in
American decision-making. The 'essentialists' regarded the USSR as being not only
'inherently expansionist but evil', while the 'mechanists' considered the Soviets to
be cautious opportunists who would avoid confrontation with the West.
'Mechanists' presumed that while negotiations on specific issues were feasible, the
prospects for a lasting accommodation with the USSR were slim. The
'interactionists', in Garthoff's words, 'tended to find greater diversity in internal
Soviet politics and therefore greater potential for the evolution of the Soviet
'3 Gore-Booth, With Great Truth, pp.412-419.
system', as well as for the alleviation of East-West tensions through diplomatic
contacts with Moscow. British policy towards the USSR can be described as a
combination of the 'mechanist' and 'interactionist' schools of thought. George
Brown's scorn for any 'goodies and baddies' view of world politics reflected the
UK's approach to East-West relations as a whole. British diplomats consistently
maintained that the UK, to use Duncan Wilson's words, 'cannot confine [itself] to
dealing with governments whose general policies we approve'.'4
As Gore-Booth noted, the principal problem affecting Britain's relations with
Communist states was not the latter's internal policies, but their intention to spread
their ideology world-wide. The Foreign Office officials who suggested that IRD
propaganda should focus on the repressive nature of the Soviet regime based this
proposal on the need to 'educate' the British public about the USSR's internal
problems, and to respond in kind to Soviet press attacks highlighting the UK's
internal difficulties. There was no intention to actively support Soviet and East
European dissidents, or to directly incite revolts behind the Iron Curtain. Like other
Western governments, the British took pains not to openly encourage the
Czechoslovak reformers during the summer of 1968. Yet after the Prague Spring
there was a difference of emphasis between an 'interactionist' Prime Minister and
his namesake in Moscow on the one hand, and Stewart and the majority of
officials in the FCO. While both Harold and Duncan Wilson believed that the
onus for preserving contacts with the USSR lay with Britain, the latter concluded
'4 Garthoff,Détente and Confrontation, pp.1176-1177. Brown made his comment in a Parliamentaxy debate on
10.7.67, see 750 ILC.Deb5s (JIMSO 1967), col.2489. D. Wilson, 'Anglo-Soviet Relations', p.389, p.390.
that it was up to Moscow to show some sense of compromise in its dealings
with the Western powers.'5
In practical terms, the Wilson government had little to show for its efforts
to promote détente, aside from the Consular Convention (1965) and the Benn-
Kirillin technological agreement (1968). Kosygin's visit to Britain in February 1967
was a more amicable affair than Bulganin and Khrushchev's trip the previous
decade. Yet Wilson showed far more interest in the appearance of Anglo-Soviet
concord - as shown by the 'striking initiatives' in trade he had hoped for in 1967
and 1968, and his continual preoccupation with meeting the Soviet leadership as
often as possible - than with the actual results. Wilson could not persuade the
Soviets to assist his peace-making initiatives on Vietnam, or to respond to the first
West German moves towards Osipolitik. His assumption that Moscow would be
interested in NATO and WTO force reductions was shown to be false. Although
Wilson and his Ministers paid lip-service to the idea of rallying NATO behind a
twin policy of defence and détente after March 1966, the Labour government
showed far less interest in the proposed Anglo-Czechoslovak 'declaration of
principles' than with the problem of offsetting BAOR's costs. While the Harmel
exercise (December 1967) reflected the UK's view that détente was not
incompatible with NATO's collective defence, its endorsement by the Alliance had
little to do with British policy. Despite Labour's emphasis on arms control in its
1964 manifesto Brown's attempt to promote preparatory talks towards a CTBT in
late 1966 was vetoed by Gromyko, while the conclusion of the NPT two years
' 5 sc(67)17, FC049125(PRO). OPD(68)45, CAB148137(PRO).
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later was due principally to agreement between the superpowers. Yet Wilson's
brand of 'gesture politics' was not unprecedented, as both Eden and Macmillan
tried to persuade public and allied opinion that their respective encounters with
the Soviet leadership had yielded practical results.
The fact that arms control had become the exclusive preserve of the
superpowers exposed Wilson and Brown's claim that at a time when bilateral
contacts between Washington and Moscow had frozen as a result of Vietnam,
Britain could serve as an interlocutor between its superpower ally and the USSR.
According to David Bendall, the two superpowers 'seem to communicate and
understand each other to a greater degree than appearances would suggest'. Both
were perplexed by what Walt Rostow subsequently termed 'the diffusion of
power', or as Bendall put it, 'the paradox that the continuing growth in their
military power and economic resources is not accompanied by a proportionate
increase in their political influence and strength', the limitations of both powers
having been demonstrated in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia. Bendall concluded that
the USA and USSR would deal directly with each other on issues relevant to
their bilateral rivalry - notably disarmament and competition in the Third World -
and that 'if there is one thing on which [the superpowers] seem mutually agreed
it is that there is no place in the game for a referee'. 16 This was applicable not
only to Britain, but also to de Gaulle's France, as well as to self-proclaimed
spokesmen of the 'non-aligned' world such as India or Yugoslavia.'7
16 White, Britain (and) Détente, p.108. Bendall to FL Smith, 5.4.68, FCO2S/14(PRO).
17 See the leading article 'World Shortage of Policies' in The Times, 12.7.66.
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Although Benn, reflecting the views of the Labour left, felt that the lack of
progress in Anglo-Soviet relations was due to the UK's dependence on the USA,
it is worth noting that de Gaulle likewise achieved little in developing détente,
despite his anti-American posturing and France's withdrawal from NATO in 1966.
The French President's illusion that his country could play a major diplomatic
role in a continent unencumbered by ideological and political divisions was
shattered by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The West Germans likewise made no
progress with Ostpolitik until the early 1970s. Furthermore, despite Johnson's
intention to 'build bridges' between the USA and the Eastern bloc, US-Soviet
détente was delayed as a consequence of Vietnam. Both the Moscow embassy and
the Foreign Office concluded in late 1964 that Khrushchev's successors would be
more concerned with their rivalry with the Chinese for leadership of the
Communist world than with improving relations with the 'capitalist' powers. Sino-
Soviet rivalry was a constraint on détente until 1969, and it is significant that the
USSR was more willing to conclude agreements with the USA and the West
Europeans at a time when China was emerging as a major military threat.18
The feud with China, the Vietnam war, the GDR's rigidity on the German
question and the relative inexperience in foreign affairs of Khrushchev's successors
were all constraints on Soviet policy in the 1960s. Yet the Soviets also squandered
opportunities to play on intra-Western differences, particularly regarding Anglo-
American relations. Given the importance of the 'special relationship' for Britain,
'8 Garthoff, Détente and Canfrontatian, pp.135-139, pp.274-275. Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil, pp.21-23.
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particularly its military, nuclear and intelligence aspects, the UK was in no position
to cut its ties with the USA. Yet despite the allegations made by Wilson's critics,
dependence did not involve submission, and relations between Washington and
London were strained by disputes over Vietnam, non-proliferation, the ABM issue
and COCOM. The Johnson administration's impatience with foreign criticism of its
policy in Vietnam had soured the USA's relations with allied and neutral powers.
The furore surrounding the Sunflower discussions in February 1967, and
Washington's decision seven months later to develop a 'thin' ABM system,
reinforced the impression in London that American policy posed obstacles to
international agreement, both on arms control and the resolution of the Vietnam
war. The Anglo-Soviet technological agreement of January 1968 aroused American
criticism, while in Britain many MPs, businessmen and even some officials
believed that COCOM was in dire need of reform, if not abolition. A more
sensitive and subtle Soviet foreign policy would have exploited these trans-Atlantic
tensions over arms control, Vietnam and trade, and would have given individuals
like Tony Benn more grounds for arguing that the USSR was a respectable,
rational power with whom the UK could co-operate not only in commercial but
political relations.
However, Soviet policy towards Britain during this period, especially in
1967-1968, was crude and unsubtle. British officials resented the contemptuous
manner with which the USSR treated the UK, in particular Moscow's off-hand
dismissal of the proposed Anglo-Soviet 'friendship treaty'. The East of Suez
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withdrawals and the devaluation of the pound had certainly highlighted the
limitations of British power and influence, but London did not appreciate either
the portrayal of the UK's weaknesses by Soviet propaganda, or Gromyko's
statement that a 'friendship treaty' was incompatible with Britain's NATO
membership (officials were also incensed by the fact that Gromyko implicitly
compared the UK with minor states like Denmark and Norway !). After this
offhand treatment, Operation Foot appeared to be an example of paying off old
scores. As far as the British were concerned, the purpose of the 'treaty of
friendship' was to establish a framework for increased cultural, scientific and
commercial relations. Yet Andropov's report to Brezhnev, cited above, showed the
Soviet leadership's complete antipathy to unrestricted East-West contacts. 'Bridge-
building' was seen by Moscow a means of subverting the Communist system, and
the Foreign Office's intention, expressed in the OPD paper Relations with the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, of highlighting the KGB's activities within the
USSR would have served only to reinforce Andropov's paranoia. The demise of
the 'treaty of friendship' in early 1968 showed that due to the Soviet leadership's
determination to limit contacts between its subjects and the outside world (imitated
by the East European regimes), it was impossible for the UK and other Western
powers to establish what Braithwaite defined as a 'normal' relationship with the
Soviet bloc states.
There was a fundamental distinction between the Eastern bloc's approach to
détente and that of the West. For the USSR and its East European allies, détente
144
was restricted to governmental contacts, and the principal goal was to preserve the
division of Europe into spheres of influence. Détente in Europe was not considered
by Moscow to be incompatible with what Vladislav Zubok and Constantine
Pleshakov subsequently called the 'revolutionary-imperial paradigm', namely the
USSR's efforts to enhance its influence and support the growth of Marxism-
Leninism across the globe. The Soviet bloc states also wanted the material benefits
of trade with the more prosperous West while isolating their peoples from
ideological contamination from the more affluent capitalist world. One unintended
consequence of Western efforts to improve contacts with the Eastern bloc regimes
was that, contrary to what FCO exponents of 'evolution' argued, the latter
intensified repressive measures against their subjects. This was evident not only in
the content of Andropov's May 1968 report to Brezhnev, but in the measures the
East German leadership took in the early 1970s to strengthen both the Stasi (the
secret police) and the GDR's border defences.' 9 Yet for the Western powers,
détente was a means of promoting trans-national contacts in order to promote
gradual reform behind the fron Curtain. This was the main assumption behind the
Foreign Office's concept of 'evolution', but the WTO invasion of Czechoslovakia
in 1968 demonstrated the Soviet leadership's entrenched hostility to internal
change, gradual or otherwise.
In December 1964 Trevelyan informed his superiors that Khrushchev's
successors had a stark dilemma to resolve. The USSR's best hopes of overcoming
its economic woes were to develop détente with the USA and its allies; this
'9 Andropov to Brezhnev, 6.5.68, Garthoff & Knight, pp.211-217. Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil, p.4, pp.51-54.
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would not only ease the military burden on the Soviet economy but would also
yield benefits in increased trade and access to Western investment and technology.
However, contacts with the West would erode the Communist order, as the peoples
of the Soviet bloc would become more aware of the contrast between their
poverty and Western prosperity. Khrushchev had been unable to resolve the
conflict between the revolutionary-imperial paradigm and the USSR's diplomatic
and economic need for East-West détente, and Trevelyan correctly predicted that
the same would be true of Brezhnev and his peers. 2° In retrospect, it was not until
after Mikhail Gorbachev became CPSU General Secretary in 1985 that the
dilemma Trevelyan observed was resolved. By the time Gorbachev discarded the
revolutionary-imperial paradigm and the obstacles to reform within the Soviet bloc,
the irony was that the central planning system that Wilson had referred to in his
'white heat' speech was disintegrating. The ambassador to Warsaw's comment in
June 1966 that 'the day will come when the whole system will crack and
disintegrate' was justified by events in Eastern Europe in 1989, and by the fall of
the USSR in 1991.21
20 Zuk & Pleshakov, Kremlin's Cold War, p.282. Trevelyan to Gordon-Walker, 2.11.64, F0371/177671(PRO).
21 Cto	 to Smith, 7.6.66, F03711188510(PRO).
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APPENDIX 1: FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM ON THE UK's RELATIONS
WITH EAST EUROPEAN STATES. 1 JUNE 1964.1
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CERTAIN OF HER MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATWES.
FOREIGN OFFICE AND
No.349 Guidance	 WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
June 1, 1964
CONFIDENTIAL
Policy - and Information Policy - towards Eastern Europe
Her Majesty's Ambassadors in Eastern Europe attended a conference in London in
April to discuss developments in the area. It was agreed that our policy of tzying to
develop contacts with the East European countries had been right and that there should
be opportunities for carrying that policy further because of the effects on Eastern Europe
of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the signs of growing independence on the part of some of
the East European governments (c.f. Rumania [sic] - my Intel No.67 of May 14).
2. In pursuing a more active policy, we should not expect or try to achieve quick results.
We should not try to exacerbate the Sino-Soviet dispute, nor should we appear to be
trying to set the governments or peoples of Eastern Europe against the Soviet Union. To
do either of these things would be self-defeating and could lead to sharp reactions. We
should however treat the East European countries increasingly as independent and show
ourselves ready to discuss seriously with them our attitude on major policy questions,
even if we have little hope of thereby changing their attitude. We should also encourage
personal contacts at many levels, including exchanges of ministerial visits.
3. We should no longer refer to these countries as "satellites" but as East European
Governments or countries.
4. The meeting noted our newly agreed policy of liberalising quotas for certain imports
from Eastern Europe and although it was recognised that it was too soon to tell how
much difference this would make to the level of trade it was agreed that it was a useful
move since it brought trade with the East European countries to a more normal basis.
5. The meeting agreed that with the cessation of jamming the BBC was our most
effective instrument for influencing information in the area.
6. You may draw on the foregoing in conversation with friendly governments and
colleagues, and you should be guided by it in your general information activities.
'FO to Missions, No.349 Guidance, 1.6.64,N1051121,F0371/1'77410(PRO).
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APPENDIX 2: DRAFF DECLARATION OF 'PRINCIPLES AND
PROPOSALS GOVERNING EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AND RELATIONS', 1
JULY 1966.2
Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom believe that the stability, security and
prosperity of Europe are essential to the stability, security and prosperity of the whole
world. They recognise that there exist differences in political belief, that there are
difficulties in political relations which have not yet been resolved; and that there is
disagreement about the means of achieving a final European settlement. Nevertheless, they
call on all European states to accept that their peoples share a broad European tradition;
and that it can only be to their advantage to build upon shared experiences and to
recognise common interests. The peoples of Europe have, not least, a common interest in
survival.
2. The prosperity of Europe requires the European states to cooperate bilaterally and
collectively in furthering their mutual interests in economic, social and cultural matters.
Her Majesty's Government believe that there is today among the peoples of Europe a
greater understanding than before of the need to overcome the barriers impeding
cooperation between them. It is the duty of all European Governments to respond to this.
3. In accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, securty in Europe
requires that the relations between states should be founded on respect for sovereignty
and territorial integrity; on equal rights and non-interference in the internal affairs of
others; and on the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Any disputes and difficulties which
arise must therefore be settled by peaceful and cooperative measures.
4. The stability of Europe requires the settlement of the German problem and other
matters outstanding from the Second World War. Part of this settlement must be the final
determination of frontiers with due regard to existing agreements in accordance with
justice, reality and the wishes of the peoples concerned. It is clear that the process of
reaching a final settlement will take some time. But in the meantime progress must be
made where progress is possible.
5. To this end, Her Majesty's Government propose that in formulating their policies
towards each other all governments concerned with the peace and prosperity of Europe
should be guided by the following principles:-
(i) Limited agreements should be sought in areas where the common interest
is clear, in order to prepare the way for more fur-reaching accords.
(ii) In the interests of mutual understanding, the present trend towards wider
contacts between Eastern and Western Europe is to be welcomed and
should be encouraged by governments at the political, professional and
personal levels.
(iii) All economically advanced countries, whatever their political structure,
should recognise a common responsibility to cooperate in helping to
2 OPD(66)76, EastiWet Relations. A Declaration, note by Foreign Office, 1.7.66, CAB148128(PRO). Emphasis as
in original.
solve the fundamental problems which confront the developing countries
of the world.
(iv) Each state with an interest in European security should be prepared to
exchange an understanding with any or every other state that it
renounces the use of force as a means of setthng any dispute which
may exist or arise between them.
(v) Similarly, the aggravation of international tension should never be used as
an instrument of national policy.
(vi) European states should re-affirm their desire for progress on measures of
arms control and disarmament, with general and complete disarmament
under effective international control as the final objective.
6. Her Majesty's Government declare their intention to be guided by these principles and
their willingness to exchange declarations as proposed above with any or all of the states
of Europe. They will seek to extend their scientific, technical and cultural cooperation with
any European state willing in this manner to help realise individually and in partnership
each country's human and material potential. They will also seek to promote the best
possible commercial and economic relations with all European states. [In particular, they
will be ready to consider the establishment on a bilateral basis of Joint Economic
Conunittees with regular meetings, of the kind which already exist between Britain and
certain of her close associates in Western Europe].
(Note: The passage in square brackets raises practical problems which will require
further consideration).
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APPENDIX 3: DRAFT 'TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND PEACEFUL CO-
OPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS'. APRIL 1967.
Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, and the
Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
Desiring to strengthen the bonds of friendship and to extend all mutually
advantageous forms of peaceful co-operation between the United Kingdom and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics;
Being convinced that the further development of their relations will enable them
to co-operate more effectively in securing the relaxation of tension, in strengthening peace
and security and in seeking the just settlement of outstanding international problems;
Noting that the friendly ties between their respective countries have already found
expression in exchanges of visits between their respective Ministers and specialists, and in
the conclusion of agreements on trade, on agricultural research, on consular relations, on air
services and on relations in the scientific, technological, educational and cultural fields;
Affirming their common interest in raising living standards and in promoting the
development of science and technology in their respective countries through the expansion
of trade and of scientific and technical exchanges;
Considering that the common interests of their countries as major shipping nations
will be best served by the development of international navigation on the basis of the
principles of the freedom of merchant shipping;
Aiming to broaden and increase the exchanges which already take place between
their respective countries in the fields of education and culture;
Seeking to foster greater understanding by fcilitatmg the exchange of information
between their respective countries and by encouraging personal contacts between their
respective nationals;
Have decided to conclude a Treaty of Friendship and Peaceful Co-operation and
have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries for this purpose:
Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth (hereinafter
referred to as "Her Britannic Majesty"):
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
The Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:
Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, which were
found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:
3 Annex to OPD(67)25, Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Peaceful Co-operation, 4.4.67, CAB14S/31(PRO).
so
Article I
In all matters affecting their mutual relations the High Contracting Parties will be
guided by the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.
Article II
Ministers and other senior representatives of the High Contracting Parties will
meet regularly to exchange views and to co-ordinate action on the various aspects of
their bilateral relations.
Article Ill
(1) The High Contracting Parties will consult at regular intervals and will adopt
all measures which are to their mutual advantage to facilitate the expansion of trade. They
will seek to identify and overcome those obstacles to closer economic co-operation which
arise from differences in their economic systems.
(2) They will continue their efforts to develop effective working relationships in
pursuing their maritime interests and will seek to co-ordinate their policies on shipping
questions. They will co-operate in the development of civil aviation, including the
expansion of air services between and beyond the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union,
and in matters affecting communications.
(3) They will promote the exchange of technological information by encouraging
the conclusion of appropriate agreements between the responsible bodies in their
respective countries.
Article IV
(1) With a view to laying a broad foundation for mutual understanding between
their respective countries and peoples the High Contracting Parties will encourage the
development of conditions favouring the expansion of cultural, educational and scientific
exchanges, tourism by both groups and individuals, and the free dissemination in the
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union respectively of all books, newspapers and other
publications originating in the other country.
(2) They will promote the exchange of cinematograph, radio and television
programmes.
(3) Through the Consultative Committee which they have established they will
seek further means to expand and improve contacts in the spheres of culture, education,
science and sport.
Article V
In order to promote the amicable settlement of problems which may arise from
differences in the respective legal and administrative systems of the High Contracting
Parties, each High Contracting Party will make available infonnation which the other High
Contracting Party may request regarding its laws and regulations.
Article VI
The High Contracting Parties will seek to promote arrangements whereby persons
who enjoy the benefits of the health services and pensions schemes operating in the
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United Kingdom or the Soviet Union, as the case may be, may qualify for the benefits of
the health services and pensions schemes operating in the other country when they reside
there temporarily or pennanently.
Article VII
It is understood that nothing in this Treaty shall in any way detract from the
existing obligations of either High Contracting Party.
Article VIII
This Treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after
the exchange of instruments or ratification which shall take place in .....as soon as
possible.
Article IX
This Treaty shall be reviewed by the High Contracting Parties every five years in
order that they may consider what additions or amendments should be made to it to
accord with the continuing development of relations and the growth of friendship and co-
operation between their respective countries.
In witness thereof, the Plenipotentiaries of both High Contracting Parties have
signed the present Treaty and affixed thereto their seals.
Done in duplicate at .....this ..........day of ................., 1967, in the English and
Russian languages, both texts being equally authoritative.
For Her Britannic Majesty:
For the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
IS.
APPENDIX 4: TRANSLATION OF THE SOVIET DRAFT 'TREATY ON
THE COOPERATION IN EUROPEAN SECURITY QUESTIONS AND ON
FOREIGN POLICY CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND'.4
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Her
Majesty The Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Desirous to contribute to the development of cooperation on an all-European basis
and to safeguarding of peace and security in Europe in the interests of prosperity and
well-being of its peoples;
Mindful of the joint struggle and alliance of the two countries in the years of
World War II and conscious of the common interests in averting a new war in Europe;
Recognizing that the strengthening and development by all possible means of such
cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom
correspond to the interests of the peoples of the two countries as well as to the interests
of international peace;
Guided by the Charter of the United Nations;
Have decided to conclude this treaty and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries
for this purpose:
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Her Majesty The Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
Who having communicated to each other their respective full powers, which were
found in good and due form, have agreed as follows.
Article 1
The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate in establishing an effective system of
European security and in the implementation of this purpose of measures designed to
prevent an armed conflict in Europe and to strengthen the peace in this continent on the
basis of the principles of respect for sovereignty, equality, non-interference in the internal
affuirs, recognition of the inviolability of the borders obtained after World War II of all
European States, including the border between the German Democratic Republic and the
Federal Republic of Germany, and renunciation of the threat or use of force between
them.
Article 2
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall not undertake any actions or steps
which would directly or indirectly impair the friendly relations between the Contracting
Parties.
Each of the Parties shall also refrain from the participation in any actions or
steps by third countries or groups of States which would directly or indirectly be taken
against the other Contracting Party.
4 H. Smith (ND) to P. Hayman, 30.1.68, FCO2S/380(PRO).
I SI
Article 3
The High Contracting Parties will engage in regular exchanges of opinions and
consultations on questions of ensuring European security and other foreign policy
problems of mutual concern. To this end, the designated representatives of the Parties will
meet periodically.
Article 4
With a view to contributing to the development of friendly relations bthveen the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and to the strengthening of peace in Europe, the High Contracting Parties
shall promote in all possible ways the economic and trade relations between the two
States on the basis of the principles of equality and mutual benefit, and shall take
measures to eliminate obstacles to closer economic cooperation.
For the same purposes, the Parties will develop scientific, technological and cultural
cooperation between the two States and promote exchanges in the field (sic) of education,
public health, tourism and sports.
Article 5
The provisions of this Treaty shall not affect the rights and commitments of the
High Contracting Parties under their agreements in force.
Article 6
This Treaty shall be applicable:
a) as regards the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics - to the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
b) as regards Her Britannic Majesty - to the territory of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Article 7
This Treaty is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the thirtieth day
after the exchange of the instruments of ratification on which it is to be held in the near
futurein .......
Article 8
The High Contracting Parties shall every five years consider the question of what
additions or amendments are to be introduced into this Treaty in the light of progress
made in consolidating cooperation and developing relations between the two countries.
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries of the two High Contracting
Parties have signed this Treaty and affixed thereto their seals.
Done, in duplicate, at ........................., this .........day of .................., 196..., each in
the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authoritative.
For the Presidium of 	 For Her Britannic
the Supreme Soviet of the	 Majesty:
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
APPENDIX 5: SOVIET AND OTHER WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL
FORCES LOCATED IN CENTRAL EUROPE OR NEAR THE NATO
AREA, JANUARY 1967-AUGUST 1968.
(a) Deployment of Soviet divisions in the Western USSR and Eastern Europe.
__________________ Tank Motor-rifle I & II	 Motor-rifle III Airborne	 Total
GDR	 10	 10	 -	 -	 20
Poland	 2	 -	 -	 -	 2
Hungary	 2	 2	 -	 -	 4
Western USSR	 16	 16	 7	 3	 42
Leningrad MD
	 1	 5	 3	 1	 10
South-West USSR
	 4	 5	 6	 -	 15
Southern USSR
	 3	 12	 11	 2	 28
________________ 38	 50	 27	 6	 121
All airborne divisions and divisions in Eastern Europe are Category I. Tank divisions are
either Category I or II. With the motor-rifle (mechanised infantry) divisions Category I
and H divisions are grouped together, but an estimated two-thirds are Category I (i.e.
minimum of 85% of its strength). Category II divisions have up to 60% of their strength,
while Category III divisions are cadre formations ready to receive reservists in wartime.
Western USSR includes the Baltic, Belornssian, Moscow and Carpathian Military
Districts (MDs). South-West USSR incorporates the Kiev and Odessa MDs, while Southern
USSR includes the North Caucasus, Transcaucasus and Turkestan MDs. The two Far
Eastern MDs had a total of 13 Category I and II divisions (8 tank, 4 motor-rifle and 1
airborne), and 4 Category III motor-rifle divisions. One motor-rifle division was stationed
in Mongolia. The three central MDs (Volga, Siberian and Urals) had 8 divisions, 6 of
which were Category Ill.
(b) Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact ground forces divisional strengths (November 1966).
Country	 Tank	 M-r (1)	 M-r (2)	 Airborne	 Total
Bulgaria	 4	 7	 1	 -	 12
Czechoslovakia	 5	 6	 3	 -	 146
GDR	 2	 4	 -	 -	 6
Hungary	 1	 4	 1	 -	 6
Poland	 5	 77	 2	 1	 15
Romania	 2	 6	 1	 -	 9
_____________	 19	 34	 8	 1	 62
5 A11 figures are taken from JIC(67)3, Soviet Bloc War Potential, 1967-71, 162.67, CAB15S/65(PRO); JTC(68)1,
Periodic Intelligence Summaiy for NATO Commands, 1.6.68; & JTC(68)3, Soviet Bloc War Potential, 1968-72,
24.2.68, CAB15S/68(PRO).
6 In addition to these 14 divisions, the Czechoslovaks had 2 airborne brigades.
7 One of these divisions s a naval infantry (marine) formation.
Albania was nominally a member of the Warsaw Pact until 1968, although following the
rupture in relations between Moscow and Tirana in 1961 the Albanians ceased military
co-operation with the USSR. Albania's 6 brigade-strong army was considered by the JIC
to be in a poor state of readiness.
M-r (1) indicates motor-rifle divisions classed as being in a high state of
readiness. M-r (2) indicates motor-rifle divisions in a low state of readiness.
The respective figures given for the army of each Warsaw Pact state are as
follows: Bulgaria, 125,000; Czechoslovakia, 175,000; German Democratic Republic, 90,000;
Hungary, 95,000; Poland, 185,000; and Romania, 150,000.
(c) Estimated Soviet tactical air force strength in Eastern Europe and the Western USSR.
mid-1968.
Country / MD	 Fighters Light-bombers	 Reconnaissance	 Helicopters Total
GDR	 590	 80	 60	 50	 780
Poland	 240	 -	 30	 30	 300
Hungary	 150	 50	 -	 25	 225
Leningrad	 85	 20	 10	 10	 125
Carpathian	 250	 45	 20	 90	 405
Baltic	 170	 20	 20	 90	 300
Belorussian	 215	 -	 20	 30	 265
Moscow	 85	 -	 25	 45	 155
Volga-	 -	 -	 -	 -
Odessa	 150	 -	 30	 20	 200
Kiev	 75	 -	 -	 40	 115
North Caucasus	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
Transcaucasus	 165	 15	 25	 50	 255
_______________ 2175 	 230	 240	 490	 3135
Fighters include both interceptors and ground attack aircraft. The figures given in the JIC
estimates do not give any indication as to which of these aircraft were recently
introduced, and which are obsolete. By comparison, the MDs fcing China çFurkestan and
Far-Eastern) had a total of 495 aircraft (340 fighters, 15 light bombers, 20 reconnaissance
'planes and 120 helicopters).
S6
(d) Estimated strengths for Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact tactical air power (excluding
Albania). mid-I 968.
Country	 Fighters Light-bombers	 Reconnaissance	 Helicopters Total
Bulgaria	 270	 -	 10	 50	 330
Czechoslovakia	 515	 -	 40	 130	 685
GDR	 300	 -	 -	 25	 325
Hungary	 140	 -	 -	 15	 155
Poland	 720	 40	 20	 10	 790
Romania	 230	 -	 10	 10	 250
______________ 2175	 40	 80	 240	 2535
According to JIC estimates, Albania's air-force was thought to consist of 75 fighters and
5 helicopters, and was classed as a token force with 'no operational capability'.
Of the non-Soviet WTO air forces, those of Czechoslovakia and East Germany
were rated the best in terms of training and material. While the Polish air force was the
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Maps A and B are taken from JIC(67)3,Sovjeg Bloc War Po:stial. 1967-71, 16.2.67, CA3158165(PRO).
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